Kloyer, M. and Helm, Roland and Burr, Wolfgang (2007) Compensation preferences of R&D-suppliers: some empirical results. International Journal of Technology Management (IJTM) 40 (4), pp. 371-387.
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R&D suppliers who are not compensated according to their preferences are motivated to behave opportunistically. The paper presents empirical findings about these preferences. The investigation is based on the assumption that the probability of a continuous compensation, instead of a final payment, increases when the negotiation power of the supplier rises. The results confirm this presumption with regard to the power determinants of effective intellectual property rights and the number of cooperation alternatives. In contrast to that, suppliers, who control the complementary assets themselves, have no explicit preference.
|Institutions:||Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaft, insbesondere Strategisches Industriegütermarketing (Prof. Dr. Roland Helm)|
|Keywords:||contract R&D; research and development; supplier opportunism; compensation preferences; negotiation power; resource dependence theory; continuous compensation; suppliers; cooperation; intellectual property rights; IPR|
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Refereed:||Yes, this version has been refereed|
|Created at the University of Regensburg:||Unknown|
|Deposited On:||18 Nov 2010 11:17|
|Last Modified:||15 Jul 2011 12:26|
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