POLITICS AND IMMANENCE
STATE AND HISTORY IN HEGEL AND DELEUZE

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5  
1. Affinities and divisions between Hegel and Deleuze ................................................. 5 
2. The questions of the work ......................................................................................... 6 
3. Existing scholarship ................................................................................................. 9 
4. On the method ........................................................................................................ 16 
5. Structure of the work ............................................................................................. 18 

CHAPTER I: HISTORY AND BECOMING ..................................................................... 20  
Introduction: the analogy between Hegel and Deleuze ............................................. 21  
PART I: HEGEL AND THE HISTORICAL NECESSITY OF THE STATE ................. 23  
1. The historical emergence of immanence ............................................................. 23 
2. The concept of history in Hegel .............................................................................. 24 
3. Two conditions of history ..................................................................................... 26 
4. Passions and the State ............................................................................................ 27 
5. The writing of the State .......................................................................................... 33 
6. An-sich, Für-sich, Für-uns .................................................................................... 38 
7. Two exteriorities ...................................................................................................... 43 
8. Result ....................................................................................................................... 49 

PART II: DELEUZE AND ANTI-HISTORICAL BECOMING ......................................... 51  
1. Introduction: the second pair of the analogy ....................................................... 51 
2. Deleuze’s concept of history ............................................................................... 51 
3. The problem of contradiction ............................................................................. 54 
4. Althusser and overdetermination ......................................................................... 57 
5. Contradiction and paradox ................................................................................... 59 
6. Events and becomings ........................................................................................... 65 
7. The collapse of history ......................................................................................... 72 
8. Result ....................................................................................................................... 77 

PART III: THE CONCEPT OF IMMANENCE ................................................................. 79  
1. Absolute immanence .............................................................................................. 79 
2. The remains ........................................................................................................... 85 
3. Result ....................................................................................................................... 88 

CHAPTER II: CITIZENS AND NOMADS .................................................................... 90 
Introduction: two conceptions of politics ................................................................. 91  
PART I: HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF POLITICAL PRACTICE ........................................ 92  
1. Politics and history ................................................................................................. 92 
2. The emergence of practices .................................................................................. 94 
   a) Politics as despotism ......................................................................................... 94 
   b) Free men of the polis ....................................................................................... 96 
   c) The alienated State .......................................................................................... 98 
   d) Political power beyond the State ................................................................... 99 
3. Practice and the Sittlichkeit ................................................................................... 100 
4. The division of the Sittlichkeit .............................................................................. 112 
   a) The family ....................................................................................................... 116 
   b) The civil society .............................................................................................. 117 
   c) The State ......................................................................................................... 121 
5. The unified division of the State-organism .......................................................... 121 
   a) The objective side of political practice ......................................................... 123 
   b) The subjective side of political practice ....................................................... 124
6. Personality and the people .......................................................................................................................... 127
7. Result ............................................................................................................................................................. 129
PART II: DELEUZE’S CONCEPT OF POLITICS AS NOMADOLOGY .......................................................... 130
  1. Macro- and micropolitics .............................................................................................................................. 130
  2. Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history .................................................................................................... 131
  3. Savages and barbarians ............................................................................................................................... 137
    a) Savages and kinship ................................................................................................................................. 138
    b) Barbarians and the despot ...................................................................................................................... 142
  4. Civilized men and capital ............................................................................................................................ 144
    a) The modern family ................................................................................................................................. 150
    b) Nation-state and politics as axiomatics .................................................................................................. 155
  5. The war machine ........................................................................................................................................ 166
  6. Result ............................................................................................................................................................. 178
PART III: THE CONCEPT OF IMMANENCE – POLITICS AND LIFE ........................................................... 180
  1. The source of production ............................................................................................................................. 180
  2. Life: citizen, bourgeois, nomad .................................................................................................................... 182
  3. Immanence as judgment and life ................................................................................................................ 192
  4. Politics of passions ....................................................................................................................................... 197
  5. Result ............................................................................................................................................................. 202
CHAPTER III: END OF HISTORY - IMMANENCE AND POLITICS AT THE LIMIT ........................................ 205
  1. Introduction: practice at the limits ............................................................................................................. 206
  2. Two ends of history .................................................................................................................................... 208
  3. The paradoxes of organization ................................................................................................................ 216
    a) Absolute Spirit ....................................................................................................................................... 217
    b) The eternal return ................................................................................................................................... 224
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 246
  1. The paradox of politics and immanence .................................................................................................. 246
  2. The limits of immanence ........................................................................................................................... 251
LITERATURE .................................................................................................................................................. 254
INTRODUCTION

1. Affinities and divisions between Hegel and Deleuze

At first sight the relationship between Gilles Deleuze and G. W. F. Hegel does not seem to be problematic. The two thinkers represent the culminations of opposed philosophical traditions. Hegel is the icon of modern philosophy. He is often regarded, not least thanks to his own history of philosophy, as the culmination of philosophical development that lasted for almost two millennia and that encompasses figures such as Plato, Aristotle and Kant. Deleuze, on the other hand, represents one of the most concentrated efforts to discredit this tradition. He not only criticized the traditional history of philosophy exemplified by Hegel, but he introduced an “underground” current of philosophical tradition where the main protagonists are the “underdogs” such as the Stoics, Spinoza and Bergson. He sought to invent for himself a new line of descent, which would not include the major formative figures of philosophical tradition. As opposed to thinkers such as Derrida and Foucault, who still considered (often with resignation at the fact) that some elements of Hegel’s philosophy required careful re-appropriation, Deleuze did not find any redeeming value in his work. His exceptional hostility to Hegel was well documented. Answering the question of why he is merciless with Hegel, he stated: “Why not Hegel? Well, somebody has to play the role of traitor”. He goes as far as making himself a caricature of the post-modern anti-Hegelian. Although he was capable of reinterpreting thinkers such as Plato or Kant, authors he considered as enemies, his attacks on Hegel were devoid of any attempt at ironic interpretation. His harshest critique was always reserved for Hegel.

However, despite Deleuze’s attempts to distance himself from Hegel as much as possible, in recent years an increasing interest in the relationship of the two has emerged. This interest concerns not only their irreconcilable differences, but also divisions that seem to point to a

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deeper affinity between them. The themes that run throughout their works seem to converge on so many points and concepts that the distance between them, their positions at the “extremes” of their respective traditions, seems to bring them only closer.

This is especially true of the concept of *immanence*. Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit is a project of immanence, it describes a movement that traces the path of Spirit toward its inner [innewohnende] truth. Deleuze, on the other hand, from his early works develops a conception of immanence from direct confrontation with Hegel’s dialectic. It is not surprising, therefore, that the new interest in the affinity between Hegel and Deleuze focuses on the idea of immanence as well as those concepts that support it. The recently emerged literature on the two authors reflects this. Ontology has been the main area of work when it comes to finding the links between the two philosophers. My work will build on this recent research, with one important difference. I will use the ontologies of Deleuze and Hegel in order to examine, compare and develop their political ideas in relation to one another. Specifically, my work will focus on Hegel’s and Deleuze’s political ontologies, and the significance, theoretical consistency and contradictions that arise from *grounding politics in immanence*.

Whereas the ontological question receives increasing attention in the secondary literature, the relationship between Hegel’s and Deleuze’s political ideas has not be examined to the same extent. This is why, I believe, this area offers plenty room not only to better understand the relationship between the political ideas of the two authors, but also to, in relating politics to ontology, expand on the already present scholarship on immanence. I will argue that what truly brings these thinkers together is the inherent philosophical and specifically ontological approach they take with regard to politics. More importantly, it is the contradictions and problems that arise from attempting to *ground politics in immanence* that set Hegel and Deleuze apart from many of their contemporaries.

2. The questions of the work

This work is an examination of the relationship between *immanence* and *political practice* in the philosophies of Hegel and Deleuze. The task is to show that there exists a mutual conditioning between the thinking of immanence and political practice in the works of both authors. The main question of this work is the following:

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4 I use the terms “politics” and “political practice” as synonymous in this work. What “practice” means and why politics is a practice will be examined in the second chapter.
Does Hegel’s and Deleuze’s grounding of politics in immanence introduce a paradox in their conceptions of political practice?

Several thesis are contained in this question. The first one is that both authors ground political practice in immanence. To ground politics in immanence in the first place means that political practice for both Hegel and Deleuze represents something that has a wider spectrum of meaning than what the usual concept of “politics” reveals. Politics for both authors signifies a general mode of existence that does not relate to one practice among others but to the practice that organizes and disorganized the human world. This extension of the meaning of “politics” to an (dis)organizing capacity of humanity is what “grounding in immanence” means on the most basic level. It means that politics somehow relates to the essence of life and its relation to the world and nature. Immanence signifies both a closure, being within, residing inside and in Deleuze’s case, pure exteriority, in other words, the absence of “immanence relative to...”.

This elementary meaning, when related to politics, imparts political practice a capacity to organize, form and sustain, as well as disorganize and open the human world in such a way that the laws, norms, habits, ideas and institutions of the world function in a way that rejects any external, transcended and violent mechanism. It presupposes politics as the capacity to live in and sustain one’s own world. Finally, that politics is grounded in immanence relates to the concept of the ground. In Hegel’s case, as will be shown, grounding is never a matter of an isolated relationship between two elements such as cause and effect, but of totality in which causes and effects operate. In other words, grounding relates here to the whole in which politics operates, its relationship to other practices as well as different forms of Spirit. That politics is grounded in immanence presupposes an examination of politics and its role within the field of immanence of Spirit. In Deleuze’s case, grounding is at the same time to unground. As he states, “to ground is to metamorphose”. The reason why this is the case is that the grounded never resembles the ground – the only ground and sufficient reason is difference itself and its immanent nature. The question of grounding politics in immanence is therefore one of relating politics to difference. Consequently, in Hegel’s case, I will view politics and its relationship to the whole, and in Deleuze’s its relationship to difference. Both of these relationship open the way of thinking politics in the field of immanence.

The second thesis is that this grounding results in a paradox. The attempt to relate politics to immanence, to impart politics ontological significance that extends to a world-

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(dis)organizing capacity, and to give immanence as being-within and exteriority a primary political meaning, creates insurmountable problems. To extend politics and ontology into one another reveals a paradox in the works of both authors. I will argue that the paradox, which emerges from this attempt, is the same in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies. The paradox is expressed in the theoretical excess of natural violence that both thinkers fail to contain through arguments. In other words, what is presupposed in immanence is precisely the absence of violence that obstructs political practice in its world-(dis)organizing role. The paradox is that this feature of immanence is threatened when related to politics. The term “natural” should not mislead. I will show that the concept of “natural” has a specific meaning in both Hegel and Deleuze, based on the relationship between repetition and difference.

The third thesis is that, as a result of this paradox, both Hegel and Deleuze are forced to accept the presuppositions of the other author, which they previously excluded. They move in opposite directions in their attempts to ground politics in immanence. However, in both directions the same paradox is encountered that forces them to accept the other thinker’s presuppositions.

The concepts of immanence and politics

The main question of the work warrants two further questions.

1) What do Hegel and Deleuze understand under immanence?
2) What do Hegel and Deleuze understand under politics?

The answer to the main question presupposes the questions on the meaning of immanence and politics. I already mentioned the “basic” meaning of these terms. Politics is a form of practice through which immanence is opened. Immanence, on the other hand, signifies both being as residing-within and pure exteriority, or simply put, the capacity to live in a world without recourse to transcendent, external and foreign mechanisms of organization. Their precise meaning, however, necessitates two further concepts without which they remain vague. These concepts are history and State.

One of the presuppositions of this work is that the grounding of politics in immanence in both Deleuze and Hegel relates to their respective conceptions of history. History plays an essential role in both of their philosophies. In Hegel’s case, this is a well-established fact. Deleuze, on the other hand, has only recently emerged as an important thinker of history. The essential presupposition of my work is that immanence and its relation to politics in both authors
remains unthinkable without recourse to their conceptions of history. Consequently, the first objective of this work will be to give an account of Hegel’s and Deleuze’s ideas of history. This account will show that the meaning of immanence relates to its emergence through historical development. Therefore, to understand immanence means to know its historical conditions. Furthermore, the account of their conceptions of history will show that they both presuppose immanence as *absolute*. However, from thinking immanence as absolute they develop diametrically opposed ideas of political practice. Although they both relate politics to the concept of immanence as absolute, the concept of politics has diametrically opposed meanings in their philosophies. According to Hegel, politics represents the capacity to organize the world. This capacity emerges historically and by the mechanisms of *State-power*. The State is a historical formation and history is a temporal mode of life organized within the confines of the State. In Deleuze’s philosophy, on the other hand, the meaning of politics extends to an anti-historical practice that dissolves power. Therefore, the relationship of immanence and politics leads to the question of the relationship between history and the State. The opening of immanence presupposes either historical (Hegel) or anti-historical (Deleuze) attitude. Both of these attitudes presuppose the role the State plays in the organization of human life and how human beings relate to their world. These four concepts: *immanence, politics, history* and *State*\(^7\) as well as their relationships throughout Deleuze’s and Hegel’s work are the main subject of this work.

### 3. Existing scholarship

As mentioned above, the scholarship on the relationship between Hegel and Deleuze began to emerge only recently. The majority of this literature concerns itself with the subject of ontology. This is not surprising because this subject appears as the most natural way to access the relationship between the two authors. Since my work is also a work of ontology, this literature will feature prominently in my arguments. The works that deal with Hegel and Deleuze in general can be divided into two large groups.

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\(^7\) I will use the term “State” with a capital letter. This is not done in order to place emphasis on the concept of the *State* as opposed to the other three central concepts. Instead, it serves the practical purpose of avoiding confusion when using other terms such as “state of nature”, “state of affairs”, “vegetative state”, and so on. The same applies to Hegel’s concept of *Spirit*. 
The first group consists of works that deal primarily with some part of Deleuze’s philosophy. His relationship to Hegel comes into focus as part of the broader examination of Deleuze’s ideas. Many of these comparisons often underscore the incompatibility of Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies. Examples of these works are Michael Hardt’s *Gilles Deleuze: Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, Slavoj Žižek’s *Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences*, Lee Watkins’ *Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari: Freedom in Philosophy and the State*, and Keith Ansell-Pearson’s *Viroid Life: On Machines, Technics and Evolution*.8

The second group, which is of primary interest to me, consists of works that attempt to show not only the outward similarities, but the sameness in themes, arguments, ideas and problems that Deleuze and Hegel share. These include a collection of essays in *Hegel and Deleuze: Together Again for the First Time*, edited by Karen Houle and Jim Vernon9, *Hegel, Deleuze and the Critique of Representation* from Henry Somers-Hall10, *Death and Desire in Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze* from Brent Adkins11 and Christopher Grove’s *Hegel and Deleuze: Immanence and Otherness*. All of these works make a strong argument for an examination of the relationship between the two thinkers along the lines of convergence instead of divisions. Their interest is focused on common concepts such as history, idea, concept, judgment, representation as well as immanence. My work will build on this literature, and especially those works that put emphasis on immanence.12 However, my work will also diverge in two ways from this literature.

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9 The authors I will refer from this collection include John Russon and Cheah Pheng, since both of them concern themselves directly with the question of politics in Hegel and Deleuze.


11 Although this work does not go so much into the relationship of Hegel and Deleuze and concerns itself more with the presentation of their concepts, it will come into focus when I talk about the problem of death in Hegel and Deleuze. Adkins, B. (2007): *Death and Desire in Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p. 12.

12 The only work that fully examines the problem of immanence in Hegel and Deleuze is Christopher Grove’s *Hegel and Deleuze: Immanence and Otherness*. However, as is the case when it comes to the concept of immanence, apart from some short excursions, the relationship of this concept to Deleuze’s and Hegel’s political
In the first instance, I will focus on the theme of immanence (as well as on other concepts such as judgment, idea and representation) only insofar as it is related to the problem of political ontology in Hegel and Deleuze. As noted, the effort in tracing the relationship between the two philosophies has been overwhelmingly in the domain of ontology so far, with scarce recourse to politics.\(^{13}\) The other difference is that my work will not attempt to correct either Hegel with the help of Deleuze or vice versa.\(^{14}\) For the most part, such attempts begin with the common theme and result in a solution that either favours Hegel or Deleuze insofar as it is (correctly) presupposed that both authors share a common intent.\(^{15}\) The thesis of this work is that Deleuze and Hegel not only “correct” each other to a certain degree, but that when it comes to the relationship of politics and immanence, they both lead to the presuppositions of the other author, which they have previously excluded. This relationship is furthermore two-directional. I will not presuppose that Deleuze’s or Hegel’s position is superior in any regard (this might perfectly be true for other problems in their philosophies that will not concern me here).

Because the literature on the relationship between Hegel’s and Deleuze’s political philosophies is basic at best, literature that deals with these authors independently will also play a significant role. When it comes to Hegel, works that focus on his philosophy of right and philosophy of history will be my primary consideration. When it comes to Hegel’s philosophy of right, I will focus on the concept of practice. My approach to Hegel in general will be in line with the school of thought of praxis-philosophy.\(^{16}\) The main secondary literature I will use to

\(^{13}\) There are several exceptions to this. The first one is Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari: Freedom in Philosophy and the State, from Lee Watkins, although the work focuses for the most part on Hegel. Another exception is Millay Christine Hyatt’s No-where and Now-here: Utopia and Politics from Hegel to Deleuze. There are extensive references to the problem of immanence in this work, mostly in connection to the problem of utopia. Since I will also touch upon the problem of utopia in Hegel and Deleuze, this work will feature in the third chapter of my text. Hyatt, Millay Christine (2006): No-where and Now-here: Utopia and Politics from Hegel to Deleuze. Ann Arbor: ProQuest Information and Learning. p. 41.


\(^{16}\) Although I will base my interpretation of Hegel primarily on the concept of practice, I will also include some elements of the “recognitional” school of thought. My primary source from this school will be Robert Pippin’s interpretation of the concept of recognition, since it focuses primarily on this concept within Hegel’s mature philosophy of right. I will attempt to show that Hegel’s concept of political practice allows for a synthesis of the two schools of thought. Therefore, I will diverge from Axel Honneth’s interpretation, which views this
develop Hegel’s concept of practice will include authors such as Manfred Riedel and Milan Kangrga. However, I will focus mostly on Hegel’s concept of political practice. This shift to political practice will bring Hegel directly in relationship to Deleuze. I will argue that both authors view politics as a productive practice. However, since I will read both Hegel from the position of Deleuze and vice versa, my focus will be the difference between their views on the relationship of practice and production. As a result of this, my interpretation of Hegel’s concept of practice will diverge from those of Riedel and Kangrga. Whereas Riedel, for example, sees the essence of Hegel’s concept of practice both in its productive and theoretical capacities, I will argue that Hegel’s concept of practice also contains elements of what Deleuze calls anti-production. This element of anti-production, I will show, marks the distinction between practice in general and political practice in Hegel. In line with this reading, another point of divergence from Riedel and Kangrga in my approach will be the relationship of praxis and theoria. I will show that from Deleuze’s position, this synthesis reveals an insufficiency insofar as it omits the element of the unconscious in practice. Precisely this unconscious element subverts Hegel’s concept of political practice and reveals its anti-productive character.

At the same time, I will argue in opposition to authors like Michael Hardt, that practice and theory do in fact become synthetized in Deleuze’s work. Although Deleuze’s concept of politics has seen increasing attention in the secondary literature, the relationship of this concept to that of practice has not been examined. More specifically, the concept of practice in Deleuze is often regarded in general and undefined terms. By reading Deleuze from a Hegelian position, and more precisely, from a position of praxis-philosophy, I will attempt to


develop this concept in Deleuze beyond its vague connotations\textsuperscript{22} that are found in the secondary literature.

My reading of Deleuze from a Hegelian position will simultaneously develop a critique of Deleuze. This critique will diverge from many interpretations that marginalize the destructive elements in Deleuze’s political theory. After I have developed Deleuze’s concept of practice by relating it to the concepts of production and theoria, I will show that this concept presupposes destructive elements. In this regard, I will diverge from Eugene W. Holland’s view on the shift in how Deleuze and Guattari perceive fascism between Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. Whereas Holland still views Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the primacy of desiring-production to social production from Anti-Oedipus in a positive light, locating the emergence of destructive elements only in A Thousand Plateaus, I will argue that this primacy of desire in Anti-Oedipus already carries an ambivalent meaning when placed in relation to the concept of the State.\textsuperscript{23} This ambivalence is based on the fact that, in sharp distinction to Hegel, Deleuze’s concept of practice cannot be internally differentiated. In other words, whereas Hegel distinguishes politics from other forms of practice, Deleuze is unable to mark a strict line of demarcation between politics and any other activity. On the one hand, I will show that this is precisely Deleuze’s intent, but on the other, that his approach also places no limits to political practice, and that it thereby abolishes the border between politics and absolute immanence. Closely related to this problem is the concept of the “war machine”. I will view this concept primarily from the standpoint of Hegel’s philosophy. Therefore, I will diverge from Paul Patton’s interpretation that strictly follows Deleuze and Guattari’s division between the war machine and war.\textsuperscript{24} I will not make a sharp distinction between these two concepts. Rather, I will place these concepts in relationship to Hegel’s conceptual pair of State and conflict. This will simultaneously determine my approach in relation to Hegel’s concept of the State. As opposed to isolating the concept of the State within either the philosophy of history or the philosophy of right\textsuperscript{25}, I will attempt to

\textsuperscript{22} An exception to this is Ian Buchanan’s essay on the relationship between theory and praxis in Deleuze. However, as in Hardt’s case, the only source for their interpretation is an interview Deleuze gave together with Foucault that does not provide a developed conceptualization of practice. Buchanan, I. (2008): Power, Theory and Praxis, in: Deleuze and Politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p. 15; Hardt, M. (1993): Gilles Deleuze: Apprenticeship in Philosophy. Minnesota: University of Minnesota. p. 104.


bridge the gap between the two by a Deleuzian reading of the relationship between the State-apparatus and the war machine.

The concept of the “war machine” brings me to the subject of the *philosophy of history*. As Deleuze and Guattari claim, the nomads and their war machine have always been dismissed from the standpoint of history. The reason is that the war machine signifies a surplus of desire in relation to existing historical structures. The idea of surplus of desire will become one the central points in my interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history. I will examine his philosophy of history primarily from the standpoint of the relationship between the excessive, transformative and conflictual nature of passions, on the one hand, and the State, on the other.

It is not my intent to provide a comprehensive account of Hegel’s philosophy of history. Instead, I will focus only on those moments that place his ideas in the vicinity of Deleuze. For this purpose, I will use authors such as Timo Bautz who directly examine the problem of passions in Hegel’s historical writings. However, my interpretation of Hegel’s concept of passions will again be read from a Deleuzian position. As opposed to Bautz, who examines the relationship between passions and the State in the context of world-history, one of the central themes of my work will be the relationship of passions to the *modern State*. I will show that whereas passions play a central role in the world-historical development of the State, their importance in the functioning of the modern State is even more pronounced. This interpretation will be based on Deleuze’s idea of the appropriation of the “war machine”.

Another point concerning the subject of philosophy of history is the concept of the *end of history* that will be the subject of the third chapter. My interpretation of this concept will diverge sharply from the classical interpretation found in Alexandre Kojève. I will base my interpretation on Deleuze’s reading of this concept, coupled with the secondary literature that

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27 As mentioned at the beginning, I will focus on Hegel’s concept of history in its relationship to the concept of the State. As a result of this, the primary interest of my work will be world-history. However, I will not make a sharp distinction between world-history and the general concept of history in Hegel. Specifically I will diverge from those interpretations, such as the one from Walter Jaeschke, that view Hegel’s world-history as a reduction of the concept of history. Jaeschke, W. (1996): *Die Geschichtlichkeit der Geschichte*, in: Hegel-Jahrbuch 1995. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. p. 369.


regards this concept from the standpoint of the relationship between freedom and its modern contradictions. At the same time, my reading of Deleuze’s concept of the end of history will focus on the tension between history and becoming. This tension, I will show, leads to an irresolvable paradox in Deleuze’s philosophy. In this regard, my interpretation will differ from Craig Lundy’s, which seeks to establish a balance between history and becoming. Furthermore, whereas authors like Jay Lampert view the end of history as something peculiar to capitalism, I will show that although Deleuze uses this concept in relation to non-historical nature of capital, the concept can be extended to encompass some paradoxes within his own philosophy.

Finally, my reading of the concept of immanence in both authors will primarily be influenced by Deleuze’s own development of this concept. The only comprehensive study of the concept of immanence in Hegel is Klaus Brinkmann’s Idealism Without Limits: Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity. However, this work focuses entirely on the problems of ontology and logic. As mentioned, Hegel views immanence [Innerlichkeit] as essential to the development of Spirit. Therefore, I will refer to authors in my development of Hegel’s concept of immanence who focus on Spirit and the idea of interiority. In Deleuze’s case, the concept of immanence is the backbone of his whole philosophy and the secondary literature is replete with studies of this concept in his work. However, what is characteristic for my approach is the focus on the paradoxes of immanence. So far, this subject has not received proper attention

in the secondary literature\textsuperscript{36}, and none whatsoever when it comes to the paradoxes of immanence that emerge from its relationship to politics.

4. On the method

The relationship between Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies brings forth several important methodological questions. The first question is, how does one approach comparing two distinct philosophies? Not only do these two philosophies belong to different theoretical currents, one to German idealism, the other to French post-modern thought, but the philosophers themselves seem to be of opposite convictions regarding many central problems. Another question is the divergent terminology used by the two philosophers that refers to a broader set of concepts and includes ideas not always compatible with one another. Sometimes overlapping concepts also relate to broader philosophical considerations not easily brought under one framework. This concerns primarily the two concepts in the title of this work: immanence and political practice. Both authors, as I will argue, operate with concept of \textit{immanence} as absolute, yet in a different context\textsuperscript{37}. At the same time, they also think politics in relation to immanence, but their understandings of political practice could not be further apart.

Nevertheless, the aim of this work is to show that all the contextual disparities do not alter the fact that the concepts of \textit{immanence} and \textit{political practice} as well as their relationship in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s works, reveal the same problematic. Consequently, any disparity in the concepts is a matter of different kind of philosophizing, which concerns the same underlying question. In other words, although the two authors have opposite convictions on many central questions, they still think through these \textit{same} questions. This is a result both of Deleuze’s direct


\textsuperscript{37} Hegel uses the Latin term “die Immanenz” in German, but not very often compared to the Germanic terms “das Innere” and “die Innerlichkeit”, which carry similar meaning as the Latin term. \textit{Innerlichkeit} and \textit{innenwohnen} (which is the literal translation of the Latin \textit{immanere} which means \textit{indwelling}) are one of the most important features of Spirit. He usually uses the Germanic version as a substantive (\textit{e.g.} “das Innere”, “die Innerlichkeit”), and the Latin version as an adjective (\textit{e.g.} “die immanente Entwicklung”, “die immanente Bewegung”), although he also extensively uses the Germanic version as an adjective (\textit{e.g.} “die innere Entwicklung”). The words are interchangeable. See, for example: Hegel, G. W. F. (1989): \textit{Wissenschaft der Logik II}, in: Werke, Bd. 6. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. p. 476.
exchange with Hegel and the underlying idea on the relationship between *history* and the *State* that they share. This relationship is analogous and allows one to establish a *conceptual exchange* between the two thinkers.

One of my thesis is that the paradox of *natural violence* present in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies leads these thinkers to accept the presuppositions of the other author. What this means is that certain concepts as well as their lack in the work of the one author, point to a complementary line of argumentation present in the other author’s philosophy. I will trace such places in their work by critiquing one author from the philosophical standpoint of the other. For example, if Hegel fails to conceptually articulate the exteriority of historical development in the form of non-State violence and *conceptually ignores it* (he does not have a concept for it), despite its obvious presence in his work, Deleuze’s concepts will be utilized to articulate this lack in Hegel’s philosophy. In other words, it is possible to establish an exchange between the two thinkers based on a conceptual lack in one author’s work and the corresponding articulation of this lack in the work of the other author. A counter-example is Deleuze’s concept of *becoming*, which he regards as anti-historical temporality that does not necessitate the State-form. Deleuze’s rejection of *transcendence* in the concept of immanence does not explain how history is necessitated for the purposes of “conditioning” and “determining” *becoming*. It also does not explain the problem of why *becomings* lead to the emergence of the State. Elements of Hegel’s philosophy will serve to articulate this problem in Deleuze.

Therefore, the main methodological tool used in this work will be *comparison* supported by *analogy*. However, neither comparative analysis nor analogy are the main interest of this work. These two methods will serve to prove the thesis that Hegel and Deleuze share a concept of immanence as absolute as well as a *same* paradox of an excess of natural violence. Consequently, the method will also include some elements of *deconstruction*, since it will be necessary to “unpack” Hegel’s and Deleuze’s concepts beyond their textual referential framework. The process of deconstruction will follow a pattern, where when a central paradox emerges in the work of one author, I will articulate the paradox from the position of the other author’s text. In this way, a “conceptual exchange” will take place between specific points in their works that will reveal the same issues which, as I have argued, underlie their political ontologies.
5. Structure of the work

The structure of this work will be organized around the four central concepts: *immanence*, *politics*, *history* and *State*.

Because the relationship of immanence and politics is based on Hegel’s and Deleuze’s conceptions of history and the State, the task of the first chapter “History and Becoming” will be to develop their ideas of history. The first part of the chapter will deal with the relationship of history and the State in Hegel’s philosophy. I will show, by using Hegel’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, how the State establishes the conditions for historicity. The second part of the chapter will focus on Deleuze’s concept of *becoming* that he developed in opposition to the Hegelian idea of history. *Becoming* is a concept prominent in Deleuze’s collaboration with Guattari[^38], *A Thousand Plateaus* as well as in his *The Logic of Sense*. The concept expresses a temporal form that does not depend on the State. The final part of the chapter will answer the first sub-question and give the concepts of *immanence* with which Hegel and Deleuze operate.

From the concepts of immanence the focus will turn to the theme of political practice. This will be done in the chapter “Citizens and Nomads”. The first part of the chapter will again take up Hegel’s concept of the State, but this time from the side of its *political constitution*, as opposed to its historical role. For this purpose I will use Hegel’s *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. In the second part of the chapter, I will turn to Deleuze’s idea of *universal history* from

[^38]: The authors I focus on in this work are Hegel and Deleuze. However, my work will also often cite works from Deleuze that he wrote together with Félix Guattari. These works are primarily *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. The theme of the relationship between *history* and the *State* in Deleuze’s philosophy is contained in these works. Therefore, the ideas on *history* and the *State* are also Guattari’s ideas. The question then emerges, why is Guattari not included in the title of the work as well? The reason is that although Deleuze and Guattari co-authored numerous works, they also developed distinct philosophical ideas and terminology. In other words, the general interest of Guattari’s independent work is different from Deleuze’s. In my work, I will focus on the relationship between the concepts of the *State* and *history* through the concept of *immanence*, a subject-matter that was the focus of Deleuze’s philosophical efforts throughout his career. Furthermore, the concept of *immanence* will lead to other concepts such as *representation*, *judgment*, *life*, *difference* and *repetition*, all of which build the body of Deleuze’s philosophy. Guattari’s absence is justified because I will regard the common themes he developed with Deleuze from the position of Deleuze’s, and not Guattari’s body of work. This is why the theme of psychoanalysis, Guattari’s speciality, will feature only in the background and will be relevant in the context of philosophical arguments. It is also why I will not refer to Guattari’s independent arguments when it comes to the concepts of history and the State, even if they could resolve some problems present in Deleuze’s philosophy. I will refer to “Deleuze” when relating to the ideas that stem from his philosophy, and to “Deleuze and Guattari”, when referring to works such as *A Thousand Plateaus* and *Anti-Oedipus*. 
Anti-Oedipus as well as his critique of the State from a position of political practice as nomadology from A Thousand Plateaus. The chapter will end with extended conceptions of immanence as well as with the answer to the second sub-question of the work.

The final chapter “End of History: Immanence and Politics at the Limit” will focus on the concepts of immanence and political practice as developed in the previous two chapters. The chapter will give a concept of political practice in relation to the limits of historical mode of organizing human life. It will answer the question: How does politics appear at the end of history? This will at the same time lead to an answer to the main question of the work.
CHAPTER I: HISTORY AND BECOMING
Introduction: the analogy between Hegel and Deleuze

One of the presuppositions of this work is that both Hegel and Deleuze rely on the concept of immanence as absolute immanence. They think immanence as absolute and ground politics in it. Both philosophers reject transcendence in the form of external violence that determines the processes within the sphere of immanence. However, they both seek to show how transcendence can be overcome. Immanence is not given, instead it emerges, it is constructed or established.

In this chapter I will show how Hegel and Deleuze think the emergence of immanence. For both of them, its emergence is related to history. The question, therefore, is whether immanence presents a historically conditioned process or not? Hegel and Deleuze give opposite answers to this question. For Hegel, immanence is a historical process, whereas according to Deleuze immanence relates to the anti-historical movement of becoming. Although they give opposite answers to the question of the relationship of immanence to history, they do this because they understand history in a similar way. Specifically, they understand history as a mode of temporality organized by the State. History is a process whose engine is the State because without it, there is no historical mode of life within the community.

Therefore, although Hegel and Deleuze move in opposite directions, it is possible to draw an analogy between them based on the two concepts of history and State. This conceptual similarity has its source in Deleuze’s critique of Hegel, and more precisely, in his appropriation of the concepts of history and State in order to submit them to critique. In the following chapter I will show that this analogy extends to the concept of immanence. The reason why Deleuze criticizes these two concepts lies in the fact that he seeks to discredit the idea of immanence as something particular to historical development and the mechanisms of State-life.

I will show that in both authors, the State is regarded as the point at which temporality becomes historical. They both understand the State as a political mechanism which serves to establish a border between the human world and the external nature. In both cases, nature signifies the exteriority of history. Deleuze terms this exteriority becoming [le devenir], whereas Hegel calls it natural violence [Naturgewalt]. History, therefore, signifies a process in which natural violence or becoming are subjected to temporality organized by the State. However, Hegel and Deleuze assign different value to this process. Whereas for Deleuze a reduction of becoming to history signifies the “uprooting” from immanence39, in Hegel’s view, it represents

the establishment of immanence by way of abolishing *natural violence*. The analogy between *history* and *becoming* (Deleuze), on the one hand, and *history* and *natural violence* (Hegel) on the other, will serve to develop the concept of absolute immanence.

The chapter has three parts. In the first one I will present Hegel’s idea of State-grounded historicity, in the second Deleuze’s critique of history from a position of *becoming*, and in the third I will turn to the concept of immanence.
PART I: HEGEL AND THE HISTORICAL NECESSITY OF THE STATE

1. The historical emergence of immanence

Immanence in Hegel arises with history. Spirit is intrinsically a historical category and its immanent development presupposes a historical form of temporality. In order to examine the role of history in Hegel’s philosophy, I will focus on how history is differentiated from the non-historical temporality of natural violence. This part of the chapter will show that the role of history consists in differentiating Spirit from natural violence by converting this violence into State-power [Staatsgewalt]. History is world-history and signifies the establishment of a human power in the form of the State.

The immediate form natural violence appears in are passions. According to Hegel, passions at first express a drive that seeks to satisfy a lack without mediation. They break all limits society places on them and appear as an excess in relation to law. However, passions do not remain on the level of mere natural violence. Historical development signifies a process of internalization of passions into rational structures of society. When they become internalized, passions serve as the engine of social life and historical change. This takes place through the mechanisms of the State. Events that are driven by passions necessitate a State in order to become recorded and written down in such a way that they establish living memory constitutive for the institutions of society. In this way, natural violence comes into the service of the State. The way through which natural violence comes into the service of the State is that it becomes relegated to relative exteriority. Relative exteriority differs from absolute exteriority, which signifies natural violence that constitutes and conditions Spirit. Therefore, the process of history relativizes exteriority. This relativization unifies the contingency embodied in natural violence with necessity of freedom.

At the same time, I will also argue that Hegel, in his concept of exteriority, retains an excess of contingency not unified with necessity. This excess takes the form of past instances of Spirit, often represented by those States that have been superseded by world-spirit (e.g. China or India). One of the central arguments of this chapter will be that these past forms of Spirit point to a theoretical surplus of natural violence, one that I will then develop in the subchapter on Deleuze as well as in the second chapter of this work.
2. The concept of history in Hegel

There are multiple concepts of history in Hegel’s philosophy. For example, there is a distinction to be made between the concept of history in Hegel’s earlier works, such as *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and later texts, such as *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Furthermore, Hegel distinguishes the concept of world-history, which is my concern here, from other concepts of history. At the same time, world-history stands within the confines of what Hegel terms philosophical history and is distinguished from original and reflective history. Philosophical consideration of history is not univocal because it emerges within different branches of philosophy in general. In this regard, history has a role to play within the philosophy of history, but also within the philosophy of right. There are philosophical-historical considerations of history, but also philosophical-political ones. There is also a specific consideration of history relating to philosophy of religion, philosophy of arts and philosophy of philosophy. For example, there is a specific concept of history of philosophy that contains components different than those pertaining to religion or arts. The branching off of the concept

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40 In *original* [ursprüngliche] history, the Spirit of the events and the Spirit of the writer coincide (*e.g.* Thucydides writes on the history of the Peloponnesian war). Original history is a reflection in the form of representation of actions, passions and events that took place within the confines of the same world in which the writer of history acts. It is an immediate self-reflection of Spirit. As such, it represents a low form of historical reflection since it often takes the form of merely narrating events that the writer experienced or heard. Reflective [reflektierende] history is a higher form of historical consciousness and is divided into general history (*e.g.* a historical reflection on one world, a history of one people); pragmatic history (a historical reflection that seeks to import something from a past world into the present one, *e.g.* French revolutionary writers attempting to resuscitate the Spirit of the Roman republic); and critical history (a writing on history itself, not a writing of history, but a critical examination of a specific historical account and its credibility). Hegel, G. W. F. (2001): *The Philosophy of History*. Kitchener: Batoche Books. pp. 15 – 17, 19 – 21.


42 For example, the history of religion is focused primarily on its external conditions (the establishment of the Church, religious wars, expansion of belief, *etc.*). The inner side of religion, according to Hegel, exhibits little transformative power (Christian religion was from its beginning already determined in its basic principles). As opposed to this, the history of philosophy is primarily a matter of its inner content (the development of thought from Thales to modern times). More importantly, history of philosophy is itself the *content* of philosophy (to study the history of philosophy means to study philosophy), whereas history of religion is not the same thing as religious
of history into specific philosophical disciplines reflects another criterion for dividing this concept, based on the idea of the developmental nature of Spirit. In this regard, it is possible to consider world-history from the standpoint of subjective, objective and absolute Spirit.

Therefore, the following points should be considered when talking about Hegel’s concept of history:

1) Differences relating to concepts of history found at different stages of Hegel’s work;
2) Differences relating to a division in the concept of history Hegel makes;
3) Differences relating to the concept of history when placed in relation to a specific branch of philosophy;
4) Differences relating to the same specific concept of history when regarded at a different stage of dialectical development.

I will not explicate all of these points because that would go beyond the scope of this work. Instead, I will focus on the specific points within this framework that concern the concept of history, which is to become most closely related with the concepts of State and immanence. I write “most closely related”, because it is impossible to isolate any single concept of history and consider it completely unrelated to the others. Although this differentiation of the concepts of history and a further division within a specific concept help to comprehend the richness of Hegel’s philosophy of history, in the texts themselves it is not always possible to differentiate between, for example, Hegel’s earlier and later concept(s) of history or between the concept of history as considered within the different branches of philosophy, without at the same time finding a necessary connection between the two. This is the case not only because Hegel’s earlier conception of history influenced his later formulations, but also because any specific formulation of history stands in a dialectical relationship to the others, based on the fact that, in Hegel’s view, the idea of history itself has a history that is integral to its concept. For instance, the (anti-historical) concept of history found in Aristotle, the one found in Judeo-Christian worldview, and the one in Hegel’s philosophy of absolute Spirit, compose a concept of history in its specific developmental moments and as such are integral to Hegel’s thought not only as objects of his philosophical enquiry, but at the same time as concepts he actively employs as his own.

Hegel firmly positions the task of developing a concept of world-history within the sphere of philosophical history. Although philosophical history is distinguished from reflective and original history, specific elements of the two are implied in it. This concept of history will be the main focus in this subchapter. Consequently, my central source here will be Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History. The reason is that the conception of history developed there is not only a culmination of previous ideas but stands in an immediate and necessary relation to Hegel’s philosophy of right, because it focuses on historical development as a development of a political principle. The side of historical development as that of a political principle will be the focus of the second chapter. Here I will confine myself to the role the State plays in history and the role of history itself in establishing immanence through appropriation of natural violence. Only after I have developed a concept of immanence based on the examination of history, will I turn to the political side of the problem.

3. Two conditions of history

The subject of Hegel’s philosophy of history is world-history. World-history specifies the concept “history” in that it has for its object history from the perspective of Spirit. As such, world-history does not concern itself with the history of any specific people, but with the historical development of Spirit that both transcends and contains particular peoples. World-history takes people as a form of world-spirit. World-spirit is the protagonist of world-history and the specific form Spirit in general takes. This form is the people in the totality of its life. It includes culture, beliefs, traditions, art, religion, and so on; all of them constitute the world emerging around a people. Peoples are therefore the protagonists of world-history, but only insofar as they are constitutive for the process of world-spirit.

A world is governed by the principle of rational organization. Since reason is the criterion of world-history, not all peoples are admitted into the philosophical reflection on world-history. Only those peoples that contribute to the development of the world in accordance with reason are constitutive for world-history. Reason in history presupposes the presence of the State.

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43 Hegel establishes a difference between the outer and inner development of the State, the former aspect being a subject of philosophy of history, the latter of philosophy of right. I will follow this arrangement, focusing in this chapter on the historical emergence of the State, and in the next chapter on the political constitution of the modern State.

The presence of the State is what ensures rational organization of life. Consequently, only the State-form of people allows Spirit to develop itself into a world. This development is based on the *sublation* [Aufheben] of natural violence [Naturgewalt] into State-power [Staatsgewalt]. The *sublation* itself presupposes an act of recording history. The recording of history is the task of the State and expresses the development in the consciousness of freedom.

In the following I will show that the object of Hegel’s world-history are peoples that 1) form a State and 2) record their own history and in this way constitute a world.\(^{45}\)

### 4. Passions and the State

Because Hegel views the formation of the State and the recording of history as preconditions of history, this means that he takes for object of his world-historical account those peoples, who have already established a State and have been in a position to write their own history. Hegel’s philosophy of history does not concern itself with peoples before they established a State.\(^{46}\) He places these stateless peoples into a condition of *violence*.\(^{47}\) The violence they are exposed to is *natural*. What characterizes natural condition is its contingency, namely its repetitious character which leads to no development.\(^{48}\)

However, natural violence is also found in those peoples who did form a State, in other words, it is present in an existing *world*.\(^{49}\) Thus, natural violence extends itself from the time before the State and into the time of an established State. The difference between natural violence of pre-State life and the one found in the State is the capacity of the latter to drive historical development. In other words, natural violence within the confines of the State


\(^{46}\) *Ibid.* p. 79.


becomes a transformative violence that effectuates historical change.\textsuperscript{50} Natural violence is transformative in the form of \textit{passions}.

Passions are a form of willing that is bound to particular aims and goals. By being expressed in particular aims and goals, passions at first appear as a limited form of freedom or caprice [\textit{Willkür}]. “Freedom of a low and limited order is mere caprice; which finds its exercise in the sphere of particular and limited desires.”\textsuperscript{51} Although passions represent a form of particular and limited desire, they tend to express \textit{a surplus} in relation to existing social structures. What this means is that passions are something excessive and destructive in relation to social norms.

“Their power lies in the fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose on them; and that these natural impulses [\textit{Naturgewalten}] have a more direct influence over man than the artificial and tedious discipline that tends to order and self-restraint, law and morality.”\textsuperscript{52}

Since passions tend to express something capricious, wild and particular, they also tend to obstruct the reproduction of the universal. Before the emergence of the State, they amounted to nothing more but repetitious violence:

“The state of Nature is, therefore, predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings. Limitation is certainly produced by Society and the State, but it is a limitation of the mere brute emotions and rude instincts; as also, in a more advanced stage of culture, of the premeditated self-will of caprice and passion.”\textsuperscript{53}

Hegel terms “state of nature” as a state of “natural impulses” and “inhuman deeds and feelings”. In one sense, “inhuman” could mean “animal”. Hegel does often use the term

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Hegel does not use the term \textit{Naturgewalt} often in his lectures on history. In one place he relates it to a “spectacle of passions [\textit{Schauspiel der Leidenschaften}]” and names it “the most violent thing [\textit{das Gewaltigste}]”. In another place he states that natural violence is the ruler of madmen, and in his lectures on religion terms it the violence of the elements before the emergence of gods. I have taken the term \textit{natural violence} in the first instance as an expression of the immediate unity of passions and violence in general, and as something “left behind” when passions emerge as a mechanism of subjective volition. Although Hegel also often uses the term in the sense of “natural power”, “natural impulse” or “natural force”, I will show in the following that without the State, the only form this power can take is violence. Hegel, G. W. F. (1989): \textit{Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte}, in: Werke, Bd. 12. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. p. 34; Hegel, G. W. F. (1989): \textit{Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Dritter Teil}, in: Werke, Bd. 10. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. p. 55.
\item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.} p. 34.
\item \textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.} p. 56.
\end{itemize}
“animal” [tierisch]. But this could lead to a confusion because he also understands under “inhuman”, human behaviour that is unrestrained and contingent. Although he is not very consistent on this matter, what is consistent is the specification of this concept as _passion_ that is characterized by an _immediate satisfaction of a lack_. This means that the object of desire is immediately acquired without mediation.

The immediacy of passions leads to a cyclical contingency that engenders only more violence. In this way passions have similar status to raw natural violence. “Passion is regarded as a thing of sinister aspect, as more or less immoral. Man is required to have no passions.” However, passions differ from raw violence:

“I mean here nothing more than the human activity as resulting from private interests — special, or if you will, self-seeking designs — with this qualification, that the whole energy of will and character is devoted to their attainment; that other interests (which would in themselves constitute attractive aims) or rather all things else, are sacrificed to them.”

Passions drive the individual to realize particular aims and goals. In this regard, they are selfish and opposed to the order of the State. They drive toward immediate satisfaction of a _lack_ and represent natural violence excessive in relation to State-law. But at the same time, what characterizes passions is that the individual is sacrificed to these particular aims and goals, and instead of these aims and goals being something in the service of the individual, it is the individual that is in their service. When I am consumed by a passion (e.g. a passion to paint) this tends not only to represent a drive to satisfy a particular aim and goal, but also a drive that can lead me to sacrifice all other aims and goals to this passion (e.g. I spend all my money on materials, books, _etc._). Furthermore, a passion can be so strong that I may view my ability to paint as essential for my life. Without it, my life would lose meaning. To this effect, the individual stands in an analogous position in relation to its passions as to the State, since in both

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54 _Ibid._ p. 55.
55 In some places he equates the adjective “natural” and the concept of nature in the form of _caprice_ with “animal”, but at other times he equates “animal” with behaviour that he regards as conditioned by _natural law_ (instinct). For the purposes of this work, it is sufficient to note that within the context of Hegel’s concept of history, natural violence has a meaning of contingent and unrestricted violence that is not mediated either by instinctual mechanisms (as in animals), or by the law of society. Hegel, G. W. F. (1989): _Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Zweiter Teil_, in: Werke, Bd. 9. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. p. 473.
58 _Ibid._
cases it is subordinate to something alien to itself. This, however, is more than an analogy. It is precisely because passions consume individuals and lead them to sacrifice themselves to higher aims and goals, that they gain a transformative effect within the State.\(^5\) They express both the capacity of the individual to submit to something larger than itself as well as the capacity to destroy any limits when particular aims and goals cannot become satisfied within a given State. In the first instance, States emerge through the activity of passions, but they emerge in such a way that passions become limited. This limitation of passions breaks their cyclical purposiveness and makes them operate in the service of the State.

“Thus the passions of men are gratified; they develop themselves and their aims in accordance with their natural tendencies, and build up the edifice of human society; thus fortifying a position for Right and Order against themselves.”\(^6\)

The State does not abolish the “state of nature”, but subjects it to its own purposes. It is a mechanism that emerges through passionate pursuit of aims to which the individual sacrifices itself. At the same time, passions exceed the confines of the State, because at certain points the State represents something insufficient in relation to passions. When a given State cannot resist the violence of passions, its historical contingency becomes revealed. When this takes place, passions act as the *cause movens* of history. This means that passions are at the same time limited by the State through their own capacity to subject individuals to alien purposiveness, they are placed in the service of the State by being limited, and through this become historically transformative when particular aims and goals cannot be realized within a given State. Consequently, passions as a form of purposiveness that drives historical development presuppose the State. Although they represent something opposed to a particular State, they are


in fact natural violence in the service of the State as such.\textsuperscript{61} Insofar as they are excessive\textsuperscript{62}, they act as a historical force, which leads to the further development of the State.\textsuperscript{63}

Passions, therefore, are transformative both through limitation and their tendency to break limits. They possess an in-built capacity to produce a power that is different than the preceding violence. To be in a state of natural violence means that there is an unmediated exertion of violence from point A to point B and in turn an immediate response from point B to point A (e.g. blood vengeance). The “state of nature” starts with this immediate violence, but in its response it does not repeat it, but transforms it (blood vengeance turns into lawful punishment).\textsuperscript{64}

Hegel would explicate this difference between natural and spiritual development by drawing on the process of the living organism. Whereas natural organism, same as Spirit, develops itself into that which already in itself is, it does this in a way that is “direct, unopposed,


\textsuperscript{63} For example, the passions that drove the generals of the Roman republic were constitutive for the republic. The honour, glory and wealth that the generals gained through their conquests was also the honour, glory and wealth of Rome. When Caesar conquered Gaul, it was Rome that conquered Gaul. Therefore, the passions of the individuals, their drive for honour and power, was at the same time something in the service of the republic. However, these passions eventually exceeded the confines of republican life. They could no longer be contained by the values held by people like Brutus, Cassius or Cato. Suddenly, what brought Rome its glory, what made others fear the name of Rome, destroyed this State. Therefore, the passions contained within the law, which fuelled the State, turned against it, bringing about a new State. And finally, the individual, who appeared at first as a servant of the State, who then turned against the State, yet again became placed into the service of the new State (the Empire). Caesar or Augustus perished as individuals, but the Empire that emerged through their work lasted a lot longer (and as constitutive memory, lasts to this day).

\textsuperscript{64} Hegel explains revenge as cyclical and unlimited, every act of revenge is an act that inflicts new harms, necessitating another revenge. However, every action also results in a surplus of events, not foreseen by the actor. For example, an individual might seek revenge by attempting to burn down a house of someone who harmed him. In so doing, however, the flame spreads to the neighbourhood and suddenly many houses are burning. In this way, an act of revenge exceeded the intentions of the doer. Precisely this passionate, contingent, violent pursuit of a goal (in this case, the revenge) results in a surplus. The surplus itself, however, becomes constitutive for further organization of life. For example, the burning down of the houses leads the community to establish new rules concerning how and by whom the revenge is to be imposed. Hegel, G. W. F. (2001): The Philosophy of History. Kitchener: Batoche Books. p. 42.
unhindered [auf eine unmittelbare, gegensatzlose, unbehinderte Weise].”65 There is nothing standing between its concept and its realisation. As opposed to that, the development of Spirit is contradictory. Spirit is mediated by its own “other”, which is not only contradictory to it, but hidden from it as the unrevealed force driving it forward.

“Thus Spirit is at war with itself; it has to overcome itself as its most formidable obstacle. That development which in the sphere of Nature is a peaceful growth is, in that of spirit, a severe, a mighty conflict with itself.”66

Because passions do not merely exist within the realm of nature, but inhabit a spiritual world, their particular purposiveness does not remain on the level of particularity. Blood vengeance and the passion that drives it sacrifice the individual and in this act reveal the capacity of the individual to become included into something higher. On a world-historical scale, this transformative sacrifice takes on grandiose form, where individuals in question are of particular importance. They are religious, political individuals, who in their pursuit of particular aims and goals exert world-historical transformations:

“Such individuals had no consciousness of the general Idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, they were practical, political men. But at the same time they were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time — what was ripe for development.”67

Consequently, both a particular, given State, and the historical transformations of the State in general, are predicated on passions, because “nothing great in the World has been accomplished without passion”.68 The State represents this greatness, it is natural violence, which has been sublated into power of law.69 It is fuelled by natural violence in the form of passions. At the same time, the State is a victim of passions, since its development is predicated on their permanent “excessiveness”. History, therefore, presents us with an interplay between States and passions.

65 Ibid. p. 71.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. p. 45.
68 Ibid. p. 37.
69 Although Hegel focuses on “great individuals” as the driving force behind historical transformations (e.g. Alexander, Napoleon, Caesar, Jesus, Socrates, etc.), these individuals and their passions are transformative because they introduce conflict and divisions in society. They “gather the people” around themselves and stand against other groups that remain “loyal” to tradition. Hegel, G. W. F. (2015): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, in: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 27, 1. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. p. 59.
5. The writing of the State

At the beginning of this subchapter I mentioned that there are two conditions a people must fulfil in order to be granted the title of a world-historical agent. The first concerns the formation of the State. It was shown that the State is the mechanism that transforms natural violence into ordered legal power. Natural violence, i.e. violence found beyond the confines of the State, is contingent, because it cannot result in anything else but the same natural violence. Contingent violence represents the repetition of the same because it does not produce a rational generality. Natural repetitions do not result in events that are for us recognizable as different, but rather appear as a multitude of violent occurrences that constitute neither progress nor regress.\(^70\) As long as passions are not rational, meaning as long as they do not have a transformative effect, they cannot constitute historical reality. The State allows events to come to pass by turning passions against themselves. Because it makes passions transformative, the State serves as the centre for all events that befall a people. It gathers around itself the literary, religious, moral, artistic, and other forms of life of the people and “processes” contingency by converting it into a world.\(^71\) The method by which the State “gathers” the different forms of life of the people, and serves as the centre of the world, is the recording of events. The State is the fulcrum of people’s memory. This has two closely connected meanings.

In the first instance, this simply signifies what it says: the State keeps a record of its own history, it memorizes past events, heroes and villains, disasters and triumphs. However, the keeping of a record of events at the same time serves as a pre-condition of history. Peoples who do not have a State, do not record their own history and as a result, they do not have history. Before the emergence of the State one can only speak of pre-history:

\(^70\) For example, the first human tools are sometimes hard to distinguish from natural stones. The very first ones were nothing else but these stones held for the first time. As opposed to this, the works of the Renaissance masters (a work “present” in the stone) reveal a clear and precise model of reason that has been internalized by the stone. As a result, reason (e.g. an art critic) recognizes it as its own work. Such works are a regular station of reason, it reflects itself in its own work: in interpretation, religion, wonder and so on.

\(^71\) Hegel says that he uses the term the State in a more comprehensive meaning [\textit{in einem umfassenderen Sinne genommen}], as a form of appearance of Spirit as such. Rosenzweig notes that in opposition to his early tautological relationship between the concepts of people [\textit{Volk}] and spirit of the people [\textit{Volksgeist}], where the State features merely as an element of [\textit{Volksgeist}] in the form of the “constitution”, in his later work, the embodiment of people’s life becomes the State itself. Hegel, G. W. F. (1963): \textit{Die Vernunft in der Geschichte}. Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner. p. 114; Rosenzweig, Franz (1920): \textit{Hegel und der Staat}. München / Berlin: R. Oldenbourg Verlag. p. 181.
“Nations may have passed a long life before arriving at this their destination, and during this period, they may have attained considerable culture in some directions. This ante-historical period — consistently with what has been said — lies out of our plan; whether a real history followed it, or the peoples in question never attained a political constitution.”

The State is the vehicle of people’s memory. This memory is important not only because it constitutes a record of events in itself, but because it marks a certain form of Spirit that conditions the life of the people. There is a difference between a record kept by a tribe and a State-written record. This difference is based on a further distinction Hegel makes between history [Geschichte] and historiography [Geschichtserzählung].

“In our language the term History [Geschichte] unites the objective with the subjective side, and denotes quite as much the historia rerum gestarum, as the res gestae themselves; on the other hand it comprehends not less what has happened, than the narration of what has happened. This union of the two meanings we must regard as of a higher order than mere outward accident; we must suppose historical narrations to have appeared contemporaneously with historical deeds and events. It is an internal [sic] vital principle common to both that produces them synchronously. Family memorials, patriarchal traditions, have an interest confined to the family and the clan. The uniform course of events which such a condition implies, is no subject of serious remembrance; though distinct transactions or turns of fortune, may rouse Mnemosyne to form conceptions of them — in the same way as love and the religious emotions provoke imagination to give shape to a previously formless impulse. But it is the State which first presents subject-matter that is not only adapted to the prose of History, but involves the production of such history in the very progress of its own being.”

Res gestae signifies the event itself, whereas historia rerum gestarum the “writing down” of the event. Res gestae does not have substance without being made an object of consciousness. However, for Hegel, being made an object of consciousness does not have a univocal meaning, because there are different forms of consciousness conditioned by different forms of relation toward the object. As he states in the quotation, there are family memorials and patriarchal traditions, which might be of interest to the family or the tribe. There are also myths and legends, sagas and poems that convert an event into memory. The event in these cases is

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72 Hegel stands in the long line of thought that differentiates between history and pre-history. Pre-history is usually reserved for communities that do not keep a record of their history. For a long time, an established view was that history proper begins with writing. However, because writing developed with the formation of the first States that necessitated bureaucracy and record keeping, the beginning of history also coincided with the formation of the State. Hegel does not make this connection, but all of the elements are present: the State is a pre-requisite of history because it is capable of keeping a record. Consequently, peoples who do not write their own history, do not have a history. Hegel, G. W. F. (2001): The Philosophy of History. Kitchener: Batoche Books. pp. 75 - 77.

73 Ibid. pp. 76 - 77.
remembered, but highly modified, because in the “conversion” of the event into a legend, gods and other divine beings, immortal heroes and monsters, are often invited into the account of the event (in this regard, the event is real only as a legendary or mythical narrative). The myth therefore expresses the event, but often in a way marking a specific form of consciousness that is conscious of the event. The distinguishing mark of pre-historical accounts is that they are still fully immersed into a state of natural violence. Gods are represented as natural forces, contingent and mad, usually depicted as half-human, half-animal, as mountains and storms, sky and the earth. In other words, pre-historical events are often populated by creatures that express cyclical, passionate, contingent and unpredictable activity. At this stage, it is hard to differentiate between history proper and “history”, which is still an ensemble of human and natural powers.\textsuperscript{74} The emergence of the State, however, signifies the formation of a specific human power in the form of human events.\textsuperscript{75} It marks a development of consciousness, which becomes emancipated from natural violence and through this free from fear.\textsuperscript{76} In the State, Spirit recognizes itself as a distinct power alongside nature, and as a force capable of forging unity without referencing external and alien powers, but only itself (its own laws, gods, kings, and so on).\textsuperscript{77} The historia rerum gestarum signifies a specifically human relation to events that are

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\textsuperscript{74} One example of this is the Greek mythology, which between the archaic and classical age experienced a shift in its theogony, first marked by monstrous creatures harassing the human race, later by Olympian gods, who gained ever more human qualities. See also: “Of the representations which Egyptian Antiquity presents us with, one figure must be especially noticed, viz. the Sphinx — in itself a riddle — an ambiguous form, half brute, half human. The Sphinx may be regarded as a symbol of the Egyptian Spirit. The human head looking out from the brute body, exhibits Spirit as it begins to emerge from the merely Natural — to tear itself loose therefrom and already to look more freely around it; without, however, entirely freeing itself from the fetters Nature had imposed.” Ibid. p. 218.


\textsuperscript{76} Speaking on the Phoenicians, Hegel writes: “In Industry Man is an object to himself, and treats Nature as something subject to him, on which he impresses the seal of his activity. Intelligence is the valor needed here, and ingenuity is better than mere natural courage. At this point we see the nations freed from the fear of Nature and its slavish bondage.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2001): \textit{The Philosophy of History}. Kitchener: Batoche Books. pp. 210 - 211.

\textsuperscript{77} This does not mean that history and myth do not co-exist in any given society. But for Hegel, this presents a middle-point in the development. Best examples are the Greeks, who still cherished living myths that permeated society, and at the same time had what one could call \textit{bona fide} historians, such as Thucydides. However, around the time of Thucydides, the old myths were already in decline, and one can witness their mockery by persons such as Xenophanes, as well as the arguments for their ban by Plato.
recognized as human and as belonging in some way to consciousness as its own history.\(^78\) In this way, the consciousness of the event expresses freedom, or the capacity of the subject to exert control over future events that befall it. As a result, the events that befall a people are theirs, in other words, they appear, to a certain degree, as products of their activity. Of course, this passage from events as something foreign with a dark source to something ours, is not immediate and takes many intermediary steps. The State, however, even if it still figures as a system of violence alienated from the people (such as in despotism), still appears as something distinct from the repetitious and unpredictable violence of monstrous beings beyond the State. The despot is their despot and the people take pride in their kings. Only in this way do events appear not only as outside occurrences that force the people to react, but intrinsically as an expression of the people’s capacity to act and, through this, control their own destiny. Events become religious, artistic, philosophical, scientific, political and ethical processes, transcending their natural, violent and fear-instilling form. The State, therefore, creates a border in relation to the outside, it forges unity which is self-sufficient and self-referential, and not conditioned by something foreign, accidental and passing,

“It must further be understood that all the worth which the human being possesses — all spiritual reality, he possesses only through the State. For his spiritual reality consists in this, that his own essence — Reason — is objectively present to him, that it possesses objective immediate existence for him. Thus only is he fully conscious; thus only is he a partaker of morality — of a just and moral social and political life.”\(^79\)

\(^78\) “Wonderfully, then, must the Greek legend surprise us, which relates, that the Sphinx — the great Egyptian symbol — appeared in Thebes, uttering the words: ‘What is that which in the morning goes on four legs, at midday on two, and in the evening on three?’ Œdipus, giving the solution, Man, precipitated the Sphinx from the rock. The solution and liberation of that Oriental Spirit, which in Egypt had advanced so far as to propose the problem, is certainly this: that the Inner Being [the Essence] of Nature is Thought, which has its existence only in the human consciousness.” The figure of Sphinx could be described as the sum of all the Greek (and Hegel’s) fears. It is a combination of monstrous elements, signifying brute and ruthless nature, on the one hand, and feminine features that are subject to passions and capricious contingency, on the other. This combination is the backbone of countless ancient myths: the endless see filled with islands inhabited either with monsters such as Cyclops, irresistible women such as Calypso and the Amazonians, or with the combination of the two (Harpies, Sirens). The same combination of natural violence and passions appears in Hegel and stands in opposition to the principle of reason: “When women are in charge of government, the state is in danger, for their actions are based not on the demands of universality but on contingent inclination and opinion.” Ibid. p. 241; Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 207.

The basic structure of history consists of events that become written down and recorded, remembered, and finally known, where this knowledge constitutes the event itself. At the same time, the event, or more precisely, the fact that it is recognized as an event, marks a conscious relation to the world which constitutes the subject or the State as the centre of historical development. The process of writing is a process of the solidification of events into living memory, it concentrates the passage of time into the institutions of social life. These institutions in turn gain organizing capacity, as opposed to organization emerging from some alien and capricious power. The State writes in such a way that through this writing institutions are born that carry within themselves the memory of Spirit.

“But History is always of great importance for a people; since by means of that it becomes conscious of the path of development taken by its own Spirit, which expresses itself in Laws, Manners, Customs, and Deeds. Laws, comprising morals and judicial institutions, are by nature the permanent element in a people’s existence. But History presents a people with their own image in a condition which thereby becomes objective to them. Without History their existence in time is blindly self-involved — the recurring play of arbitrary volition in manifold forms. History fixes and imparts consistency to this fortuitous current — gives it the form of Universality, and by so doing posits a directive and restrictive rule for it. It is an essential instrument in developing and determining the Constitution — that is, a rational political condition […]”  

Hegel gives an example of this importance of history when he compares India and China. Whereas in China one could speak of history and the State, India, although technically speaking had a State, in fact constituted simply a people. The reason was that the Indian State did not properly record events, it all amounted to “phantasy” and “sensibility”. Temporality amounted to a play of caprice and passions were not “fixed” through historical memorization. Historical writing, in other words, constitutes history, because it places the event within the institutional life of the State, at the same time making the event itself organized in relation to the people as a memory of their life as distinct from natural, repetitious and external passage of time.

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80 Ibid. p. 181.
81 “[…] If China may be regarded as nothing else but a State, Hindoo political existence presents us with a people, but no State.” Ibid. p. 179
82 Ibid. p. 156.
83 Another important element in the recording of the event is underscored by Julius Löwenstein. According to him, this process allows the event to exist in connection with other events, establishing in this way a coherent view of one’s own world. Löwenstein, J. (1927): Hegels Staatsidee. Ihr Doppelgesicht und ihr Einfluss im 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin: Springer Verlag. p. 24.
6. **An-sich, Für-sich, Für-uns**

A distinction has been made between *res gestea* and *historia rerum gestarum*. The event takes place both as an occurrence and as the *consciousness* of this occurrence. The logical conceptualization of this distinction is based on Hegel’s two central modes of being: *being in itself* [An-sich-sein] and *being for itself* [Für-sich-sein]. To grasp how the consciousness of the event determines its reality, it is necessary to understand these two modes of being. I will use these concepts as well as the related concept of *for us* [Für-uns], to explain how the recording of events transforms the nature of passions from raw natural violence to transformative violence in the service of the State. I will show that passions as the driving force of history presuppose the instance of *for us* as the recuperation of historical recording. Furthermore, I will show that the process of mediation of *being in itself* with *being for itself* changes the nature of contingency by *relativizing* it. Passions shed their contingency by transforming absolute exteriority into a relative one, effectively making contingency unified with necessity.

The first two concepts that require consideration are *being in itself* and *being for itself*. These two terms carry with them two pairs of meanings, the first one relates to the relationship between consciousness and substance, the other has roots in Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality [*dynamis*] and actuality [*energeia / entelécheia*]. The first pair relates to the established relationship between the event and its recording as well as to the idea that history is the development of consciousness. *Being in itself* represents the still immediate, abstract instance of identity that has not yet developed its innate content. *Being for itself*, as opposed to this, represents the developed concept and identity where the substance recognizes itself as subject. The subject is something *for itself*. It emerges only through the relationship to itself. The developed form of subjectivity, which represents the historical end-point, is the unity of *being in and for itself* [An-und-für-sich-sein], the realized identity where *being* and *self-consciousness* coincide. The second pair of meaning relates to the fact that *being in itself* contains the seeds of self-consciousness and the totality of all its moments. Hegel, therefore, integrates Aristotle’s concept of *dynamis* into *being in itself* and the concepts of *energeia / entelécheia* into *being for itself*.84

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84 Although in Aristotle’s works the terms *energeia* and *entelécheia* are often used interchangeably, they also have different meanings that supplement each other. *Energeia* signifies being-at-workness (from the word *ergon*, which means work, deed). Something does an act and in doing that, it is what it is (e.g. the fact that the house shelters is its being-at-workness). *Entelécheia*, on the other hand, signifies that this being-at-workness means being-complete, at an end and fulfilling a purpose. For Aristotle, the fact that a thing does that which constitutes
There is one further position of the subject, beyond the established *being in and for itself*. This is the position of *for us*. Hegel very often uses *for us* as synonymous with *in itself*. For example, he often writes “for us, or *in itself*”\(^{85}\), and opposes *for us* to *for itself*, “known to us, but not to itself [für uns, nicht für sich selbst]”\(^{86}\). This might seem confusing at first because *being for itself* is the position of the subject, whereas it seems that *for us* presents us with another subject-position. But the position of *for us* is the subject-position of the author Hegel himself and us the readers who are following the dialectical process in his text. It is the position that at first stands outside the confines of the dialectical process because it has the perspective of the “whole”, the “completed” process before the substance itself has it. If we take the example from his philosophy of history, the idea would be that *in front of us* we encounter Spirit in the form of a principle lived by an ancient people. Considering that the Spirit will overcome this principle and will develop itself further, the Spirit at the stage of an ancient principle is still *in itself* and has in this form the potential to develop. At this stage, it is simply that which it is *in itself*. It does not know what it will become. As opposed to this, we as the authors and readers find ourselves in a position where we know what Spirit is at this particular stage as well as what it will become. Therefore, what it is *in itself*, it is also *for us*. In its development Spirit must become what it is *in itself* and *for us*, “for itself”. *For itself* that we perceive, from the position of an already established development, must become Spirit’s own knowledge. What we know, it must know, and the task of Hegel’s philosophy is to show this process. But as Spirit is in the process of knowing itself, its *being in itself* changes as well. Because the dichotomy of potentiality and actuality is thought within the framework of consciousness in Hegel’s philosophy, the idea of *being in itself* is complex. It does not only denote a potentiality, but a “default” state of being, being’s basic potentiality. As a result, *being for itself* is not simply the realization of a potential, but the becoming of *being in itself* into a self-conscious *being in itself*, where the “default” mode of being or its potentiality changes as well. The *in itself* represents


immediacy as such, which is mediated by becoming for itself that splits the substance and introduces a self which does not remain only in position of for itself, but also becomes a novel in itself, insofar what is immediate to the self is itself. In other words, the immediacy of nature is not merely external, but becomes an internal immediacy. This means that for us does not simply stand outside of the process in the form of an observer. Our immediacy is itself always already mediated. Our position is the result of the process, the being-conscious of the process that resulted from the historical development. Hegel’s philosophy of history stands inside this historical development as its integral part. It represents the writing of history, which at the same time records events in the form of known history [begriffene Geschichte]. As a result, for itself becomes revealed as for us, our position is the knowing of Spirit’s own history. The being in itself, being for itself and for us therefore coincide.

This has two important consequences. In the first instance, this means that Hegel’s philosophy of history is not something radically different from preceding histories. It is simply the same process repeating itself. In history, for us is integrated into the process as such. In the second instance, Hegel’s philosophy of history does not commence with Hegel, but with the first historians to have written. In every self-made history of the people, the given people sees itself as an accomplishment of its own principle, it reflects itself in art, literature, philosophy, religion, and most importantly in its State, around which all the particular moments are bound. But this “arrogance” stands in opposition to the Endzweck of development – the principle of freedom. Consequently, the recorded history of the people, its achieved level of consciousness and image of itself as well as its relation to the “outside”, are betrayed by another principle.

A modern person is in itself something different than an ancient person. Both possess the potentiality to realize themselves into self-conscious beings. However, because the individual is not merely a biological unit, but always already a socially conditioned form of Spirit, the potentiality of a modern person relates to the potentiality of the world in which it is born. Therefore, whereas on the most basic, hypothetical level, any individual, born anywhere and at any time has the elementary potential to be a free person (based on its human capacities of language, thought, reflection), the historical development divides the potentialities present in the ancient world still not fully conscious of freedom and the modern world organized around a developed idea of freedom. The modern person has no option to realize the ancient world, and the ancient person, although technically capable of realizing a modern idea of freedom, will never have the necessary potential since this world does not pre-exist it. This is also why in itself as what is immediate to myself is different than the immediacy of the ancient person. What appears to me as immediate and in itself is transformed by the historical development in consciousness of freedom and mediated by a longer historical process of becoming free. This is why Hegel retains the concept of in itself within the concept of being in and for itself [An-und-für-sich-sein].

This happens in the realm of absolute Spirit, and in conceptual form in philosophy. The relationship of this form of Spirit to the State will be the subject of the third chapter.
carried by another people, who are the true keepers of their principle, because it is they who further develop it.

The people who were the bearers of a specific principle, and the State that expressed a particular principle of Spirit become obsolete and give way to a new and higher developed form of State. However, because being in itself does not represent merely a “past” form, but the immediacy always already mediated by historical development, Spirit always remains identical to itself. At all times it sees itself in its own immediacy. Identity [Identität, Sichselbstgleichheit] signifies the persistence of Spirit, the unity of the moving and developing principle, which are expressed in different forms of States and peoples. Hegel shows that although there are discontinuities between different peoples, such as destructions of States before the emergence of new ones, as well as periods of decline, they represent an exteriority in relation to history. In other words, Spirit, in all of its instantiations, the different peoples and States it erects, always preserves identity with itself [sich selbst gleich bleibt]. It retains its immediacy as Spirit and it does this up to the point of our own recording of history. Therefore, in opposition to natural violence, Spirit represents movable identity [bewegende Sichselbstgleichheit]. Nature, as opposed to this, does not exhibit this feature. It is immovable, or as Hegel states:

“Estranged from the Idea, Nature is merely a corpse of the understanding. Nature is the Idea, but only implicitly. This is why Schelling called it a petrified intelligence, which others have even said is frozen.”

The development of nature has no trajectory toward anything else but Spirit. “God does not remain petrified and moribund however, the stones cry out and lift themselves up to Spirit.”

The reason is that nature never reaches the position of for us, it always remains within the confines of immediacy unmediated by development in consciousness. Nature as nature brings forth no purpose other than Spirit itself as distinct from nature, because nature has no contradictory development and does not appear as “other” to itself. It has no unity within itself and it can only become internalized by Spirit, never being capable to internalize Spirit in turn.

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90 Ibid. 94.
93 Ibid.
This is why nature is not merely external, but signifies the “determination of externality” itself.\footnote{Ibid. p. 205.}

However, precisely because the instance of for us is not present in nature, and because for itself and for us eventually coincide, for us, nature is something both internal and external. It is sublated and internalized in the form of our second nature, a concept Hegel uses to describe spiritual forms of life.\footnote{Cf. “But morality is Duty — substantial Right — a “second nature” as it has been justly called; for the first nature of man is his primary merely animal existence.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2001): The Philosophy of History. Kitchener: Batoche Books. p. 55.} At the same time, it is something external and alien, a nature we have abandoned and left outside.\footnote{Manfred Riedel would show that Hegel’s critique of “state of nature” and “natural law” is based on the presuppositions that these theories reduce nature to a multiplicity without a concept proper to it. Furthermore, he shows that this critique is aimed at Kant and especially Fichte, who although understood nature as a product of subjectivity, did this within the confines of understanding [Verstand]. This led to a merely empirical concept of nature. The speculative concept, on the other hand, requires a positive conception of natural right - in other words, a concept of nature as internal to the ethical sphere of man [Sittlichkeit]. In this regard, nature figures as a product of Spirit and human social life. Here I want to show another side of internalization of nature into the sphere of the Sittlichkeit, which is expressed in the simultaneous persistence of exteriority as natural violence that does not figure in the concept of natural right. Riedel makes a similar argument based on Hegel’s development of the concept of nature itself. He points out that in Hegel’s earlier works “nature” still figures as a positive concept, because it is included in the sphere of ethical life but that later, when its role becomes overtaken by “law”, the concept comes to signify an instance of exclusion (this shift actually plays a role in Hegel’s development of the concept of Spirit). Cf. Riedel, M. (1982): Hegels Kritik des Naturrechts, in: Zwischen Tradition und Revolution: Studien zu Hegels Rechtspolitik. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. pp. 87 – 89, 102 – 104.} Therefore, nature signifies both the raw repetitious violence, as well as the developmental capacity of Spirit. What binds these two meanings together is the idea of immediacy, of being in itself as the natural state as such. Spiritual form of life becomes natural – immediate to itself. However, the idea of immediacy as such does not constitute Spirit, rather it is a result of internalized development through which this immediacy becomes conscious of itself. The idea of immediacy, consequently, relates both to something external (the immediacy of nature in the mode of being in itself) and internal (the immediacy of natural/spiritual being in itself that has sublated nature). It reveals a split in the concept of nature as something both internalized and external. I will now turn to this two-folded idea of nature and the corresponding pair of relative and absolute exteriority.
7. Two exteriorities

I showed that at first passions appear as natural violence and as the “most violent” thing. But as Spirit develops in history, passions shed away their contingency. Passions develop and establish themselves as something formed by the State. They are no longer reducible to a raw natural drive. The excessiveness of passions as natural violence represents the mechanism through which the State both emerges and collapses. The relationship of the State and passions establishes a contradiction presupposed by historical development. In nature, the absence of for us is predicated on the idea that passions never bring forth a form different than themselves – they do not enter into contradiction with themselves because they do not become limited through the State. Consequently, as passions develop from natural violence, their raw and “natural” violence becomes excluded from the realm of the State.97

Hegel would conceptually frame this idea via a distinction made in the concept of exteriority. He would distinguish between absolute and relative exteriority [absolutes und relatives Außen]98 to mark a point of transition from substance to subject. The ground for this distinction is contained in the idea of movable identity presented above. Although the expression “movable identity” signifies merely the processuality to which Spirit is submitted and should certainly not be confused with locomotion, there is still one element that this processuality shares with locomotion. This is visible in the fact that Spirit has a direction of movement. Hegel quite clearly establishes a direction of history – it, as the development of Spirit, represents a movement toward the interiority of Spirit. Thus, Spirit moves from the position of being in itself as exteriority marked by natural violence, into being in and for itself that is its interiority. Spirit moves toward its own interiority,99 because it presupposes the emancipation from external necessity. Spirit discovers itself as the ground of its own necessity.

97 Bautz writes that because passions are effective only when a State is presupposed, they themselves must become “moral” [moralisch]. Furthermore, they function either for or against a particular Sittlichkeit, they are never neutral. However, as I will show in the second chapter, what differentiates the modern Sittlichkeit from past States is the fact that passions function at the same time for and against the Sittlichkeit. The relationship is not one of “either...or”, as is the case in world-history. Bautz, T. (1988): Hegels Lehre von der Weltgeschichte. Zur logischen und systematischen Grundlegung der Hegelschen Geschichtsphilosophie. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. p. 92.
99 Ibid. p. 104.
The State, therefore, represents the development of Spirit into itself and away from external necessity in the form of natural violence. This external necessity is what is called the *absolute exterior*. It is *absolute* because it constitutes Spirit, meaning that it appears as necessary in relation to Spirit. This sense of exteriority terms violence *as such*. “Violence [*Gewalt*] is the *appearance of power* [*Macht*], or power as external.”\(^{100}\) As absolute exteriority, natural violence appears as something that cannot be controlled and as a power standing beyond the power of the subject, different from it and appearing in the form of fate.

“Power, as *objective universality* and as *violence against the object* is what is called *fate* – a concept that falls within mechanism in so far as fate is called *blind*, that is, its *objective universality* is not recognized by the subject in its own specific sphere.”\(^{101}\)

Violence is the mark of absolute exteriority and the effects of exteriority upon the subject.\(^{102}\) But as Spirit emancipates itself from this exteriority it does not annihilate it. Instead, the position of exteriority changes. As natural violence turns into State-power the contingent factor turns from absolute to relative. Hegel gives an example of this:

“Thus the Christian World has no *absolute existence* outside its sphere [*absolutes Außen*], but only a relative one which is already implicitly vanquished, and in respect to which its only concern is to make it apparent that this conquest has taken place. Hence it follows that an external reference ceases to be the characteristic element determining the epochs of the modern world.”\(^{103}\)

Christianity does not have absolute exteriority in relation to itself because it views the world *in toto* as a product of Spirit. The world results from an *absolute* in the shape of man and in intimate relationship with man. In the Judeo-Christian framework, nature has been created *for* man. This stands in stark contrast with preceding mythologies, where the world figures as a creation of powers unrelated to man and where human beings appear as an after-thought or even a mistake.\(^{104}\)

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\(^{102}\) On this relationship, see: Tinland, Olivier (n.d.): *La violence dans la philosophie de Hegel*. Available online at: [http://www.academia.edu/1797741/La_violence_dans_la_philosophie_de_Hegel]. pp. 2-3. (Last accessed on 10. 01. 2016).


\(^{104}\) To know nature as a home, to recognize it as a product of one’s own powers, is to live in a world. According to Hegel, Christianity is on the path of discovering this. Because nature is a world, it does not present itself as exteriority that conditions man in the form of a foreign power. This presents a continuation of the Greek discovery of man. As Paul Ricoeur notes, Hegel uses the term *Geschichtlichkeit* (that will go on to become one of the central concepts of later philosophy) only on two occasions: when talking about the Greek *Sittlichkeit* and the figure of Christ. The term signifies the memorial mode of being of Spirit, which is a feature not possessed by
Consequently, in absolute exteriority Spirit still perceives natural violence as a law distinct from itself, as something externally imposed and radically different from it. In the case of chthonic mythology it was shown that gods were regarded as nature that could not be predicted or contained.\textsuperscript{105} This isn’t simply a “point of view”, because Spirit stands in relation to exteriority as something absolutely different from itself. The contingency of exteriority is absolute because it determines Spirit in its consciousness of itself. The archaic Greek, still immersed in the fear of unpredictable and horrifying beings, views himself as someone who is subject to blind fate, to wild and catastrophic events that shape his existence. Relative exteriority, as opposed to this, signifies the recognition of violence as something transformed and internalized. The recognition of this violence as something constitutive is the essence of the State.\textsuperscript{106} When exteriority becomes conquered, \textit{human law} begins to rule in opposition to the lawlessness of mad gods and renegade titans that express the unpredictable caprice of nature. The exteriority is reduced and stripped of its absoluteness because it becomes

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\item nature. Historicity is the power of memorial folding that establishes a world. The new act, new thought, new form of emotion fall back into this folded worldly realm of man, not into nature, which remains flat. Ricoeur, Paul (2006): \textit{Memory, History, Forgetting}. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 370.
\item Indeed, the Olympian mythology will witness not only more aesthetically humane divinities but also a limit to their caprice. The Greeks expressed this in the idea of \textit{Ananke} (Fate), an external necessity to which not only mortals but the gods themselves were subjected.
\item I noted before that there are two sides to Hegel’s idea of the State (one belonging to philosophy of history, the other to philosophy of right). Both of these sides are necessary because to omit one side is to absolutize the other. This is the case with Adorno, who writes positively on the “cult of the State” present in Hegel, because it is justified on account of the State being the only mechanism capable of resolving the contradictions of the civil society (that is unable to resolve these contradictions). Adorno plays both sides of the argument - he seemingly agrees with those authors who view Hegel’s State as a precursor of fascism and totalitarianism: “Hegel broke off [dialectical] thoughts by abruptly absolutizing one category – the State.” But he then turns the argument around to show that the “cult of the State” is justified in the face of the destructive and savage nature of the market, condoned precisely by those who accuse Hegel of a “State-cult”. Although this is a weird defence of Hegel, Adorno only examines the State within the format of the philosophy of right. This leads to a heightened interest in the relationship of the State (and more precisely the Prussian State) and civil society. But the historical side holds the key to the relationship of the State to the realm of nature, a broader relationship that reveals the reasons for Hegel’s fascination with all States. All States present a power comparable to nature, yet distinct from it, a human power of organization that is not conditioned by age, blood, kinship (instances of natural organization in tribes, families, and so on) but by reason - a power that institutes history by “drawing out” a people from a mass of individuals and that at the pinnacle of historical development abolishes the “people” in order to enter into a relationship with the individual (this is the side that belongs to philosophy of right that I will turn to in the second chapter). Adorno, T. (1993): \textit{Hegel: Three Studies}. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. pp. 28, 80.
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\textsuperscript{105} Indeed, the Olympian mythology will witness not only more aesthetically humane divinities but also a limit to their caprice. The Greeks expressed this in the idea of \textit{Ananke} (Fate), an external necessity to which not only mortals but the gods themselves were subjected.

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internalized through the mechanism of the State. Contingency as natural violence loses its absolute character and does not hold any constitutive role for Spirit anymore. Instead, it becomes reduced to relative contingency.

Hegel gives an example of this in his philosophy of religion:

“Punishment comes upon a man as an evil, as force [Gewalt], as the exercise of power which is foreign to him, and in which he does not find himself. It appears as external necessity [äußere Notwendigkeit], as something external which falls upon him, and something different from what he has done results from it; punishment follows on his action, but it is something different from, other than, what he willed himself. If, however, a man comes to recognise punishment as just, then it is the consequence and the law of his own act of will which is bound up with his act itself. It is the rationality of his act which comes to him under the semblance of an ‘other’ [...].”

When natural violence becomes sublated, murder is no longer a blind occurrence of fate that perpetuates itself through vengeance in further natural violence. Instead, it appears as a crime, an injury of law, warranting a punishment for its correction, a punishment that Spirit, i.e. society and in principle the murderer himself accept. The passage from absolute to relative contingency, therefore, signifies that contingency of the event becomes unified with necessity. All the passions that lead to contingent occurrences gain a trajectory toward engendering a world of Spirit. They do not merely repeat themselves, nor do they repeat older forms of punishment. Spirit as nature forces itself from within to conform to rational forms of organization.

Dieter Heinrich gives an example of this: two people falling in love represents a contingent, unpredictable and completely inconsequential occurrence. But this contingent event leads to a process of mutual recognition, subjecting the chance meeting to necessity of exteriorizing oneself and relinquishing one’s freedom in order to affirm it through social practices of love, marriage, and so on. Instead of the chance meeting resulting in procreation and repetition of

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organic life, it gains spiritual significance and serves as a building element for spiritual forms of life (the family and by extension the State itself).\textsuperscript{109} In this way, contingency does not have to be subjected through force to necessity (requiring external application of violence), but internally becomes capable of engendering necessary forms of life. The transition from repetitious violence into repetition of law, therefore, takes on the form of development within immediacy itself – from natural immediacy to a spiritual one.

“In its immediacy, spiritual life at first appears as innocence and unprejudiced confidence. However, the essence of Spirit lies in the sublation of this immediate state, because spiritual life differs from animal life through the fact that it does not remain something in itself, but becomes for itself. [Author’s translation]”\textsuperscript{110}

The split in the nature of immediacy, one remaining on the level of being in itself, the other achieving the instance of for itself, corresponds to the relationship of absolute and relative exteriority. Nature as such has no interiority and represents determination of exteriority. Spirit, as opposed to this, internalizes determination. Whereas nature experiences determination from the outside (e.g. a stone is determined by pressure, temperature, composition of matter, gravity, and has no other identity apart from these external relations), Spirit has a capacity for self-determination.

There are two points resulting from this analysis that require attention. The first concerns the split experienced by exteriority. It was shown that exteriority acts as violence which gradually becomes transformed and internalized. Natural violence as passion serves as the motive force in the actions of world-historical individuals, but also in establishing an objective order that in turn serves to subject and form the individual will. This process repeats itself: States emerge through passions and collapse under the violence of passions. More developed States exhibit a higher level of internalization of violence and they possess a higher capacity to resist exteriority. History, therefore, as a process of Spirit moves in the direction of interiority and does this by retaining the identity of Spirit.


However, there is also another resultant point. Although natural violence experiences transformations by being internalized, it still repeats itself as natural violence beyond any historical development. Simply looking at Hegel’s description of State-power, one can see that he identifies spiritual movement in opposition to movement that remains identical to itself without contradiction, development or change. Indeed, what defines Spirit is its capacity for self-determination. Self-determination necessitates exteriority to affirm itself as such, otherwise there would be no point in attaching the qualifier “self” to “determination”. In other words, if there is an instance of for itself that is also for us, which at the same time signifies a form of sublated immediacy – our “natural” being in itself of spirituality, then this capacity for self-determination is predicated on a permanent relationship to external nature. There is not only the movable identity of being in itself that reaches for itself as the point of our own subjectivity (for us), but also the stubbornness of self-identical contingency, which although changes in character from the position of Spirit, does not become annihilated. Nature can only develop toward Spirit (the instance of for itself) but also remain as nature, what it is (never reaching the instance of for us). The examples of this are numerous and are never conceptually formulated by Hegel. The most banal example would be murder that can still produce vengeance beyond the law. For us, there is a difference between vengeance and law, because as shown, for us is the instance we occupy together with Hegel. From this position, we can qualify murder as a crime categorized under the law and in this way circumvent the passion to exact revenge. The contingent act – murder, is in this case unified with necessity. At the same time, although Spirit recognizes this occurrence as a crime, there is actually nothing preventing murder repeating itself in murder. Nature persists as nature. This might seem inconsequential, and from the standpoint of world-historical development, as well as in Hegel’s view, it is inconsequential. Nature persists in some way or another without becoming Spirit. However, another side of this is that world-history itself leaves behind a multitude of peoples that have become expelled from it and reduced to a kind of vegetative, natural existence.

“India, like China, is a phenomenon antique as well as modern; one which has remained stationary and fixed, and has received a most perfect home-sprung development. [...] While China and India remain stationary, and perpetuate a natural vegetative existence even to the present time, this land [Persia – G.H.] has been subject to those developments and revolutions, which alone manifest a historical condition.”

In the case of India and China of Hegel’s time, Spirit remains identical to itself beyond the bounds of dialectical development. For us this Spirit persists in a “vegetative” and “stationary”

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This vegetative nature in Hegel’s philosophy lacks a concept. It falls under the established conceptual framework of contingency and immediacy. This is a consequence of Hegel’s theoretical position: contingent appearances of nature deserve no concept when not synthetized with necessity. However, although they might not deserve a concept, they still persist in some form of reality. In other words, there is a difference between the contingency of natural violence before its unification with necessity and its persistence as natural violence after this unification takes place. The importance of this difference will feature prominently in the following argumentation of my work.

8. Result

In this chapter I showed that Hegel views the State as a mechanism through which natural violence becomes sublated into rationally organized human power. The State internalizes natural violence as external necessity that instils fear and reproduces it as a spiritual form of life. This takes place via the recording of events through which they gain historical significance. Passionate investments that drive these events become memorized and channelled into the institutional framework of the human world. By recording and memorizing, the State establishes a historical form of life, one which does not reference nature, but its own memory in order to perpetuate itself. Absolute exteriority of nature becomes relativized. When this takes place, contingency does not become eradicated, but instead becomes unified with necessity. Simultaneously, an excess of contingency appears in the form of events that do not conform to internalized necessity. This surplus of contingency is non-historical and at first inconsequential for the life of Spirit. Its inconsequentiality is underscored by Hegel’s view that such contingency does not deserve proper conceptualization.

In the following chapters of this work I will show that this lack of conceptualization on Hegel’s part is implicitly an object of Deleuze’s critique. These non-conceptualized forms, it will be shown, have - precisely as under-developed forms of Spirit - a constitutive role in the

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112 Cf. “This impotence on the part of nature sets limits to philosophy, and it is the height of pointlessness to demand of the Notion that it should explain, and as it is said, construe or deduce these contingent products of nature, although the more isolated and trifling they are the easier the task appears to be. [Emphasis added]” Although Hegel speaks of various natural products here, the view could be extended to “leftover” forms of Spirit as well. The reason is that they both figure as natural, lower forms of Spirit and that Hegel describes these forms precisely with terms such as “contingency” or “vegetation”, which are usually reserved for anything that has to do with nature. Hegel, G. W. F. (1970): Philosophy of Nature. Vol. 1. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. p. 215.
functioning of developed forms of Spirit. In other words, the excess of absolute exteriority in the form of vegetative repetition is anything but inconsequential. Before I explicate further on this point, I will turn to Deleuze’s general critique of history by introducing the second conceptual pair in the analogy, that of history and becoming.
PART II: DELEUZE AND ANTI-HISTORICAL BECOMING

1. Introduction: the second pair of the analogy

The examination of Hegel’s conception of history has revealed that beyond the concept of history, and as a result of this concept, a residue can be found in Hegel’s texts. The concept of history as an isolated sphere of memory reveals an excess of occurrences not appropriated into the historical narrative. These occurrences represent contingent appearances that do not possess a concept. They can only be described as Spirit in a lingering and vegetative state of natural violence or as an exterior that is relative in relation to Spirit in its developed form.

In the second part of this chapter I will examine the other conceptual pair of history and becoming found in Deleuze’s philosophy. The task will be to show that the relationship between history and becoming is analogous to the first pair of history and natural violence. Both pairs rely on an idea of exteriority in order to express the sense contained in them. The sense expressed in these conceptual pairs, however, is opposite, but their analogous nature leads to similar consequences when the concept of immanence is extracted from the relationship.

2. Deleuze’s concept of history

One of the most recurrent criticisms Deleuze levels at Hegel is that there is no immanence in his philosophy, only “false theatre, false drama, false movement”. His critique aims to achieve a concept of immanence under the presupposition that Hegel had intended and failed to do this. The failure, Deleuze argues, lies in Hegel’s reliance on the historical account of events. Deleuze contends that the main feature of the historical account of events is a reduction of events to the State-sanctioned “writing”. History is “always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus”.

Deleuze’s concept of history is indebted to Hegel, but he often uses the concept only to denounce it. The meaning of the term history in Deleuze’s philosophy is not consistent. For example, sometimes he utilizes the concept of history to signify any form of a historical

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account, such as when he writes about “all history”. At other times he clearly distinguishes between history as a “form of interiority” and history, which could be thought in another way. One example of this is the following sentence:

“Hegel and Heidegger remain historicists inasmuch as they posit history as a form of interiority in which the concept necessarily develops or unveils its destiny. The necessity rests on the abstraction of the historical element rendered circular.”

He establishes his critique on the grounds that history is “posited” in a historicist account, which implies that there could be a non-historicist view of history. For example, in *What is Philosophy?*, he and Guattari distinguish between “History” with a capital letter and “history” in general. In other places Deleuze is completely opposed to the notion of history: “There is no history but of the majority, or of minorities as defined in relation to the majority.” One further claim, which stands in a close proximity to this, is the already mentioned one, according to which history is always written from the position of the State and in its name. Both of these ideas are clearly aimed against Hegel who in the same work (along with Goethe) features as a “State thinker”. As a result of this, Deleuze would claim that one needs to abandon “the narrowly historical point of view of before and after”. However, he then again turns around by claiming that history cannot be reduced to a discourse guided by traditional philosophy of transcendence, arguing instead that it must always be viewed in relation to its immanent nature by referring to *becoming* as something prior to history. To add to this confusion, he states that *becoming* necessitates history, without which it would become “indeterminate” and “unconditioned”. It is not fully clear how this other approach of postulating *becoming* as prior to history stands in relation to the idea of “abandoning the narrowly historical point of view”, especially when *becoming* itself necessitates history.

In any case it seems that Deleuze holds two different views on history:

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1) On the one hand, history is something opposed to the main principles of his own philosophy - it is never anything else but the writing of the State or a “state of affairs”. Consequently, a historical view has to be abandoned. History comes close to something of an illusion, which must be abandoned in favour of the “real ground of history”, namely becoming that has exclusive rights to immanence.

2) On the other hand, history is integrated into Deleuze's philosophy as a positive concept and not only as an object of critique. Nevertheless, in this form it remains something that has its ground in the “deeper process” of becoming and represents an epiphenomena of immanence. Here the same relationship is present as in the first case, only with the appendix that becoming itself is not possible without history, thus erasing the idea that history can be categorized as an illusion.

The claim that “all history” is nothing else but the writing of the State and the “standpoint of majority” necessitates the abandonment of the “historical point of view”. It relates history to the notion of “false movement”. However, when introducing an alternative to history in the form of becoming as true immanence (and opposed to “false movement” of Hegel's philosophy), history does not appear as an illusion that obscures becoming, but as an integral and necessary part of it. At this point, the claim about “all history” suddenly shifts to accommodate “history” as opposed to “History” with a capital H.

Both of these claims necessitate an account of the difference between history and becoming. This difference is not straightforward in Deleuze’s philosophy. It presupposes not only other authors who influenced Deleuze, but other concepts through which this difference is established. I will argue that there are three central concepts for the understanding of the relationship between history and becoming. These concepts are: paradox, event and assemblage [l’agencement]. They simultaneously give an explanatory framework for differentiating history and becoming and posit these two concepts in relation to the concept of the State that serves as a boundary between them. In other words, history is the writing of the State, whereas becoming is not and relates to nature. The three concepts, furthermore, stand in close relationship to each other: events are paradoxical and emerge as an effect of the interplay between bodies and their expressions. These three elements (events, bodies, expression) constitute an assemblage.

Therefore, in this subchapter I will first deal with the concept of contradiction, in order to show how the resolution of contradiction present in social conflict leads to the necessity of the State. In order to break the link between history and contradiction, Deleuze would introduce the concept of the paradox. The second object of this subchapter will be the concept of the assemblage. This concept relates to the form of multiplicity which does not necessitate a
“whole” that would be alienated from its constitutive parts - in other words, it does not necessitate the State as a form where all contradictory elements would be sublated and subjected to totality. Finally, in this subchapter I will examine the concept of the event, and how can events be thought beyond the historical framework. The presentation of the concept of becoming will show that events are not presupposed by any temporal form that could isolate society from nature. Nature and society stand in a relationship of indifference to each other when related to the concept of becoming.124

One important element on which the argument will be based in this subchapter is Althusser’s critique of Hegel’s concept of contradiction. The reason why Althusser will play a prominent role is both his influence on Deleuze’s critique of Hegel and the fact that Deleuze in his critique of history attacks not only Hegel, but the whole framework that views history as a process of change based on the resolution of conflict. Althusser does not only play a prominent role in this theoretical framework, but also serves as an example of the failure to go beyond it. Therefore, in order to understand Deleuze’s critique of Hegel, it is necessary to view this critique in the context of a broader confrontation with a general mode of understanding social life based on a specific idea of conflict. Althusser plays an important role within this context because he stands between Hegel and Deleuze. He develops a critique of Hegel that, in Deleuze’s view, fails because it remains bound to the core presupposition of Hegel’s thought.

3. The problem of contradiction

Deleuze’s concept of history and its relationship to the concept of becoming have their common ground in his critique of the concept of contradiction. Deleuze’s attack on contradiction appears throughout all the phases of his work and is one of the important points of his critique of Hegel in general.

His main argument against the concept of contradiction is that it frames temporality along a specific idea of conflict.125 This idea of conflict relies on the principle of resolution, which is

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124 The main works I will refer to in this chapter are *The Logic of Sense* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. Although these two works greatly differ in their objectives, they both contain Deleuze’s theory of the event. Furthermore, *A Thousand Plateaus* extends the theory of the event found in *The Logic of Sense* by giving it immediate social and political role.

125 I will use the concept of “conflict” here provisionally. Although Deleuze presupposes conflict as the main factor in how history and becoming relate to each other, conflict, as it is usually understood (e.g. a conflict between pre-determined parties), is not what he means under the term. Conflict, as I will later show, is related to concepts.
inherently presupposed in contradiction. This means that, in relation to the contradiction between two terms, another, third term is posited that serves to sublate and internalize them both, pacifying in this way conflict and engendering predetermined historical peace in the form of the State. The presupposition of resolution in contradiction or, in other words, the presupposition of the State in conflict, obscures the fact that conflict is not a matter of contradiction but difference. Difference is a concept that does not presuppose a resolution of conflict. Therefore, to reach a concept of change that fully accommodates conflict, one must go beyond the concept of contradiction.

What is the distinction between difference and contradiction? In the first instance, contradiction is a form of difference, specifically, it is the “largest difference” between two terms. There is no greater difference between two points than that of contradiction. However, this largeness of difference, according to Deleuze, obscures difference and in this way the nature of conflict. The first argument against contradiction claims that no matter how large the distance between two terms is, it is always a difference between determined terms, namely such terms that are either existent or deduced as possible. The existence of contradictory terms conditions the possibility of anything that emerges when contradiction is resolved. Contradiction is posited between existing determinate forms (e.g. between bourgeois and proletariat), which then conditions the outcome of conflict. The possible then becomes something deduced from the already present terms. The form emerging from the resolution of contradiction is itself a determinate form deduced from the existing social relations and of resistance, line of flight and the war machine. By introducing these concepts later on, I will also expand on the meaning of “conflict” in Deleuze. The point is that Deleuze seeks to dissociate “conflict” from the idea of contradiction - in other words, from the idea that conflict always already presupposes established interests and subjectivities.

129 “If we distinguish two sorts of beings, the being of the real as the matter of denotations and the being of the possible as the form of signification, we must yet add this extra-being which defines a minimum common to the real, the possible and the impossible. For the principle of contradiction is applied to the possible and to the real, but not to the impossible: impossible entities are ‘extra-existents’ reduced to this minimum, and insisting as such in the proposition.” Deleuze, G. (1990): The Logic of Sense. London: The Athlone Press. p. 35.
projected from the point of contradictory present state. This is why State-violence is presupposed in all conflict, since all conflict presupposes resolution in some instance.

“[…] In contradistinction to primitive violence, State or lawful violence always seems to presuppose itself, for it preexists its own use: the State can in this way say that violence is ‘primal,’ that it is simply a natural phenomenon the responsibility for which does not lie with the State, which uses violence only against the violent, against ‘criminals’—against primitives, against nomads—in order that peace may reign.”

This self-presupposition of State-violence has its logical ground in the way contradiction “captures” difference and forces it to conform to the conditions of a pre-determined resolution. Differentiation, which is inherent to conflict, is posited as both contradictory and in this way resolvable, necessitating a political form of the solution.

“It seems that, according to Hegel, ‘contradiction’ poses very few problems. It serves a quite different purpose: contradiction resolves itself and, in resolving itself, resolves difference by relating it to the ground.”

The resolution in Hegel does not stand under the conditions of the principle of excluded middle, where the solution would be to choose either one or the other term of the contradiction. Instead, sublation pacifies both elements, resolving contradiction by engendering novelty, making resolution the driving element of historical development. Whereas understanding does not accept contradiction as anything else but an error of thought, reason, which is at work in history, mobilizes contradiction as productive difference, but it does this for the purpose of re-establishing the “identity of identity and difference”. In this way, historical development is loaded with a presupposed form of conflict, as well as with a pre-given form of resolution. Whereas natural violence figures merely as an irresolvable and perpetually differentiating

132 Whereas understanding [Verstand] rejects contradictions as logical fallacies based on the exclusion of the third term and the identity principle, reason [Vernunft] integrates contradiction via dialectics. For the understanding, sublation represents the third term that opposes the criteria of truth. When understanding encounters a contradiction, the conclusion is that the argument is erroneous. For example, if one encounters a contradiction between A and B, one must accept either one or the other, and both only on the grounds that the contradiction between them has been abolished. The subject can be either A or B, but not both. As opposed to this, reason accepts the state where both terms are permissible by introducing the third, excluded term C. This excluded term internalizes both sides of the contradiction. Precisely this internalization accomplishes resolution. This means that although reason differentiates itself from understanding insofar as it accepts contradiction and the excluded third term, it still seeks to abolish it through the process of sublation.
conflict, State-violence signifies the capacity of Spirit to, as shown in the first part, appear “other” and contradictory to itself, thereby effectuating historical development. This development, however, is already predetermined in content, because it cannot resolve itself into anything else but the State.

Deleuze, as shown in this basic outline, criticizes contradiction from a position of difference. From his position, history is not a process of contradictions and resolutions, but of becomings. Before I turn to the concept of becoming, I would like to sketch an outline of one modification to Hegel’s concept of contradiction that would lead into the concept of becoming. This modification is contained in the work of Louis Althusser and his critique of “expressive totality”, as well as in his reformulation of the concept of contradiction into that of overdetermination. The outline of this critique will enable me to fully differentiate Deleuze in his critique of Hegel’s concept of contradiction.

4. Althusser and overdetermination

Althusser’s critique of contradiction relies on a similar argument to that of Deleuze, namely that contradiction cannot express the full nature of conflict. By being subjected to contradiction, conflict becomes petrified and simplified. Althusser differentiates between “simple” and “complex” contradiction. In Hegel’s philosophy, according to Althusser, there are only “simple” contradictions. He would use Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* to claim that at first the contradiction “does not appear to be simple, but on the contrary very complex”.

Nevertheless, this complexity of contradiction in the consciousness, presented in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is an illusion obscuring Hegel's ultimately linear idea of development. Although in *Phenomenology* one perceives a multitude of contradictions, what in fact takes place is sublation, through which these contradictions become internalized within one dominant contradiction. Althusser terms this “cumulative internalisation”. By becoming internalized, contradiction becomes pacified and as such forms a constitutive part of consciousness. The contradiction is no longer active, because it is not capable of effectuating change or disruption in the development of consciousness. The form that reduces all contradictions to a single contradiction and serves as their point of internalization, Althusser identifies as expressive

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134 Ibid.
He then utilizes this differentiation between simple and complex contradiction at the level of society. The totality expresses in a centralized fashion all the different aspects of society. For example, the Hegelian model of Marxism would claim that all social relations express economic relations – the economic essence is present in all phenomena. In this way, the totality of social life is determined by the base that conditions all the other elements, on the one hand, and is at the same time expressed in all of them, on the other.

In opposition to the idea of internalization, Althusser introduces the concept of survival [survivance], which is “the reactivation of older elements”. The concept of survival presupposes that society is structured in such a way that at any given time multiple contradictions determine the social field, without an instance of a form that could pacify them. Society is composed of heterogeneous structures and every structure presupposes a different historical level of development that has survived internalization. Various structures of society exist beyond the level of an expression of totality and are relatively independent from it. There are economic, religious, ideological, political, and other structures, which all presuppose specific historical developments of their own and that in turn determine the totality they compose. Consequently, every contradiction is actively at any time determined by other contradictions. Every level of society and every contradiction is determined by a different contradictory pair. In this way, different structures relate to each other through overdetermination [surdétermination].

Within the framework of overdetermination, rather than something being sublated and internalized within a higher form, expressing this form and becoming integral to the functioning of the system (“reduced to the modality of a memory”), it survives. The feudal structure “survives” the transition to capitalism in the same way superstructural developments survive certain economic developments (e.g. political, artistic, and other forms that emerge from the

\[\text{\textit{totality.}}^{135}\]

\[\text{Ibid. p. 102.}\]

\[\text{As shown in the first subchapter, Hegel views relative contingency as something identical with necessity. Contingent, passing occurrences become converted into stable, rational and historical events. A murder has a trajectory toward the establishment of law, which conditions further occurrences of murder. This synthetic relationship of contingency and necessity is the essence of totality. As I will show in the third part of this chapter, repetition of contingent occurrences leads to an emergence of the whole as something “more” than its constitutive, individual elements.}\]

\[\text{\textit{Ibid. p. 116.}}\]

\[\text{For example, the contradiction between labour and capital is overdetermined by a contradiction between capital and land. (One result of this is the famous peasant question that runs throughout the history of Marxism).}\]

\[\text{\textit{Ibid. p. 115.}}\]
present capitalist system, which are at the same time remnants of older formations). As a result of this, historical change is not linear and continuous, but contingent, discontinuous and overdetermined, because it does not follow one form of conflict and its contradictions. Instead, change emerges through the clashing of heterogeneous structures that are not synchronized and cannot be related to an expressive totality.\(^\text{140}\)

5. **Contradiction and paradox**

Althusser wrote that what differentiates Marx’s history - the “continent of knowledge” he “opened up” - from Hegel’s philosophy of history, is the reformulation of the concept of contradiction into that of overdetermination.\(^\text{141}\) This “opening up” of history revealed that various elements of the social fabric co-exist, despite belonging to different temporalities. Social structures are not homogeneous but are composed from elements, which in Hegel would either exclude each other or necessitate sublation in order to become mutually integrated.\(^\text{142}\)

\(^\text{140}\) Althusser’s idea of overdetermination has its roots in Leon Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development. This theory emerged as a response to Marxists such as Georgi Plekhanov, who adhered to a strict economic determinism, stating that the conditions in Russia were not yet ready for an establishment of communism, because the country had to traverse the path of capitalism first. In his first formulation of the theory, Trotsky would claim that Russia was an exception to this rule, because it depended industrially on already developed capitalist countries such as England, Germany and France. Russia imported not only the machinery necessary for industrial production, but also social relations specific to capitalism. These new relations merged with the already existing feudal structures, as well as with the absolutist political regime, leading to a heterogeneous social formation marked not only by the contradiction specific to capitalism (between capital and labour), but also by those present in the remaining feudal structures and the absolutist regime. Trotsky would later expand this theory to encompass the whole world (Russian exception became the blueprint for the world, because the world itself is composed of multitude of countries, all at a different level of development and at the same time closely connected to each other). This expanded theory of unequal and combined development was appropriated by Althusser. Trotsky, L. (2008): *The History of the Russian Revolution*. Chicago: Haymarket Books. pp. 3 – 12.


\(^\text{142}\) For example, the modern State at the same time excludes religion, insofar as politics appears independent from its dominance, and contains religion, because the modern State sublated the historical novelties of Christianity (and Protestantism) in a political form. Finally, the modern State itself is sublated into religion as a form of absolute Spirit. Within a structuralist, overdetermined account, the modern State co-exists with religious forms of life where these forms do not represent living memory or an expression of absolute Spirit but a constitutive
According to Althusser, based on the model of *overdetermination*, history can finally be regarded within scientific terms because it does not rely on “expression” of the whole throughout all the elements of the social structure.

Deleuze will favourably comment on Althusser’s critique of contradiction and its reformulation into the concept of *overdetermination*:

“Louis Althusser, for example, shows in this sense that the originality of Marx (his anti-Hegelianism) resides in the manner in which the social system is defined by a coexistence of elements and economic relations, without one being able to engender them successively according to the illusion of a false dialectic.”

Although Deleuze goes as far as stating that Althusser “liberated” Marx from Hegel, his own critique of contradiction not only builds on Althusser’s attack on Hegel but also turns against Althusser himself. From Deleuze’s standpoint, the concept of *overdetermination* remains caught up in the logic of contradiction. More precisely, *overdetermination* is still a concept based on the primacy of contradiction. The change from “simple” to “complex” contradiction does transform the way one thinks social conflict, but since what is changed is contradiction itself, this transformation retains the basic presupposition of a development organized around resolution. In Althusser, this resolution is present in the form of the determination “in the last instance”. According to this formula, the economic base “determines (“in the last instance”) which element is to be dominant in a social formation”. In Althusser’s case, the “last instance” that determines is the economy. Although the economy is not determinative in a way that would establish an expressive totality (where each particular social element would express economic relations), it determines which of the elements is to be the factor within the capitalist economy (for example, the role of religion within the framework of pre-revolutionary Russian tsarist regime, as well as in the economy of peasantry). Similarly, modern capitalism is not opposed to theocratic regimes *per se*, and there are many examples today of capitalist forms of social organization being integrated with religious legal and political frameworks without necessarily leading to mutual exclusion or sublation.


145 I should note that Deleuze does not directly critique the concept of overdetermination. However, the following arguments will show that since this concept represents an extension of the concept of contradiction, an implicit critique of overdetermination is contained in Deleuze’s work. This critique does not aim to reject Althusser’s concept, but to reinterpret it from the standpoint of the theory of difference.

dominant form of conflict. If religion is determined as dominant in the medieval setting, this does not mean that religion is merely an ideological expression of economic relations. Rather, religion is the form through which conflict emerges. Because of this, religion itself has determinative effects on the economy. However, according to Althusser, the dominance of religion as well as all of its effects is still determined by economic relations “in the last instance”. In other words, religion is the dominant mode in which economic relations are determinative.

The fact that Althusser made the economy determinative “in the last instance” is not so much the issue for Deleuze because any other sphere of human practice might have been placed in economy’s place. The important consequence of this form of determination is that whatever determines “in the last instance” figures as the real, whereas other spheres are reduced to a “dominant” mode of reality. As a result of this, overdetermination again becomes reduced to a specific set of contradictions. Because Althusser's determination “in the last instance” resolves conflict into the economy, the economy appears “in the last instance” as the engine of conflict and change, as exemplified in Althusser’s claim that the “class struggle is the motor of history”.147 This undermines Althusser’s own attempt to abandon the base-superstructure model, and repeats the basic gesture of Hegel’s concept of Spirit, in which different practices are “resolved” into one totalizing concept, from which they are then deduced under the conditions of historical development. Certainly, for Althusser, this resolution is not direct, linear or predetermined, but it still clings to the economy “in the last instance”. Although Deleuze does not make this argument, it could be said that Althusser has in fact doubled the economy. On the one hand, economy loses its role of the “base” in relation to the superstructure, since overdetermination makes economy itself determined by other contradictions. On the other hand, since overdetermination is still based on contradiction and consequently, resolution, there exists a spectral economy of the real, which still figures as the base in relation to both the superstructural elements and to the overdetermined economy itself that interplays with them. There is, therefore, the economy that determines religion as dominant, religion which determines economy back, and finally economy as the “real in the last instance” which determines this overall structure of interplay between the elements. Consequently, although in Althusser’s case historical development takes the form of non-linear overdetermination, therefore introducing contingency and discontinuity into historical change, the reliance on “the

last instance” still retains the primacy of contradiction over difference, which means that conflict becomes resolved by being related to the “ground” - in this case, the economic base.

According to Deleuze, in order to grasp social transformation that takes place on the level of difference, it is necessary to remove the “last instance”. When this instance becomes removed, all forms of transformative conflict are given reality. With the removal of the “last instance”, contradiction resolves itself only into a paradox that lacks the element of resolution. Before they are historical or related to the idea of contradiction, events are paradoxical and as such are not bound to a model of temporality that relies on resolution.

“Is it necessary, then, to invoke identity and contradiction? Would two events be incompatible because they were contradictory? Is this not a case, though, of applying rules to events, which apply only to concepts, predicates, and classes?”

Paradox relates to the persistence of the contradiction. While the term “contradiction” carries in its basic meaning a sense of something that must be resolved, when we speak of something paradoxical, we do not necessarily view it in the light of its solution.

“It may be that there is necessarily something mad in every question and every problem, as there is in their transcendence in relation to answers, in their insistence through solutions and the manner in which they maintain their own openness.”

The persistence of the problem through its solutions reveals the falsity of contradiction. The paradoxical nature of conflict cannot be reduced to a pre-established problem, which would then call for its solution. Rather, the problem signifies a “fundamental displacement” insofar as it survives all its solutions. The problem is not qualified in the last instance as economic, since this retains continuity in how the problem is “framed” and “resolved”, i.e. the class struggle. This is something that is still visible in early Althusser, insofar conflict in essence is a class conflict. However, insofar society as such figures as a problem in general, the problem is not related to one of its instantiations and resolutions, but can differ in how it is explicated and resolved. The difference between contradiction and a paradox is revealed precisely in the problematic nature of conflict which cannot be exhausted in its solutions. A resolution of contradiction does not add to totality, but subverts it, because every solution displaces the problem and keeps it open. Deleuze, for example, speaks in Difference and Repetition of

revolution as the “social power of difference” and as “the paradox of society”. A revolution neither introduces nor resolves a contradiction, but fully reveals the paradoxical nature of society. Conflict is primarily unqualified, problematic, and therefore does not operate by contradiction, but by what Deleuze calls lines of flight.

“A social field is defined less by its conflicts and contradictions than by its lines of flight [ligne de fuite] running through it. An assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep structure nor superficial structure; it flattens all its dimensions onto a single plane of consistency upon which reciprocal presuppositions and mutual insertions play themselves out.”

The concept of the line of flight relates to both the unqualified nature of conflict as well as resistance as such. Resistance is a central feature of all conflict (e.g. two sides resist each other, push against each other, etc.). However, resistance also operates on another level. Apart from the main lines of conflict, “a line of rigid and clear-cut segmentarity” on which “there are many words and conversations, questions and answers, interminable explanations, precisions”, there are more subtle lines that do not conform to the established limits of conflict, made up of “silences, allusions, and hasty innuendos inviting interpretation”. Finally, there are “flashes”, “like a train in motion”, when “it is no longer possible for anything to stand for anything else”. These “flashes” where “nothing stands for anything else”, signify lines of flights. At these points, the coordinates of conflict shift. These lines are not necessarily “world-historical” events but imperceptible processes of differentiation. They describe another side of conflict which is not readily visible in its qualified form. At first sight, every conflict appears determined. There are identifiable sides of conflict, their interests are recognizable, and all resistance appears as resistance against the interests of the opponent. At the same time, resistance cannot be exhausted in its trajectory toward a determined object. The reason is that every resistance reveals an excess. One does not resist only in relation to a determined opponent but also to the whole coordinates of conflict one find oneself in. For example, a conflict between two generations cannot be reduced to a contradiction that would become sublated. Additionally, this conflict cannot be traced back to the economy “in the last instance”. The demands of the older generation on the younger one and vice versa do not exhaust the range of resistance of these two groups. Instead, both groups “drift” and exceed the coordinates of conflict (e.g. a

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154 Ibid.
member of the younger generation forms a counter-cultural movement; the member of the older
generation reinvents tradition). Resistance leads to differentiation, where the affirmed
differences carry the capacity to influence and direct the trajectory of conflict. Therefore,
whereas contradiction “fixates” resistance by making it subject to predetermined interests and
to the form of some external instance (either sublation or “last instance), lines of flight place
the primacy of resistance in its creative capacity. The causes of conflict are immanent in their
effects and vise versa, since both possess full reality. In this regard, Deleuze agrees with
Althusser’s basic idea of overdetermination. However, he rejects the “last instance” since
precisely this instance abolishes the immanence of conflict, creating a ghostly double of the
economy outside the effects. Lines of flight signify flight not because they escape conflict, but
because they escape its contradictory, “fixed” form. They permeate conflict, constantly
transforming its institutionalized form.

“Lines of flight, for their part, never consist in running away from the world but rather in causing
runoffs, as when you drill a hole in a pipe; there is no social system that does not leak from all
directions, even if it makes its segments increasingly rigid in order to seal the lines of flight. There
is nothing imaginary, nothing symbolic about a line of flight. There is nothing more active than a
line of flight, among animals or humans. Even History is forced to take that route rather than
proceeding by ‘signifying breaks’.”

This is also the reason why contradiction in fact must not resolve itself and lead to a new
form of social relations. The paradoxical nature of the event is not based on the primacy of
contradiction but on the fact that differentiation as such invites the whole of difference.
Something is not differentiated by being different to an established entity; rather, it is already
differentiated in itself, without recourse to a previous determination. Therefore, what is
regarded as a contradiction represents merely the “observable” element of differentiation that
appears contradictory to some pre-established perceived property. In other words, contradiction
is a “fixation” of the paradox, a petrification of the problem in one of its instantiations. The
mistake of those who operate with contradictions in theory is to accept the fixation of the
problem on the part of the social machine as a intrinsic feature of history:

“The death of a social machine has never been heralded by a disharmony or a dysfunction; on the
contrary, social machines make a habit of feeding on the contradictions they give rise to, on the

155 Ibid. p. 204.
crises they provoke, on the anxieties they engender, and on the infernal operations they regenerate. [...] No one has ever died from contradictions.”

The removal of the element of resolution from contradiction reveals a split in the event. In its contradictory mode, exemplified for Deleuze by Hegel, the event is positioned within a successive and linear temporality, which is related to the ground from which the event gains specific sense. The event is seen as either emerging from contradictions or resolving them. It appears either as a problem necessitating a solution or as a solution to the problem. Althusser’s overdetermined model still retains the basic presupposition of contradiction, retaining the continuity and linearity of the economic. In contrast, lines of flight signify the productive nature of conflict based on the primacy of resistance, not on the primacy of its resolution. When this primacy of resolution is removed, the event reveals its form of becoming. I will now turn to the concept of becoming and the non-historical form of events.

6. Events and becomings

Deleuze claims that unlike history, which is concerned with states of affairs, becomings are pure events. According to him, “all history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession”. It orders and categorizes events or becomings into a chronological framework. On the one hand, this gives us the intuitive understanding of history as the order of events through time but on the other, presupposes that the event is something of another order. Pure event is something “which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is embodied”. For example, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest is a state of affairs [état de choses] - it denotes something that took place on a specific date (9 A.D.), it encompasses specific actors (Germanic tribes and Roman legions) and has a broader historical context leading up to the battle (the expansionist policy of the Roman Empire). It also encompasses the consequences that resulted from the battle (the reluctance of the Roman Empire to expand

beyond the Rhine). This would be a short historical account of the battle that describes a *state of affairs*.\(^{159}\)

However, as a “pure event” the battle also contains a sense that cannot be reduced to its “state of affairs”. In the first instance, the battle is merely a collision of bodies. In the case of the battle in question, “the event is always produced by bodies which collide, lacerate each other or interpenetrate, the flesh and the sword”.\(^{160}\)

The battle is an assemblage of bodies that “intermingle”. Yet the event, although produced by bodies, is something beyond the bodies that interact: “But this effect itself is not of the order of bodies, an impassive, incorporeal, impenetrable battle, which towers over its own accomplishment and dominates its effectuation”.\(^{161}\) As an “impassive, incorporeal, impenetrable battle”, the event is found only in its expression.\(^{162}\) Therefore, there are three elements here: bodies, expression and events.

Bodies refer to anything which might act or be acted upon.\(^{163}\) Events emerge through the actions and passions of the body in relation to other bodies; *e.g.* bodies “intermingle” in the battle and effectuate an event. This event is then expressed. However, when Deleuze and Guattari speak about expression, they do not mean language in its function of representation or communication, but rather in its performative capacity.\(^{164}\) In other words, through its

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\(^{159}\) Sean Bowden gives a concise definition of the “state of affairs” as “physical qualities and real relations”. A real relation would be the one where two “real” armies (Germanic tribes and Roman legions) clash. All the bodies of the event also possess physical qualities. Precisely these features make the event identifiable in history. Bowden, S. (2011): *The Priority of Events: Deleuze’s Logic of Sense*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p. 174.


\(^{161}\) *Ibid.*


\(^{163}\) “We may take the word ‘body’ in its broadest sense (there are mental bodies, souls are bodies, etc.).” *Ibid.* p. 80.

\(^{164}\) I will leave out the many concepts Deleuze and Guattari use in their theory of the assemblage, the most important of which are *machinic assemblage* and *collective assemblages of enunciation*. Machinic assemblage refers to bodies, so in order to keep things clear, I will simply speak of bodies. Collective assemblages of enunciation relate to language. However, language is not what Deleuze and Guattari understand under the term. Rather, they refer to the socially organized capacity of language to be performative. In other words, language as such already signifies a formalization of the assemblage and its reduction to communication or representation. Collective assemblages of enunciation, on the other hand, refer to a set of incorporeal transformations effectuated through language. They do not refer to language as representation of things, but to the capacity of language to be
expression, language is always a set of speech acts. If bodies with their actions and passions refer to a “set of corporeal modifications”, expression relates to a “set of all incorporeal transformations current in a given society and attributed to bodies.”

Deleuze and Guattari give an example of this.166 When a judge enunciates a sentence, his words do not represent the event of the defendant becoming a prisoner. Instead, his enunciation is precisely what “incorporeally transforms” the body of the defendant into that of the prisoner. Nothing changes “in the body”, yet the body now becomes the body of the prisoner. This “incorporeal transformation”, effectuated by the sentence, is the event of becoming a prisoner.

At the same time, the body is not a blank surface on which the sentence is effectuated. It is not a passive object upon which enunciation works. On the contrary, it carries its own capacity to act and be acted upon. For example, the way the new body functions within the prison system can change the way sentences are enunciated. The body of the prisoner comes into contact with other bodies in the prison, they “intermingle” and “collide” and in this way effectuate new events, which can then influence the way new sentences are given.

“The purpose is not to describe or represent bodies; bodies already have proper qualities, actions and passions, souls, in short forms, which are themselves bodies. Representations are bodies too! If noncorporeal attributes apply to bodies, if there are good grounds for making a distinction between the incorporeal expressed ‘to become red’ and the corporeal quality ‘red’, etc., it has nothing to do with representation. We cannot even say that the body or state of things is the ‘referent’ of the sign. In expressing the noncorporeal attribute, and by that token attributing it to the body, one is not representing or referring but intervening in a way; it is a speech act. [...] The expressions or expressed [les exprimés] are inserted into or intervene in contents, not to represent them but to anticipate them or move them back, slow them down or speed them up, separate or combine them, delimit them in a different way.”

Expressions act as speech acts because they intervene in bodies, moving them, slowing them down or changing their combination. Bodies, on the other hand, produce events which are effective in the world, that is to act as a set of speech acts. For example, the statement “you are now old enough” could be understood as a matter of representation. The speaker is representing through language the fact that another person is now “old enough” to do certain things. However, from the standpoint of the collective assemblage of enunciation, this statement is not a matter of representation, but of an intervention in the body of the person who is “old enough”. This intervention “incorporeally transforms” the body of that person insofar as this person becomes included into a new set of bodies – e.g. the idea of responsibility or independence, and so on. The statement is not a passive representation of a fact, but something that actively intervenes in the body.

165 Ibid. pp. 80, 85.
166 Ibid. pp. 80 – 81.
167 Ibid. p. 86.
the content of expression. These two sides, bodies and expression, compose what Deleuze and Guattari call an assemblage [l’agencement]. An assemblage relates both to the relationship between bodies (the way they act and are acted upon in relation to each other) and to expression, which expresses the events produced by bodies and “incorporeally” transforms them. In this way, the assemblage is always permanently assembled or, as the French term reveals, “fitted together” and “arranged”.

The two sides, bodies and expression, permanently shift in relation to each other. Enunciation intervenes in the bodies by incorporeally transforming them. Conversely, by being “incorporeally transformed”, bodies are organized in a specific way (e.g. the prison system). This organization of bodies in turn leads to new events that change the way expression transforms bodies. What this means is that both bodies and expression stand in a relationship of relative independence. Neither directly conditions the other. Instead, they are “connected” only through events or incorporeal transformations which are, on the one hand, produced by bodies and, on the other, expressed in statements. Deleuze and Guattari term this relationship “reciprocal presupposition”.

One important consequence of this relationship is the fact that the assemblage is devoid of “determination in the last instance”:

“Collective assemblages of enunciation [expressions – G.H.] function directly within machinic assemblages [bodies – G.H.]; it is not impossible to make a radical break between regimes of signs and their objects. Even when linguistics claims to confine itself to what is explicit and to make no presuppositions about language, it is still in the sphere of discourse implying particular modes of assemblage and types of social power.”

Expression cannot be regarded as something that one-directionally imparts sense to bodies. Instead, expression functions already within a specific arrangement of bodies. As mentioned above, the “public” sphere of communication, explanations, declarations, and so on, is always already included into a specific distribution of social power and organization of bodies. In this

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168 The concept of the assemblage [l’agencement] has the meaning of an arrangement in the process or “fitting together”. This process of “fitting together” does not relate to the activity of the subject. What Deleuze and Guattari want to express with the term is the mutating and transforming nature of organization. The concept at first resembles Hegel’s concept of totality. Bodies in their actions produce something “more” in the form of events that stand beyond and above them and which then become expressed through statements. However, whereas a totality is static in the sense that no part can exist in independence from the whole, an assemblage permanently shifts its individual elements, constantly changing the whole. The fact that it is composed of “two sides”, bodies and expression, bridged only by the events, means that if one level slightly shifts, the other one experiences transformations as well.

169 Ibid. p. 145.

170 Ibid. p. 7.
regard, shifts and changes occur that cannot be traced to a sovereign decision or a consent established through language. Conversely, the distribution of bodies is always already pre-determined by expression, insofar as what is said or communicated is not merely the representation of content, but the expression of an event irreducible to bodies. The Battle is indeed a battle and not a random mixture of bodies that only afterwards becomes declared a battle. But within the Battle itself it is possible to differentiate between the collision of the bodies (the material economy in the most general sense) and the specific event emerging from it, which is then expressed.

“Peace and war are states or interminglings of very different kinds of bodies, but the declaration of a general mobilization expresses an instantaneous and incorporeal transformation of bodies.”

As a result of this, the “state of affairs” is not sterile and static, but is permanently “instantaneously and incorporeally” transformed. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest as an arrangement of bodies conditions expression, but enunciation expresses the sense of the battle by inserting it into a specific regime of power. The event of German nationalism, for example, does not re-interpret the battle; it is not a discourse that appropriates the historical event of the battle (e.g. the Battle took place, representing a “state of affairs”, which is then subjected to interpretation). But it is also not the case that German nationalism as a discursive reality emerges as a causal effect of the Battle (e.g. because X happened, Y happens). In opposition to these alternatives, Deleuze views the Battle as an event that is permanently fought. The Battle finds its expression in different social assemblages, at the same time shaping these assemblages and being determined by them through specific forms of expression. This means that the Battle as an event cannot become sublated, fixed and located into a specific timeline of events. It can also not be reduced to memory, as a form of reality which constitutes historical consciousness. The Battle as an event is alive, not as an event sublated in living memory, but as an ongoing event, an “impassive, incorporeal, impenetrable battle”. The Battle is ongoing precisely through its expression in different assemblages which it presupposes and that are in turn presupposed by it. These expressions, conversely, permanently relate to bodies and their mutual connections and relations. For example, the event of the Battle finds an expression in the assemblage of German nationalism that effectuates incorporeal transformations of the bodies, insofar as it mobilizes the masses. These processes are not based on historical causality, but on a causality between events where the historical framework of “memory” does not have precedence. Therefore, the Battle is not “in the past” as a form of memory, which shapes consciousness. It

also does not feature as an event that causally links to future events. Rather, it figures as something which always presupposes, on the one hand, the capacity of bodies to act and be acted upon, and on the other, their expressions. As a result of this, the Battle is never “fixed” in one sense, because both bodies and their expressions shift in the way they presuppose each other.

Consequently, the event does not relate to the “material reality of economy”, nor to the consciousness of the event. Rather, the relative independence of events from bodies and expressions allows them to appear as becomings.

“But what we mean by ‘to grow’, ‘to diminish’, ‘to become red’, ‘to become green’, ‘to cut’, and ‘to be cut’, etc., is something entirely different. These are no longer states of affairs - mixtures deep inside bodies - but incorporeal events at the surface which are the results of these mixtures. The tree ‘greens’ [...][172]

The concept of becoming reflects instances of the body undergoing differentiation. The sword is a becoming: cutting, rusting, and so on. However, the process of cutting and rusting is not merely a property attributed to the body; instead, these differentiations emerge from the capacity of the body to act and be acted upon in relation to other bodies. The product of these interactions of bodies is the event. The event, as shown, is contemporaneous with all its expressions. The Battle as an event is an ongoing Battle and not merely something in the past. Insofar as it is an ongoing Battle, the effects it has on bodies through expression are real. For example, this means that the Battle is not merely an object in relation to the conscious subject, but that it permanently involves subjectivity into its expression. In other words, the Battle as an event includes subjectivity in itself:

“There are two ways of considering events, one being to follow the course of the event, gathering how it comes about historically, how it's prepared and then decomposes in history, while the other way is to go back into the event, to take one's place in it as in a becoming, to grow both young and old in it at once, going through all its components or singularities. Becoming isn't part of history; history amounts only [sic] the set of preconditions, however recent, that one leaves behind in order to ‘become,’ that is, to create something new.”[173]

Becoming, therefore, signifies becoming with the event or, in other words, the continuity between the event and the “subject”. As opposed to an instance of for us, from which the event appears in the mode of sublated memory, the event is quasi-eternal in the sense that it is

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contemporaneous with all its expressions, leading the subject to become. This is the meaning of the sentence that “all history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession”. Becomings relate to the fact that events do not “decompose and die”. They cannot become pacified and reduced to a sublated form. Consequently, when certain events find new expressions in new social assemblages, they cannot be reduced either to constitutive memory or to ideology. For example, the event of German nationalism that appropriates the Battle is not merely the ideological effect of the economy “in the last instance”. Rather, the expression of the Battle in this new event actively transforms the bodies of the people. As a result of this transformation, a new organization of bodies emerges which shapes the economy itself, giving it a qualified form.

This is why Deleuze and Guattari state that ideology “as a regime of sings or a form of expression is tied to an assemblage, in other words, an organization of power that is already fully functioning in the economy, rather than superposing itself upon contents or relations between contents determined as real in the last instance.” Furthermore, any reductionism “miscontrues the nature of content, which is in no way economic ‘in the last instance,’ since there are as many directly economic signs or expressions as there are noneconomic contents”.

This abolition of the distinction between the base and superstructure, and the transformation of the superstructure into an inherent mechanism of the “base”, subverts the primacy of the causality of contradiction. Contradiction, as mentioned above, requires “fixed” and determined points. Whether these points are economic or spiritual makes no difference. Becomings abolish such points because they collapse contradiction into smaller difference and reveal it as an irresolvable and problematic paradox. Consequently, contradiction cannot serve to causally link events into a linear timeline because events are of the order of “incorporeal transformations”, which are not reducible to the material economy of bodies or to expression. Events exceed the logic of contradiction because they do not emerge from it, nor do they necessarily resolve it.


175 Ibid. p. 69.

176 For example, the term “commodity” does not represent the real “thing” that takes on economic form, which would determine social relations. Instead, it is always already a “thing” constituted by political, artistic, or gender relations. It is only through these interventions that the “commodity” in fact gains a specific economic function, which can then condition other spheres of life. Similarly, there is no such thing as a “capitalist economy” which relates to some material reality that would not always already be constituted by different expressions, specific forms of subjectification and so on. Conversely, there is no expression that is not already included into and conditioned by the economy it itself co-constitutes. Ibid. p. 130.
7. The collapse of history

As shown, Althusser critiqued the dialectical model of history and contradiction from a position that sought to achieve a scientific model of history. This critique entailed the reformulation of contradiction into *overdetermination*, or a complex form of determination that cannot be reduced to a binary, contradictory model. Deleuze’s subsequent critique of contradiction follows in Althusser’s steps insofar as it seeks to reject any primacy of contradiction. This means that for Deleuze, contradiction cannot be determinative on any level. Contradiction operates only on a large, molar level and is merely an observable effect of molecular *becomings*. Consequently, Deleuze’s critique does not aim to reach a scientific model of history, but to subvert history as a model of registering events. When contradiction and resolution become removed, history does not only lose its “engine” in the element of a specific form of conflict determined by one form of practice “in the last instance”. Rather, it loses its exclusive relationship to events since now it becomes equated with the “states of affairs”, which always reduce an event to some form of contradictory model of determination. *Becoming* is an instance of events not found on neither the side of the bodies nor the side of their expression.

The result of making events primarily a feature of *becoming* leads to one significant consequence. Already in Althusser’s case, a social formation was never a matter of one isolated historical temporality. By referring to instances of *survival*, the description of the social formation was related to temporalities of different structures that all possess their own specific historical development. However, Althusser did not ask the following important question: Since “history” is never a process of one single total form but always of distinct historical developments that become combined, are these distinct historical developments also total and “historical”, or do they have another structure? For Deleuze, when “history” is broken down into multiple distinct histories (*e.g.* history of politics, history of the economic base, *etc.*) then these distinct histories cannot retain a historical form. This means that history does not break

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177 The concept of the “molar” is opposed to the “molecular”. Every determined being is “molar”. For example, a person is a “molar” form. As such, it possesses an identity to which it is related by connections and relations with other “molar” forms (*e.g.* family, people, what the person does, hobbies, and so on). Molecular movements describe changes and transformations that elude explanation based on these molar forms. For instance, a person might change its attitude or way of thinking about a specific thing without being capable to deduce this change from the sphere of its own conscious experience. See, for example: *Ibid.* pp. 195 – 196.
down into multiple structures that all possess different historical temporalities; rather, it breaks down into series of events, which do not follow a causal and overdetermined pattern of contradiction. If history is the idea of the unity of time, which expresses the totality of social life, then a fragmentation of this unity does not only break down history into many histories (histories of different developments), but it breaks down the idea of history itself. By relating primarily to becomings, assemblages dissolve barriers between the “subjects” of these developments. Most importantly, the border between the categories of society and nature collapses, and history as a realm of human events slowly loses its meaning in relation to nature as something sublated. It is precisely from this standpoint that Deleuze rejects history as the primary mode of registering events, since it appears as nothing more but the writing that conforms to a “state of affairs”. More precisely, “history is nothing more than the writing of the State”, it is always written “in the name of a unitary State apparatus”, and “is one with the triumph of States”. The reason why this is the case is precisely that history establishes the border between “social” and “natural” by exerting a selection of events according to a predetermined category of natural, into which everything not deduced from pre-determined coordinates of conflict is placed. Deleuze, therefore, fully agrees with Hegel: the State establishes the preconditions of historicity insofar as it appears as the mechanism that resolves conflict into itself. Because the State expels all elements that are not in accord with the historical narrative, it necessarily serves as the “ground” into which contradiction is resolved. Conflict can be resolved only by being resolved into the State as a form of peace. The category of “natural”, on the other hand, signifies an excess that cannot be resolved, becomings that do not conform to institutionalized and delimited forms of conflict, but always express movement which expands conflict by creating new lines of flight. From Deleuze’s standpoint, Althusser’s achievement was to give importance and historical role to those elements Hegel saw as “remains” in a “vegetative” state. However, this importance became lost in the reduction of

178 Although Althusser used the term history in a positive manner, he took great care in differentiating his structuralist reading of history from the traditional accounts. Deleuze, on the other hand, goes further than Althusser, because he rejects history as such. On the general intellectual background for Deleuze’s rejection of history, see: Colebrook, Claire (2009): Deleuze and History, Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 2-3.


180 How and why this happens will be examined in greater detail in the second chapter when I introduce the concept of the “war machine”. At this point it is sufficient to note that Deleuze agrees with Hegel when it comes to the relationship between history and State presented in the first part of this chapter.
these elements to an economic base “in the last instance”. As opposed to this, becomings do not differentiate between society and nature precisely because they do not operate on the model of contradiction as a form of difference that considers only fixed, determined points from which change can emerge. Natural violence, or an excess of conflict which cannot be contained, barred off, expelled, institutionalized and so on, remains a permanent feature of every social formation. In this regard, every society is already included into the “natural realm” which it has supposedly sublated. Only with the State as a specific social form of violence does the model of “nature” emerge as something that forces becomings into a historical account. But “nature” as such knows no difference between artifice and nature; assemblages are permanently composed of elements where the established borders between the two break down.

“We will call an assemblage every constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow – selected, organized, stratified – in such a way as to converge (consistency) artificially and naturally […]”\(^{181}\)

In other words, the only meaningful concept of “nature” is the one that signifies the indifference of nature and society. “There is therefore a unity to the plane of nature, which applies equally to the inanimate and the animate, the artificial and the natural”\(^ {182}\).

However, the nature of an assemblage also explains the ambivalent use of the term “history” by Deleuze. Because history is conditioned by the State, it does not appear as an illusion but as an assemblage that functions according to a specific regime of power. History is not a relative and false point of view; it is a reality according to which the social field is organized and temporalized. The State is also an assemblage - a regime of expression and bodies\(^ {183}\) - and as such it is not merely a matter of ideology or false consciousness. Rather, the State is a reality operating within bodies or, as Deleuze claims, a “habit of thinking”.\(^ {184}\) As a consequence of this, becoming cannot be divorced from history:


\(^{182}\) From this point on, I will use the term “Nature” with a capital letter to signify Deleuze’s concept of indifference of nature and society. The term “nature” with a lowercase letter will be used to express nature both as something sublated into society and external to social life. The adjective “natural” will be used in italics (*natural*) to signify the Deleuzian sense of the term and normal (natural) for the other two Hegelian senses. Deleuze, G.; Guattari, F. (2005): *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p. 254.


“Becoming is the concept itself. It is born in History, and falls back into it, but is not of it ...

What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self-positing as concept, escapes History. [...] The event is actualized or effectuated whenever it is inserted, willy-nilly, into a state of affairs; but it is counter-effectuated whenever it is abstracted from states of affairs so as to isolate its concept.\textsuperscript{185}

This play of effectuation and counter-effectuation might seem at first thoroughly Hegelian: whatever comes to be already contains the seeds of its own demise. But at this point it is possible to summarize and point out the major differences between becoming and history:

1) It is true that becoming functions in a similar way to history. Hegelian history relies on dialectic\textsuperscript{186}, meaning that whatever appears already in its appearance reveals itself as passing, never capable of being petrified in the present. The same can be said of becoming. However, according to Deleuze, the main difference is that history relies on itself to counter-effectuate what is effectuated. The engine of counter-effectuation is the resolution of contradiction, which conditions that what appears as a result must respect and follow from the effectuated in a linear fashion. The contradiction between two terms must be resolved in a term which is directly related to the preceding two. The contradiction between “animal” and “human” cannot be resolved in a “quasar”. Becoming, on the other hand, does not proceed in history but takes it as a springboard, meaning that the “state of affairs” is not processed through contradiction but a heterogeneous paradox. Becoming springs from history but side-steps it, not through the possibility established by a contradiction but by way of processuality that is not bound by existing terms. Put simply, history pushes difference into opposition and contradiction and views it in this form as the only engine of change – two principles must come into conflict, and this conflict has to be resolved for change to emerge. On the other hand, becoming is established via any form of difference, no matter how minute, as well as through contradictions that must not necessarily lead to resolution but can instead perpetuate themselves as paradoxes.

2) The event in history is reduced to a “states of affairs”. All other events are therefore conditioned by this reduction in a causal chain. But becoming extracts these events and submissions them to a different kind of causality which does not place the negative between


\textsuperscript{186} It should be mentioned that Deleuze also uses the term “dialectic” in a positive sense as well, as a problematic [\textit{la problématique}] that “replaces the negative”. This is an example of Deleuze’s ambivalent usage of terms. He sometimes uses a concept to denounce it, only for the concept to reappear later on and take on new meaning within the critical framework Deleuze built against the original meaning of the concept. Cf. Zourabichvili, François (1994): Deleuze. Une philosophie de l’événement. Paris: PUF. p. 54.
them. Events are not negated by being internalized by the subject. History proceeds from the position of the subject and passes through difference in the form of contradiction with the intent to re-establish the identity of the subject (Spirit). On the other hand, becoming proceeds from the position of pure difference itself because it is internal to the event. The subject we encounter is, according to Deleuze, nothing but the “trace” of an event.187

3) Finally, because we always find ourselves in a specific historical position, one must always proceed from the “states of affairs”. The contradiction in Deleuze's two-folded use of the concept *history* can thus be seen in light of the fact that history appears as a reality from which one *becomes* and to which one *returns*. If we take an event such as the *Battle of the Teutoburg Forest* and place it only in the context of the historical circumstances in which it took place, the only way it is possible to develop something from this event is to respect the chronology of “before and after”, thus perceiving the events both leading up to the battle and following it in the framework of linear development.188 However, if one extracts the event of the Battle from the “states of affairs”, it becomes possible to form assemblages that are not conditioned by the linear temporal path. On the other hand, if events did not relate back to history or, in other words, did not fall back [*retomber*] into history, the problem would remain that no point of reference could be established when speaking of events (we require history to retrieve the *Battle of the Teutoburg Forest*). In this way *history conditions becoming*.

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188 For example, the historical account takes the Battle as an element in the chronology of events (*e.g.* the Roman Empire was blocked in its expansion when defeated in the forest, and as a result of this, Scandinavia has never been under Roman rule. This resulted in a situation in which the Germanic tribes that resided there remained outside the sphere of Rome’s influence. This in turn led to the remaining “barbarians” (Vikings) attacking the newly emerged “successors” of Rome, *etc.*). This historical account marks the contingencies and twists of fate that lead to the emergence of something “more”, a process of spiritualization which transforms our consciousness. But the Battle is merely memorized, constitutive for something “more”, which is deduced from the account. However, in *becoming*, the Battle escapes such an account, it is not memorized and “dead”, constitutive for something more, but can continue as a conflict in most unexpected places, emerging through new expressions in nationalism, art, ways of perception, communication (including here, for example). History “misses” these transformations and views the event as something “done” and “over”.

76
8. Result

Deleuze attempts to develop an impersonal transcendental field of *becoming* by way of abolishing the historical framework in which events are situated and thought. This requires the abolishment of the primacy of contradiction, because contradiction operates only through determinate, fixed points. From the standpoint of contradiction, conflict appears as having a trajectory toward *sublation* and internalization. Althusser’s concept of *survival* attempted to overcome the idea of cumulative internalisation, but failed insofar as it related the elements that survive to a determination “in the last instance”. In Deleuze’s view, survival does not only signify remains in relation to the “present” dominant system, but also *natural* surplus which is *inherent to becomings*. When *society* and *nature* become indifferent, there is no sense in speaking of survival, since the element that served as the benchmark of “before and after”, as well as the categorization according to the division of Spirit and raw, *natural remains*, becomes lost.

However, at the same time, *becomings* necessitate history, because on their own they do not have any tangible point of reference. The referential relationship that is always historical and which serves as the starting position must be simultaneously abolished and preserved. This brings me to the problem of Deleuze’s conception of history and his ambivalent usage of this term.189 History is ontologically present as an ordering of events. Deleuze extends ontological

189 There is *history* in Deleuze, not only in the sense of an object of critique, but also as a positive concept. Deleuze and Guattari use the term *history* as their own concept and not simply as something to reject. However, this concept of history is something that emerges from *becoming*. It is not possible to distinguish how this history is different from processes of becoming. The other, “negative” concept of history is the one Deleuze appropriated from Hegel and the historicist tradition in general, and which he must integrate into *becoming*. When Deleuze states that *history* determines *becoming*, this isn’t a statement on a positive concept of history differentiated from the traditional one, but a statement on the necessity to include the traditional concept into his theory of becoming. When Jeffrey Bell considers Deleuze's historical ontology which traces the contingencies that lead to something existing and that “is something that can be accumulated through time, through an increasing number of associations. It is not all or nothing regarding the existence of entities...” this is nothing else than Deleuze's idea of the assemblage / *becoming*. One could say of course, that history is the science of *becoming*, a discipline whose object is *becoming* (in the same sense that a distinction was made between *res gestae* and *historia rerum gestarum*), but this does not abolish the fact that the truly influential concept of history is the one he inherits during his critique of Hegel, because it is precisely this concept that is radically different than *becoming*, yet must be somehow brought in line with it. Bell, A. J. (2009): Of the Rise and Progress of Philosophical Concepts: Deleuze’s Humean Historiography, in: *Deleuze and History*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p. 61; Cf. Lampert, J. (2006): *Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History*. London and New York: Continuum. p. 7.
validity to history, as well as to the State, but only after he had shown their contingent nature from the point of view of *becoming*. This exceptionally mirrors Hegel’s relationship between *history* and *natural violence*. Hegel imparted ontological validity to contingency, but only insofar as it served to constrain and subject Spirit to development which moves in direction of converting absolute exteriority into a relative one.

The analogy between these two pairs, on the one hand, *becoming* and *history*, and on the other, *history* and *natural violence*, is the subject of the following subchapter. From this analogy I will attempt to develop a concept of immanence common to both Hegel and Deleuze.
1. Absolute immanence

The thesis of this chapter was that there exists an analogy between Hegel’s and Deleuze’s conceptions of history. This analogy is expressed not only in the highly overlapping meanings both philosophers give to the concepts of history and State but also in the general theoretical structure that arises around these concepts. The basic conceptual framework revolving around the concept of history in both authors focuses on the idea of exteriority as a realm beyond history and on the mechanisms by which this exteriority becomes internalized and historicized. For Hegel, this relationship is conceptualized as a opposition between history and natural violence, whereas for Deleuze, as an opposition between history and becoming.

It was stated that the central point of argument for Deleuze resides in the problem of immanence. From his philosophical standpoint, immanence is not confined to history. The concept of immanence can be developed by looking at the difference between history and natural violence, on the one hand, and history and becoming, on the other.

Immanence in this context can for Hegel mean only the establishment of a historical line of development which presupposes State-power. It signifies the sublation of natural violence as well as the exclusion of nature that is not in some way already internalized within the realm of Spirit. That immanence [Innerlichkeit] has this meaning for Hegel is not contested by Deleuze.\(^{190}\) However, for Deleuze, it is precisely history as “false movement” that abolishes immanence. Furthermore, whereas for Hegel, the State functions as a mechanism of establishing immanence by way of constituting a written record of events, which in turn constitute history, in Deleuze’s view, the writing performed by the State and the establishment of a State-sanctioned record reduces the event to a “state of affairs”. Therefore, immanence has at this point both the meaning of an established historically isolated sphere of human State-power (Hegel) and of “false movement” (Deleuze).

Hegel’s and Deleuze’s ideas of immanence are obviously antagonistic. In reaching a concept of immanence that would relate to both Hegel’s and Deleuze’s conceptual frameworks, one needs to show in what way do history and becoming overlap. In other words, the question is: What is the “same” in these two concepts? The distinction is obvious, it relates to what role

difference plays in these concepts. History seeks to re-establish identity by “pushing” difference to its maximum, beyond opposition and into contradiction, which presupposes resolution. \textit{Becoming}, on the other hand, does not necessitate contradiction to effectuate change (difference as such is affirmed), and contradiction cannot be exhausted in its resolution (instead, it relates to the problematic nature of difference). Consequently, what is the “same” in both instances is difference. The way it remains the “same” is \textit{repetition}. In other words, difference repeats in history as contradiction and as difference in \textit{becoming}.

\textit{Repetition} for both philosophers captures the relationship between history and its exteriority. For Hegel, repetition effectuates qualitative novelty into the same: “By repetition [\textit{Wiederholung}] that which at first appeared merely a matter of chance and contingency becomes a real and ratified existence.”\footnote{Hegel, G. W. F. (2001): \textit{The Philosophy of History}. Kitchener: Batoche Books. p. 332.} It was shown that Spirit in Hegel’s philosophy remains identical to itself [\textit{sich selbst gleich}] as it develops in the many instantiations of its form. This represents the movable identity. Spirit repeats itself in its contradictions and through these repetitions develops itself. On the other pole stood the repetition of the immovable sameness, a place of permanent natural violence that does not result in a lawful power but only in more natural violence. The first repetition in the realm of Spirit is the one where events appear. But these events appear only on account of something apart and beyond events being effectuated through the work of repetition. As an event repeats, something “more” emerges beyond the event that signals its subjection to lawful form. Dialectical repetition produces something apart and beyond mere difference - it effectuates change that encompasses \textit{all} events.

Totalization presupposes repetition insofar as contingency in its repetitious movement slowly emerges as necessity and this necessity takes on a form of the \textit{whole} that synthetizes all particular instances of repetition. What is remembered in the instance of \textit{for us} is what constitutes events. From this position, history does not appear as a collection of repetitious events but as a process through which consciousness emerges that is capable of exerting judgment on events. In this way, a procession of events is re-written in order to legitimize the observing consciousness. The memory is not only a collection of remembered events but a totality as the surplus in relation to events that towers above them and serves as their judgment. Therefore, the State that serves as the fulcrum of people’s memory establishes the coordinates of judgment. This is the meaning of the statement that world-history \textit{is a court of judgment [Gericht]}.\footnote{Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): \textit{Elements of the Philosophy of Right}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 372.} World-history, in the most literal sense of the word, judges from the position of...
memory and through its judgment the criterion of the division between natural and spiritual gains full concretization.

“Justice and virtue, wrongdoing, violence [Gewalt], and vice, talents and their [expression in] deeds, the small passions and the great, guilt and innocence, the splendour of individual and national life [Volkslebens], the independence, fortune, and misfortune of states and individuals [der Einzelnen] - all of these have their determinate significance and value in the sphere of conscious actuality, in which judgement and justice - albeit imperfect justice - are meted out to them. World history falls outside these points of view; in it, that necessary moment of the Idea of the world spirit which constitutes its current stage attains its absolute right, and the nation [Volk] which lives at this point, and the deeds of that nation, achieve fulfilment, fortune, and fame.”193

All past events are subject to the absolute right of historically realized level of freedom. Not only peoples without a State, but also past States are subject to this judgment. By turning contingent events into the instance of law, and by extracting from them the universal and placing it as their right and truth, world-history becomes a court.194 Only the State that finds itself at the level of development of world-spirit gains this right, since it represents the only mechanism that allows for this capacity to emerge. State holds ontological jurisdiction within history insofar as it processes contingent repetitious natural violence into law. The process of repetition is therefore two-folded in Hegel’s conception of history. On the one hand, it is the dull and lingering repetition of the same, an empty shell of Spirit’s former life and a remnant of the past that is captured in a permanent present devoid of memory. On the other hand, it is the repetition of Spirit as a process loaded with difference and subjected to the identity of Spirit. Repetition of nature, therefore, has only one direction – Spirit; and the repetition of Spirit has an innate capacity to engender something above and beyond the elements of repetition which re-appropriates these elements as its own content. The direction repetition takes is the interiority of Spirit – its concept. It establishes a law embodied in the State.

Precisely this direction lacks in Deleuze’s becoming. Becoming relates to an impersonal transcendental field of events driven by repetition. The assemblages that effectuate events and in turn emerge through events are in a constant process of mutation without a plan posited by the subject. The mechanism of repetition is divested from direction. Repetition is intrinsic to

193 Ibid. p. 373 - 374.
194 “The notion of a thing is “the Universal immanent in it””. Marcuse, Herbert (1969): Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. p. 127. Marcuse further explicates that the reason is that the Universal postulates the sphere of “proper potentialities” of the thing. This relates to the idea that Spirit does not only overcome its being in itself, but changes it, thereby changing its sphere of “proper potentialities”.

81
differentiation as such without something “more” being necessitated in the form of totality. Assemblages do represent a surplus, but not one that would appropriate difference and frame it within the confines of the contradiction. The “image of thought” that presupposes contradiction, according to Deleuze, “alienates the two powers of difference and repetition, of philosophical commencement and recommencement.”\textsuperscript{195} Becoming renounces the intrusion of a third concept between repetition and difference. Repetition is difference and difference is repetition. There is no third instance that would intrude on this immanent nature of the event.\textsuperscript{196}

Events repeat and effectuate difference without the instance of universal law. Consequently, there can be no instance of judgment beyond the heterogeneous repetition of the event itself. This is a result of Deleuze’s view that judgment is a form of representational thinking, which presupposes already established values. Judgment presupposes the subject, in this case, the State, which represents the law in the form of the universal.\textsuperscript{197} In opposition to this

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{196} The formula often employed by Deleuze is Nietzsche’s \textit{eternal return of the same}. The same, however, is thought as difference. Difference and being coincide. The category of being, traditionally thought as unity and sameness, becomes infiltrated by difference. At the same time, difference is raised to the level of the traditional instance of unity and sameness. What is same in events is not Spirit, but difference. “Return is the being of becoming, the unity of multiplicity, the necessity of chance: the being of difference as such or the eternal return.” In Hegel, from Deleuze’s standpoint, this chance becomes internalized by being subjected to the form of Spirit. Difference signifies precisely the instance of chance beyond its synthesis with necessity, or indeed, the only true necessity. I will come back to the concept of the \textit{eternal return} in the third chapter. Deleuze, G. (1986): \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}. London and New York: Continuum. p. 189.

\textsuperscript{197} Judgment is the activity of applying a predicate to a subject. Therefore, judgment presupposes a subject. It is not tasked with showing the emergence of the subject itself, but simply with applying a predicate to it (this Deleuze calls common sense). Judgment also must apply a correct property to a subject, it must make a good judgment (\textit{e.g. are tomatoes fruit or vegetable?}); Deleuze calls this the activity of good sense. Both common sense and good sense are necessary for a correct judgment to be given. Both also necessitate already established laws where the subject and a pattern of applying predicates are pre-existing. This law is given by history. Assemblage theory attempts to counter this form of judgment insofar as it does not locate subjects to which predicates are attached, but distinct entities independent of the framework subject-predicate. In other words, the pattern of good sense is not pre-existent. However, Deleuze also acknowledges that the activity of judgment in Hegel’s case is not based on finite, but infinite representation, where “passive” subjects are not determined through finite predicates, but instead through other subjects that are not identical (\textit{e.g. the movable identity} of the “Nature is Spirit”). Cf. Somers-Hall, H. (2013): \textit{The Logic of the Rhizome in the Work of Hegel and Deleuze}, in: \textit{Hegel and Deleuze: Together Again for the First Time}. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. pp. 56 – 57; Groves, C.
\end{footnotesize}
presupposition the criteria of the event as *becoming* lies within itself. An event must not be inducted into the historical account in order to count as an event. For this reason, the only positive “judgment” one can speak of in Deleuze’s case is not its classical, representational form, but judgment *upon the whole*. If the event does not necessitate the *whole* to count as an event, “judgment” is not exercised by history, *but upon history*. This could be called a *judgment of Nature* which presents a plan(e) of immanence.\(^198\)

“We call this plane, which knows only longitudes and latitudes, speeds and haecceities, the plane of consistency or composition (as opposed to the plan(e) of organization or development). It is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocality. We therefore call it the plane of Nature, although nature has nothing to do with it, since on this plane there is no distinction between the natural and the artificial. *However many dimensions it may have, it never has a supplementary dimension to that which transpires upon it.* That alone makes it natural and immanent. The same goes for the principle of contradiction: this plane could also be called the plane of noncontradiction. [Emphasis added]\(^199\)

Immanence is not a classical judgment of applying a predicate to a given subject, nor a judgment in which the subject permanently passes through “predicates” in the process of its development (Hegel).\(^200\) Instead, “judgment” relates to the claim that there is no judgment of God as an instance standing beyond what transpires in the event.\(^201\) As opposed to historical

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\(^{199}\) The French concept *le plan d’immanence* contains the concept “le plan” that has the meaning of a *plan* (blueprint), as well as of a *plane* (an ontological realm). This plan is neither law nor structure, but a contingent play of forces that constitute *becomings*.


\(^{201}\) At this point, I am using the term “judgment” in relation to Deleuze provisionally. However, as I will show in the third chapter, this provisional use also has an extended, more literal one. The reason is that insofar as events cannot be dissociated from history, they necessarily *impact* historical temporality. In other words, since Deleuze does not view history as an illusion, but as the real organization of temporality, *becomings* will necessarily have an effect on this temporality.

\(^{200}\) Edward Mussawir gives a positive account of judgment in Deleuze, specifically, a pre-historical and post-historical notion of judgment opposed to the historical kind exercised by the State. “The activity of judgment is indeed aimed at ‘holding responsible’, but whereas history gives us individuals held responsible for their *actions* by institutions that set down petty laws designed at self-preservation, the activity of judgment holds the human species responsible on the contrary for its *reactions*, for its ‘established values’, for its resentments and morality.” Tim Flanagan makes a similar argument based on the comparison of Deleuze’s and Benjamin’s conception of the baroque. Cf. Mussawir, E. (2011): *Jurisdiction in Deleuze: The Expression and Representation of Law*. Abingdon
judgment, the judgment of Nature is that of repetition, which stands in immediacy with difference. The only thing judged are judgments themselves as instances that attempt to introduce immanence as “immanent to something…”, i.e. as immanence to some form of exteriority.

“Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in anything, nor can it be attributed to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject. In Spinoza, immanence is not immanent to substance; on the contrary, substance and its modes are in immanence. Whenever immanence is attributed to subject and object, which themselves fall outside the plane, the subject being taken as universal, and the object as any object whatsoever, we witness a denaturing of the transcendental, which now merely presents a double of the empirical (this is what happens in Kant).”

Both philosophers infuse history, on the one hand, and becoming, on the other, with the power of judgment. History passes judgment from a position of the whole, whereas becoming on the whole. If judgment is the power of the historical subject, the event is judged in relation to history, whereas non-events become relegated to nature. On the other hand, if judgment is the power of Nature (in the sense of the absence of difference between nature and history), the border between interior and exterior becomes abolished. The paradox is that both philosophers claim an instance of judgment based on a development that can be described (disregarding the specific terminology of Hegel and Deleuze here), as “natural”, i.e. an instance which is organic, non-artificial and originary. In Hegel’s view, history is opposed to nature and as such is artificial. However, as the development of the concept it is also natural in the form of a second nature. According to Deleuze, on the other hand, the internal capacity of the event to be “valid” without a higher instance of identity is based on the absence of any kind of “second nature”. There is only one univocal sense of Nature. In both cases, there is a claim to an


The univocity of being rejects the idea that being is said in many ways. Being is not analogous and does not have an eminent mode (e.g. such as in “God”). “With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and must be: it is being which is Difference, in the sense that it is said of difference. Moreover, it is not we who are univocal in a Being which is not; it is we and our individuality which remains equivocal in and for a univocal Being.” This applies to the whole framework of conceptuality that presupposes nature as equivocal (most visibly, in the concept of “second nature”). Incidentally, Henry Somers-Hall correctly states that, “it is through self-
instance of judgment that holds ontological validity – a judgment of being. This instance of judgment that has ontological validity is immanence. However, whereas for Hegel, being is imparted to that which can conform to the structure of dialectical judgment, in Deleuze, it is difference itself that judges – not from any position of value, subjectivity or representatitition – but by condemning transcendence. Insofar trascendence is condemned, judgment has an absolving function – it emancipates immanence.

This is the common trait that defines Hegel’s and Deleuze’s concepts of immanence. Deleuze calls it “absolute immanence” in opposition to Hegel’s Spirit, whereas Hegel considers Spirit’s direction of involving itself as a process of absolutization through which self-consciousness knows itself as the world.205 Judgment in Hegel absolves Spirit from natural violence, the capacity to judge signifies that law and not contingency determine the nature of the event. In Deleuze’s case, the repetition of difference condemns transcendence in its attempt to relativize immanence – judgment is passed on transcendence and in this way absolves immanence. Both Deleuze and Hegel think the concept of immanence as absolved [absolvere] from transcendence, in other words, from otherness that stands in relation to immanence. This transcendence for Hegel is represented by natural violence, whereas for Deleuze by any form of judgment that categorizes events according to pre-determined “spheres” of reality.

2. The remains

The position from which Deleuze claims that Hegel’s account of history abolishes immanence is the idea of absolute immanence. Absolute immanence is a concept of immanence referentiality, and as a consequence, contradiction, that Hegel is able to overcome the equivocal conception of being that is found in classical logic”. In this light, Deleuze’s hostility to contradiction becomes even more understandable. Deleuze, G. (1994): Difference and Repetition. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 10; Somers-Hall, Henry (2009): Hegel, Deleuze and the Critique of Representation. New York: State University of New York Press. p. 139.

205 Klaus Brinkmann calls Hegel a philosopher of radical immanence. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, according to him, presents an immanence of experience and the appropriation of transcendence: “We thus achieve a position of radical immanence, an immanence without transcendence, or an immanence in which all transcendence is transcendence within immanence. As we shall see shortly, this position marks the point of departure and the trajectory of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Beginning with a manifold that is poor in determinations, we progressively integrate a richer transcendence that is a transcendence only for an as yet finite consciousness, but is already part of the immanence of experience.” Brinkmann, K. (2011): Idealism Without Limits: Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity. London and New York: Springer. p. 74.
that does not presuppose transcendence. For Deleuze, immanence relates to exteriority as such – there is no “internal” sphere of law as opposed to external nature – only relations of exteriority. Therefore, he thinks immanence as a plane without borders that would define it in relation to transcendence. Any kind of relation that would place immanence to some form of transcendence would in effect abolish it. But from Hegel’s standpoint, the same kind of thought arises - that immanence is established in relation to transcendence, which takes the form of exteriority that must become internalized. I showed that the split effectuated in Hegel’s concept of exteriority - between absolute and relative - delegates a specific form of exteriority to contingency. Relative exteriority does not constitute Spirit from a position of transcendence, rather, it does this from within. When abstracted from its synthetic relationship with necessity, Hegel does not even bother to assign a concept to this contingency, at best calling it “vegetative existence”, which also applies to immediate, pre-historical exteriority. But as I will show, this then in essence is repeated by Deleuze’s demand for absolute immanence. What is encountered here is one of the first paradoxes present in both Deleuze’s and Hegel’s conceptions of immanence. Hegel seeks to think history as the inner memory of Spirit, which not only differentiates itself from nature, but also appropriates and recognizes it as itself. There is no development of nature beyond that of Spirit. However, this does not include those instances of natural violence that stand beyond the confines of historical memory. Exteriority persists in the form of contingency. For Deleuze, on the other hand, there is no exteriority. There is no exteriority because all is exteriority. Immanence is exteriority– assemblages are relations of exteriority. Parts are always “exterior” to the whole because they operate on the plane of immanence. Being has no other instance of its being-ness apart from its own becoming.206

However, here lies the problem: the fact that Deleuze defines absolute immanence in relation to transcendence, even if this is done in order to abolish it, derails the attempt to postulate absolute immanence.

“Only when immanence is immanent to nothing except itself, can we speak of a plane of immanence.”207

When I define absolute immanence by stating that it is not defined in relation to transcendence, I did in fact define it in relation to transcendence. A concrete example of this is

206 This is very similar to Hegel’s idea of nature as the idea outside of itself, where the constitutive parts are not immanently connected to each other (such as in thought), but are found distributed externally to each other in space. Hegel, G. W. F. (1970): Philosophy of Nature. Vol. 1. London: George Allen and Unwin. p. 202.

the already presented double-function of history in Deleuze’s conception of becoming. On the one hand, history is an object of critique, on the other, it is a necessity without which becomings would be indeterminate. History is necessary as a point of counter-effectuation and as the framework that keeps contingent becomings from losing any relation to each other. However, because history cannot figure as transcendent, it is integrated into the concept of becoming itself – immanence thus accommodates the very thing it rejects in its concept.

“A transcendent can always be invoked which falls outside the plane of immanence, or which attributes the plane to itself. Nevertheless, all transcendence is constituted solely in the stream of immanent consciousness proper to the plane. Transcendence is always a product of immanence.”

This mirrors the problem presented in this subchapter: where does judgment come from? Why is there a process of totalization and stratification in an assemblage? A similar proposition is present in the earlier works as well:

“One side of the machine assemblage faces the strata, which doubtless make it a kind of organism, or signifying totality, or determination attributable to a subject. [Emphasis added]”

Stratification or totalization appears as one aspect of the assemblage, “one side” it faces. These strata are “judgments of God; stratification in general is the entire system of the judgment of God”. It is also in the assemblage that the “elements of expression give the noncorporeal expressed [events – G.H.] a power of sentencing or judgment”. Why does this take place? Why does stratification appear? One could of course explain the process, the question however remains, why does it take place at all? Why of all the possible assemblages that could actualize themselves, it is precisely the State and its historical framework that gain the role of supplanting becoming? Why the following sentences:

“Everything is not of the State precisely because there have been States always and everywhere. Not only does writing presuppose the State, but so do speech and language. The self-sufficiency, autarky, independence, preexistence of primitive communities, is an ethnological dream: not that these communities necessarily depend on States, but they coexist with them in a complex network. […] And in primitive societies there are as many tendencies that ‘seek’ the State, as many vectors working in the direction of the State, as there are movements within the State or outside it that tend

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208 Ibid. p. 388.
210 Ibid. p. 40.
211 Ibid. p. 107.
to stray from it or guard themselves against it, or else to stimulate its evolution, or else already to abolish it: everything coexists, in perpetual interaction.”

The question of why this is the case will be answered in the third chapter of this work. At this point, it suffices to show how absolute immanence tends to reveal similar paradoxes in Hegel and Deleuze. Both attempt to establish immanence as absolute yet are confronted with an excess that somehow either emerges within immanence or remains external to the historical process of immanence. In a similar fashion to Deleuze, who insists on defining absolute immanence without recourse to transcendence, Hegel does not even assign a concept to the phenomenon of survival. Absolute immanence in both cases reveals a surplus, an excess of violence: somewhere along the lines a State emerges and we begin to think historically. Why? In Hegel’s cases, historical thought and State law are confronted with an excess of events – China and India as the remains of Spirit lingering in a vegetative state. In both cases, as I will show, these instances of “excess” have a constitutive role to play in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies. In other words, the State is not an illusion that obscures becomings, but something that gains “necessity” precisely through historical development. In Hegel’s case, the “vegetative” elements persist, and as I will show in the next chapter, they have a constitutive role to play precisely as “lingering” and “vegetative” remains.

3. Result

In this chapter I presented Hegel’s and Deleuze’s conception of history, from which I then formulated the concept of immanence as absolute. Although their philosophies are incompatible because they presuppose a broader set of concepts to which they give a diametrically opposed sense, their concepts of immanence presuppose immanence as absolute. This concept is absolute immanence as an instance of judgment that has ontological validity. However, this is simply a formal answer. The concept gives a concise and very sterile answer to what immanence is. Furthermore, to answer the main question of this work, I still have to answer the second sub-question of what politics is. The next step will include a convergence of these two themes. The answer to the question of politics will also include a broader and richer concept of immanence. It will show that immanence as judgment is life and more precisely life that is inherently political. At the same time, the examination of politics will represent an expansion on the theme.

of the first chapter, it will continue to develop the *historical* and *anti-historical* aspects of politics and its relation to the State.
CHAPTER II: CITIZENS AND NOMADS
Introduction: two conceptions of politics

The result of the previous chapter was a concept of immanence common to both Hegel and Deleuze. *Absolute immanence* is judgment with ontological validity. Whereas for Hegel, ontological reality emerges as the capacity of an entity to develop according to its concept, for Deleuze, any criterion of this kind abolishes immanence because it constrains being into an isolated sphere of historical development. It is clear that although the concept of immanence is thought as absolute in Hegel and Deleuze, the sense they attribute to the conceptual framework emerging around this concept is opposite. Even concepts such as *history* and the *State*, which in the first instance signify almost the same thing in Deleuze’s and Hegel’s philosophy, carry a completely different sense when related to the concept of immanence. This shows that the difference between Deleuze’s and Hegel’s accounts lies not so much in the concepts that revolve around the concept of immanence (these concepts revealing an analogous structure), but in the conditions of immanence, specifically, which concepts play a constitutive role in relation to immanence. In Hegel’s account, *history* and the *State* establish immanence, whereas according to Deleuze, they introduce transcendence. In Deleuze’s view, immanence is found in Nature that is not determined by a border toward history. For Hegel, the bordered off instance of history signifies a process of *immanentization*. All further concepts developed by Deleuze, in the first instance *becoming*, can be extracted from this symmetrical relationship. *Becoming* “frees” Nature from its historical context and returns it the role of immanence.

However, although the different conceptions of history do lead to concepts of immanence as absolute, arguments that lead into the realm of political philosophy proper again diverge. The task of the following chapter, which is to examine the concept of *politics*, will again lead to the concept of immanence. This time, however, the concept will be extended and made more concrete (to use the Hegelian expression). The answer to the question, what is politics, will expand upon the already present conclusion of the first chapter.

The question of this chapter is: what do Hegel and Deleuze understand under politics? The answer to this question stands not only in an immediate relationship with the conclusion of the first chapter, but also directly continues the historical framework of Hegel’s philosophy and Deleuze’s conception of *becoming*. In Hegel’s case, the historical development is a development of a political principle. In Deleuze’s case, the concept of *becoming* has an immediate political sense. The task is to show these two connections.
PART I: HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF POLITICAL PRACTICE

1. Politics and history

The objective of this part is to show that Hegel’s conception of history presented in the previous chapter is directly related to his idea of politics. This relation is based on his equation of historical development with the work of the negative [das Negative]. The negative in history, it will be shown, takes the form of politics. History represents a development of a political principle. The development of man and the State represents the establishment of a sphere of objective Spirit as the totality of human practice. Political practice emerges within this totality together with the development of other practices. At the same time, political practice emancipates itself through the division of different practices, but it does this only to return all particular practices into the totality of ethical life [Sittlichkeit].213 Whereas the first chapter showed the emergence of the State against nature, this chapter will show its emergence against its own inner immediate unity. The abolishment of this unity, as well as its reconstitution in the modern Sittlichkeit, is the work of political practice. Therefore, in this part, I will show the following:

1) The historical emergence of political practice through the inner division of the Sittlichkeit and the simultaneous establishment of multitude of practices;
2) The meaning of the concepts of practice and Sittlichkeit;
3) The place of political practice in the modern Sittlichkeit, and its relation to both the State and nature.

213 I will use the term die Sittlichkeit throughout this work in German. There are three reasons for this. The first one is that some of the English translations do not correspond to what Hegel understood under the term. These translations are, for example, “the ethical sphere” or “the ethical order”. The Sittlichkeit, for Hegel, relates not only to the external “sphere” or “order”, but also to forms of consciousness, which constitute these spheres. It presupposes, as I will show, both the subjective and objective side of practice. The second reason is that the other possible translation, “the ethical life”, could introduce confusion in this work. This confusion might arise as a result of my use of the term “life” later on, which will appear in many concepts, such as “natural life”, “spiritual life”, and so on. The third reason is that I also often use terms such as “social life”, “social order” or “social formation”, all of which come close to the concept of the Sittlichkeit. Therefore, in order to keep the terminology clear, the only instance where I speak of Hegel’s ethical life is where it writes “Sittlichkeit”. All other concepts, which might resemble a translation of this term, are not used in this sense.
In the preceding chapter the State has been regarded as a human power against natural violence and as a border between the human world and nature. In this context, the function of the law was to serve as a power beyond nature to which a human being could submit itself. In this chapter, the inner constitution of the State will be examined. The inner division of Spirit is effectuated on levels that encompass absolute, objective and subjective Spirit. However, it is from the position of the objective Spirit that its inner division will be considered here, specifically, from the position of what Hegel calls the objective or the ethical world [die sittliche Welt]. Accordingly, the main primary source for this chapter will be Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right. However, before discussing the modern form of constitutional freedom and structure of the Sittlichkeit, I will first present a historical account of the inner development of politics in relation to other practices. Since there is no such account in Hegel presented in one place, I will attempt to reconstruct this development by drawing on the sources where Hegel explicitly presented history as a development of a political principle. These sources will include, in the first instance, Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history, his lectures on the philosophy of religion, as well as his lectures on the history of philosophy. The main text I will base my reconstruction on is a short outline of the history of the Sittlichkeit found in Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of right. Hegel there describes the Sittlichkeit as the objective, real freedom [objektive, reale Freiheit]. In the ancient Sittlichkeit, however, concept and reality do not yet coincide [entsprechen sich Realität und Begriff noch nicht]. The dissolution of the ancient Sittlichkeit led to the emergence of right and morality. Right developed with the dissolution of the Roman Sittlichkeit, where men first gained the determination of personhood [Männer galten nicht mehr als Bürger, sondern als Personen], whereas morality emerged with Socrates and Stoicism.214

This basic outline, coupled with Hegel’s remarks on the development of politics and freedom, as well as their relationship to the State, will serve to reconstruct the historical emergence of political practice as well as its changing relationship with other forms of practice.

2. The emergence of practices

   a) Politics as despotism

In Hegel’s view, the history of political practice is the history of the State. The State represents a border in relation to natural violence, it *sublates* this violence into lawful power. This border, however, is conditioned by a slow historical emergence. History represents the link between Spirit in its natural state and Spirit, which is emancipated from nature. In the natural state, political practice is almost non-existent. Its non-existence is determined by its immediate unity with other forms of practice. As a result of this, the State at this stage represents the totality of practice. For example, the king who holds State-power is at the same time a religious figure. Similarly, the father plays the same role in the family as the king in the State. Although there is a difference between the father and the king, they both express the same model of authority that reproduces itself throughout all of society. This model is the *natural* condition of power as a framework for all practice, which is uniform.\(^{215}\) To speak, for example, of the division between religion and politics is anachronistic, both exist as one practice and therefore, from our standpoint, neither one exists. Consequently, to speak of their unity is possible only on account of their later division. Before that division takes place, political activity is religious and religious activity is political.\(^{216}\) This extends to all spheres of practice because the model of the State permeates all forms of life and reproduces itself on all levels of society. Feudalism gives an example of some of the features of such a society:

“When there was religious unity, and before the rise of the middle class [Bürgerstand] brought great variety into the whole, princes, counts, and lords could regard one another more readily and more correctly as a whole, and could accordingly act as a whole. There was no political authority [Staatsmacht] opposed to and independent of individuals as there is in modern states; the political authority and the power and free will of individuals were one and the same thing.”\(^{217}\)

Political power, as Hegel notes here, is not differentiated from the power of the individuals. This identity of politics with other practices made political practice at the same time present


\(^{216}\) “As is the case with states generally, the Political was at first united with the Sacerdotal, and a theocritical state of things prevailed. The King stood here at the head of those who enjoyed privileges in virtue of the sacra.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2001): *The Philosophy of History*. Kitchener: Batoche Books. p. 315.

everywhere and non-existent. For example, by being merged with the practice in the family or the cult, politics extended itself beyond the scope of what we would term the political sphere. As a result, it did not exist as such since it was indistinguishable from other practices. For example, if political practice was determinative and present in the family (insofar as the family was directly subsumed under the State), this also represented a dependence of political practice on natural, family prerogatives. The State determined the oikos, but at the same time, precisely this patriarchal nature of the State in relation to the family showed the dependence of the State on natural, family principles. This uniform sphere of practice, where politics is conditioned by external elements and which at the same time marks the presence of political power throughout the whole of society, is represented in despotic rule. Despotism for Hegel represents the first form of the State. The State in despotism was characterized by an unfree society. Only the despots could be called free, but only provisionally, because they were not free from natural violence, which was incorporated into them. Since the despots did not recognize the freedom of others, they themselves were not recognized as free from other persons. Furthermore, because they were incapable of recognizing freedom in others, their will was bound not to the principle of freedom, but to natural caprice.

“The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit — Man as such — is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free. They only know that one is free. But on this very account, the freedom of that one is only caprice; ferocity — brutal recklessness of passion, or a mildness and tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of Nature — mere caprice like the former. — That one is therefore only a Despot; not a free man.”

In despotism, the decisions of the State were decisions of caprice and contingency. Society was slave to the despot, who in turn was slave to his caprice. Because only one was free from outside restraints, this rule of passions represented an immediate unity of morality, politics, and other forms of practice, which at the same time represented their absence. As a result of the fact that the State did not differentiate itself from society, which is related to the fact that society as such did not differentiate itself from natural powers, the conditions for political practice in the true sense of the word were non-existent. There were no free persons among whom political action could thrive.


219 Ibid. pp. 31 - 32.
b) Free men of the polis

In despotism, the State still exhibited the rule of natural conditions, because it did not yet internally differentiate itself. The true inner development of the State is characterized by the emergence of politics. In a political community, politics ceases to be the activity of the despot and becomes the activity of the multitude of what are now free individuals within the State itself. These are free men of the polis. Political activity as politics proper appears for the first time in Greece. “The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free [...]”

The freedom and capacity for politics in the polis was grounded in the fact that individuals were not bound to the will of the despot, instead they were bound to law. With the emergence of the polis, the law dissociated itself from the will of the despot and attained independence in relation to a politically constituted multitude. Speaking on the conditions of the emergence of philosophy in Greece, Hegel states:

“If we say that the consciousness of freedom is connected with the appearance of Philosophy, this principle must be a fundamental one with those with whom Philosophy begins. [...] Connected

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220 Ibid. p. 32.

221 The despot and the law coincide in antiquity. The will of the despot is the law. But even here, as history progressed, one could sense a law that is in some instance “independent” from this contingent will. The despot could not simply institute any law. Certainly, his will was the law, but this will itself was merely caprice and slave to already present customs. Those rulers (such as Akhenated in Egypt), who instituted a completely foreign and different law than the one “natural” to the populace were removed and were condemned to damnation memoriae. The reason was that the despot himself was, as Hegel notes, a slave. He was the point in which the will of the populace found its expression. The residents of the Mesopotamian city-states regarded themselves superior to the barbarous and lawless nomads because they had a king and a city. In a similar fashion to a Greek who looked with disgust at the Asiatic despots because they ruled over a society of slaves, the populace of Asiatic city-states regarded the nomads as slaves because they did not have a despot. If the despot strayed too far from this general and unspoken “law”, he would have been quickly found poisoned or hacked to pieces and any memory of him, any word relating to him, removed from the records of the State. However, this does not mean that the tyrant was constrained in his day-to-day activities. The tyrant had every right to execute, massacre and torture anyone he pleased – this was expected of him, because it meant that he was the king, it meant that a ruthless and absolute power existed over a people beyond that of absolute contingency of “nature” (the outside of the nomads and monstrous gods). But this was precisely the point, “his job” was to be a border and a force against this contingency and foreign power, never a conduit allowing it to invade the State, which was the most despicable act a king could commit.

222 “At the time of the Kings, no political life had as yet made its appearance in Hellas; there are, therefore, only slight traces of Legislation.” Ibid. p. 269.
with this on the practical side [nach der praktischen Seite] is the fact that actual, political freedom flourishes, and this only begins where the individual knows himself as an independent individual to be universal and real, where his significance is infinite, or where the subject has attained the consciousness of personality and thus desires to be esteemed for himself alone. [Translation modified]²²³

The law established a clear border between the contingent decisions of the despot to which the State was reduced and the orderly repetition of law. It became alienated from any particular will and ceased to be equal to despotic decisions. By becoming distanced from any individual will, the law became a sphere where multiple wills could become represented. This, as Hegel noted, took place only when the right of individuality was recognized. Law makes individuals free because it prevents any single individual will from collapsing into others. It acts as a mediating instance through which different individual wills recognize themselves as such.

However, with the multiplication of wills in the law different interests emerge and seek recognition. As a result, the law of the polis enters into a collision with itself. Political practice emerges as mediation of these detached and different interests represented in the law. Politics, therefore, requires, on the one hand, the law as the form in which the State differentiates itself from natural violence and, on the other, free persons who emerge only when human beings have freed themselves from the caprice of despotism.

Although political activity as practice between free men emerged in the Greek polis, the law in which the individual wills were represented knew only one instance from which legitimate interests could emerge - the polis itself. Despite being given the capacity to argue for or against interests as individuals, there was really only one interest an individual could pursue - the common good or the polis itself. Even divergent and often opposite interests had to bear the mark of the common interest, meaning that oppositions did not arise from the fact that the individual sought to pursue his interests beyond the framework of the polis.²²⁴ The individual


²²⁴ “They [the individuals – G.H.] are absolutely authorized to assume their position, only in as far as their will is still Objective Will — not one that wishes this or that, not mere “good” will. For good will is something particular — rests on the morality of individuals, on their conviction and subjective feeling. That very subjective
interest could never come into conflict with the polis itself, only with another individual interest, and then both of these had to appear before law as legitimate common interests. In other words, the “individual” interest was merely the form in which the common interest was pursued, in itself it had no validity. Furthermore, in the polis only the few were free, because freedom remained burdened with contingency such as race, ethnicity, and so on - the political subject had to be male, exert his power over an oikos, had to be Greek and speak Greek. To be free meant to be a citizen of the free State – nothing less and nothing more.

c) The alienated State

With the fall of the polis, the immediate and organic unity of political practice dissolved. The first steps in this direction were the sophists and Socrates, with whom the individual will (in form of conscience) broke out of boundaries established by law. In other words, not only do interests now come into collision against one another, but they come into collision with the law itself.

Although this process began in Greece, the fullest expression of this conflict took place in the Roman Empire. The atomization of individuals under the rule of the Roman emperors led to the alienation of man from the sphere of politics. Politics changed its nature from an instance that defines man in totality as in the Greek polis, to an instance which stands in opposition to man and prevents his essence from becoming realized. Two forms of practice gained their independence from politics during the time of Rome. On the one hand, property emerged outside the immediate identity of the citizen and the State, on the other, morality became


225 Ibid. p. 31.
229 In his earlier writings, Hegel succinctly describes this process: “The picture of the state as a product of his own energies disappeared from the citizen's soul. [...] Freedom to obey self-given laws, to follow self-chosen leaders in peacetime and self-chosen generals in war, to carry out plans in whose formulation one had had one's
isolated from the State and independent from the word of the emperors. These processes are expressed in Stoicism, Epicureanism and finally Christianity. The Judeo-Christian image of the world, in particular, accentuated the idea of an alternative community beyond the existing States. This community directly opposed the rule of worldly monarchs.

This alienation of political power into the monarch and beyond the reach of citizens might seem like a return to a despotic relationship, but the difference is that practices now exist within the State which are radically different from politics. Morality and property mark a significant shift in the existing framework of political power. It is these two changes, the relationship of man to other human beings beyond the confines of the State and the relationship of man to things beyond property conditioned by citizenship, which will usher the transformation that will take place within the sphere of later history.

d) Political power beyond the State

Political development as a development of the general power of people constitutes at the beginning the totality of all practice. In its development, however, practices not only emerged and developed in independence from politics, but also came into opposition with it. However, when these practices themselves gain political power, when morality and property become political agents against the political authority of the State, the final development in the concept of politics takes place. What happens is that morality and property seek political recognition,
i.e. they seek recognition within the State. They are not content to simply remain isolated within it. In seeking this recognition, non-political practices appropriated political practice from the State for their own purposes and turned it against the existing authority of the State. In this way, they emancipated politics from its immediate and natural relationship with the State. At that point, politics does not become alienated from religion, the family or morality, but from itself, political power loses its immediate connection with the State. This breaks apart its dependence on moral and religious prerogatives, familial conditions and puts it in the hands of property holders, who use politics against the political world of the traditional ruling classes. As a result, not only are morality and property alienated from the State, but political power itself now comes into hands of non-State actors.

The role of the modern State, for Hegel, is to again bind all these diverse practices to one another and to give them political unity based on their political recognition. Political practice must return to itself by reproducing the old unity it had expressed at the beginning, meaning that it must recompose and reassemble society, as well as forge an identity toward the outwardly sphere of nature. However, an important difference is that in Hegel’s modern State these diverse elements will not be present in an immediate and non-reflected unity, but rather in a unity mediated by political practice itself.

3. Practice and the Sittlichkeit

At the beginning of historical development the State subsumed the whole society. The State exhausted the totality of spiritual determinations of man. Political practice was the practice of the despot and as such could barely be called practice. There existed a unity of practice only in an immediate form. This general unity of practice is what Hegel calls the ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. Therefore, if at the beginning of historical development all Sittlichkeit was constituted by “political” practice alone, it was technically speaking constituted by no specific practice at all. Only through the emergence of political practice proper (in the polis) does space

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232 Hegel identifies both Protestantism (Germany, England) and the French revolution as world-historical political events in which personality and morality sought their recognition. “Thus we see that revolutions have occurred in France, Italy, Naples, the Piedmont, and finally Spain too - in all the states, therefore, that we have called Romance. But those nations in which the freedom of the Protestant Church had already been established remained at peace: they have undergone their political reformation or revolutions together with their religious one.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2011): Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 520; Cf. Hegel, G. W. F. (2001): The Philosophy of History. Kitchener: Batoche Books. pp. 453 - 455, 466.
open in the Sittlichkeit for other practices. The character of every society is determined by a specific relationship of political practice toward other practices. If political practice is the centre of the Sittlichkeit, the concentration and shrinking of this centre into itself releases other forms of practice (but only if political practice as freedom previously inhabited this space), which now stand detached from it. The modern Sittlichkeit, which Hegel seeks to describe in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, is marked by the reverse movement of political practice returning into the whole sphere of the Sittlichkeit, but without abolishing other practices. The State does not equal society anymore and does not exhaust in itself the Sittlichkeit. The reason is the alienation of practices from politics into their own sphere of purposiveness.

My task now is to develop a concept of political practice in relation to the modern State. But before this is done, it is necessary to understand two further concepts: practice and Sittlichkeit. These two concepts stand in close relationship with the State (the State, as noted, exhausted in itself these two concepts). However, because in the modern Sittlichkeit political practice differs from moral or economic practice, it is necessary to understand what these concepts mean beyond their identification with the State. This is necessary for the obvious reason that political practice is a form of practice and that it constitutes with other practices the modern Sittlichkeit.

Hegel’s concept of practice

According to Hegel, practice is the idea of productive activity in which freedom is realized. Practice means to “make something objective [objektiv machen]”\(^{233}\). What is made objective is purpose. The problem of purpose in practice will become central for Hegel’s attempt to bring both Aristotelian and Kantian elements of practice into his own account.\(^{234}\)

From his earliest writings, Hegel has been concerned with overcoming the division between morality and legality in Kant’s concept of practice. This is also one of the main elements in his mature philosophy of right. Hegel regarded Kant’s idea of freedom as essential in thinking practice. However, from the very beginning he criticized Kant’s concept of freedom based on


\(^{234}\) I will base my development of Hegel’s concept of practice primarily on the interpretations of Manfred Riedel and Milan Kangrga. This concept will then be applied to the modern Sittlichkeit, and more specifically, to the concept of politics as developed in relation to the modern State.
the reduction of practice to morality. By positioning freedom as a transcendental principle of the human will, Kant, in Hegel’s view, created a gap between freedom, on the one hand and all non-moral acts, on the other. Certainly, Kant would seek to bridge this gap by organizing external, legal relations around the principle of freedom, as well as developing a philosophy of Bildung that could extend morality into other spheres of human life (such as family relations), but what Hegel found problematic is that these relations could never actually appear as intrinsically free – they would always be free only on account of an individualized moral will.

The position from which Hegel criticized Kant is an ancient one. In Aristotle, Hegel found what he termed the Sittlichkeit as an expression of total social practice. In Aristotle, as opposed to Kant, practice directly relates to all human relations: in the polis, as well as on the level of moral and family relations. However, the problem with Aristotle and the ancient conception of freedom in general is that it functions only when all other social relations are subsumed and completely subordinate to politics. In Aristotle, as Hegel notes, “the political is the most eminent, because its purpose is highest in relation to the practical. [Author’s translation]”235 Therefore, what Hegel found in Aristotle – a conception of practice which relates to all spheres of life, making them internally connected – he saw as a drawback of Kant’s position. Conversely, what the Ancients lacked is Kant’s principle of freedom as such.

To bring these two sides together, Hegel would turn to one essential element of practice - purpose. The problem in Aristotle, from Hegel’s position, is that the purpose of practice is pre-given, because it is contained in the polis. What the human being has to achieve is political freedom, in other words, to be a citizen of the polis. All other forms of practice, including those in the family and on the level of the individual are derived from and subordinate to this highest purpose. The giveness of the purpose is revealed in the fact that purpose and nature are here still in unity. Physis and telos are often used as synonymous by Aristotle to underscore that the nature of a human being is contained in its purpose as a citizen of free polis. Although Aristotle regarded the polis as a sphere of human affairs that are “capable of being otherwise” 236 as


236 Aristotle demarcated the ontological realm of things “that are of necessity” and “things capable of being otherwise”. This distinction does not mirror our modern division between nature and freedom. Both “nature” as a realm of organic and non-organic matter, and the polis as a subject of the philosophy of human affairs [he peri ta anthropina], belong to the ontological realm of things “that are of necessity” and “things capable of being otherwise”. What is characteristic for the polis is the ontological primacy of “things capable of being otherwise”. For example, judgment that pertains to “things by necessity” is timeless, it is always true, but a judgment on things
opposed to *physis* which is unchanging, *physis* was still determinative for him insofar as the creation of the citizen is a process “neither by nature nor contrary to nature” [*oute phusei oute para phusei*].\(^{237}\)\(^{238}\) It is not by nature, because being a morally good citizen does not happen by necessity (e.g. a man does not become morally good in the same way that a cow grows its horns), but it also does not happen contrary to nature (it is in man’s nature to be morally good). What this means is that a human being does not become a citizen by necessity, but to become a human being it must also become a citizen. And becoming a citizen is determined by the fact that it already has a *pre-established coordinating system of practice* into which it is moulded and through which its essence is attained. The image and the purpose a human being has to attain in order to count as a human being is *already there*, waiting for it within the framework of the *polis*. Because politics represented the highest form of practice and organically contained the two other forms of practice, practice for Aristotle represented an activity in which the purpose is *that activity*. In other words, what is effectuated through this activity is nothing more or less than what was already there – the *polis*, or as Hegel calls it, the finished, “political work of art”.\(^{239}\) What this means is that the *polis* cannot appear as a *product* of human practice, only as an unquestioned conditions. This is one reason why Aristotle differentiates between practice and production [*poiesis*] based on the fact that practice does not result in a product apart from the activity of practice itself, whereas *poiesis* does.\(^{240}\)

In order to overcome the limitations of the ancient ideal of *Sittlichkeit*, Hegel would turn to Kant. What Kant does is that he dissolves the unity of *physis* and *telos* that was present in Aristotle (as well as the subsequent Christian tradition).
“For if the concept determining the causality is a concept of nature, then the principles are technically practical, but if it is a concept of freedom, then these are morally practical […]”

Kant distinguishes practice from production through a development of a new form of causality distinct from nature. Practice in Kant is conditioned by the principle of freedom that prescribes what ought to be. This means that purpose of practice cannot be physis as a stable, cyclical condition of human life.

“A practical rule is always a product of reason, because it prescribes action as a means to an effect that is the aim. However, for a being in whom reason is not the sole determining basis of the will, this rule is an imperative, i.e., a rule which is designated by an ought. [Emphasis added]”

Telos became freed from external causality by diverging from nature [physis]. Practice has its source in the practically-moral will and as such is not bound to nature as the sphere of pre-given purposes but constitutes a world in the form of “Kingdom of Ends [Reich der Zwecke].” Purpose is something particular to the human will, which represents the “power of purposes [Vermögen der Zwecke]”. As a result of the divergence between telos and physis, the unity of the two in the polis becomes abolished. Rather than being externally imposed, purpose became a product of human reason. In other words, the differentiation that still held true for Aristotle, that practice brings forth no new product, changes in Kant. Practice is productive insofar as it posits purposes which are not pre-given or inherited from the polis. The purpose of practice is not something attained, but freely produced, based on the fact that practice now gains its own form of causality which is distinct from nature. Finally, the “sole, unconditioned, and final end (ultimate end) [Endzweck] to which all practical use of our cognition must finally relate is morality [die Sittlichkeit], which on this account we may also call the practical without qualification or the absolutely practical [das schlechthin oder absolut Praktische].”

This idea of practice as a productive activity grounded in freedom with a capacity to engender purposes is the starting point for Hegel’s development of the concept. However, Hegel will adopt the new concept of practice grounded in the idea of freedom by again returning to Aristotle. According to Hegel, although Kant discovered freedom as the ground of human practical activity, he made this principle in the first instance active within the domain of

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244 Ibid. p. 59.
morality. Only morality is “practical without qualification or the absolutely practical”. All other relationships, where a human being is bound by external factors, such as for example, to be a son, a father, and even a political and legal subject – were still subject to the causality not of freedom. At best they could either be organized “externally” to accommodate this causality or morality itself could indirectly influence other spheres of life, cultivating human beings beyond the boundaries of moral actions. However, in the last instance, a moral imperative could antagonize a fatherly act and vice versa, because a fatherly act in itself is not an act of duty, in the same way that the acts of a legal person (without any further consideration) are technically speaking non-free acts. To be free is to act according to a self-posed purpose, i.e. purpose produced by reason, which acts as an imperative grounded in causality that does not directly constitute family, legal or political relations.

Hegel would criticize Kant on several fronts in order to develop his own concept of practice. In the first instance, in Philosophy of Right, he speaks of practice as something which always already conditioned by the “actual world [wirkliche Welt]”.

“As far as the latter is concerned, the right of objectivity takes the following shape: since action is an alteration which must exist in an actual world and thus seeks recognition in it, it must in general conform to what is recognized as valid in that world. Whoever wills an action in the actual world has, in so doing, submitted himself to its laws and recognized the right of objectivity.”

Here, Hegel aims at Kant’s transcendentalist causal idea of practice. Insofar as any action takes place within the “actual world” it is subject to the principle of recognition, which immediately relativizes the idea of action out of duty being the sole determinative instance of

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248 Legal relations are not free relations. They represent an external organization of human relations in order to accommodate the capacity of the free will. Freedom is internal to the will, all other relations are merely deduced from this principle and are in themselves not free.


moral action. However, at the same time, this does not mean that practice as such must completely conform to a predetermined set of co-ordinates that were present in Aristotle. The “right of objectivity” does not immediately abolish the Kantian principle of freedom. Instead, Hegel will seek to show that “objectivity” itself leads to the development of precisely such freedom, on the one hand, and is constituted by it, on the other. In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel already presupposes this process through which objectivity leads to its own subjectification, i.e. development in self-consciousness. The presupposition is based on the explications in his philosophy of history. The objective world is historically developed self-conscious world. At the same time, in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel shows how the individual will become objectified into the world of Sittlichkeit. The presupposition of both these processes, however, has its ontological ground in Hegel’s Science of Logic. It is here that the main question of purposiveness which is central for practice becomes directly related to Kant. As mentioned, one of the main contentions Hegel has with Kant is that he never managed to unify the distinct spheres of life. Cognition, practice (morality) and technically-practical acts all remain divided by large gaps. Kant certainly did not leave the problem unresolved and the central work where he does seek to bridge the gap is his Critique of Judgment. It is there that the products of nature are regarded as purposive in order to accommodate human cognition and that products of both art and nature cultivate morality.

However, from Hegel’s perspective, the unification of cognition, practice and production never actually takes places in Kant. He merely bridges the gaps by an idea of “presupposition”. In a similar way that legal acts are acts that conform with the moral law but are not moral and free in themselves, so is nature regarded as if it were purposive, but is not actually so.

The problem for Hegel rests in the connection established by as if, which he seeks to remove. In Science of Logic Hegel argues that the “presupposition” of purposiveness of nature present in Kant is only one element in the practical syllogism that Spirit sublates by actively engaging with nature. This engagement through activity posits purpose, but in doing so, purpose becomes exteriorized. Although nature functions under a distinct form of causality than that of freedom, human beings engage in a process of transforming nature by imposing purpose on this causality. The immediate existence of the object in the realization of purpose becomes abolished, and internal to human activity, in the same way that the mere subjective form of purpose is sublated by acting on the external world, becoming internalized by the objective world.

“[…] The connection of purpose is not a reflective judgment that considers external objects only according to a unity, as though an intelligence had given them to us for the convenience of our faculty of cognition; on the contrary, it is the truth that exists in and for itself and judges objectively, determining the external objectivity absolutely. The connection of purpose is therefore more than judgment; it is the syllogism of the self-subsistent free concept that through objectivity unites itself with itself in conclusion.”  

That the relation of purpose “judges objectively” reveals a logic of practice that is not transcendentally detached from nature. Practice is capable of exerting on natural causality its own purposiveness, submitting nature to human purpose and reproducing it as a realm of objectivity. This logic repeats itself later in the relationship of cognition and practice, where both at first stand as incomplete moments of the absolute idea. Practice, in its raw form, devoid of the theoretical moment, finds pre-given objectivity which represents non-truth, since practice seeks to introduce a change in the world. In the same way that teleology showed how purpose becomes exteriorized in its realization, so does practice act in the world by realizing a purpose thereby transforming objectivity (which is now not any random purpose, but what Hegel calls the good). Theory, on the other hand, acts in an investigative manner, since it encounters pre-given objectivity which it views as criteria of truth. Both are, therefore, conditioned by givenness of the world, i.e. the world still figures as nature here. It is only in their unification, however, in the absolute idea, that practice as such gains full concretion. The reason for this is that practice does not encounter objectivity as something to be merely transformed on the side of the object anymore, but both on the side of the subject and object, since practice is now at once theoretical activity. Conversely, theory is not internal, subjective transformation according to objectivity which serves as “truth”, but both a subjective and objective process of cognition that determines the object itself.

“Thus the subject now exists as free, universal self-identity for which the objectivity of the concept is a given, just as immediately present to the subject as the subject immediately knows itself to be the concept determined in and for itself. Accordingly, in this result cognition is restored and united with the practical idea; the previously discovered reality is at the same time determined as the realized absolute purpose, no longer an object of investigation, a merely objective world without the subjectivity of the concept, but as an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is rather the concept.”  

from mechanism to chemism to teleology involves a progressive inwardizing or subjectivizing of objective process.”

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To put this in simpler terms: as practice actively engages with objectivity, it experiences transformations because its consciousness changes. Conversely, consciousness of nature is re-shaped by its own practical engagement with nature. Therefore, what unites practice, on the one hand, and production, on the other, is the “theoretical” in the form of **consciousness of freedom**. Practice becomes productive, in other words, transformative in nature and capable of reshaping it into a realm of Spirit. Conversely, consciousness itself becomes practical and changes through its own external engagement with objectivity. Practice transforms natural, pre-given and found relations into spiritual ones. In doing so, practical activity transforms the consciousness that is practical because it reveals to it its own free character. This development in the consciousness of freedom in turn increases the productive capacities of practice. The final purpose of practice reveals itself as nothing else but its own self-consciousness, *i.e.* its own knowledge of its free character through which it exhibits highest productive capacity, since it is least constrained by natural determinations.

For example, the family is a natural unit established through biological and emotional bonds. From a Kantian position, the cultivation of the senses *via* morality could raise the relationships in the family to a higher level, but the family as such would never actually transcend its base, natural form. It can merely be influenced by morality or legally represented and codified. For

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256 A Roman is free, but he is free only within the conditions of the Roman world he has produced. The fact that he has produced a world at all, however, is not based on the fact that he is Roman or anything else. It is predicated on the fact that he is *free*. But because he does not know he is free, he thinks himself Roman and makes this “Roman” character of his existence the prerequisite of all freedom he has. There is a tautological feature to practice: the fact that I can produce anything at all (engender any form of action) in a purposive way is one element of freedom (the other being that this production takes place within inter-subjective, relational framework). When I do not know this, I produce in such a way that I think that my productive power is thanks to X (*e.g.* my Roman character, the gods, *etc.*). When I know that my practical activity is the result of the fact that I am unconstrained by the existence of the historically established world, practice itself immediately changes its character – it becomes self-conscious practice, *i.e.* truly free. (This, of course, relates back to *historia rerum gestarum* from the first chapter). The knowledge that freedom is the ground of all production (and not any contingent element – pleasure, Roman character, divinity, and whatever else one might think of) automatically changes the character of production itself. The family, for example, starts producing free persons, not Romans. Purpose of upbringing is to raise free persons, because it is not the Roman character which is known as the condition of the world, but freedom. Knowledge conditions practice, but knowledge itself is a form of practice because to know is to reproduce in concepts and in consciousness my own existence. The concept of freedom itself is a result of the activity of freedom.
Hegel, however, family is a natural bond which internally negates itself and reproduces itself as a realm of freedom: a person establishes a relationship with family members that transcends the biological bond – and this transcending is a feature of familiar relationship themselves and not of an indirect cultivation through morality. As a result, the family raises free persons and moral subjects on its own account. A moral person emerges in the family because the family itself is subject to the principle of freedom conditioned by historical development. Knowing the natural transforms the natural into practical. Knowledge abolishes the presupposition that nature is purposive and makes it purposive. Consequently, the “known” in the form of purpose, becomes internalized by nature. For example, the natural family relationship “takes in” the theoretical or the rational into itself. It converts nature into an ethical world [sittliche Welt]. This is why, for Hegel, love is a form of freedom. From a Kantian position, love would be a “pathological” relationship, in other words, one based on passions and therefore non-free. In distinction to Kant, and as shown in the first chapter, the essence of freedom for Hegel is not contained in the marginalization or even the suspension of passions (in order to act in accordance with duty), but in their transformation from raw natural violence into the driving force of free relations. Freedom is relational and as relational, productive.

Hegel, therefore, extends the concept of Sittlichkeit onto all spheres of life and dissociates it from the concept of morality [Moralität], integrating into it the old Greek concept of ethos. Sittlichkeit signifies the totality of man’s life as a system of purposes, where these purposes

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257 For Hegel, the element of divine creative power to create ex nihilo is internal to practice. Practice negates established natural and given forms of life and converts them into spheres of freedom. On this theological background of Hegel’s concept of practice, see: Riedel, M. (1976): Theorie und Praxis im Denken Hegels. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Wien: Verlag Ullstein GmbH. p. 65.

258 All knowing is practical, because to know an object is to negate it in its natural existence and know it under the conditions of the human world. For example, I know a stone as a composite of specific elements, subject to different natural laws, all these concepts are as human concepts result of the development of Spirit, possible only in a human Sittlichkeit. I thus reproduce the existence of the stone by way of conscious practice connected to the totality of the historically conditioned world.

259 “The concept has first liberated itself into itself, giving itself only a still abstract objectivity for its reality. But the process of this finite cognition and this finite action transforms the initially abstract universality into totality, whereby it becomes complete objectivity. – Or considered from the other side, finite, that is, subjective spirit, makes for itself the presupposition of an objective world, such a presupposition as life only has; but its activity is the sublating of this presupposition and the turning of it into something posited. Thus its reality is for it the objective world, or conversely the objective world is the ideality in which it knows itself.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2010): The Science of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 675.
pertain to all forms of practice.\textsuperscript{260} Sittlichkeit represents the totality of world-producing human practice.\textsuperscript{261} By making freedom a principle of unity of practice, theory and production, the Aristotelian presupposition of objectivity becomes abolished. Because the State appears as an element of the Sittlichkeit, practice does not merely “take in” purpose present in the polis, but produces it on different levels. In this way, the direct conditioning of practice by politics becomes broken. The State is forced to recognize and accept other forms of practice. For

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{260} The source of the concept of Sittlichkeit is the term custom \textit{[die Sitte]}, which signifies precisely the opposite of morality, a form of pre-reflexive practice where the individual is not free. However, in contrast to Kant, who equated morality and Sittlichkeit, for Hegel, the term also signifies a form of social necessity based on freedom. It represents a form of general practice mediated on all levels by different forms of freedom. This is ironic because the source of the term morality is the Latin word \textit{mos}, which means custom (\textit{die Sitte}), habits or dispositions. Moralis is a term Cicero coined from \textit{mos} when he translated Aristotle’s concept of \textit{ethikos}, in itself a rather complex concept that pertains to an individual (his character and dispositions), that is at the same time integrated into a broader conception of \textit{ethos} (“character” in the general sense, which is derived from the Greek idea of customs). Precisely this double-character of \textit{ethos} is what Hegel attempts to resurrect.
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\textsuperscript{261} This is the reason why Hegel’s concept of the Sittlichkeit expresses both a form of bondage and freedom. The concept describes the fact that without the community I am nothing, an animal. Even if I leave the community and go to live “free”, away from society, this freedom which drives me has its source in the Sittlichkeit (and more specifically, the modern Sittlichkeit where this drive is more likely to appear). Furthermore, outside of the Sittlichkeit there is nothing to recognize me as free. I am free but the trees, the sun and the animals do not consider me free. Consequently, I am free only half-way (on the subjective side). Any attempt to produce my own sphere of freedom (for example, when I build a hermit-hut) already mimics and uses forms of practice that reveal my bondage to the source of my freedom. Individual freedom exists through the fact that I am bound to that which gives me this freedom. Hegel’s early term for this idea of “communal” relational condition of human beings was “love”. The reason why Hegel used this term was that love, as Kangrga notes, signifies a form of bondage – I do not chose the fact that I am in love. On the other hand, only free persons can base a relationship on love, it is a modern phenomenon which signifies the fact that my marriage was not preordained, and my relationship to someone else was not a matter of procreation, of satisfying the community, continuing the blood-line, building alliances, and so on. (This of course does not mean that the Ancients did not feel love, but that love was not a socially recognized practice). Love in itself signifies freedom from preordained conditioning of the relationship between two human beings, and at the same time a “natural” drive toward one another. (This is why, for example, the love of Romeo and Juliet fails, or at least must seek escape in death, because the burden of “extra-romantic” bondage to their families is too great). Eventually, Hegel would abandon this term for the concept of Sittlichkeit (relegating love to the family). Cf. Avineri, S. (2003): Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 32; Kangrga, M. (2008): \textit{Klasični njemački idealizam}. Zagreb. FF Press. p. 243. On the relationship of Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit to morality, on the one hand, and to the Ancient Greek conception of the Sittlichkeit on the other, see: Schmidt, Steffen (2004): Hegel’s “System der Sittlichkeit”. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. pp. 37, 38.
\end{quote}
example, because the individual is free and because the family can be a sphere of freedom, politics must recognize them as such. The person is therefore a practical being as a knowing and producing being in all spheres of life: as an individual, a member of the family, a citizen of the State, and so on. This represents the unity of theoria, poiesis and praxis into one unified concept of Sittlichkeit.\textsuperscript{262} Therefore, practice is a self-conscious, productive activity. However, it is a historically conditioned self-conscious, productive activity. This means that the level of the consciousness of freedom necessarily determines the nature of practice. If there is no consciousness of individual freedom or, in other words, if there is no capacity to recognize such freedom – there is no individual freedom.\textsuperscript{263} Similarly, within the Sittlichkeit, different spheres of practice reveal different levels of freedom: the family is a natural bond which is converted into a spiritual practical relationship, but as such it does not fully express the range of man’s practical freedom (the natural element still partially conditions it).

The question now is the following: Where is political practice to be found in the modern Sittlichkeit? What is its role? Before this question is answered, I will describe the modern constitution of the Sittlichkeit. In this description of the modern Sittlichkeit, I will then locate political practice.

\textsuperscript{262} For Hegel to make a chair is a practical activity, it is praxis, it produces something with a purpose on basis of knowledge and presupposes the memory of historical development under social relations. To act morally is in this regard the same as to produce a chair. In producing the chair social mechanisms of the order under which this chair is produced are reproduced as well: the chair-maker is reproduced, the world is constantly being produced. At all times an act of a free person is theoretical, practical and productive. The difference between producing a chair and producing a moral purposive act, however, is that of the levels of freedom. The totality of all these activities such as sawing, speaking, writing, making shoes, digging, voting, arguing, teaching, being a son, and virtually anything a human being does, constitutes the ever-reproducing world of the Sittlichkeit. Anything a human being does as a practical being is “stamped” with the seal of freedom.

\textsuperscript{263} This historically conditioned “knowledge”, as already shown in the first chapter, is not merely information, but something that intrinsically permeates the being of modern consciousness. It is a form of consciousness, not merely its content. Cf. “Hegel’s argument for a particular sort of original dependence necessary for the possibility of freedom – recognitional dependence – is not based on a claim about human need, or derived from evidence in development or social psychology. It involves a distinctly philosophical claim, a shift in our understanding of individuality, from viewing it as a kind of ultimate given to regarding it as a kind of achievement, and to regarding it as a normative status, not a fact of the matter, whether empirical or metaphysical.” Pippin, B. Robert (2008): Hegel’s Practical Philosophy. Rational Agency as Ethical Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 215.
4. The division of the Sittlichkeit

According to Hegel, political practice stands in a close relationship with other forms of practice. All forms of practice follow the appearance of political practice in the polis. Their slow emancipation from politics broke the immediate unity of practice at the beginning of historical development. The establishment of different practices abolished the ancient Sittlichkeit, which made possible the full development of freedom. Politics, however, cannot remain alienated in any particular form from other practices. Instead, it must be thought as constitutive for the modern Sittlichkeit. In order to have a constitutive role in the modern Sittlichkeit, politics must be in accord with other forms of practice. It must stand in accord with the freedom of the moral subject, the member of the family and the member of the civil society.

According to Hegel, the self-perpetuation of the will must be understood not only as the realization of the individual will, but as the constitution of an objective order of freedom in which this will realizes itself. This complex system of freedom is possible only when all particular forms of my willing (as a moral person, a member of the family, a religious person, a worker, and so on) are mediated by the instance of me being a member of the State, or a political subject. Therefore, State-power still figures as the law to which human beings relinquish themselves in order to become free. Law represents the historically conditioned and developed framework of freedom in which the purposes of the human world are permanently realized and reproduced. However, as a result of the transformation in the nature of practice, as well as in the relationship between purpose and nature, the State itself experienced significant transformation. This transformation took place in the law. By releasing purpose from its bondage to external causality, the law prevents a direct subsumption of freedom under the State. The immediate relationship of freedom and the polis does not exist anymore because other forms of practice, i.e. other forms of freedom emerged historically. A direct equation of freedom and the State would signify the abolishment of the development in freedom and, therefore, the abolishment of freedom itself. Rather than the State constituting the sphere of freedom by furnishing the purpose of practice in the form of political life, it withdraws in the same way it historically withdrew allowing other forms of practice to form their own spheres of freedom. The modern State does not directly constitute the Sittlichkeit by exhausting the concept of freedom in itself; instead, it recognizes other forms of practice. Since the State itself is an element in the historical development of the objective world of freedom, it does not simply feature as a pre-existing framework of practice in opposition to morality. Instead, it inherits the immanently developed capacity to recognize forms of freedom without directly subjecting them
to its own purpose. In recognition, the State simultaneously acknowledges other spheres of freedom independent from itself and affirms itself as the instance that constitutes the modern *Sittlichkeit* by doing precisely this.²⁶⁴ Because practice is a world-creating productive activity, this recognition is not simply a recognition of a form of practice. Instead, it represents the recognition of the *idea of practice*: the subjective and objective elements of practice. In other words, the State must recognize subjectivities that appear as practical beings as well as the corresponding sphere of freedom established by a particular form of practice. The State must acknowledge and recognize all those spheres of practice that emerged historically and that constitute the *Sittlichkeit* together with the State:

1) The State must recognize the family man *and* the modern family as the sphere where man is free from the State to act as a family member. The reason is that if the family were directly conditioned by the State, the State would have “direct” access to the child, constituting it in this way as its own immediate subject (the citizen of the *polis*).

2) The State must recognize practice in the form of individual freedom. In other words, the State must recognize the moral independence of man from the confines of the law as well as freedom in the form of the relationship with a thing beyond the confines of property bound to citizenship. This results in the necessity to recognize a completely new sphere of practice – the *civil society* [*die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*]. This sphere emerged through the synthesis of the elements of the family (economic practice) and the State (some forms of political practice). In this act, the State recognizes a completely new form of subjectivity – the *bourgeois* – which is the centre around which the transformation in the law happens.

The recognition of these two instances takes place in the law. Through recognition the historical inner division of practice is affirmed and integrated into the *Sittlichkeit*. However, this new relationship does not have the form of outside State-power that recognizes independent elements that appeared out of nowhere. The *idea* of law experienced world-historical transformations leading to the displacement of principles upon which the *Sittlichkeit* is

²⁶⁴ In this way freedom is “broken up” into multitude of freedoms, each of these having its historical emergence and claim to recognition. At the same time, this recognition is the recognition of one freedom - the idea of freedom which is modern man. The freedom of the will is one and indivisible. Only as such can it be “applied” to all particular spheres of freedom (civil freedom, freedom of the press, religious freedom, *etc.*). Hegel, G. W. F. (1970): *Rechts-, Pflichten- und Religionslehre für die Unterklasse* (1810 ff.), in: Werke, Bd. 4. Frankfurt am Main: Surhkamp Verlag. p. 222.
grounded. The principle of the modern *Sittlichkeit* is freedom understood as the individual capacity for practice, where this individual capacity produces a realm of freedom: the family, the civil society and the State, which in turn constitute different forms of individuality. Therefore, the principle of the modern *Sittlichkeit* is freedom of the individual subject, realized in different spheres of freedom in which the individual is active. This concrete form of individual freedom emerged in the civil society, a sphere that is based on this principle. The task of the State, however, is to *extract* this principle and make it the basis for the constitution of the *Sittlichkeit* (so that, for example, free individuality of the *bourgeois* becomes the principle upon which the family raises free individuals).

“It is free nations alone that have the consciousness of and activity for the whole; in modern times the individual is only free for himself as such, and enjoys citizen freedom alone – in the sense of that of a *bourgeois* and not of a *citoyen*. We do not possess two separate words to mark this distinction. The freedom of citizens in this signification is the dispensing with universality, the principle of isolation; but it is a necessary moment unknown to ancient states. It is the perfect independence of the points, and therefore the greater independence of the whole, which constitutes the higher organic life. After the state received this principle into itself, the higher freedom could come forth."265

Because the source of purpose is not directly conditioned by the *polis*, but instead has to come from the individual subject, the first embodiment of freedom is not the *polis*, but *abstract right* as a form of recognition of an individual will in relation to a thing.

“In relation to needs - if these are taken as primary - the possession of property appears as a means; but the true position is that, from the point of view of freedom, property, as the first *existence* [*Dasein*] of freedom, is an essential end for itself."266

Property is not directly subject to citizenship; instead, it figures as a phenomenon that is constitutive for a completely independent sphere of practice: the civil society. The right to property becomes extracted from this sphere and posited as one of the grounding principles of the modern *Sittlichkeit*. This is the right to place my will, unconstrained and under no penalty of death into a thing and to have my will recognized as such. The State must recognize the will present in the thing without subjecting it to its own purpose (as was the case with the Greeks, where property was directly subsumed under citizenship). This is the right to *personality*, which


is inalienable, meaning it cannot be abolished, traded or suspended.\(^{267}\) The second principle stems directly from this one – *morality* or the abstract recognition of *I* as the instance that constitutes the *personality of others*. *I* am recognized in the thing as my will, but it is also *I* who recognize other wills in other things. In this act *I* recognize another will as something distinct from myself as well as from the State.\(^{268}\) A framework of mutual recognition is established in which morality figures as the inner constraint *I* place on myself by recognizing a subjective will. It is *my will* that should determine the conditions of the *Sittlichkeit*, not natural and outside violence, or a State foreign to me.\(^{269}\) Thus, *I* am recognized as the will present in the thing, but it is from the relation of property (*i.e.* the fact that my will is exteriorized in the thing) that the *I* in the form of the subject conditions the relationship, because if *I* am recognized, it is *I* that

\(^{267}\) Although citizenship is not determined by property in the sense where possession gives political rights, the nature of modern property as constitutive for personality through recognition of the right to possess my own body and the capacity to externalize my will, is constitutive for citizenship. However, this capacity to be a person that emerges through property relations is common to all – it is intrinsic to the modern will (as opposed to deducing citizenship from contingent and passing possession). In other words, the person that emerges from this recognition is inalienable, one can, for example, only sell labour power but not himself. Cf.: “That is why for Hegel – in direct contrast to all premodern legal systems still based on substantial, religious, or personal bonds – all those goods that ‘constitute my very own person and the universal essence of my self-consciousness, of my personality in general and my universal freedom of will, of ethical life, and of religion’ (§66) can now become my own as, in principle, ‘inalienable’.” Ritter, Joachim (2004): *Person and Property in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* (§§34–81), in: *Hegel on Ethics and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 114 – 115.

\(^{268}\) “Hegel regards the freedom to own property as the principle that first properly grants existence on Christian freedom itself: insofar as society now orients itself exclusively to an objectified relation between persons that is mediated through property, it liberates the individual as personality, freeing the latter to become a ‘subject’ in relation to the entire wealth and depth of a personal, ethical, and spiritual existence untouched by any objectification whatsoever.” The important element here to note is precisely the idea of life “untouched by any objectification whatsoever”. This will become the crux of my argument latter on when we turn to Deleuze because it is this idea of human relationship as transcending things and materiality that will become disastrous from Deleuze’s point of view. *Ibid.* p. 115.

\(^{269}\) For example, this is why guilt can have many forms today. When the right to property is violated, it is not only the abstract right that is broken. Instead, the will that has violated this right is imputed guilt, *i.e.* there is an inner constraint placed on the will, from the will itself in the act of recognition. But this principle of guilt, same as morality, is not reducible to its own conditions. For example, I feel guilty in relation to violations against the totality of the *Sittlichkeit* in ways that are also private. I learn to feel guilty in relation to other human beings as individual persons through the fact that their wills are existent in nature constituting with other wills a world. I do not only feel the outside constraint of the law as violence that punishes me, nor guilt simply in relation to a divinity or the State, but guilt in different shades responding to different ways freedom exteriorizes itself in the *Sittlichkeit*, including things, other persons, family relations, and so on.

115
recognizes. Therefore, a system of mutual conditioning of wills is established that presupposes the principle of subjectivity as determinative for the *Sittlichkeit*.

These two principles, personality and morality, ground *Sittlichkeit* not as outside principles upon which the world is built but as *abstractions*, which are themselves developed in the totality of the *Sittlichkeit* that they constitute. In other words, these two principles of freedom permeate the *Sittlichkeit*, constituting all spheres of freedom (family, civil society and the State) and are at the same time themselves imparted reality through these spheres. Personality and morality are not “finished” principles from which the *Sittlichkeit* is deduced, but abstractions that actively constitute all social relations. In this way, they themselves appear in distinct forms. Personality (as the outer determination of the will) appears in the form of the family person, *bourgeois* and citizen. Morality (as the inner self-determination of the will) appears as love, self-interested individuality and political disposition. Therefore, according to Hegel, the objective world responds to the following imperative: *be a legal person and a moral subject*. This imperative resonates like a ripple-effect throughout the *Sittlichkeit*. The development of these principles will take the form of gradual constitution of different social forms and their permanent disorganization. The reason for their disorganization lies in the fact that the social form in question (family and then civil society) does not possess the strength of political practice that will play the role of converting all relationships into a totality.

\[a) \text{ The family}\]

In the first instance and as a result of the transformation in the law, the most natural form of the *Sittlichkeit*, the family, does not rely on the exchange of individuals between families or tribes but on *love*. Love is the most natural form of what the abstract form of personality presupposes – mutual recognition.\(^{270}\) What is affirmed in love is both the freedom of the individual (insofar as the relationship between two persons is not conditioned by non-romantic pressure) as well as the dependence of this freedom on the recognition of the other. As a natural form of *Sittlichkeit* the family is tasked both with the satisfaction of emotional and biological needs, as well as with the upbringing of children. However, in the modern *Sittlichkeit*, the

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\(^{270}\) “The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right [*für mich*] and that, if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person [*daß ich in ihr gele*], who in turn gains recognition in me.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 199.
family does not raise good Roman citizens, slaves, good craftsmen or brave warriors; instead, it raises persons and subjects.\textsuperscript{271} The family is not directly subsumed under other forms of practice. In contrast, it is allowed to constitute itself in accord with its own inner purposiveness.\textsuperscript{272} The legal framework must be capable of recognizing the principle of love for a contract between two persons to emerge.

With the raising of children, the family’s purpose in relation to the Sittlichkeit ends. The family remains independent from the State, but the State in turn must remain independent from the family. This form of Sittlichkeit fulfils its purpose when the child grows up and exits the family dissolving it as a constitutive power. If the family were to encroach on the State, a collapse into tyranny would ensue. This means political practice is not present in the family. On the other hand, neither is economic practice anymore, because if it were, it would curtail individual freedom binding the reproduction of life to the conditions of family life (e.g. the son inherits the father’s trade and so on). Therefore, the family is freed both from direct political influence of the State and from economic organization that could impinge on the freedom of the individual.

\begin{quote}
\textit{b) The civil society}
\end{quote}

With the dissolution of the family the individual becomes free. Free individuality establishes and creates its own sphere of freedom – the civil society:

\begin{quote}
“\textit{In civil society, each individual is his own end, and all else means nothing to him. [...] It is the sphere [Boden] of mediation in which all individual characteristics [Einzelheiten], all aptitudes, and all accidents of birth and fortune are liberated, and where the waves of all passions surge forth, governed only by the reason which shines through them. Particularity, limited by universality, is the only standard by which each particular [person] promotes his welfare.”}\textsuperscript{273}
\end{quote}

The bourgeois is not simply a result of the family relinquishing economic practice. Instead, the bourgeois also represents a political force that alienates politics from the State, basing the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{271}] Ibid. pp. 211 - 212.
\item[\textsuperscript{272}] In pre-modern times, Hegel writes, “considerations of wealth [des Vermögens], connections, or political ends may determine the outcome. This may have very harsh effects, inasmuch as marriage is made a means to other ends. In modern times, on the other hand, the subjective origin [of marriage], the state of being in love, is regarded as the only important factor. Here, it is imagined that each must wait until his hour has struck, and that one can give one’s love only to a specific individual”. Ibid. p. 202.
\item[\textsuperscript{273}] Ibid. pp. 220 – 221.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
State on principles of recognition in relation to being a person and a moral subject. The civil society allows property and morality to thrive, thereby preventing the State from collapsing into the family and in this way eradicating modern forms of freedom. This reproduction, as shown, takes place through an independent relationship to a thing (in which neither property grounds citizenship nor citizenship grounds property). Therefore, it represents a sphere in which individuals encounter themselves as individual wills (and not as family members or citizens). The main form through which the civil society contributes to the self-perpetuation of the modern Sittlichkeit is by permanently destroying it. The civil society brings the Sittlichkeit to its extreme by dissolving it.

“In these opposites and their complexity, civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption common to both.”

However, precisely this tendency toward the destruction of the community introduces one of the most important elements within it – the modern man. The degeneration of social bonds and the reduction of the individual to an abstraction, results in the collapse of previous relationships that held human beings to some pre-determined form of satisfaction of needs.

“The ways and means by which the animal can satisfy its needs are limited in scope, and its needs are likewise limited. Though sharing this dependence, the human being is at the same time able to transcend it and to show his universality, first by multiplying his needs and means [of satisfying them], and secondly by dividing and differentiating the concrete need into individual parts and aspects which then become different needs, particularized and hence more abstract. […] Here, at the level of needs, it is that concretum of representational thought which we call the human being; this is the first, and in fact the only occasion on which we shall refer to the human being in this sense.”

Therefore, the self-destruction of the Sittlichkeit represents a necessary moment for its constitution. The multiplication of needs and the means of their satisfaction, as well as the accompanying particularisation of interests are all placed into the service of cultivating modern man. The multiplication of needs only further releases the will from its bondage to particular things and social relations that sustain them. Furthermore, the necessary means of their satisfaction – work, cultivates the sense of human existence.

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274 Ibid. p. 222.
275 Ibid. p. 228.
276 “The very multiplication of needs has a restraining influence on desire, for if people make use of many things, the pressure to obtain anyone of these which they might need is less strong, and this is a sign that necessity [die Not] in general is less powerful.” Ibid. p. 229.
277 Ibid. pp. 231 - 232. For Hegel, private interests in themselves contain a public function, in other words, they are not merely self-serving but reveal a mechanism that leads to the establishment of the State. As Michael
But again, as with the family, no sooner had Hegel introduced this new sphere of *Sittlichkeit* than he shows its limits and reasons for its disorganization. *Sittlichkeit* reduced to the civil society is for Hegel impossible for the following reasons:

1) Unfettered freedom of pursuing one's own economic interests leads to concentration of wealth that serves as a centre of power, which submits the rest of the society to itself (the division between the economic and the political realm collapses and politics loses its character of an independent practice).\(^{278}\)

2) Concentration of wealth leads to ever higher pauperization of citizens, disabling them access to spiritual goods of the *Sittlichkeit*;\(^{279}\)

3) It leads the civil society into dependence on outer, external elements through the establishment of colonies (imperialism);\(^{280}\)

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Wolff notes: “private persons or individuals come to discipline, to cultivate, to “form and educate” themselves in this manner and “work away,” as Hegel puts it, their “natural simplicity”. In a certain sense, Hegel is here following the critique of Rousseau that Kant developed […]. For Hegel, as for Kant, the technical, economic, and cultural development of civil society with all of its harsh social consequences not merely is a source of corruption, but also serves a meaningful purpose”. Wolff, M. (2004): *Hegel’s Organicist Theory of the State: On the Concept and Method of Hegel’s “Science of the State”*, in: *Hegel on Ethics and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 304 – 305.

\(^{278}\) “The contrast [between] great wealth and great poverty appears: the poverty for which it becomes impossible to do anything; [the] wealth [which], like any mass, makes itself into a force. The amassing of wealth [occurs] partly by chance, partly through universality, through distribution. [It is] a point of attraction, of a sort which casts its glance far over the universal, drawing [everything] around it to itself—just as a greater mass attracts the smaller ones to itself. To him who hath, to him is given. Acquisition becomes a many-sided system, profiting by means or ways that a smaller business cannot employ. In other words, the highest abstraction of labor pervades that many more individual modes and thereby takes on an ever-widening scope. This inequality between wealth and poverty, this need and necessity, lead to the utmost dismemberment of the will, to inner indignation and hatred.” Hegel, G. W. F. (1986): *Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805 – 06) with commentary*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. p. 140.


\(^{280}\) “This inner dialectic of society drives it - or in the first instance *this specific society* - to go beyond its own confines and look for consumers, and hence the means it requires for subsistence [*Subsistenz*], in other nations [*Völkern*] which lack those means of which it has a surplus or which generally lag behind it in creativity, etc.” Ibid. p. 267 - 268.
4) It alienates man from his concept because it enslaves him to machines under the conditions of abstract labour.\textsuperscript{281}

For these reasons, Hegel names this form of Sittlichkeit: the State of necessity and of the understanding [Not- und Verstandesstaat].\textsuperscript{282} It represents a State only in a reduced form since it is based on an incomplete form of subjectivity still attached to the natural form of needs.\textsuperscript{283} The bourgeois pursues his interests as a being of needs. In order to satisfy these needs, the form social interaction takes in the civil society is one of compulsion. I must enter the market under the compulsion of natural needs that individualize and particularize the family man. This is a weakness of the civil society, because left to its own devices it leads to its own dissolution, but at the same time precisely its strength (its purpose), through which it keeps the principle of individuality alive.\textsuperscript{284} Like the family, it represents as much a sphere of non-freedom as it is a


\textsuperscript{282} Ibid. p. 221.

\textsuperscript{283} Shlomo Avineri comments that the idea of the Not- und Verstandesstaat in Hegel’s earliest writings corresponds to the concept of the State as such. In The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism (referencing probably to a document written together by Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin), one can read that the State is something mechanical, and that, therefore, there can be no idea of the State. Avineri notes that this concept of the State represents the yet undifferentiated unity of civil society and the State. Therefore, Not- und Verstandesstaat as civil society represented for early Hegel the State that was not differentiated from civil society, so that the powers of industrial and mechanical conditions of life appeared as one and the same force of “the State”. This is an interesting observation because, as I will show later, this is for Deleuze in essence how the State appears to non-citizens, to those who stand outside of it and to whom the difference between civil society and the State is merely the difference between waves of violence. Avineri, S. (2003): Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 32; Hegel, G. W. F. (1986): Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus (1796 oder 1797), in: Werke, Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. p. 234.

\textsuperscript{284} Manfred Riedel speaks of Hegel’s civil society as the first complete formulation of a “depoliticized society”. Although this is correct, one should add that this “depoliticized society” is political in the sense that it already contains the roots (abstract form) of political practice in the form of mutual recognition of wills (this is why Hegel calls the civil society Not- und Verstandesstaat). It is also political in the world-historical sense, because to appear as a world-historical phenomenon means to appear in the form of a political principle (both Protestantism and the French Revolution were political movements that brought about the establishment of the principle of individuality by – among others - political means). Riedel, M. (1982): Der Begriff der „Bürgerlichen
sphere of freedom. This contradiction leads to the emergence of the political State. However, the modern State does not arise from the past, in the form of the old *polis* seeking its affirmation against the newly emerged forms of freedom; instead, it emerges from within the civil society,\(^{285}\) as a dialectical force of totalization.

c) *The State*

What prevents the disorganization of civil society (and by extension the *Sittlichkeit in toto*) is the rational State. The State has no other task but to reconstitute the *Sittlichkeit* – it posits the inner division between the family, the civil society, the political State as well as the division between the powers of the State itself in the *political constitution*. Furthermore, the State accomplishes unity that does not dissolve under the pressure of family bonds and compulsion of the civil society. The State itself is divided into specific powers that guarantee the principle of freedom. Most importantly, the State is the sphere of *political practice*.

5. **The unified division of the State-organism**

The *Sittlichkeit* as the totality of practice in the form of purposive productive activity is inherently divided. It is constituted by three distinct moments or spheres of practice: the family, the civil society and the political State. Whereas both the family and the civil society on their own tend to dissolve the *Sittlichkeit*, the State is tasked precisely with containing differentiation into a totality. The unity of the *Sittlichkeit* as a whole represents a *political unity* and the State permanently reproduces this unity. However, the State does not achieve this by subsuming society under itself. The unity develops dialectically, which means that the State develops in

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\(^{285}\) The fact that the logic of the civil society has a tendency toward state-formation is for Hegel already visible in the way how this society internally begins to regulate and form itself (through corporations, estates, firms, *etc.*). In this way, private interests already tend to gain a form of common interest (*e.g.* my private interest is coupled with the interest of my firm). However, this self-regulation is insufficient since all these organizational forms remain conditioned by private interests. Hegel, G. W. F. (1989): *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse*, in: Werke, Bd. 7. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. p. 397.
accordance with the constitution of the Sittlichkeit. This is also exhibited in State’s internal constitution, in which all of its particular elements stand in a relation of mutual dependence:

“The state is an organism, i.e. the development of the Idea in its differences. These different aspects are accordingly the various powers with their corresponding tasks and functions, through which the universal continually produces itself in a necessary way and thereby preserves itself, because it is itself the presupposition of its own production. This organism is the political constitution; it proceeds perpetually from the state, just as it is the means by which the state preserves itself. If the two diverge and the different aspects break free, the unity which the constitution produces is no longer established. The fable of the belly and the other members is relevant here. It is in the nature of an organism that all its parts must perish if they do not achieve identity and if one of them seeks independence.”

The State is an organic totality - every part expresses in itself the whole and stands in an organic fashion connected with the other parts. The centre that divides and at the same time holds together all the parts is the constitution - the legal framework that guarantees all forms of freedom, their independence from each other as well as their coexistence. Therefore, the law in its political form gives the modern Sittlichkeit its unity and allows the inner development of its parts. However, this political unity is not a static unity; instead it is - as it was in Aristotle - a practice. This means that the State represents a productive and purposive activity which permanently reproduces the totality of social life. The State achieves this by making all the elements of ethical life [das sittliche Leben], all practices, be that the practice of the family man, the economic practice of the bourgeois, the moral practice of the individual, and so on, inhabited by a purpose which mediates the particular interest of these specific practices and turns them into an interest of the State. Political practice mediates, it negates purposes of particular practices and it represents them in the law realizing them in the form of a general will. This practice is performed as all other practices on two distinct levels: it has an objective side, or an institutional form of Sittlichkeit where political practice is performed, and a subjective side, or a specific form of subjectivity that is practical.

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287 “The constitution is essentially a system of mediation.” Ibid. p. 343.
a) The objective side of political practice

Political practice has its place within the confines of the fragmented Sittlichkeit. As a result of this, politics is subject to the division of labour. Political practice is relegated to a part of the population. As a result of the complexity of the modern Sittlichkeit, direct political participation is not possible. Therefore, the exercise of political practice must take the form of profession, which is then relegated to different elements of society - in the first instance, to the representatives of the estates and the government.

“Viewed as a mediating organ, the Estates stand between the government at large on the one hand and the people in their division into particular spheres and individuals [Individuen] on the other. Their determination requires that they should embody in equal measure both the sense and disposition of the state and government and the interests of particular circles and individuals [Einzellen]. At the same time, this position means that they share the mediating function of the organized power of the executive [...]”

288 The political representatives have no exclusive rights. Instead, they are tasked with representing the whole that crystallizes itself from the civil society. These practitioners of politics face the law, on the one hand, and the citizenship, on the other. Their work consists in representing interests that in this way become mediated with one another. Political practice is neither the practice of the despot nor a practice of the whole political population, but a practice relegated to a specific group of people who mediate different interests in accordance with the law.289 They represent all persons in the State as well as all the historically emerged practices

288 Ibid. p. 342.
289 According to Hegel, the political system of representation is a necessity. As a result of the complexity and the inner division of the modern State, politics must become a profession. In this way, the integrity of political practice is preserved and serves the purpose of channelling the will (the mediated interests), which arise from the civil society. In Hegel’s view, however, there should be no universal suffrage. What are mediated are the interests that appear within the confines of existing spheres of practice, for example, the interests which crystallize within the Estates. The State never encounters an individual interest per se. Individual interests always emerge already assembled and integrated into higher-level common interests of specific spheres of the society. Therefore, representation has an organic quality to it. Individual interests flow into the interests of the family, of a given corporation, of the estate, and so on, which then become mediated with other already contextualized interests. Charles Taylor writes on this: “Men must relate to the polity not as individuals, but through their membership in the articulated components of the society. It is pure abstraction to demand that all men relate to political power in the same way.” Ibid. pp. 339 - 341; Hegel, G. W. F. (1989): Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Dritter Teil., in: Werke, Bd. 10. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. p. 341; Taylor, Charles (1999): Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 446.
and the rights arising from the spheres constituted by them (the rights of the individual, of the family man, and so on).

\[b)\] The subjective side of political practice

This objective side of political practice, however, is impossible without a presupposed existence of the political subject. If a person is represented in its interest, this means that this person itself must be a political subject. The individual not only has the right to representation (through its inclusion into a specific sphere of civil society), but the duty to participate through representation in the constitution of the general will. This connection between the subjective and the objective on the side of the subject is established by what Hegel calls political disposition [politische Gesinnung]. In its political disposition, the person is not only aware of its individual interests, its bourgeois interest, or the interest of its family, but of the necessity to politically articulate these interests. In this way, the person makes his interest subject to the recognition of the State, but at the same time, recognizes the State in its power of recognition. In this act the person gains full concretion and the final form of the abstract principles of right and morality – it becomes a modern citizen. Without this disposition in the character of the citizen, no representation would be possible because the political class would detach itself from society and would function on its own and in its own interests.\[290\] This would abolish the modern Sittlichkeit on both sides, destroying the subjective essence of the citizen as well as the objective order by isolating and alienating the general will into particularity.\[291\]

Therefore, one can conclude that political practice is the practice of mediation of interests before the law where the concept of the interest signifies the objectives of the will recognized in the totality of its determinations, resulting from the historical development of practice and the spheres produced by different forms of practice. Politics represents the process of the negative that has been at work in history, itself detached and enshrined into a specific class of

\[290\] Mediation ensures that “the power of the sovereign does not appear as an isolated extreme - and hence simply as an arbitrary power of domination - and on the other, that the particular interests of communities, corporations, and individuals [Individuen] do not become isolated either”. Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 342.

\[291\] Ibid.
people in such a way that this class represents the political being of the whole of society. On the one hand, this places political practice on the side of law, the objective order, as a distinct element of the social fabric that has the form of a professional activity. On the other hand, this objective, institutional form of political practice is possible only on the grounds of subjectivity that knows itself as a complex unity of multitude of identities and that reproduces within itself the political capacity for practice. The person regards itself as capable of mediating not only its distinct identities but also its own interests in relation to other person via the representatives and mechanisms established by the law. Thus the subjective and objective side of political practice stand in unity with one another and both in a mediated unity with all other spheres of society.

“The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom requires that personal individuality [Einzelheit] and its particular interests should reach their full development and gain recognition of their right for itself (within the system of the family and of civil society), and also that they should, on the one hand, pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and on the other, knowingly and willingly acknowledge this universal interest even as their own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as their ultimate end. The effect of this is that the universal does not attain validity or fulfilment without the interest, knowledge, and volition of the particular, and that individuals do not live as private persons merely for these particular interests without at the same time directing their will to a universal end [in und für das Allgemeine wollen] and acting in conscious awareness of this end. The principle of modern states has enormous strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, while at the same time bringing it back to substantial unity and so preserving this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.”

The historical power of the negative contained in political practice becomes a power that permanently reproduces the modern Sittlichkeit. This is achieved in such a way that its unity is sustained by reproducing particular and individual interest through mediation and representation, thus keeping all these particular and individual interests independent in their purposiveness.

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292 Obviously, from our point of view, Hegel’s system of estates is anachronistic. But how and why Hegel theoretically organized the Sittlichkeit in details does not interest me that much. What is of importance to me is the role of politics within the Sittlichkeit, as well as the notion that political practice through mediation reproduces determined social forms of life, most importantly: the family, civil society and the State. If other forms appear as the “estates” or, for example, a modern political party, is secondary to the fact that practice signifies a tendency toward self-organization of the world. This particular element is what will be of importance for my later arguments.

293 Ibid. p. 282.
As a result of this, for Hegel, to be a human being is to be a *citoyen*, but to be a *citoyen* is to be everything else: a family member, a member of the civil society, a worker, a shoe-maker, a businessman, a moral subject, and so on. The *citoyen* signifies a form of subjectivity that is infused with the power to hold all these elements together in a circle of mutual conditioning and recognition. It prevents these distinct elements from collapsing into one another. As such, it is an expression of totality where no part can exist on its own and no part can be subtracted without the whole collapsing on itself. This is also why for Hegel the term *State* signifies the whole of *society*, because in every element of society what is willed is the principle upon which the particular elements of society are mutually mediated and held together in a balanced fashion. For Hegel, the *Philosophy of Right* is the *Science of the State*. But *Science of the State* is also *Philosophy of Right*, because the law is the product of historical overcoming of nature which stands at the root of the system.

Therefore, politics for Hegel is nothing more than it was for the Greeks: a practice of mediating the interests of the citizens in relation to the law. The difference lies in the idea of the *citizen*, which is grounded in the new understanding of practice in which the State does not directly condition all forms of life. Rather, different forms of practice possess their own purposiveness that are not reducible to that of the State. If these different forms of practice are to perpetuate this purposiveness, they must isolate the reproduction of the principle which grounds them from other forms of practice. However, this isolation is predicated on the fact that all these principles constitute one single principle of freedom which is regarded as the totalizing principle of human practice. Political practice is what divides this totality and holds it together by mediating and protecting the integrity of particular practices thus enabling it as a totality.

For Hegel, politics has the same eminent position it had in Aristotle, with the difference that it is not eminent in relation to elements which are subsumed under it, but in relation to elements that in themselves, through their own independent purposiveness, constitute the developed world of the *Sittlichkeit*, where politics is to be found as their organic continuation and integration. As Ludwig Siep writes, “To be a spiritual being in Hegel’s sense is necessarily to be a political being, just as for Aristotle the rational animal – the *zoon logon echon* – is essentially a political animal.”

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6. Personality and the people

Because political practice in the modern State engenders a radically different form of organization of the Sittlichkeit than in the ancient times, the very principle around which politics appears changes. The people as the central category of Hegel’s world-historical development, dissolves into a multitude. The people becomes a mass without a centre if it is not, as a people, constituted by the principle of personality.

“Without its monarch and that articulation of the whole which is necessarily and immediately associated with monarchy, the people is a formless mass. The latter is no longer a state, and none of those determinations which are encountered only in an internally organized whole (such as sovereignty, government, courts of law, public authorities [Obrigkeit], estates, etc.) is applicable to it.”

The monarch expresses the highest determination of personality. Therefore, not people anymore, but the person grounds the modern State. Consequently, only organization that follows the contours of the different forms of practice, and therefore accords with freedom and reason can sustain itself. People constitute a “people” only when their unity is grounded on modern subjectivity. Everything else that appeared in history and stands behind this principle is, when viewed in isolation, null and void.

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296 According to Hegel, the monarch expresses the principle of personality, which in turn reaches its fullness in the monarch. But this is done under specific conditions. When the constitution functions well, the monarch has only to pronounce “I will” and place his name on a decision made by the government. This “I will”, however, is of highest importance, because it marks “the great difference between ancient and modern worlds […]”. Whereas in the ancient world, the will still seeks criteria for its decisions in nature (e.g. in oracles or the entrails of sacrificial animals), modernity is based on the principle of the self-conscious will, which knows that all decision flow from its own freedom.

The problem here, however, is that there is no necessity for the monarch to represent this power, any person might do this (such as in the case of many contemporary presidents). Hegel has been often accused of supporting the Prussian monarchy of his time through philosophical arguments, but also defended by some such as Charles Taylor, who noted that Hegel’s earlier writings reflect his political experiences in Württemberg. There Hegel came to the conclusion that only the monarch was capable of bringing about the necessary changes in the organization of society (i.e. in accord with reason and against the hold of tradition and customs) without violence. Ibid. pp. 317 - 318; Taylor; Charles (1999): Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 442 - 443.
“It is part of education, of thinking as consciousness of the individual [des Einzelnen] in the form of universality, that I am apprehended as a universal person, in which [respect] all are identical. A human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc. This consciousness, which is the aim of thought, is of infinite importance, and it is inadequate only if it adopts a fixed position - for example, as cosmopolitanism - in opposition to the concrete life of the state.”

The State does not stand in a relationship with the people anymore, as was the case in preceding history, but with the modern person in the form of the political being whose highest determination is to live the life of citoyen. The “people” is the last natural determination of man, one the modern State sheds away in becoming a nation-state. The people no longer form the State by bringing into it their customs or beliefs; instead, the State, emancipated from its pre-modern elements, constitutes a people organized around the principle of reason. It is not German, French, Italian or any other history that determines the nature of the State. When it is a modern State, then its primary history is world-history - the history of necessary freedom. Only within world-history do particular histories have their validity, and then only when these particular histories are found at the proper stage of development. The “people” who do not constitute the divided citizenship under the principle of freedom has no world-historical precedence anymore. The State recognizes a person, a principle of organization from which the modern people emerge, not people as such. Therefore, the modern State represents the unity of all practices because it is the seat of political practice, which reflected onto the political disposition of the citizen mediates diverse interests contained in individual and particular wills. The State forges a general will, and makes this general will subject to permanent reproduction of the idea of freedom. This idea of freedom is the Sittlichkeit as the totality of all practice in which man objectifies himself, producing and reproducing a world.

297 Women are (partially) exempt here, because according to Hegel, women still contain too much in-born contingency. There is reason in them, but not quite purified as in men, it is more in the element of representation and life than in the concept. One could argue that, according to Hegel, women fail to internalize State-principles on the same level as men because they fail to sublate the opposition between the sexes. Whereas man achieves the position of reason by renouncing all heteronomous conditions (for example, by renouncing any constraints of manhood that could impinge on the State and turn it into a patriarchal regime), the woman remains bound to her sex and fails to transcend it. Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 240, 207.
7. Result

In this chapter I showed that politics for Hegel represents a form of practice that has central role in the reproduction of the Sittlichkeit. The Sittlichkeit encompasses the totality of human practice and purposes. It emerges through historical development in which its immediate unity becomes abolished. This immediate unity was predicated on the identity of State and society. Through time different practices emerged that severed this identity and abolished the ancient Sittlichkeit, alienating divergent determinations of man from each other. This inner development of the State corresponds to its external differentiation from nature presented in the first chapter. By sublating natural violence, the State does not only establish a border in relation to the outside, but also becomes capable to internally emancipate different spheres of human life from their natural determination. For example, the sublation of natural violence through the State is at the same time the emancipation of the State from familial relationships. Simultaneously, the family itself is subtracted from the State, releasing its capacity to become organized around its own principle of freedom (love). In this way, external necessity (e.g. sexual drive) as a contingent, passing event becomes “memorized” within the relationship of mutual recognition further constituted by law (recognized by the State). The first chapter presented the historical emergence of the State. Its development necessitated the sublation of natural determinations of man, eventually shattering the innate relationship between the State and the natural formation of people. The second chapter showed the inner constitution of the modern State. When the State reaches rational organization, people no longer make the State through their forms of natural organization. Rather, the State constitutes a people. This is the nation-state. Its capacity to forge a people is based on the fact that it serves as the seat of political practice. As a power of the negative, politics mediates productive capacities of man, it allows production to reproduce an objective world filled with divergent interests. I will later show that these divergent interests are nothing else but passions, the driving force of history that has been internalized by the State. The modern State, in other words, is not merely a world-historical subject constituted and destroyed by passions in the process of world-spirit, but an organism capable of containing and preserving these passions in the form of mediated interests. Political practice is the form of activity that achieves this. As such, it is the central determination of personality as the essence of modern man.
PART II: DELEUZE’S CONCEPT OF POLITICS AS NOMADOLOGY

1. Macropolitics and micropolitics

The preceding chapter revealed that political practice does not only develop the idea of freedom in history, but that politics also becomes central for the unhindered reproduction of freedom in the modern Sittlichkeit. It does this by mediating the established and recognized forms of practice. Political practice, therefore, presupposes both the Sittlichkeit and the State as the form in which the Sittlichkeit develops itself fully. The situation is very different in Deleuze’s philosophy. In Deleuze’s view, politics signifies not only macropolitics, a term he uses to describe political practice in the form of the negative, but also micropolitics or political practices as affirmation. In its affirmative character political practice is anti-historical. However, this does not mean that politics as such is not integral to history. Following the conclusion of the first chapter I will show here that although Deleuze criticizes the concept of history, he does not relegate historical life to illusion. He presupposes history as the framework of macropolitics, but then binds political practice (and by extension practice as such) to becoming, making historical development in relation to politics not one-directional but paradoxical. Historically, politics appears in the form of the State. At the same time, Deleuze’s idea of history contains another sense: the appearance of the State simultaneously represents a process of its disorganization. Anti-historical, political practice is what drives history not only toward the State, but away from it – into disorganization of the State-organism. Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history presents both the development and the dissolution of the State in one and the same process. Consequently, in this chapter I will present the passage of universal history as a process of macropolitics, up to the point of deterritorialization of the State and the emergence of micropolitics that presupposes becomings. I will show how Deleuze and Guattari differentiate historical from anti-historical political practice, as well as what they understand under the concept of nomadology that is integral to the latter form of political practice.

The final purpose of this subchapter is to extract Deleuze’s idea of political practice and place it in relation to Hegel’s idea of the Sittlichkeit. This will be done in order to bring both of their ideas of politics into the already established conceptual framework of immanence. I will do this in the third part of this chapter.
2. Deleuze and Guattari’s *universal history*

Deleuze’s concept of politics, similarly to Hegel’s, cannot be reduced to one single meaning. The reason is precisely the same as in Hegel - its historical character. However, this historical character of political practice is not the only one in Deleuze’s philosophy. Politics *as such*, according to him, emerges only at the limits of history. There are two main categories of politics that Deleuze formulates together with Guattari. The first one belongs to the realm of history. In this register political practice emerges as the power of the State. The second concept of politics belongs to *becoming* and it represents politics as practice of breaking away from history.

Deleuze and Guattari write in *Anti-Oedipus* what they call *universal history*. That Deleuze would engage in writing a *universal* history seems contradictory to everything shown in the first chapter. But at this point it suffices to say that universal history is a peculiar form of genealogy of power or what Deleuze and Guattari call anti-production. In opposition to Hegel’s philosophy, where the principle actor of history is Spirit in the form of world-spirit, in Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history the main process is that of desiring-production [*la production désirante*]. Desiring-production is a process of “production of production”. Deleuze regards this process as a condition of all production, both on the level of the “subject” and the level of the “object”. In other words, it is a process of producing both subjectivities and objectivities that are present in social life. However, he does not make this difference on the level of desire because desiring-production signifies productive processes before they are relegated to “reality”, on the one hand, and “fantasy”, on the other. Desire expresses the process of production of the *real*, where the real does not correspond exclusively either to the linguistic or the physical.

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“If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. […] The objective being of desire is the Real in and of itself.”

Desire, similarly to Spirit, includes in its concept practice, thought and production. However, desire is a process of emerging assemblages between partial, molecular elements before they appear as global and totalized instances of identity (e.g. subject – object, mother - father, etc.).

Social production [la production sociale] and desiring-production at first appear as one and the same process. All production and all desire appear socially conditioned. The identity of social production and desiring-production stems from, on the one hand, social conditioning of desire that, on the other, is a result of the fact that desire invests a social form of production: “social-production is purely and simply desiring production itself under determinate conditions”. Although society organizes and regulates desire, it is desire itself which acts as a force behind this process. Social organization of desiring-production is the form through which desire results in a condition placed on its own productive capacities. In other words, desiring-production is at the same time 1) production of production (assemblage-building), and as a result of its social organization, 2) production of conditions that constrain production (totalized assemblages). In both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateus, the opposition between


301 For example, when the pharaoh builds a pyramid, the productive power exhausts itself in the pharaoh. The workers who work on the pyramid are exhausted in the pharaoh. Because he is the centre of the cosmic order, and since his life holds the balance of order and chaos, all work and all production flows from the pharaoh. His eternal existence in the after-life conditions life to organize itself in a pre-determined way. Only if his corpse remains undisturbed will he continue to protect the land as well as the cosmic order. This specific form of social-production exhausts all desiring-production and all productive power flows into determined points of capture (the pharaoh, the architect, the worker). This equation conditions the possibility that something like a worker and an Egyptian emerges.

302 The difference between desiring-production and social production is not between the individual and society, but between the unconscious molecular process of production and molar organization of this production. Individuals as persons are in themselves already molar, global forms of desiring-production. The contradiction between desiring-production and social production will therefore not mirror the contradiction between the individual and the State. An individual might express the forces of desiring-production against the State-form, but it might also serve as the molar instance of organization that conditions and organizes desire. The relations of desiring-production and social production permeate all levels of society, from the individual, through the family, toward the State. Ibid. p. 29.
desire and its social organization is presented as an interplay between molecular processes and their molar expression. Desire is intrinsically linked to molecular production, where the term molecular terms interaction of elements before they appear as determined subjects and objects.

“Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from microformations already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc.”

Desire is both a process of assembling partial objects, as well as something itself assembled, intrinsically linked with the social system in which it functions. In other words, desire is always socially determined and has a specific social character. The most important way desire is socially determined, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is through the engineering of a lack [le manque]. Only through social organization of desire does lack appear. When this takes place, desire becomes re-routed to need specific subjects and objects.

“We know very well where lack – and its subjective correlative – come from. Lack is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. It is counterproduced as a result of the pressure of antiproduction; the latter falls back on the forces of production and appropriates them. It is never primary; production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack.”

The reason why lack is engineered, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is that, paradoxically, desire leads to a necessary surplus of production in relation to social life. In other words social production represents a reduction of desiring-production. Not all possible assemblages are effectuated in a given society, and desire, although socially conditioned, is never fully exhausted in its capacity. Indeed, the very difference between desire and its social organization (although these two appear as the same process) is made precisely in order to show how any given social organization does not in fact reveal the full productive capacity of life. The surplus represents an excess of production which threatens the existence of social forms. However, surplus does not represent merely “more of the same”, but a constitutive element of

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304 When the pharaoh builds the pyramids only in the attempt to represent a specific form which has religious and practical significance for Egyptians does lack appear. Materials, work-force, solutions and so on, lack in relation to representation of a predetermined framework of production. Outside of the boundaries of representation production cannot lack (there is scarcity only if something is regarded as a resource as well as a resource in relation to something which requires representation). I will return to this point later in the chapter.

social organization. In order to reproduce social relations as they are, societies must dissolve and remove surplus in some way. They do this through consumption. When surplus remains unconsumed, it can overwhelm society (e.g. by engendering unsanctioned relations through which new needs could emerge). The regulation and control of surplus is determined by a set of social practices that exert what Deleuze and Guattari call anti-production.

“[...] The forms of social production, like those of desiring-production, involve an unengendered nonproductive attitude, an element of antiproduction coupled with the process, a full body that functions as a socius.”

The “anti” in anti-production relates in the first instance to desire itself. In the same way that desire produces by building assemblages and being assembled, it is also capable of anti-production or de-assembling and disorganizing. For example, an assemblage such as a social code can be transformed or destroyed, opening ways for novel production. However, in history we seldom witness active and intentional disorganization of social forms. What we witness is the struggle to preserve existing organizations. Through social determination, anti-production gains a specific conservative character. Instead of releasing surplus, social production binds it to power-structures that consume it. This is how practice at first appears, as a social process which serves anti-production, or as a process of consumption which serves to perpetuate itself. Practice is at first antagonistic to surplus, because as a force of anti-production it converts surplus into a lack. Social norms, relations of authority, taboos, the king, prohibitions, and so on, result from the primary capacity of life to engender social relations, yet they appear as limits to further production insofar as they serve as objects of lack. For example, exchange or destruction of surplus is one set of practices present in primitive societies, which has anti-

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306 According to Deleuze and Guattari, the fact that there is a pharaoh points to a surplus which enabled a whole framework of existence to emerge around a figure of power. Without surplus, no cult, no religion, no pyramid could emerge. Without Nile, no Egypt could emerge. That desiring-production produces surplus is one of the central thesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in the same way that Hegel’s thesis was that freedom is the prerequisite of practice. The explication of this thesis will be shown later, but an example can be given in the most general terms: human beings produce not only their immediate needs, but a whole framework of existence, identities and social relations in which these needs also appear. In this regard, there is no human being that reproduces only its immediate needs, because the satisfaction of needs is always a reproduction of a broader framework of life (the fact that I believe in God, live in a culture and so on, points to the necessity of presupposing surplus). This surplus, however, is constitutive and is not only an after-effect of bare organic life from which culture springs. A human being would not be alive as an organism if surplus was not presupposed.

307 Ibid. p. 10.
productive role. Concentration and isolation of surplus into the State is another practice present in despotism.

The time-span when the human race was capable of containing surplus into regimes of anti-production _different_ from production is _history_. The essential feature of history, therefore, is the presence of the anti-producing element that appears as a result of production and _is distinct from it_, yet turns on it in order to organize and regulate it.

Another term Deleuze and Guattari use to mark the point at which anti-production is located is a _body without organs [le corps-sans-organes]_.

“This is the body that Marx is referring to when he says that it is not the product of labor, but rather appears as its natural or divine presupposition. In fact, it does not restrict itself merely to opposing productive forces in and of themselves. It falls back on (il se rabat sur) all production, constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus production and arrogating to itself both the whole and the parts of the process, which now seem to emanate from it as a quasi cause.”

The _body without organs_ produces nothing. However, this body _records_ the process of production and selects _synthesis of production_ in the process. It represents “the unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or destratified body” that is absolved from any functionalist or structuralist interpretation that would presuppose the existence of the organs. In this way, the body without organs signifies a disorganizing instance, since all organization tends towards this point. At the same time, the _body without organs_ is precisely the point at which organization is established, it is what draws organs to itself and constructs itself in the process of production. It represents both a principle of organization and disorganization. However, insofar anti-production within social organization tends to dissolve surplus, the primary feature of the body without organs appearing in history is that of reproducing organization. More precisely, in pre-modern societies, the body without organs tends to appear already determined and divine (e.g. the body of the king serves as the body without organs), it is only in capitalism that its disorganizing character will become visible and active. The reason why the body of the king, however, is also a body without organs, is precisely the fact that it is not divine, it merely

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308 _Ibid._

appears divine. It can be disorganized, and the reason why this is the case is that every assemblage has its body without organs or a point at which it loses its organistic form. 310

History is the process in which social organization of desire results in the regulating anti-producing element of the body without organs, where only its organizing capacity is at work. In other words, history represents a timeline where surplus from which the body without organs emerges serves as an instance of totalization. It is a process where the “whole” appears as something more than its constitutive parts and as something that serves to condition these parts. There are three different stages of history in which this conditioning exhibits different forms of social organization and diverse ways in which the body without organs serves as the limit of production. The first two are “fully” inside history, whereas the third, because the body here functions also through active disorganization is both historical and anti-historical (a theme to which I will return later in the text):

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310 When desiring-production leads to surplus, the surplus forms the body without organs, which falls back onto production and conditions it. As the point at which the surplus is contained, the body without organs is the limit of every social formation. It is the point at which desiring-production escapes its social conditions. In one instance, the concept signifies the absolute zero-point of production, the point at which all molar organization breaks down because this body rejects organs and disorganizes existing organizations. In this absolute sense, it signifies the metaphysical level of absence of organization. In another instance, the concept signifies precisely that which “blocks off” desiring-production because it sustains organization as the body on which recording and memory is established. For example, desiring-production emerges as an assemblage in which the subject’s desire connects objects establishing an experience of movie-going. This movie-going experience encounters different scenes, thoughts, reactions, and so on. From these elements a certain kind of body without organs appears, a surface on which recording is established - the memory of movie-going which is not simply a collection of random elements but taste. Taste is something more than a collection of movie-going experiences. This taste attracts other similar movies (e.g. when someone asks: “what else is there from that director?”, “are there any similar movies like this one?”). The body without organs that emerged as the surface of recording disjuncts between different genres, directors, and so on. At the same time, this body without organs onto which production is recorded in the form of taste serves as the limit to further production, because the subject extracts from the movie-going experience a specific limit to this experience (he rejects certain genres, directors, and so on). But precisely because it represents the limit of his movie-going experience, the body serves as the point at which something escapes. The body without organs is like a screen that selects specific experiences corresponding to established taste, but by doing this the surplus in desiring-production permanently disorganizes taste, it changes and transforms the subject itself. The more specific taste forces a range of movies to appear as a “positive experience”, the more the movie-going experience becomes “hostage” to this taste. However, at the same time, precisely when desire becomes invested in a rigid and organized taste, it is easier to break it, it becomes much more susceptible to break-down and disorganization.
1) The stage of savagery, where the anti-producing condition of all production is the body of the earth as the continuity of all members of the tribe with nature;

2) The stage of despotism, where the anti-producing condition of all production is the body of the despot;

3) The stage of civilization, where the anti-producing condition of all production is the body of capital.

In the second stage of universal history anti-production takes on a transcendent form of concentrated power that conditions and regulates all production. This is political practice that is characteristic of the form of anti-production found in despotism. Political practice in both the primitive and the civilized society represents an application of despotism onto forms preceding and following it. However, despotism represents the par excellence historical form of politics – the State.

3. Savages and barbarians

Social organization of desire results in an anti-producing body that conditions all production. Society leads to a body without organs as the recording surface of memory and history that distributes itself over production in order to capture and regulate it. This anti-producing body is itself a result of desiring-production as the unity of desire and labour (the indifference of material and phenomenal productive capacity of life). However, when it is stated that social production conditions desire, this does not refer only to some force standing apart from the process of production (such as the pharaoh) but to sexuality as such. Assemblages are products of desire and desire itself, but it is a specific investment of desire that assigns social conditions. When this takes place, assemblages become coded. Coding is a process through which a product becomes “grafted” onto production. Within the context of social assemblages I am concerned with here, codes express a certain social function that is based on belief. For example, a custom or a social norm is a code. A code captures desire and assigns it a function.

Assemblage of man includes the use of a spear, specific tattoos, determined behaviour, and

\[\text{The concept of sexuality refers to the process of organization of life as such. It should not be confused with biological reproduction only - although it does include this as well – but concerns conscious and unconscious investments in general. Deleuze, G.; Guattari, F. (1983): Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p. 108.}\]
so on. Codes relate to predetermined totalities; e.g. a man should throw a spear, not weave. Coding *fixes* assemblages and closes them off by “detaching” productive bodily process of life from its immediacy and rerouting it into a specific function – it is given a determined role in relation to other elements within the social field. When desire becomes *organized in a code*, it is directed to invest given forms of subjectivities and objectivities. In this way, desire is assigned a specific territory – there is a certain spectrum of relations in which a specific code might function. Both the code and the territory are preserved and perpetuated by a *lack* in relation to that which desire invests – a *lack* in relation to a product. For example, belief must be permanently re-established and re-affirmed. A child *lacks* the markings on the skin, the skills to hunt, the connection with the animal spirit, the capacity to sense danger, and so on. However, this *lack* is not predicated on the nature of desiring-production but on the representation engendered by codes and territories. Desiring-production, as mentioned, produces the *real* as such. In the realm of the *real* there is no *lack* and no negation. What desire produces is production itself and surplus in relation to given representation. The child *lacks* in relation to established representation, but since desiring-production leads to a necessary surplus, the child sees something un-coded, it senses something beyond the established belief (e.g. the child uses the thing in a way that is not proper). There is an abundance of possible connective assemblages that threaten to overwhelm the community and that have to be contained in codes. The form in which this surplus of production appears in relation to codes themselves is *debt*. The regulation of debt constitutes the sphere of political practice. The way debt appears within a given social formation reveals how politics itself appears.

* a) *Savages and kinship*

The earth appears as the first form of conditioning of desiring-production.

“The earth is the primitive, savage unity of desire and production. For the earth is not merely the multiple and divided object of labour, it is also the unique, indivisible entity, the full body that falls back on the forces of production and appropriates them for its own as the natural or divine precondition.”

The earth represents the immediate unity of desire and production. Desiring-production in primitive societies is according to Deleuze and Guattari invested into a “unique, indivisible entity” that conditions all particular elements of production. Every instance of production is at

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the same time the reproduction of the whole tribe and its continuous link with nature. Production flows here from the totality of the tribe-nature and back into it without mediation. Furthermore, every investment of desire in the primitive world is regulated and all productive activity is *subordinated to codes*. Codes inscribe desire, “blocking” its flows, allowing only what is sanctioned and necessary for social reproduction to pass.\(^{314}\) All products (e.g. yak, berries, pigs, leaves, and so on) possess a previously established meaningful place within the totality of the earth.\(^{315}\) Their production and accumulation is controlled in order to ensure that no surplus appears that could obstruct the working of the code by disturbing the established reproductive practices. This ensures that no un-coded, unexpected, excessive thing appears. For example, primitives will not accumulate things that from “our” perspective might be useful, because “useful” to them is also a question of a code. The particular object of use must possess mythological meaning and connection to the earth, it cannot appear beyond this framework.

Coding also extended to surplus itself. Whereas part of the surplus was consumed, exchanged and redistributed, thereby reproducing existing relations, a part had to be ceremoniously destroyed. The dissipation of surplus through practices such as destruction or ceremonial excesses is the form anti-production takes in savagery. It represents a form of expenditure that ensures that desire reproduces only what is determined by a *lack* established through codes.

The main mechanism that supports this form of society, Deleuze and Guattari claim, is the kinship system. The kinship system represents the practice of building alliances between families and establishing channels through which production can flow. This is the main form of *debt-regulation* in the savage society. Primitive families are bound by debt, which they permanently reproduce and abolish through exchange. Surplus that circulates through debt binds families together and makes them dependent on one another. However, Deleuze and Guattari also insist that here debt has the form of “finite blocks of debt”\(^{316}\) or temporary “chunks” of debt that are easily repaid. Consequently, surplus of production in the primitive society cannot gain an independent social space beyond the framework of exchange and distribution through which families establish bonds and equilibrium between one another. As a result of this, the inter-familial relationships in a primitive society are co-extensive with the

\(^{314}\) Ibid. p. 157.

\(^{315}\) The concept of the “earth” can be understood in relation to Hegel. It signifies the continuity of the community with nature and its “integration” into the body of the earth. Everything flows from the earth and back to it. There is no transcendent condition (e.g. the king) that differentiates the community from nature. *Ibid*. p. 141.

\(^{316}\) Ibid. p. 190.
totality of the social field, which itself is co-extensive with the earth. This complete extension of coding over the earth and the mobilization of the totality of the earth in every production is the reason why Deleuze and Guattari call the savage system a territorial machine. Codes and stable, determined territories are what organize primitive social systems.

“Primitive segmentarity is characterized by a polyvocal code based on lineages and their varying situations and relations, and an itinerant territoriality based on local, overlapping divisions. Codes and territories, clan lineages and tribal territorialities, form a fabric of relatively supple segmentarity.”\textsuperscript{317}

The determinative role of the codes and a fixed territory allow for an open-ended system of families where no debt can perpetuate itself into infinity because families permanently abolish debts through new alliances and exchanges.\textsuperscript{318} Practices of abolishing debt, therefore, are one of the central features of savage societies.\textsuperscript{319}

“Primitive families constitute a praxis, a politics, a strategy of alliances and filiations; formally, they are the driving elements of social reproduction; they have nothing to do with an expressive microcosm; in these families the father, the mother, and the sister always also function as something other than father, mother, or sister.”\textsuperscript{320}

It is at this point that one can locate a form of political practice peculiar to the primitive world. The practice of establishing alliances between families is what characterizes the savage system. Therefore, although as Deleuze and Guattari note that primitives have no “specialized political institutions”\textsuperscript{321}, politics is not absent. Politics is integrated into the system of alliance-

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Holland2001} Eugene W. Holland explains this feature of the savage world: “Unlike the nuclear family in modern society, where filiations relations involve usually only two (or at most three) lineage generations and alliance relations go no further than one layer of “in-laws,” savage lineages are calculated many generations deep, and savage alliance relations extend throughout the social field.” Holland, W. E. (2001): \textit{Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis}. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 70 – 71.
\bibitem{Potlatch} One example of this is the famous potlatch, when chieftains attempt to outdo one another with gifts, indebting the other group and at the same time binding each other into circular debt. Sometimes the surplus is directly and ceremoniously destroyed and in the last instance if any family or member of the tribe accumulates power that is not sanctioned by existing, abolishable “blocks of debt”, \textit{i.e.} the moment debt attempts to take on infinite form (\textit{e.g.} a chieftain proclaims himself divine and demands infinite loyalty), the person is killed and the family destroyed.
\end{thebibliography}
building through which they prevent the establishment of precisely these institutions. The organs of the tribe members are objects of common possession in the same way things are - they are “sewed into” the earth. A woman’s breast is owned by the community because its nourishing power reproduces the whole tribe (it is exchanged and bound to particular things, bearing markings, tattoos, which symbolize the code). This cruelty as the form of repression characterizing the way desire is regulated is mobilized for one purpose: primitives through their debt-regulation actively strive to prevent the formation of the State; they hold political power in check by integrating it directly into the “economy” of the tribe. The sphere of anti-production is not found beyond the confines of production. When berries are produced, they are shared along the social field, reproducing the community without a surplus of code gaining independence over it. The codes themselves are permanently placed in check through debt regulation because no accumulation and centralization of debt can institute a transcendent signifier (i.e. a family that would close on itself, establish itself beyond the sphere of production and regulate all codes). Political practice, therefore, has a specific meaning in the savage society: it is a practice of keeping the community open, always preventing an enclosure which would lead to the accumulation of surplus code. At the same time, politics and practice in general, as “a strategy of alliances and filiations” stands on the side of anti-production. Similarly to Hegel, therefore, at first practice is mobilized in order to reproduce existing framework of life. Social form of anti-production in other words represses surplus which emerges from desiring-production and this repression is how politics at first appears.

Deleuze and Guattari emphatically speak of the savage kinship system as “not a structure but a practice, a praxis, a method, and even a strategy” to underscore the productive character of primitive life, which cannot be captured by a paradigm that presupposes a structure “unfolding in the mind”, as in the structuralist view of these societies. In other words, the division between production and anti-production excludes the view that a savage society could perpetuate itself without permanent conflict, because production as such presupposes conflict. This is why Deleuze and Guattari would claim that “if what is called history is an open and dynamic social reality, in a state of functional disequilibrium, or an oscillating equilibrium, unstable and always compensated, comprising not only institutionalized conflict, but conflict that generates changes, revolts, ruptures and scissions, then primitive societies are fully inside history, and far distant from the stability, or even from the harmony, attributed to them in the name of a primacy of a unanimous group”. Deleuze, G.; Guattari, F. (1983): Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 147, 150-151.
**b) Barbarians and the despot**

The second age of universal history is the age of despotism. In this age, the body of the despot takes away the role of anti-production from the earth. This means that products are not shared anymore but accumulated and centralized. The State invents money and law as means of converting all codes into one single code through which it accumulates surplus product. Despotism is the result of the failure to contain surplus within the kinship system. It emerges when debt escapes control and becomes *uni-directional* and *infinite*.

“The infinite creditor and infinite credit have replaced the blocks of mobile and finite debts. There is always a monotheism on the horizon of despotism: the debt becomes a debt of existence, a *debt of the existence* of the subjects themselves.”

The savage system reached its *body without organs* where it disorganized and collapsed as a social formation. Deleuze and Guattari insist that the State emerges not merely in positive terms, but as an index of failure to sustain social organization bound by codes. “Thus primitive societies are defined by mechanisms of prevention-anticipation...” These societies repress in order to prevent the formation of the State. The family system must stay open-ended precisely in view of the capacity to anticipate the State, as well as the ward it off. The failure of this system signals the emergence of the State. The State emerges as a mechanisms that builds itself and appropriates existing primitive systems. It does not abolish them, but contains and transforms them as an inherent part of its functioning. Therefore, debt is now characterized by a practice of overcoding. The despot overcodes, thereby instituting a system in which all codes are converted into one single value.

“*Overcoding* is the operation that constitutes the essence of the State, and that measures both its continuity and its break with the previous formations: the dread of flows of desire that would resist coding, but also the establishment of a new inscription that overcodes, and that makes desire into the property of the sovereign [...].”

The organs of the tribe members are not inscribed in order to trace the produce down to specific clans, who can then extend the line of descent to the earth. Instead, the anti-producing

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element becomes deterritorialized, desire is released from the earth as the territorium from which production flows, and is immediately reterritorialized onto the body of the despot.\textsuperscript{327} The territorial machine gives way to a new machine that makes the body of the despot a territory toward which all production flows and from which all production is conditioned.

What despotism signifies is a new form of practice or concentrated political power that regulates desiring-production from a position of transcendence.\textsuperscript{328} In the savage society families exchanged their members in order to build alliances, as a result of which the incest taboo appeared as an after-effect of the need for families to remain open toward each other. As opposed to this, in despotism incest becomes the privilege of the despot, who establishes a direct family line with divinity. In this way the despot protects biological reproduction as co-extensive with the now independently isolated surplus (for example, he institutes legitimate and illegitimate flows of sperm and blood).\textsuperscript{329} The subject becomes barred off from the body of the despot, the only relation being one of infinite debt.

In essence, the establishment of despotism is the establishment of political practice as it is encountered in history – is ceases to be co-extensive with the redistribution and destruction of surplus and becomes a practice of concentration of debt, which form a position of transcendence regulates all production. Politics is a transcendent State-power that institutes infinite debt and that traces itself to a divine and absolute creditor.\textsuperscript{330} It results from the appropriation and concentration of surplus as opposed to its redistribution and destruction.

Because the despot is concerned with overcoding, political power is detached from the sphere of production and concentrated into the State. However and at the same time, despotism

\textsuperscript{327} The concept of deterritorialization refers to the practice of de-investing and freeing desire from given objectivities. It is the opposite of territorialization that refers to Lacan’s notion of assigning value to objects and organs by desire. See also: Holland, W. E. (2001): Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis. London and New York: Routledge. p. 19.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid. p. 218.
\textsuperscript{330} Eugene W. Holland explains the difference between savagery and despotism succinctly: “Briefly, savagery in this scheme represents something like “primitive communism,” a pre-caste, pre-class form of social organization where power is diffused throughout the community rather than concentrated in any one group or individual. Yet because of the absence of economics, savagery is also the social form most harshly governed by exacting codes of conduct, belief, and meaning. Under despotism, by contrast, differential codes of conduct, belief, and meaning are promulgated precisely in order to establish caste divisions and hierarchy, and are bent to the service of overt political power and direct imperial domination unalleviated by the freedoms that become possible in economic society.” Holland, W. E. (2001): Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis. London and New York: Routledge. p. 60.
establishes itself as a form of power which absorbs the previously independent savage system. In other words, codes remain active and old relationships are not destroyed. But the mobility and openness of families is now subordinated to a higher instance of control. This higher instance brings about a new form of repression – terror. Terror does not repress by directly controlling and assigning organs to things (it does not “sew” the organs to the earth through tattoos, jewellery, and so on). Instead, the despot conquers primitive codes and overcodes them, he institutes universal signs (writing, money) through which the divine will is now promulgated. The form of representation is displaced onto papyrus, stones, and so on, freeing the subject to be a subject, but in such a way that death and permanent terror before death conditions the person to subject its desire to the desire of the despot. Lack now not only has a limit in codes, but also in the desire of the despot: when the pharaoh lacks a tomb, Egypt is in danger of collapsing.

With the emergence of the despot a break is introduced in the social conditioning of desiring-production. This break initiates political practice proper. In savagery, politics was tied into the general system of alliance building functioning as a mechanism of anti-production. In despotism as opposed to this, anti-production becomes extended and grafted onto a transcended instance of power. Politics now becomes transcendent anti-production, enshrined and fused with the State as a “distinct juridical and political domination”. It is a despotic practice of conditioning desiring-production through the concentration of surplus-code. The despot is not a historical form of the State, rather, the despot is the concept of the State.

4. Civilized men and capital

The transition from the primitive system to the despotic one was marked by a break that instituted a division between the economic sphere proper and political power of anti-production that regulates desire from a transcendent position. This position of transcendence is kept in perpetuity by the institution of infinite debt; in other words, by the isolation of the body of the despot from the social field and his divine status that makes his desire the desire of all. The


despot is the model of the State. Therefore, the first important break in universal history is the establishment of the State as a transcendent concentration of power distinct from the sphere of production.

The second break concerns the notion of the body without organs as the limit in which the social field becomes deterritorialized. In despotism, as can be seen, practice of anti-production, on the one hand, and production on the other, occupy two distinct social positions in the same way it was the case in savagery. In both cases anti-production is “localized”, i.e. removed from processes of production. In the primitive world, although anti-production is tied into the productive sphere and has no independent social space, it is sporadic and at the limits (e.g. destruction of surplus in ceremonious events of sacrifice), whereas in despotism it is isolated and centralized.

This changes in the next stage of universal history because the nature of the limit of production itself changes. In savagery, this limit was the earth that became deterritorialized when investments of desire escaped codes and dissolved the social field, reterritorializing onto the body of the despot, who instituted a new limit – his own desire. In the next stage of universal history the body of the despot itself becomes deterritorialized, displacing the limit not onto any transcendent instance of anti-production, but onto capital. Capital, however, is a peculiar form of limit, because in opposition to preceding forms of anti-production, capital embraces the body without organs:

“The prime function incumbent upon the socius, has always been to codify the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not property dammed up, channeled, regulated. When the primitive territorial machine proved inadequate to the task, the despotic machine set up a kind of overcoding system. But the capitalist machine, insofar as it was built on the ruins of a despotic State more or less far removed in time, finds itself in a totally new situation: it is faced with the task of decoding and deterritorializing the flows.”

The most important feature of capitalism is that surplus of desiring-production does not become concentrated political power; instead, it becomes freed. Capitalism neither destroys (savagery) nor concentrates (despotism) surplus in order to remove it. Instead, in capitalism, surplus is “removed” by being directly rechanneled into the productive process. Consequently, the purpose of production in capitalism is not the reproduction of family ties or the body of the king, but the reproduction of surplus itself that becomes freed and that now serves as the anti-

334 Ibid. p. 33.
producing and regulating instance tied into the productive process itself. As a result of this, the *limit* of production is not established *via* redistribution and destruction of surplus co-extensive with production (savages), nor *via* the concentration of surplus into overt political power (despotism). Instead, the surplus of production becomes the limit itself. The only limit in capitalism is *surplus*. This is why the *body without organs*, Deleuze and Guattari claim, becomes “naked” in capitalism. Its visibility in the capitalist society is unprecedented in relation to the historical frameworks in which the body was encountered always already “fully armed” (*e.g.* as a despotic body). This means that if *surplus* is the only limit of production, the *body without organs* does not only serve as the surface of recording on which the connections are established that are then reproduced (kinship system or despotic will). Instead, the *body without organs* commences to actively disorganize the social field in order to accommodate the new limit. The process of disorganization becomes immanent to production itself because if surplus regulates production, then it is not only necessary to reproduce codes, but to destroy or de-assemble them in order to maximize the productive output.

The result of this transformation is that the preceding system of codes breaks down. Capitalism regulates production primarily through the process of *decoding*. Since the surplus was contained and captured within codes, the reproduction of the social field took the form of reproduction of codes themselves. In primitivism, the reproduction of berries was also the reproduction of the whole system of alliances through which the accumulated surplus was redistributed. In despotism, the body of the despot was the object of every production, since every production was predicated on the accumulation of surplus through *overcoding*. Capitalism, as opposed to this, does not contain social relations under codes because it perpetuates itself precisely on that element of desiring-production all previous societies feared. A surplus not contained in a code seeks to reproduce only surplus. As a result of this, the code loses its self-sufficient character.

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337 It should be noted, however, that Deleuze and Guattari claim that despotism itself already exhibited this feature. Despotism represented a process of decoding which was necessitated by subsequent overcoding. In other words, despotism built itself by robbing the primitive populace of their self-sufficient and self-regulating codes, subjecting them to transcendent coding. At the same time, overcoding itself is a form of coding. Although very different as we shall see soon, the State and all its power are in despotism still coded. Only in capitalism do codes completely lose their self-sufficiency and become subjected to another form of regulation that does not rely on codes at all. Deleuze, G.; Guattari, D. (2005): *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press. 434.
There is a fundamental paradox in capitalism as a social formation: if it is true that the terror of all the other social formations was decoded flows, capitalism, for its part, historically constituted itself on an unbelievable thing: namely, that which was the terror of other societies: the existence and the reality of decoded flows and these capitalism made its proper concern. If this were true, it would explain that capitalism is, in a very precise sense, the universal form of all societies: in a negative sense, capitalism would be that which all societies dreaded above all, and we cannot help but have the impression that, historically speaking, capitalism...in a certain sense, is what every social formation constantly tried to exorcise, what it constantly tried to avoid, why? Because it was the ruin of every other social formation.\footnote{338}

The first counterargument to this view could be that if this is indeed true, then capitalism as a social formation has no sufficient ground to exit. In other words, it is not possible to locate any necessity upon which the perpetual existence of capitalism could be explained. If codes, meanings and established connections are gone, what holds a social formation together? Deleuze himself points out the relevance of this argument, but contends that the argument itself is inherent to the process of capitalist reproduction, \textit{i.e.} it is a valid question because reality itself presents us with an ever changing and constantly transforming social formation which seems to be bent on “derailing”.

“Capitalism tends toward a threshold of decoding that will destroy the socius in order to make it a body without organs and unleash the flows of desire on this body as a deterritorialized field.”\footnote{339}

It is true that codes lose their constitutive power in capitalism. The reproductive purposiveness becomes displaced onto the surplus itself. In this way, desiring-production becomes released from its subjection to a specifically coded form of social repression.

\footnote{338}{In this regard, capitalism was always already there, according to Deleuze and Guattari, because it releases something all other societies dreaded - a surplus of desiring-production which cannot be coded. This is why throughout history there was always a possibility of coding practice going awry and opening space for capital. The reason why, according to them, capitalism did not emerge in Greece, Rome, China, India or early feudalism is the fact that the State always intervened; the despot was always there to contain the flow of codes. “When Etienne Balzac asks why capitalism wasn’t born in China in the thirteenth century, when all the necessary scientific and technical conditions nevertheless seemed to be present, the answer lies in the State, which closed the mines as soon as the reserves of metal were judged sufficient, and which retained a monopoly or a narrow control over commerce (the merchant as functionary).” Deleuze, G. (n .d.): \textit{Cours Vincennes: Anti Oedipe et Mille Plateaux: 16/11/1971}. Available online at: [http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=116&groupe=Anti+Oedipe+et+Mille+Plateaux&langue=2]. n. p. (Last accessed on 19. 01. 2016); Deleuze, G.; Guattari, F. (1983): \textit{Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia}. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p. 197.}

\footnote{339}{\textit{Ibid}. p. 33.}
Production is not “diverted” into reproduction of codes or despotic prerogatives, nor is it forced to invest specific subjectivities that will respond to the earth and to the desire of the despot. Instead, social production becomes self-purposive - it seeks only to reproduce itself as productive power. What it produces becomes secondary in relation to the conditions of its own productive capacity, which is contained in the surplus. The capitalist system functions on the presupposition of a self-perpetuating and self-serving growth of productive capacity. This accumulated productive capacity is capital. In opposition to the assemblage that was either inherently coded and that carried a specific meaning which perpetuated the world, or overcoded and contained by despotic accumulation in order to perpetuate his power, codes in capitalism serve to produce but are not in themselves the conditions of production. As a result, decoding is as much integral to production as coding itself, meaning that even if the code is “conservative”, “revolutionary”, “obscene”, “controversial” and so on, it is not an issue, because the only instance that must be satisfied is capital. In other words, the body without organs becomes activated in its primary role of disorganization. Before capital emerged, it always represented merely the limit at which a social formation collapsed. In capitalism, however, it represents a limit integral to production. Capital is capable of decoding, disorganizing and deconstructing codes without the whole society collapsing. 

340 Capital is the form in which practice (as unity of conscious and unconscious, phenomenal and material activity) is performed, it signifies a specific way human beings act toward each other and toward things. In this regard, it is a historical form of social conditioning of desiring-production. Desiring-production is a process in which phenomenal, ontological and real “reality” is permanently produced. Social conditioning can rely on codes that capture phenomenal and material productive capacity as well as despotic prerogatives, where the limit to what is desired (produced) is the desire of the despot. In capitalism, where surplus of desiring-production becomes a purpose on its own, the limit of production is the productive activity itself. For example, in a savage society a bridge was built in accordance with certain codes (for the purpose of connecting two tribes, to honour spirits), in a despotic society to affirm the power of the despot (to signify his power over the forces of the river, to conquer new codes). In this way, within the process of productive activity a certain code was already pre-packaged that extended to the notion of functionality (pyramids from our idea of functionality were the most useless things ever built). In capitalism, the process of building a bridge has the form of an empty abstract practice which is geared toward its own self-increase. Only in this circular self-posed purpose of growth do other codes enter into play. The bridge, for example, exhibits a set of different features: aesthetical, technological, functional, etc. They are all aspects of specific codes (e.g. a certain architectural style that has its history and development). But these codes are not self-sufficient because this architectural style does not come into conflict with the technological demands of the bridge, rather, both are assembled through decoding into a new code. This increases the “power” of both codes insofar as they become placed into a new assemblage, which “automatically” leads to surplus in the form of new events and bodies (e.g. the body of the child encounters the body of the bridge, and unlike in savagery or
However, precisely because capitalism seeks to reproduce only surplus, the process of decoding is always and simultaneously a process of *recoDing*. Capitalism’s drive to produce conditions a permanent need for the reinvention of codes. Capitalism does not primarily *overcode* but *decodes* and *recodes*. In other words, it functions through disorganization coupled with simultaneous re-inscription of a code. The acts of decoding and recoding, however, are not a feature of coding as such, but of a form of practice that is capable of directly working on codes from a codeless position. This practice is *axiomatization*.

“We must review what distinguishes an axiomatic from all manner of codes, overcodings, and recodings: the axiomatic deals directly with purely functional elements and relations whose nature is not specified, and which are immediately realized in highly varied domains simultaneously; codes, on the other hand, are relative to those domains and express specific relations between qualified elements that cannot be subsumed by a higher formal unity (overcoding) except by transcendence and in an indirect fashion.”

An axiom, in opposition to a code, has *no inherent meaning*, it represents a rule in the form of an abstraction that seeks to maximize surplus. Axiom serves to increase the total amount of capital (regardless of the code utilized for this purpose: knowledge, things, infrastructure, art, culture, *etc.*). Because axiomatization regards codes only insofar as they increase capital, multiplicity is coded and decoded in relation to this demand. Capital “axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with the other”, and “decoded and deterritorialized flows of capitalism are not recaptured or co-opted, but directly apprehended in a codeless axiomatic”. If we translate this into the ontological framework explicated in the previous chapter, the following could be said: all assemblages in capitalism are legitimate assemblages insofar as they lead to the event of an increase in capital. The circulation of surplus becomes freed from codes, because codes neither serve to abolish and redistribute surplus to displace debt, nor to relegate surplus to transcendence for the purpose of preserving despotic power. When the preservation of codes becomes secondary, the conditioning of desiring-production through social organization takes

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341 The concept of re-coding should not be confused with the concept of recoRding.
on the form of direct coupling of the productive process to the surplus. In order to reproduce, the surplus displaces the new capacity to decode and the accompanying power to recode onto an axiom. Consequently, axiomatization represents the synthesis of anti-production and production, because the mechanisms of dissipation of surplus become one with the productive process. Surplus becomes directly re-invested into production, thereby resulting in the unification of social practices that condition production, on the one hand, and desiring-production, on the other.

Because codes do not organize society, political practice is not organized around codes. It is not integrated in them in the form of the practice of kinship, nor does it figure as a transcendent over-coding despotic practice where subjectivities and objectivities are organized around transcendent infinite debt. Before I engage with the problem of political practice as practice of civilized men, it is necessary to show what civilized man is. Modern, civilized man is not produced by desire being directly coded in cruelty, nor by terror imposing the will of the despot and instituting infinite debt. Civilized man appears within the modern family as a result of direct application of the axiomatic onto desire.

a) The modern family

The production of human subjectivities in systems of savagery and despotism was tightly interwoven with the sphere of social production. Desiring-production and social production were in this regard in union. The child was always included in the system of production and exchange, integrated into the totality of social practice and developed to respond to different forms of debt (blocks of debt or despotic debt) that in turn expressed a specific attitude toward the surplus of desiring-production. The limit of society, its body without organs in the form of anti-production where the surplus was contained, directly conditioned the production of subjectivities because it sought to regulate production through the substantial meaning of codes. This changes in the modern family because the production of subjectivities becomes isolated from social production. Desiring-production and social production experience a “change in regime,” for the first time they become distinct from one another: the subjectivity produced in the family is not subject to a pre-given code. The sphere of social production, in other words, does not directly condition the reproduction of subjectivities. The reason is that the subject does

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not emerge through coding, but through the application of the axiomatic onto desiring-production. This application presupposes the absence of codes as conditions of subjectivity, in other words, it necessitates a general decoding and the abolishment of pre-given products infused with meaning as the framework in which the subject becomes represented.

The codes that functioned in a pre-civilized society were extremely varied; pre-modern subjects identified with gods, tribes, spirits, animals, mountains, natural events, plants, natural cycles, astronomical objects, etc. There were few restrictions in the variety of codes. On the other hand, when found in its living form, the code was often rigid and exhibited little transformative power. Desire’s investment of a specific code meant that meaning established in the assemblage of human life and nature was often “for life”. Transformations that occurred in subjectivity, did this within the confines of the code. This conditioned not only the beliefs, thoughts, imaginations or hopes of the subjects, but also the way human beings relate to things, something that was also often determined by the purposiveness established in the thing. All these different and varied codes became desubstantialized in capitalism. The meaning they were infused with was abolished in its constitutive character. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the modern subject is not constituted by a code, which then serves as an anchoring point for all subsequent transformations. Instead, it is constituted through the application of the axiomatic on desire that is in itself meaningless and purified of codes, but precisely because of this, open to all codes. What the modern family produces is precisely what Hegel called an abstract person. It produces an empty, rudimentary subjectivity, an abstraction of an axiom that only subsequently internalizes and constructs codes.

This takes place through the isolation of the family from the totality of the social field. The family is not integrated into the system of alliances and co-extensive with the social body anymore. Its isolation is the precondition for the family to reproduce a civilized subject – it “withdraws” from the totality of the social field and protects the subject from codes. The models of identification are not natural events, astronomical objects, animal spirits, divinities, terrains and rivers, but only two distinct figures: mother and father. When the family becomes released from codes and subtracted from the social field of production, mother and father become only that, they do not stand for anything else and they have no other social purpose.345 As such they become emptied from any coded form of identification (e.g. the father is not someone who imparts to me the mythos of my clan, the stories of my tribe, the history of my village, and so on). Instead, they become empty signifiers. In this way, anti-production becomes purified from

345 Ibid. p. 265.
codes, released from any pre-given “large” objects (e.g. the despot). Parental figures become conduits and condensation points for the totality of the social field which is then structured through them by the de-coded idea of law and natural violence:

“When the family ceases to be a unit of production and of reproduction, when the conjunction again finds in the family the meaning of a simple unit of consumption, it is father-mother that we consume. In the aggregate of departure there is the boss, the foreman, the priest, the tax collector, the cop, the soldier, the worker, all the machines and territorialities, all the social images of our society; but in the aggregate of destination, in the end, there is no longer anyone but daddy, mommy, and me, the despotic sign inherited by daddy, the residual territoriality assumed by mommy, and the divided, split, castrated ego.” 346

Deleuze and Guattari invert here the psychoanalytical framework. Familial relationships are not what primarily conditions social life; instead, social production in the form of the axiomatic is what organizes the family. The parental figures serve to impart the totality of the social field in a pre-structured form to the child. The capitalist form, as shown, is based on direct coupling of anti-production to the surplus. This means that territorialization as a capacity to consign desire to a pre-given territory does not rely on previous coding. Instead, by being directly coupled with the surplus, anti-production expels codes in their constitutive role and becomes reduced to the principle of territoriality. Territoriality signifies merely an “appropriation” of a territory, independent from any code that might establish a functional connection to the territory in question. Territorialization represents, therefore, a higher-order organizing principle than coding. Whereas the child is imparted specific “content” through coding, which becomes fixed by a function to the whole of the social life, in territorialization, desire is not infused with any contextual meaning. Instead, it becomes mapped by axiomatic lines that results in territories which only subsequently become populated with transitory content. This schema now has no pre-determined “content” that fills the “law”; instead, it is structured by the “purified” dualism of law and natural violence, of territoriality and extra-territoriality and in general, by a dualistic model of sexuality organized around the divide of internalized and externalized violence. The isolation of the family, in other words, enables a subjectivity which does not “believe” in a coded form of anti-production, but internalizes law as an empty and structural feature of consciousness that life necessitates and that only subsequently becomes “filled” with content. I do not believe in law in the form of a myth, a religious idea, customs of my tribe, etc. I view law as something I must subject to in order to live. What specific “content” law might have is a secondary question to the fact that I internalize the capacity to subject to law. In this way, I

346  Ibid. p. 265.
become emancipated from any coded form of subjection, but I am still subject to the necessity to internalize law as such.

This is the reason why the subject produced in the modern family is incapable of being directly included into the social field – it lacks job training, skills, knowledge, and other elements that were “packaged” with codes in pre-modern societies. This forces the subject to exit the family and pursue processes of coding from a higher-order position of the axiomatic. As a result of this primary lack of codes, the new form of subjectivity fosters an open relationship with codes, the subject is not only capable of internalizing existing codes in a manner unconditioned by pre-established meaning but also of decoding and creating new codes. The specific range of codes is conditioned by capital, i.e. the limit in the form of non-qualified surplus (one that is not previously coded or given a despotic form). The modern subject has its own form of rigidity imposed by the conditions of the axiomatic, as well as a form of flexibility based on the fact that it is permanently driven to invest and decode existing codes. This subject is malleable, adaptable and much more fluid in relation to codes (e.g. I can say: “I think I want to be A, B, C...I always wanted to be D, as a child I dreamed of H”). Civilized man is capable of acquiring new needs and renouncing old ones at an incomparable rate in relation to its precivilized cousin. This allows not only the possibility, but reveals the necessity for a permanent drive to change codes. This reflects itself not only in the notion of market mobility, but also in the sphere of “cultural” existence such as for example: fashion, trends, music tastes, architectural styles, fantasy and imagination, modes of storytelling and every other productive activity. The subject is free from codes and able to construct new assemblages based on novel codes. This “weakness” of the civilized subject, its “impoverished structure” makes it a

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347 The subject is in this context also conditioned by pre-capitalist forms of subjectivity, though these are now not codes in a substantial sense. Fredric Jameson writes on this: “Such tendencies, to reinvent the private garden or the religious enclave, to practice the sacred after hours like a hobby, or to try to libidinalize money into an exciting game - in other words, to attempt to transform bits of the axiomatic back into so many codes - is obviously at one with the way in which the various forms of precapitalism (coding and overcoding, the despotic State, the kinship system) survive in capitalism in forms that resemble their traditional counterparts, but that have in reality completely different functions. This incapacity of the axiomatic, or of capitalism, to offer intrinsic libidinal investments to its subjects - its urgent internal need to reinvent older forms of coding to supplement its impoverished structures - is surely one of the most interesting and promising lines of investigation opened up by the "Marxism" of L’Anti-Oedipe.” Jameson, F. (1997): Marxism and dualism in Deleuze. Available online at: [https://fadingtheaesthetic.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/24411363-fredric-jameson-marxism-and-dualism-in-deleuze.pdf]. pp. 4 - 5. (Last accessed on 04. 02. 2016).

348 Ibid.
nomadic subject. A nomadic subject is capable of investments that are mobile and that do not become fixed by codes. However, as something arising from application of the axiomatic, nomadism is subject to the reproduction of capital. In this regard, the nomadic subject appears as a civilized subject. The inherent “emptiness” of the modern subject, its capacity to invest and de-invest codes from the position of the axiomatic, defines civilization in opposition to savagery and barbarism. The subject is empty, because when the child “exits” the family, it encounters neither surplus organized around other families such as in savagery, nor surplus concentrated in the despot such as in barbarism; instead, it encounters the sphere of capitalist reproduction, where the surplus circulates “naked” and free. What the “naked” circulation of surplus presupposes is precisely the capacity for territorialisation, which becomes emancipated from the kinship system and the despot, passing over to subjective representation. In other words, social conditioning of desiring-production becomes personified through the application of the element that was in previous societies “public” and contained either in the kinship system or the despotic will.

“What acts as an objective and public element – the Earth, the Despot – is now taken up again, but as the expression of a subjective and private reterritorialization: Oedipus is the fallen despot – banished, deteritorialized – but a reterritorialization is engineered, using the Oedipus complex conceived of as the daddy-mommy-me of today’s everyman”

The external, objective element becomes consigned to the subject, as a result of which antiproduction passes from “outside” structures (the kinship system, the despot) to interiority, finding its anchoring point on the side of the subject. Control in capitalism is not exerted by existing, static and “large” social objects anymore, but by subjective representation. Therefore, although a “change in regime” takes place in capitalism, which means that social production and desiring-production experience a divergence insofar as the family becomes detached from the totality of the social field, it is only in capitalism that their “identity in nature” becomes obvious; in other words, that it is social production which conditions desiring-production,

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350 Ibid. p. 304.
351 “Could it be that the identity in nature is at its highest point in the order of modern capitalist representation, because this identity is ‘universally’ realized in the immanence of this order and in the fluxion of the decoded flows? But also that the difference in regime is greatest in the capitalist order of representation, and that this representation subjects desire to an operation of social repression-psychic repression that is stronger than any other, because, by means of the immanence and the decoding, antiproduction has spread throughout all of production,
precisely through the fact that the conditions of production are now placed within desire itself both on an individualized and on a general level that now takes the form of a nation-state.

\[ b) \text{ Nation-state and politics as axiomatics} \]

In primitivism codes possessed self-sufficiency. Their application meant that the code completely conditioned life to which it was applied. With the emergence of the State in despotism, this self-sufficiency was disturbed because all codes became overcoded and subjected to universal instances of value. The State invented writing, money, and other forms of imperial representation in order to capture surplus that escaped codes. Codes remained active, but also became deterritorialized by being placed under the conditions of despotic power. In other words, the despotic State led to both the deterritorialization and homogenization of codes by applying a universal code, reterritorializing desire from above. The modern State, on the other hand, does not reterritorialize from the outside, but from within. The difference between the modern State and the despotic one lies primarily in their place in relation to the sphere of production. The despotic position is transcendence, it signifies political power that stands beyond the sphere of production, accumulates surplus and regulates production. The modern capitalist State, on the other hand, is immanent to the social field.

“The capitalist State is in a different situation: it is produced by the conjunction of the decoded or deterritorialized flows, and is able to carry the becoming-immanent to its highest point only to the extent that it is party to the generalized breakdown of codes and overcodings, and evolves entirely within this new axiomatic that results from a hitherto unknown conjunction.”

In capitalism, the State, instead of hovering above society, becomes “drawn into” the field of production and integrated into it. Instead of transcending codes, the modern State realizes the axiomatic. What does this realization of the axiomatic consist in?

In order to understand this, one has to look at the genealogy of the State in universal history. Deleuze and Guattari describe in *A Thousand Plateus* how the despotic State becomes replaced by the modern, capitalist State. The despotic State, which is based on direct political domination, serves both as the starting point in the history of States, as well as something that

\[ \text{Ibid. p. 262.} \]

\[ \text{Ibid. pp. 246, 337.} \]
all subsequent States will seek to emulate. As mentioned above, despotism is in essence the concept of the State. In this regard, all the States in history are based on despotic relationships. Their differences rely primarily in what form despotism appears in, and in what relationship does it stand to the field of production and specifically to the system of codes.

There are two types of States that succeed and also reformulate old despotic States. The first type includes so called evolved States, which include: “evolved empires, autonomous cities, feudal systems, monarchies”. What characterizes these States is a higher degree of decoding in relation to despotism. As shown, the despotic State emerged through relative decoding of primitive desire which was then recaptured on the level of transcendence. However, the despotic State itself in overcoding also leads to relative decoding, insofar the State creates a “distance” between the codes themselves and the sphere of control, which allows desire certain mobility in relation to codes. For example, in despotism labour is public. Migrants, slaves, imported populations can flow under the dominion of the despot, internally displacing and disturbing codes. As opposed to primitivism, where the social field is fluid, but internally fixed by codes, which means that the fluidity always follows the channel of customs, beliefs and family ties, the fluidity in despotism is higher precisely because despotism operates from above, but also stricter, because the fluidity has only one purpose – the accumulation of despotic power. Political power in general, emancipated from territorial codes and operating from above is capable of subverting, subsuming, exchanging elements in order to sustain and increase itself. The first successor, “evolved” States go even further in this process of decoding. They change the relationship of power by converting it from a top-down approach of subsuming the whole social field under despotic regulation, to a relationship of personal bondage. For example, personal bonds (such as between the king and a vassal) replace the old static model of public control. In this way, power (anti-production) becomes relatively defused. The second type of successor States, nation-states, represent the limit of this process. Capitalism signifies both a general decoding as well as deterritorialization at its limits. In capitalism, power becomes defused within the social field. At the same time however, despotism as such does not become abolished. In the same way history represents a gradual escape-trajectory of desire, it is also a process of building new forms of repression over old and existing ones. Similarly to how despotism built itself on existing codes, so does capitalism re-activate despotism, making it operational for its reproduction. The way it does this, however, is quite novel. Capitalism

flattens and abolishes all relationship of subsumption that operated in previous ages. Despotism subsumed primitivism, in the same way evolved States based on personal bonds subsumed despotism. Capitalism, however, instead of subsuming, establishes a destratified field of immanence, where all of the previous elements become operative in one way or another. This field of immanence is the axiomatic and the State which realizes the axiomatic is the nation-state:

“It is in the form of the nation-state, with all its possible variations, that the State becomes the model of realization for the capitalist axiomatic.”

The reason why a nation-state “becomes the model of realization for the capitalist axiomatic” lies precisely in its capacity to establish a de-stratified territory where capital can flow without obstructions. This State is in no way subjected to coding, instead it shuts-down all codes that block the flow of capital and ensures that any stratification within the State is conditioned not by codes but by State-power itself. The State is not concentrated in the despotic will anymore, nor does it appear as a system of personal bonds, but extends itself over the whole sphere of production, completely changing its relationship to society. Both in despotism, as well as in the evolved States, political power functioned primarily from an isolated position of transcendence. In both cases there was a clear pre-established hierarchy, where either power was completely concentrated in one point, or relatively defused establishing personal bonds that emulated despotism (e.g. master-serf). In both cases, however, power relied on the presence of intrinsic codes which shaped the nature of this power. In other words, although the State overcoded, it was also itself subjected to codes. In capitalism as opposed to this, power or anti-production appears de-coded itself, visible, not pre-arranged and consequently not immediately legitimized. The diffusion of anti-production expels intrinsic

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354 Ibid. p. 456.

355 A modern State is concerned with growth and the general increase in capital, regardless what form capital takes. The State is not concerned with pre-existing codes, simply with the imperative that something is produced. A State is also very much a product of class relations, but a nation-state is never a matter of a selected ruling class (there is no ruling class in capitalism, only dominant ones that do not compose one monolithic class), instead it seeks to regulate these class relations in service of a maximal output of capital. For example, what is termed a welfare-state is a set of axioms that are placed in order to maximize capital in a specific historical framework (to reconstruct the country, establish an economy fuelled by war, pacify the working-class, to appear competitive in relation to existing “alternative” systems, such as socialism and so on). Similarly, the dismantling of the welfare-state is an accumulation of axioms that seeks to maximize output of capital in a given historical framework.

codes and instead of these codes having primary role in coding desire, desire is now directly coded by political power.

“The State as the model for the book and for thought has a long history: logos, the philosopher-king, the transcendence of the Idea, the interiority of the concept, the republic of minds, the court of reason, the functionaries of thought, man as legislator and subject. The State's pretension to be a world order, and to root man.”\(^{356}\)

Precisely this tendency becomes realized in the modern world. In opposition to despotism, where there is a sharp border between the economic sphere of production or society and the State or concentrated anti-production in the form of politics, in capitalism this border is absent. The absence of the border is predicated on two elements.

The first one is that the State relinquishes its despotic prerogatives. “Never before has a State lost so much of its power in order to enter with so much force into the service of the signs of economic power.”\(^{357}\) This loss of position of transcendence corresponds to political power becoming axiomatics. “It is the real characteristics of axiomatics that lead us to say that capitalism and present-day politics are an axiomatic in the literal sense.”\(^{358}\) Politics is not a practice of a transcendent power concentrated on the body of the despot anymore, but a practice that regulates all codes pertaining to human beings and things in relation to the increase in capital. The State enters “into the service of the signs of economic power”, but because the State is a form of concentrated political power, this “service” is a form of control.

This is the second reason why the border between the State and society is absent – power is defused within the social field, more precisely, despotic power becomes immanent to economy. The regulation therefore retains its despotic character that marks a concentration based on anti-production, but now within the sphere of production itself. Therefore, the nation-state represents at the same time a break with despotic practice and its continuation:

“On the one hand, the modern State forms a break that represents a genuine advance in comparison with the despotic State, in terms of its fulfilment of a becoming-immanent, its generalized decoding of flows, and its axiomatic that comes to replace the codes and overcodings. But on the other hand there has never been but one State, the Urstaat, the Asiatic despotic formation, which constitutes in its shadow existence history's only break, since even the modern social axiomatic can function only by resuscitating it as one of the poles between which it produces its

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\(^{356}\) Ibid. p. 24.

\(^{357}\) Ibid. p. 252.


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own break. Democracy, fascism, or socialism, which of these is not haunted by the Urstaat as a model without equal? [Emphasis added]"\(^{359}\)

This is why Deleuze and Guattari also make a link between overcoding and axiomatization, and why overcoding is not merely “stronger” coding.\(^{360}\) Overcoding and in general the application of political power already contained certain proto-axiomatic elements, \textit{i.e.} the capacity to flatten and de-code elements from above in order to sustain and increase itself. Certainly, the process was still over\textit{coding} insofar political power was itself obscured in codes (\textit{e.g.} the divine legitimacy of rule) and because overcoding functioned indirectly on relative, contextualized elements. However, the seeds of the axiomatic, of the capacity to de-code, shut-down codes and make anti-production independent from belief, turning it back on it, is something already present in despotism. In difference to despotism, however, where the distinction between the social field and the sphere of power must be permanently maintained precisely through a two-tier system of codes, the axiomatic exists through emulating primitivism and again synthetizing economy and politics. In other words, in capitalism:

1) Economy determines political practice because politics is bound to material relations of production and reproduction of capital. Politics is not the self-enclosed practice of the despot in the form of anti-production that regulates society from a transcendent position. Instead, politics is integrated into the sphere of production itself.\(^{361}\)

2) However, this immediately has another meaning. Politics determines economy. The reason is the same as in 1) - it is bound to it. It determines economy through the fact that although capitalist reproduction presupposes decoding and recoding, it does this only on the grounds of permanent \textit{reterritorialization} onto capital.


\(^{361}\) As shown in the first chapter, Deleuze attempts to unify the two distinct spheres of \textit{base} and \textit{superstructure} that were characteristic for Marxism. He does away with ideology and regards subjectivities as investments constitutive for the economic process. As a result of this, \textit{citizen} and \textit{bourgeois} are not properly speaking in opposition. What the nation-states establishes is a human being that functions as a State precisely in its private capacity of isolation, territoriality and drive for expansion of subjectivity. The State is not only an outside structure that conditions man, but is present inside him in the form of a miniature despot, a privatized colony of desire. See also: Holland, W. E. (2001): \textit{Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis.} London and New York: Routledge. p. 16.
Therefore, one of the main characteristics of capitalism is that politics and economy become again intertwined, without there being “determination in the last instance”. This synthesis of the two spheres emulates primitivism, but now “mediated” by despotism, insofar power and economy become one without any intermediary coding. This synthesis of power and economy without any intermediary coding is capital.

“Capital differentiates itself from any other socius or full body, inasmuch as capital itself figures as directly economic instance, and falls back on production without interposing extraeconomic factors that would be inscribed in the form of a code. With the advent of capitalism the full body becomes truly naked, as does the worker himself who is attached to this full body. In this sense the antiproduction apparatus ceases to be transcended, and pervades all production and becomes coextensive with it.”

Anti-production becomes directly economic, but this also means that economy itself becomes internally anti-productive. Anti-production is directly economic because it frames and quantifies “economic” processes, as opposed to qualifying them through codes. By placing political capacity for organization within economic processes themselves, this capacity becomes itself economized.

The synthetic relationship of power and economy has its seat in the civilized man. The civilized man is not enslaved by the despot, because debt is not owed to him, he is also not caught in a fixed and determined relationship of debt such as in a personal bond. Instead, in civilization debt becomes internalized, it institutes a subjectivity that is answerable only to its own State-form. “For once again, before it becomes a feigned guarantee against despotism, the law is the invention of the despot himself: it is the juridical form assumed by the infinite

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362 Despotism can be seen as the Enlightenment of power, a process whereby political power achieves relative emancipation from codes. This emancipation of power enables it to exert control over codes. In this way, despotism also relaxes economy, since now economy is not completely determined by codes, but also by transcended power. In capitalism, the synthesis of economy and politics takes place under the conditions of despotical form of power, which is now itself completely de-coded. Capital itself is both an economic and a political category or a unison of economy and power. Codes are here subject of power-economic formations, transitory elements which do not have constitutive function anymore. However, precisely because of its purified, de-coded nature, coding is also necessary – something must be inscribed into capital in order to cope with its pure, meaningless form. Totalitarianism is perhaps the closest any society ever came in realizing this pure idea of capital, a society where there is nothing but capital. There is only power and economy which has no other purpose but the reproduction of power. As a result, totalitarianism is a wasteland of efficiency, surplus-creation and development, in other words, a lifeless and soulless world.

This means that desire becomes recaptured and “coded” not by whatever culture or custom is in place, only subsequently to become subsumed under State-law, but directly by the State, or political power itself. It is political power which gives the axiomatic its “axiomatic” character, because the “code” applied to the subject is not organic, self-sufficient and pre-loaded with functions based on belief. Instead, through its conversion into political power the code becomes meaningless and randomized. The modern family, in other words, is abstracted from the social field, in order to become the place onto which the axiomatic can be applied without any coding coming in between.

To put it in other terms, the concrete form in which anti-production or power is defused over society is the privatization of power. Private man is “private” insofar as what is privatized is the structural feature of the State. And precisely through this privatization, the State-form of anti-production extends throughout all society. Only from this internalized position does the State as a set of social institutions emerge. The concept of capital, in other words, presupposes both historically and logically the concept of the State.

The idea that the despotic State establishes a certain form of anti-production, which then in capitalism becomes privatized and internalized seems to diverge from the established view on the division of State and society as one of the main features of capitalism. Following from this, Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis also seems to oppose Hegel’s idea that the modern State does not subsume, but recognizes other forms of practices. This is why Deleuze and Guattari differentiate between the State-form as a specific form of anti-production and the State as a set of institutions which changes throughout history. At the same time, the extension of the State-form over social relations, means that the relationship between a human being and the State changes. Their idea is in this regard thoroughly Hegelian. Because the State-form extends over the sphere of production, similarly to Hegel, the State becomes concrete or, in other words, the State becomes the central organizing principle of human life. The process in which the State withdraws and opens space for other forms of practice is at the same time a process of its

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364 Ibid. p. 213.
365 The “nation” that appears on the territory where codes operated is something quite different from those codes. The nation makes codes simply the building blocks for the axiomatic. The “French nation” does not preserve the cultures that thrived on “French” territory, on the contrary, it destroys them and preserves only those elements the State utilizes to construct itself. As shown in the part on Hegel, a nation is a people constituted primarily by the State. Codes of language, customs, tradition, and so on, are all selected and combined through State-sanctioned law. Cultural forms of life are not materially viable anymore, because in their place stands the State. As it will become clearer later on, capitalism is a state-society.
totalization. The privatization of anti-production in the seclusion of the modern family has for its object that which was “public” in savagery and despotism. What is privatized is what the State developed in despotism – the capacity to regulate and control desire.\(^{366}\) In this regard, Hegel’s principle of identification with the State as the main feature of the nation-state is echoed by Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of “privatization” of despotism. Both of these processes view the emergence of the nation-state as a process of gradual concretization of the State. The result of this is that culture or religion, tribe or family do not condition social organization anymore directly. Instead, this role is taken up by the State. The heterogeneity in capitalism, the plurality and conflicts of the civil society, the multitude of cultures, and so on, are predicated on the capacity of the State to install itself at the root of human life. There is no living (economically viable) culture in capitalism. Culture in capitalism does not establish a link between the community and its means of life. This link is now maintained by State-law as determined by the internal struggle of the community. This similarity with Hegel is even more visible in the historical form Deleuze and Guattari attribute to this process.

“The State was first this abstract unity that integrated subaggregates functioning separately; it is now subordinated to a field of forces whose flows it co-ordinates and whose autonomous relations of domination and subordination it expresses. It is no longer content to overcode maintained and imbricated territorialities; it must constitute, invent codes for the decoded flows of money, commodities, and private property. It no longer of itself forms a ruling class or classes; it is itself formed by these classes, which have become independent and delegate it to serve their power and their contradictions, their struggles and their compromises with the dominated classes. It is no longer the transcendent law that governs fragments; it must fashion as best it can a whole to which it will render its law immanent. It is no longer the pure signified that regulates its signified; it now appears behind them, depending on the things it signifies. It no longer produces an overcoding unity; it is itself produced inside the field of decoded flows. As a machine it no longer determines a social system; it is itself determined by the social system into which it is incorporated in the exercise of its functions. In brief, it does not cease being artificial, but it becomes concrete, it ‘tends to concretization’ while subordinating itself to the dominant forces.”\(^{367}\)

The State is in primitivism merely an abstraction, it figures as a danger that must be permanently exorcised through relations of exchange and debt abolishment. With despotism the State becomes more concrete, it becomes a reality, which is at the same time abstract, foreign and transcended, accumulating together with God from above. However, only in

\(^{366}\) Ibid. p. 251.

\(^{367}\) Ibid. p. 221.
capitalism does the State gain full concretization, because it fosters a form of subjectivity which is now characterized by internalized debt.

The human being in capitalism does not view the State as a transcended and foreign power, but something it can “privatize” and claim as its own. No pre-modern State would allow a human being to do this, to attempt to frame or express the conflicts through State-law. Certainly, State-law shaped and organized society, but always from a position of transcendence and unquestionable power of the despot. All knew where the State began and where the State ended, and those who did not respect this border paid a heavy price for their transgression. In the capitalist society, this border becomes removed. My organs are not the possession of a community, they are also not attached to the despot as a figure distinct from me. My organs become privatized – I view my body as mine. The woman’s breast cannot be exchanged and the despot cannot punish the stealing hand by cutting it off. Instead, I possess myself and all my debts. Modern subjectivity fosters a form of individuality which is not “included” into socially organized forms of conditioning of desire, but becomes in itself the mechanism of this organization – I become my own subject. This completely changes the coordinates of conflict in capitalism, since conflicts are not culturally determined through codes and belief, or externally limited by a despotic State. Instead, conflict is directly political, since despotic anti-production now permeates the social field.

Therefore, the nation-state represents a very strange State, it is de-stratified, which goes against the historical concept of the State as transcendent and concentrated political power. A _people_ emerge within this State as a competitive unit against another _people_, and as a _people_ constituted by competition. Finally, the State itself does not overcode codes, but serves as the realized axiomatic of capital – itself being determined by conflict and resulting from it. However, it results from conflict insofar as it determines and limits its coordinates internally. The limit to conflict now resides in the individual as the locus of anti-production, where what is privatized is nothing else but the despotic anti-production. The modern State is in essence a democratization of the despot across a people. This is why capital is not some released economic power that has been conditioned throughout history, but _the continuing conditioning of this power via_ anti-productive practice present within the surplus itself in the form of the _principle of objectified subjectivity_ that is expressed in property, family and the nation-state.

The modern attempt on the part of the State to “root man” is, despite its relative success, paradoxical. Because production in capitalism is not conditioned by pre-established codes that must be reproduced and because the _body without organs_ becomes engaged in the process of
production through active disorganization, the nature of capitalist production is *nomadic*. The principle to be satisfied in reproduction is territorialization, the accumulation of that which is posited as the ground of productive capacity – capital. This *territorialization* is realized in the social forms of the modern family, capital (as a social relation) and the nation-state – forms that all relate to a privatized form of desire. Yet because this principle is simply an abstraction in relation to the system of codes, *i.e.* it is a form of decoding, it is dependent on permanent recoding. To put this in other terms: the axiomatic requires codes as a form through which it can perpetuate itself. Capitalist system is in a permanent quest for new codes, both within its interior, where it fosters conflicts, pluralisation and heterogeneity, and on the outside, where it seeks to conquer new territories, establish new nation-states, open new markets, bring in populations into the axiomatic and so on. The State is not only integrated into the sphere of production; instead, it is the on-going process of permanent integration into production both within its own territory, and outside of it. It conditions desiring-production to become subjective productive capacity in the form of capital, but to perpetuate and reproduce capital it requires nomadic and polyvocal synthetic power of desiring-production. This places the State into a position dependent on permanent internalization of nomadic elements that threaten it (*e.g.* subcultures, immigrants, non-government organizations, financial institutions, technological inventions, and so on) and which it must constantly pacify and axiomatize. Consequently, high levels of repression that result from the State-form directly fusing with life, lead paradoxically not only life to appear as a subject in the form of capital, but the State which emerges from this fusion to become subjected to nomadic process of life. In this way, the limit in the form of desiring-production, the code of the savage or the body of the despot, *i.e.* the limit where surplus was to be found and which was external to the social field (because if ever reached, the social field would collapse), becomes *internal* to the social field, but in such a way that it is permanently displaced.

“Concerning capitalism, we maintain that it both does and does not have an exterior limit: it has an exterior limit that is schizophrenia, that is, the absolute decoding of flows, but it functions only by pushing back and exorcising this limit. And it also has, yet does not have, interior limits: it has interior limits under the specific conditions of capitalist production and circulation, that is, in capital itself, but it functions only by reproducing and widening these limits on an always vaster scale. The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of adding a new axiom to the previous ones.”

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368 That the axiomatic is never saturated relates to the nature of laws and regulations in capitalism. Codes (*e.g.* a social norm) carried specific meaning within themselves. This means that codes centralized practices around
To this effect, because the State is inherent to the production process itself, it becomes subject to the permanent reaching and displacement of the limit (war, supra-national institutions, inner heterogeneity, and so on). The State utilizes those elements for growth that tend to destroy it. It does not condition codes from the outside, placing a limit to them in the form of despot’s desire, but enters codes in the form of an axiom, making them subject to permanent deterritorialization, at the same time and as a result of this, the State becomes displaced, “drawn” by deterritorialization that it releases by expelling codes. This makes the State permanently “catch up” its own deterritorialization, attempting to re-establish its borders, consolidate itself and extend the model onto the earth. The State necessitates non-coded surplus in order to perpetuate itself, but through this appropriation of surplus it continually reaches the limit where it comes in danger of collapsing, only to displace and reterritorialize the limit again.

As shown, a body without organs is a limit, it is a deterritorialized body that stands beyond the established social relations. It is produced through the surplus and it is in the limit of society that the surplus is found. The limit of a despotic society is the despot / divinity; there is no higher productive power. The limit in capitalism is capital. However, capital is a limit that is permanently displaced and transformed precisely because it integrates nomadic elements into itself. That capital is a limit means that it represents the space in which specific events can take place, i.e. the space where difference can emerge. For example, green economy emerges within the confines of the axiomatic as something possible within it (and historically speaking, directly conditioned by the need to overcome the destructive nature of capitalist reproduction). This emergence, however, happens within the limits of the axiomatic. In capitalism, this economy emerges only under the conditions of the axiomatic: it must function within the confines of the existing market-economy and satisfy the precondition of the increase in capital to be sustainable. The State is here not only included as a regulative instance that seeks to promote or stimulate the economy from the outside but as an already immanent factor of the axiomatic: e.g. the property character of renewable energy, the competitive eco-system which is established, taxation, lobbying, party politics, and so on. The conditions of the emergence as well as the failure of renewable energy lie within the limit of the axiomatic. The limit was displaced (no such energy was there 100 of years ago) but at the same time preserved (it is still capital)

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As a result, the nation-state often fluctuates between the two extremes of totalitari

anism, on the one hand, and complete deterritorialization and revolution (including fascism), on the other. This unstable and volatile position of the modern State points to the limits of its existence, because no matter how far these limits are displaced, as with the family, whose axiomatic nature reveals a power outside of it, so does the nature of the nation-state reveal its own exteriority in the form of the global axiomatic. The permanent deterritorialization of the nation-state and the fact that it must exert violence both on the inside and the outside to preserve itself is predicated on the worldwide nature of the axiomatic. Nation-state is the form and the model in which the axiomatic is realized, but it represents a model of practice that is global. Capitalism is a world-system in which nation-states are material bases of reproduction, it is:

“A worldwide axiomatic, […] a worldwide enterprise of subjectification by constituting an axiomatic of decoded flows. Social subjection, as the correlate of subjectification, appears much more in the axiomatic's models of realization than in the axiomatic itself. It is within the framework of the nation-state, or of national subjectivities, that processes of subjectification and the corresponding subjections are manifested.”

That the axiomatic is immanently global however is something inscribed in the break effectuated with the downfall of despotism. It means that political practice cannot remain contained within national borders, since these borders are products of permanent deterritorialization of the State. The global nature of the axiomatic reveals that when codes fail to exhaust desiring-production in their meaning, the earth itself becomes visible – one becomes capable of seeing beyond the code as well as beyond the despot who took refuge in the citizen.

5. The war machine

The axiomatic makes the “identity in nature” between desiring-production and social production visible. This reason for this is that in capitalism surplus remains un-coded. The subject in capitalism appears as the driving force of territorialization, constituted through a privatized form of desire, which finds its social realization in the modern family and the nation-state. At the same time, the expansion of productiveness in capitalism is curtailed by being re-inscribed onto the State-form. In order to avoid collapse, the nation-state is forced to permanently conquer its own interior, where nomadic practice leads to differentiation, as well

370 I will return to the problems of totalitarianism and more importantly fascism in the third chapter.
as its exterior in the form of new territories (e.g. land, markets or new peoples). In other words, political power of debt imparts economy a model, whereas economy defuses political power. All economy is subject to the increase in capital and its re-inscription into individualized and general form of State-power. At the same time, economic practice diffuses and abolishes political power in its despotic form, democratizing it, but only up to the limit of subjectivized anti-production.

The fourth concept of politics or politics of becoming does not signify a dialectical development of political practice from the axiomatic. Instead, it signifies practice which represents a break with the historical form of politics. This practice has its source in the nomadic nature of desire. As opposed to the citizen who marks the high point of history, the result of civilization and the dissolution of codes, a being whose true home is the State (and who makes every home a State), the nomad signifies the exteriority of the State. Nomad marks the exteriority of the State because it signifies the point at which the State fails to exert totalization. Nomad is a remnant of production, but a remnant intrinsically prior to all products. As a remnant, it points to a more originary form of practice than the axiomatic.

“The product is something removed or deducted from the process of producing: between the act of producing and the product, something becomes detached, thus giving the vagabond, nomad subject a residuum.”

This “residuum” signifies surplus as the constitutive excess of production. Surplus in capitalism, as shown, is freed in a way that fosters an open and heterogeneous production. Although nomadism was present in savagery as well, it appeared always already captured in codes. Savages encountered assemblages that were not subject to a preordained form of production, and desire had freedom to connect and establish relations that were only subsequently imbued with fixed and static function. As a result of overcoding in despotism, the range of coding became subject to stricter regulation. The limit to codes were not the codes themselves (which could then exhibit high heterogeneity and diversity), but a universal code that homogenized all the others, at the same time paving the way for de-coded flows of desire.

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373 For example, Hegel’s natural contingency, such as a single natural event, might become constitutive for the community by influencing imagination. However, this primary freedom of desire was then constrained through coding – results of desire’s playfulness becoming fixed and petrified. However, the content of production still exhibited nomadic qualities (assemblages that from our perspective seem playful, contingent and even outright incomprehensible).
Desire in capitalism regains its nomadic feature it exhibited in primitivism. However, this now takes place under different conditions. Desire has free reign in capitalism only under the conditions of surplus-reproduction and subjective representation. What nomadism as such signifies, however, is unqualified surplus. Nomads are not territorial, do not constitute either culture or civilization and have no history.

“It is in this sense that nomads have no points, paths, or land, even though they do by all appearances. If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialization afterward as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary (the sedentary’s relation with the earth is mediatized by something else, a property regime, a State apparatus). With the nomad, on the contrary, it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself. It is the earth that deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad with a territory. The land ceases to be land, tending to become simply ground (sol) or support.”

The nomad reterritorializes onto deterritorialization. What this means for Deleuze and Guattari is that desire as surplus becomes neither coded nor axiomatized. As a result of this, political practice of the nomad takes on a radical character. It becomes incompatible with the State-form of politics. More precisely, what the nomad expresses is the dissolution of State-politics. The reason is that the nomad is un-representable and un-recognizable. It appears inherently as war.

374 I already mentioned that both despotism and capitalism (which emerges from despotism) share the common trait of homogenizing the social field. However, there is an important difference in how they proceed in this task. The despot homogenizes from the position which is external to the object that is homogenized. For example, different spheres of social life become homogenized through practices of taxation, repaying debt in kind, etc. Capitalism, as opposed to this, homogenizes from within, but in a way that does not create homogeneity between the elements. Rather, what takes place is what Deleuze and Guattari call “isomorphism”, where differential elements are retained but also capable of “resonating” together. Different forms do not correspond to each other and allow for a high degree of heterogeneity, but they still contain the same structure and function (i.e. they function as capital, although they belong to highly divergent genera and species). In this way, capitalism exhibits both the features of an assemblage (where the “whole” operates in such a way that differences are retained) and as a totality (where all the elements gain relevance insofar as they operate within the “whole”). Deleuze, G.; Guattari, D. (2005): A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press. p. 436.

375 Ibid. p. 381.
“There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic origin and is directed against the State apparatus.”

Nomadism is a rich term in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy and I will focus on only one of its aspects. This aspect concerns the origin of resistance and conflict. According to Deleuze and Guattari, what they call a war machine represents a mutating assemblage which can be registered on many different levels, from literature to martial arts, and from mathematics to politics. In one sense, the war machine as such signifies the indeterminacy of resistance and conflict. As Paul Patton argues, it is the “condition of creative mutation and change”. The reason why it acts as the condition of creativity and change lies in its open relationship to desire. Deleuze and Guattari permanently make the difference between the State, as something determined and recognizable and the war machine, an assemblage that precedes totalization.

“The State-form, as a form of interiority, has a tendency to reproduce itself, remaining identical to itself across its variations and easily recognizable within the limits of its poles, always seeking public recognition (there is no masked State). But the war machine’s form of exteriority is such that it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exists in an industrial innovation as well as in a technological invention, in a commercial circuit as well as in a religious creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State.”

In order to make this difference more clear, Deleuze and Guattari invoke both Pierre Clastres and Hobbes, arguing that war and the State are antagonistic to each other: “the State

376 Ibid. p. 230.

377 Under the concept of the “war machine” Deleuze and Guattari consider every possible form of production and life, from Scythian weaponry, Kleist’s way of writing, mathematical inventions, barbarian invasions, martial arts, Jewish prophetic movements, etc. They consider everything that appears as a form of resistance (line of flight) not already presupposed by State-instituted contradictions. They also examine the hierarchies and relations of authority within nomadic processes. What they insist on is the difference between hierarchies of nomadic movements, which are permanently mutating and transforming, exhibiting subordination to production, on the one hand, and the hierarchies of the State-form that sustains the primacy of authority, on the other. This is the paradox of capitalism. On the one hand, capitalism exhibits a mutating capacity to subvert and invert the relationships of hierarchy, on the other hand, it places this mutating capacity in the service of reproducing hierarchy and domination as such. Capitalism, therefore, exhibits the primacy of the war machine, which is - paradoxically - presupposed by the primacy of the State. In this sense, where Hegel imparts the capacity to introduce conflict, change and mutation to world-historical individuals, Deleuze and Guattari give it to a diverse set of practices and assemblages, all of which can act as a war machine. In other words, where conflict, change and mutation come from can never be determined. Patton, P. (2000): Deleuze and the Political. London and New York: Routledge. p. 110.

was against war, so war is against the State”. More precisely, neither is the State the source of conflict, nor is conflict the source of the State. Conflict and the State are antagonistic to each other and have divergent lines of descend. The reason why this is so is that the State’s highest value is peace. As formations of peace, States are wary of war, because war tends to dissolve the State. The war machine, in the most abstract sense that belongs to the nomad, exists beyond the State, as a form of conflict that is still indeterminate.

“As for the war machine, it appears to be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its laws: it comes from elsewhere.”

When thinking of war, we tend to think of destruction and death. However, there is a difference between the war machine as an indeterminate process of resistance, of something which introduces conflict and resistance in a given assemblage, on the one hand, and war that is subordinate to peace on the other. The indeterminacy of resistance expresses the fact that it is not organized around predetermined subjects or objects, instead conflict is intrinsically linked with desire’s capacity for creation:

“It is not the nomad who defines this constellation of characteristics; it is this constellation that defines the nomad, and at the same time the essence of the war machine. If guerrilla warfare, minority warfare, revolutionary and popular war are in conformity with the essence, it is because they take war as an object all the more necessary for being merely "supplementary": they can make war only on the condition that they simultaneously create something else, if only new nonorganic social relations.”


380 There is no such thing as a “pure nomad” or “pure citizen”. No person is simply a nomad or a citizen. The nomad does not represent “global personality” and unified identity, therefore, no person can be a nomad. Nomad exists on the molecular level or the level of multiplicity. Every person is found between these two poles, one in which the State-form seeks to unify and totalize and the other which escapes this. A “person” is a nomad because it is excluded, abolished, barred off, and it is citizen insofar as it creates a specific form of exclusion. These two sides of subjectivity take place within one and the same process. At the same time, although my use of the term “citizen” in this work is constrained by the context of Hegelian philosophy and its roots in the ancient ideal of the citizen, which I utilize to place a stronger emphasis on the dualism of State-subjectivity and a nomadic one, there are attempts to redefine the idea of citizenship from a Deleuzian perspective. One example is Holland’s notion of “nomad citizenship”: Holland, W. Eugene (2006): Nomad Citizenship and Global Democracy, in: Deleuze and the Social. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p. 202.


382 Ibid. p. 423.
Only when the State appropriates the war machine, we tend to project into conflict those features that are imposed by the State. For example, we might view conflict presupposing specific features of human beings – fear, aggression and trajectory toward mutual destruction – that in turn necessitate the pacifying influence of the State. However, this pacifying influence takes on the form of fear and threat of destruction, only now imposed by the State itself. Similarly, we might view conflict emerging around the principle of possession. The capacity to appropriate things and the fact that this capacity must be regulated in some way again invites the State. But what is omitted here is how possession proceeds and what social forms does it take. According to Deleuze and Guattari, therefore, what is projected into conflict is nothing else but what the State already inscribes into it.

“In short, it is at one and the same time that the State apparatus appropriates a war machine, that the war machine takes war as its object, and that war becomes subordinated to the aims of the State.”

The appropriation of the war machine by the State makes the capacity to engender conflict pre-determined. For example, it appears as a conflict between two despots, between “private” individuals, between delineated genders, and so on. As a result of this, the assemblage of organic and non-organic life always already appears as a determined subject of war: an army, a market, or a war between States. This leaves the impression that desire has a natural trajectory toward precisely those predetermined forms of conflict. However, this is not the case.

“War, it must be said, is only the abominable residue of the war machine, either after it has allowed itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus, or even worse, has constructed itself a State apparatus capable only of destruction.”

The capacity for resistance and conflict becomes abstracted from its creative nature and subordinated to pre-determined aims and goals. When this takes place, resistance becomes shaped by a pre-arranged form of conflict. In the clash with the war machine the State necessarily encounters resistance, the machine appears to seek war. However, the war machine signifies an assemblage of desire, which is not exhausted in its product, in a specific form of conflict – but marks precisely its exteriority and surplus. Because surplus precedes all products, no established form of production can in fact claim priority in relation to desire. In this regard, resistance has primacy over State-power. Indeed, resistance in its nomadic form is turned against power.

\[\text{Ibid. p. 418.}\]
\[\text{Ibid. p. 230.}\]
“War, at least when linked to the war machine, is another regime, because it implies the mobilization and autonomization of a violence directed first and essentially against the State apparatus (the war machine is in this sense the invention of a primary nomadic organization that turns against the State).”\(^{385}\)

Consequently, in any given conflict, the war machine does not only resist to an already existing State or any other object, it resists \textit{a priori} because it cannot be internalized, closed off and totalized.

Therefore, a war machine (\textit{e.g.} a revolution, an invention, new social relationship, \textit{etc.}) is not simply a reaction to the historical oppression of the State – it does not emerge only as an answer to State relations and existing political configurations that would resolve the contradiction. Rather, the war machine appears from beyond the institutions of the State as a power of \textit{becoming.}\(^{386}\) The war machine, or the capacity of resistance, is not a feature of any particular State. All States are plagued with conflict, both institutionalized and non-institutionalized. In this regard, conflict has primacy. However, when conflict becomes subjected to predetermined social aims and goals, the war machine becomes “abominable” war, because these social aims and goals, which are contained within the institutions of the State, gain primacy in relation to the transformative character of desiring-production that produces them. The primacy of social aims and goals stands in an antagonistic relationship with nomadic practice, because \textit{nomadism}, as a function of desire that is devoid of lack, is non-purposive. However, the non-purposive nature of the war machine has in fact been always conditioned throughout history. The primitives were the first to appropriate the war machine – conflict here

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\(^{385}\) \textit{Ibid.} p. 448.

\(^{386}\) One important influence on Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between the \textit{State apparatus} and the \textit{war machine} is Ibn Khaldun’s theses on the main division of humanity between the desert (nomads), on the one hand, and the town (civilization), on the other. The interaction of the two takes on a cyclical form – nomads exhibit a higher \textit{Asabiyyah} (a term signifying among other things \textit{social cohesion}), whereas civilization is marked by dissolution of social bonds under the pressure of the State. Sedentary organization has a tendency to deteriorate and is rejuvenated when nomads attack towns and States. Nomads conquer towns, but are in turn conquered by sedentary form of organization because they appropriate the existing culture of the people they subdue. When they enter sedentary organization, the nomads themselves begin to lose their old bonds and become subject to slow decline, necessitating another wave of nomads to perpetuate the State. This same motif is found in Hegel. As shown in the first chapter, the decline of States is a reality of history, but one relegated to exteriority. Spirit necessitates conflict insofar as this decline must be counter-acted by another people, who by appropriating the culture of the collapsing civilization are in turn appropriated by Spirit, further developing its principle. \textit{Ibid.} p. 481.
had the purpose of preventing the formation of the State.\textsuperscript{387} The very first transformation of the war machine into war made both the war machine and war antagonistic to the State. However, the downfall of the primitive world introduced despotism, where the war machine become appropriated in order to accumulate and expand the power of the despot. In other words, conflict was internally limited through codes, in the same way it was in primitivism, and externally, by the State. Finally, in capitalism, the State and the war machine enter a more immediate relationship – here the State installs itself at the heart of conflict and appears as the permanent result of conflict – as its natural trajectory.

However, insofar conflict here appears non-coded, “naked” and internally conditioned by the State, it also becomes more visible in its non-institutionalized form. Conflict in capitalism is not pre-determined by customs, tradition, mythology, \textit{etc.} but by the axiomatic which allows conflict to change and mutate, making the war machine visible. The primacy of non-institutionalized conflict is both visible, however, and placed under the conditions of capital reproduction.\textsuperscript{388} But the limitation to conflict does not come primarily from codes (belief, tradition, customs) and from without (despotic law), but from within, in the form of privatized subjectivity. In other words, although the war machine becomes fully visible in capitalism insofar as it becomes released from codes and despotic confines, it becomes reterritorialized and re-appropriated by a new model of subjectivity fostered directly by a form of anti-production developed in despotism.

“Marx said that Luther's merit was to have determined the essence of religion, no longer on the side of the object, but as an interior religiosity; that the merit of Adam Smith and Ricardo was to have determined the essence or nature of wealth no longer as an objective nature, but as an abstract and deterritorialized subjective essence, the activity of production in general. But as this


\textsuperscript{388} This is the paradoxical position of the modern State. The State cannot survive without the war machine, which at the same time leads to its dissolution. This is why capitalism at the same time exists and perpetuates itself on those elements that tend to dissolve it. Its strength lies precisely in the ability to survive on “breaks”, “fits” and “collapses”, which it integrates into its own reproduction. Craig Lundy writes on this: “Thus capitalism welcomes its others and enemies, since its very strength is drawn from those forces that are outside it and resist it. There is nothing better for the capitalist machine than a good healthy recession, for this creates instability, driving down wages and increasing the \textit{rates} of profit. Wars and taxes are other good ways to clear out room for capitalist \textit{growth}. Combined with the abilities of technology and consumer society, the capitalist machine can practically find aid anywhere in its proliferation of and capitalisation on flow surplus – like a Nietzschean sickness, its strength resides precisely in the manner of its afflictions” Lundy, C. (2012): \textit{History and Becoming: Deleuze’s Philosophy of Creativity}. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p. 120.
determination develops under the condition of capitalism, they objectify the essence all over again, they alienate and reterritorialize it, this time in the form of the private ownership of the means of production. [...] The same thing must be said of Freud: his greatness lies in having determined the essence or nature of desire, no longer in relation to objects, aims, or even sources (territories), but as an abstract subjective essence-libido or sexuality. But he still relates this essence to the family as the last territoriality of private man whence the position of Oedipus. \[Emphasis added]\]

Deleuze and Guattari express in this passage the same idea that Hegel’s concept of Spirit expresses: the idea of “activity of production in general” or production unconstrained by predetermined objectivities. With the onset of capitalism, production becomes emancipated from “large” objectivities. For example, production in general becomes deterritorialized from external objects (e.g. the land) and becomes the inner capacity of life. However, in the same way labour is reterritorialized onto private property, so does production in general again become subjected to a pre-determined form of subjective and privatized representation.

Therefore, from Deleuze’s standpoint, the emancipation of practice from heteronomous codes and its grounding in the family, the State and capital retains a concept of practice that still presupposes transcendent conditions. This condition is the idea of the subject or, in other words, the idea of consciousness and purposiveness. The capacity of the modern State to sustain conflict is predicated on its axiomatic character that is open to all codes (as long as they do not operate directly within desire). However, this “openness” to conflict is predicated on the fact that conflict becomes organized around a form of subjectivity which is private, territorial and driven by interests which signify the primacy of social aims and goals.

At the same time, because production is always a production of surplus, conflict cannot remain confined to this form of subjectivity. The reason is that practice in capitalism is not only unified with production through the mediation of \textit{theoria} as in Hegel (self-consciousness conditioned by historical development). Instead, as social form of anti-production, practice is also an expression of \textit{desire or the unconscious itself}. As shown earlier, production and anti-production operated on two distinct levels in all pre-modern societies. Anti-production found its expression in practices which were highly regulated and cyclical. Primitives developed the practices of exchange and destruction, despotism the practice of overcoding. In both cases, practice was removed from production. In capitalism, this changes because anti-production and production become synthetized – in other words, anti-production operates directly within desire. As a consequence of this, production is internally constrained – the subjectivity is not

deduced from large objective structures which contain anti-production, but instead serves as the locus of anti-production. However, the flip side of this relationship is that anti-production itself cannot remain static and cyclical, but because it operates directly within desire, it becomes volatile and unpredictable. When production itself serves as the mechanism of anti-production, this means that both production acts anti-productively, but also that anti-production acts (often against its “rights”) productively, exceeding the limits of given subjectivity as well as aim and goals it seeks to preserve. This is why practice in capitalism has both pre-modern characteristics – it serves to constrain and regulate production, but also completely new characteristics – it can become passionate production, exhibiting volatility, unpredictability, spontaneous resistance and revolutionary capacities.

From Hegel’s perspective, practice and production are synthetized through consciousness: I am practical by producing and realizing purposes under the conditions of consciousness of freedom. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, I am practical in a way that exceeds conscious aims and goals. In other words, my conscious practical activity is not the only form of practice. Because practice and production become synthetized under the conditions of the unconscious, production also exceeds practice and allows it to mutate, exhibiting new forms of resistance.\(^\text{391}\)

This is why conflict in fact permanently mutates and changes coordinates in capitalism, often going beyond the parameters of subjectivity – engendering new ones, only to be recaptured and returned to the “zero-form” of privatized model of desire. The State encounters in the nomadic war machine a permanent excess of conflict in relation to the socially recognized aims and goals. The reason for this excess lies precisely in the fact that political power in pre-modern societies always resided on the side of anti-production, either implicit and tied into the kinship system or as a concentrated political power proper in despotism. With the synthesis of production and anti-production in capitalism, a new side of politics reveals itself. In the first instance, politics retains its old, despotic character:

\(^{390}\) Ibid. p. 336.

\(^{391}\) This is visible in the nature of the concept of production between Hegel and Deleuze. Production for Hegel means the realization of a potential and development according to this realization. Furthermore, the trajectory of production is historical and goal-oriented as well as conditioned by consciousness. Production in Deleuze is non-historical, it is a static genesis in the sense that there is no “before” and “after”. As demonstrated in the first chapter, events are not conditioned by what came before and what comes after – all events are co-temporaneous and become actualized in the relations and connections established by bodies. In this way, process is neither goal-oriented nor does it have only one defined trajectory. It is historical, as much as it is anti-historical and production can both introduce products that cannot be deduced from historical conditions as well as reproduce and re-activate older elements that supposedly are sublated.
“It is the real characteristics of axiomatics that lead us to say that capitalism and present-day politics are an axiomatic in the literal sense.”

Politics is the power of negation that internally mediates the assemblage, reproducing the “productive” citizen-subject, on the one hand, and the “dead” object, on the other, making these two instances principal for the realization of the axiom (the two sides of capital). However, because anti-production itself now is tied into production, this also means that politics is not relegated exclusively to the State, instead it operates on all levels of society. Emancipated from despotism, politics is economized, it spills over into society and indeed makes social conflict, which was in previous societies always merely cultural and based on codes, directly political. This is why, precisely because politics is “an axiomatic in the literal sense [...] nothing is played out in advance.”

This aspect of politics is one of becomings, where politics begins to exhibit the capacity to subvert the coordinates of conflict determined in a static, privatized subjectivity. If politics did not possess this capacity, if the State had precedence in respect to the war machine, we would still mediate and recognize subjects from the 19th century. The politics that appears with the war machine or excess of conflict is neither a practice of power-accumulation through extraction of surplus from the codes, nor a practice of negation that establishes the totalities of the citizen-form and the property-form. Politics does not mediate between existing decoded frameworks of practice (family, State, capital), because it does not represent anything.

“For politics precedes being. [avant l’être] Practice does not come after the emplacement of the terms and their relations, but actively participates in the drawing of the lines; it confronts the same dangers and the same variations as the emplacement does.”

Politics is a form of practice where subjectivities and objectivities are included in the process of the war machine. In other words, they are not viewed as criteria and conditions of conflict, but as a permanent product of the war machine: “If the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings...” The politics of the nomad does not develop itself from the axiomatic dialectically. Instead, the inherent weakness of the axiomatic allows desire to escape and establish a line of flight beyond the possibilities established through contradiction. Politics in the form of the war machine relates to the inherent power of the

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393 Ibid.
394 Ibid. p. 203.
395 Ibid. p. 188.
paradox, which means that it permanently mutates without a plan, where these mutations do not solve the problem, but displace its coordinates completely.\footnote{Deleuze views precisely this paradoxical nature of conflict as something that appears from the effects of the unconscious on practice. Already in \textit{Difference and Repetition}, he writes: “The unconscious is neither an unconscious of degradation nor an unconscious of contradiction; it involves neither limitation nor opposition; it concerns, rather, problems and questions in their difference in kind from answers-solutions: the (non)-being of the problematic which rejects equally the two forms of negative non-being which govern only propositions of consciousness. […] The unconscious is differential, involving little perceptions, and as such it is different in kind from consciousness. It concerns problems and questions which can never be reduced to the great oppositions or the overall effects that are felt in consciousness.” Deleuze, G. (1994): \textit{Difference and Repetition}. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 108.} This duality in the modern concept of politics, on the one side, the axiomatic and the State as the embodiment of politics which resolves conflict, and politics as conflict and the war machine itself, is expressed in the difference between macro- and micropolitics. Macropolitics is the politics of the developed social objects determined by privatized subjectivity – primarily, the politics channelled by the institutions and the mechanisms of the State. Micropolitics as opposed to this is itself something conditioned by privatized model of subjectivity and a conflict determined by it – but in a negative form. It is that which subverts, exceeds and tricks our given interests because it relates to the level of desire, as well as to connections and relations within the social field, that are not fixed around subjects as determined locus-points of organization.

This is why whenever politics is denied its productive power and reduced to despotism in order to “open space” for the spheres of production (and regulate them), it returns through the back door: in the family, the school, the factory, on the streets, from beyond the borders – it emerges on its own. Politics is like cancer, it comes from within the organism, but also like a deadly disease from without, it dissolves the organs slowly from both sides, ensuring the body does not turn divine. Politics dissolves dualisms and contradictions that support the State. Because it does not reside only in the register of the negative that mediates between recognized subjects, but is very much a force of production, it precedes dualisms and whenever anti-production attempts to establish them, the political reappears and dissolves them.

“In short, everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a \textit{macropolitics} and a \textit{micropolitics}. […] There is an entire politics of becomings animal, as well as a politics of sorcery, which is elaborated in assemblages that are neither those of the family nor of religion nor of the State. Instead, they express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt,
or always on the fringe of recognized institutions, groups all the more secret for being extrinsic, in other words, anomic.”

Micropolitics cannot become recognized before the law because it signifies precisely that which remains un-recognized and supressed. The reason for this non-recognition is not that the State stands opposed to nature as some unitary and established realm of originality, but that Nature signifies the absence of the dualism where established global subjectivities and objectivities are to be found and then “mediated”. The State as a form of political power fails as an expression of politics. It fails in relation to politics that always “overflows” the confines not only of particular codes in particular histories and mythologies, but that absolute code also, which is the axiom in the universal history – the State.

6. Result

Deleuze’s idea of political practice relates not only to the historical framework to which Hegel’s idea of politics is confined, but also to a surplus of political practice that does not emerge from the dialectical development. Politics as micropolitics is a result of historical development, because it appears at a specific point in history, but only insofar as it signifies a break with history and a “gap” in the continuity of the State. In this sense, political practice as nomadic practice emerges from history by abolishing historical continuity. In their final collaboration, Deleuze and Guattari will name micropolitics “becoming-democratic that is not to be confused with present constitutional states…” and “becoming-revolutionary”. The notion of democracy here is not its particular, historical form, but precisely its ancient meaning of disorganization and of an excess of passions.

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400 Patton is correct to defend Deleuze and Guattari against Mengue’s charge that the two thinkers are antagonistic to democracy. They certainly are antagonistic to liberal democracy, but in the same way that they distinguish a particular revolution from becoming-revolutionary, so one has to differentiate between a particular democratized State or society (such as liberal democracy) and becoming-democratic. Democracy is not a regime of power, it is a process of dissolution of power. In this regard, there can be no democratic regime, only democratized regimes, those in which becoming-democratic is at work. Insofar as micropolitics operates on a molecular, pre-individual level, it can be termed as democratic par excellence, because democracy is not a model
The task of the next subchapter is to bring Hegel’s and Deleuze’s conceptual frameworks of political practice (political practice as the practice within the totality of the Sittlichkeit and political practice as the practice that establishes a line of flight from this totality) with the idea of immanence as ontological judgment. The synthesis of politics and immanence is to be found, I will show, in the concept of life.

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of government in which competition channels interests which are re-affirmed, but a process of desire gaining precedence over interests. It is a process of uprooting fixed subjectivities, not of their affirmation and petrification through competition. In this regard, democracy should be dissociated from competition as well, which always presupposes a given limitation of democracy through the State (e.g. the competition of the equal citizens in the polis from which slaves or women are excluded from the start, or the modern market-competition from which the majority of world-population is barred off). In this regard, one element of democracy is certainly its positive, realized form – a sphere which has been democratized (the equal citizens of the polis or the nation-state). But the positivity democracy gains here is that of the State. The other side of democracy is that of the process of the dissolution of the State, which manifests itself both as the polis or the nation-state, but also as an ongoing process against the democratized State. To speak of liberal democracy as some defined, positive phenomenon, where power and democracy, State and democracy are implicitly regarded in unison and accord goes not only against what democracy meant for the great part of its history, but also falls into the trap of celebrating the State for the achievements of something which is inherently opposed to it. Patton, P. (2005): Deleuze and Democracy, in: Contemporary Political Theory, Issue 4. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 400 – 413.
PART III: THE CONCEPT OF IMMANENCE – POLITICS AND LIFE

1. The source of production

Both Hegel and Deleuze regard politics as a form of practice. They also understand practice as a productive activity. The activity is productive because it does not simply reproduce established forms of social life. Practice is not confined to the borders of the *polis* because it produces novelty and effectuates difference. The way practice achieves this is different in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies. In Hegel’s case, practice necessarily establishes an objective world as the sphere of human life bordered off from natural violence. In Deleuze’s case, practice is exercised on the surface of the earth. This means that practice does not differentiate between the sphere of purposive activity and the activity of those elements that do not conform to the criteria of consciousness.

As a form of practice, politics for Hegel remains bound to the field of historically established idea of practice. Practice presupposes recognized subjectivities, which it mediates, reproduces and develops. For Deleuze, on the other hand, politics concerns emerging assemblages and *becomings* that are unhistorical and untimely. Hegel’s State appears as the instance that is constituted by recognition and that recognizes subjectivities. For this reason the State represents the highest product of worldly practice. Human activity subjects nature to purpose and establishes the State as a form of political unity. This political unity appeared historically in forms that were alien to it and that bound practice to contingent and external sources. However, in the form of the modern State, this political unity appears absolved from contingency. The reason is that, in the modern State, politics unifies all forms of human practice through mediation. Politics protects the integrity of individual practices as well as the integrity of the whole. When contingency becomes relativized, practice reveals its built-in drive toward productive establishment of an objective world in the form of the State.

According to Deleuze, *historical politics* has to do with historically established framework of freedom. Its task in the form of *macropolitics is negative* because it represents interests that are legitimate, *i.e.* within the range of established framework of freedom. Any desire that does not come about historically or is not deducible from the range of possibilities of freedom appears as *natural* violence. Deleuze’s politics, as opposed to this, is *affirmative*. He views politics not as a reflexion upon the established sphere of law, where interests are negated in order to become represented, but as the emergence of the assemblage prior to the process of
totalization. Politics represents the full and immediate presence of *natural* violence released by the war machine, because it signifies the appearance of a “new people” and a “new earth”.\footnote{Deleuze, G.; Guattari, F. (1994): *What is Philosophy?* New York: Columbia University Press. p. 101.} In this way, Deleuze criticizes not only the particular functions assigned to territories (codes), which serve to divert practice by investing desire into representation, but the very principle of territorialization contained in the State-form.

Therefore, whereas for Hegel, the subject emerges with the historical emergence of political practice, in Deleuze’s view, this emergence of the subject in the form of the State as the “default” world of freedom establishes only practice sanctioned by the primacy of social aims and goals. In Hegel’s view, the exteriorization of purpose into nature erects the State, borders off nature and establishes a world. According to Deleuze, this exteriorization of purpose does not only presuppose *a purpose* as the framework in which difference can legitimately appear, but makes this exteriorization a process of colonization of Nature and difference by the conscious subject that results in the nation-state. Consequently, there are in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s positions two ways natural violence appears: it either figures as a *remnant* of historical development or as its *result*. In Hegel’s case, natural violence is a *remnant* of totalization effectuated by the State, it is a pre-historical form of violence that becomes relative and synthetized with necessity within the framework of the State. According to Deleuze, *natural* violence is the result of totalization effectuated by the State. Both of these alternatives presuppose the question on the *source of practice*. If the practical subject is enclosed within a self-produced world, then anything beyond the world takes on the form of natural violence. If the subject is not to be found enclosed but is inherently nomadic, then what is violent is the establishment of the world and the exhaustion of desiring-production into the framework of historically sanctioned possibility. For Hegel, the expulsion of natural conditions makes practice discover its source in the idea of freedom that represents an absolute prerequisite of practice. The State is emancipated from nature to organize its inner constitution according to the principle of freedom. Therefore, the source of practice is *freedom*, mediated natural violence. For Deleuze, on the other hand, the source of practice must be sought in a broader framework than freedom. Freedom can be used to term practice, but only when freedom signifies not only the freedom of the subject, but freedom of those elements that escape subjectification - nomadic elements. Freedom is not a concept over which the subject has monopoly. Instead, practice must be relegated to a de-subjectified framework from which the subject as such emerges. This broader framework that includes freedom beyond consciousness,
i.e. freedom that is not exclusive to modern human beings, is LIFE. Desiring-production and life are synonymous terms in Deleuze’s philosophy. Life as desire produces neither on account of codes, nor on account of axioms. Life is productive as such:

“What is philosophically incarnated in Hegel is the enterprise to ‘burden’ life, to overwhelm it with every burden, to reconcile life with the State and religion, to inscribe death in life—the monstrous enterprise to submit life to negativity, the enterprise of resentment and unhappy consciousness. Naturally, with this dialectic of negativity and contradiction, Hegel has inspired every language of betrayal, on the right as well as on the left (theology, spiritualism, technocracy, bureaucracy, etc.).”

The problem of life in the question of the driving force behind practice allows to show the link between political practice and immanence. This link can be established because both Hegel and Deleuze involve life into the framework of their political thought. Political practice is inherently turned to life, both in its purposive and nomadic form. Politics, it will be shown, establishes immanence and it does this by either releasing subjectivity from its immediate living form, or by releasing life itself from the clutches of subjectivity. In both cases what is at stake is the problem of life and how it relates to the State. In Hegel’s case, politics establishes immanence as law, in Deleuze’s case, immanence as life.

2. Life: citizen, bourgeois, nomad

The most important difference between Hegel’s and Deleuze’s concepts of life concerns organization. According to Deleuze, life is not only the power of organization but also disorganization. The body without organs operates on the principle of both organization and disorganization. With the emergence of capitalism, the disorganizing element entered the political realm and abolished despotism, forcing the State to adapt to the forces of deterritorialization. In Hegel’s view, however, the modern State represents a power that accommodates disorganization on account of its capacity to totalize. The State returns the dissolving family and the civil society (and in this way the whole system of Sittlichkeit) to their State-form. In this regard, the power of the State is a power of permanent reterritorialization. Deleuze’s criticism of Hegel, that he “reconciled life with the State”, presupposes that life’s limit is not the State. The link between immanence and political practice, therefore, will take

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the form of the question of the limit on life or, in other words, the question of death. In the different relationships established between life and death, a human being emerges either as a bourgeois, a citizen, or a nomad. The way these three figures relate to immanence will be demonstrated by comparing their attitudes toward life and death. I will show that all these attitudes are based on the idea of political practice having its source beyond the confines of fear.

The concept of life in Hegel’s philosophy is conditioned by a general divide between natural violence and Spirit. But unlike other concepts conditioned by this divide, the concept of life possesses one important feature that in turn conditions this divide. Life signifies both natural violence (insofar as it represents the natural condition of being an organism) and the processuality of Spirit. These two conceptions, furthermore, have their source in the logical idea of life. Life, for Hegel, has one primary meaning from which both secondary sides (biological and spiritual life) are derived. This meaning is ontological and expresses the logical structure of existence. Life represents organisation of matter through internal purposiveness. An organism, according to Hegel, exhibits internal purposiveness insofar as it represents a whole from which the parts internally develop themselves. When this internal purposiveness is removed, life dissolves into chemism and mechanism, processes that exhibit dependence on external power in order to accomplish unity. Life is therefore the first appearance of the idea as the unity of subjectivity and objectivity and represents the basic form of totality.

As a basic form of totality, life appears in the form of natural life and spiritual life. Life remains life in all its developments. However, as it develops, it exhibits a division into life that remains on the level of flat repetition and life that internally leads to spiritual forms of

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403 Richard D. Winfield writes on this: “Organs are very different from the parts of a mechanism or the elements of a chemical compound, which can be reduced and separated out. What is distinctive about organs reflects how the organism involves an internal purposiveness or a unification of subjectivity and objectivity. […] In an artefact, like a watch, the parts are united by an agency lying outside the artefact, an agency that acted to construct the artefact out of pre-existing components. Precisely because the unity of mechanism is external to its elements, the parts must already be at hand apart from the whole in which they are put together”. Winfield, D. R. (2012): Hegel’s Science of Logic. A Critical Rethinking in Thirty Lectures. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. p. 207.

404 Relating to this capacity of life to function as a whole that constitutes itself through internal purposiveness, Annette Sell claims that Hegel’s metaphors, such as life of the Spirit, life of the concept and so on, are actually no metaphors at all. Instead, the concept of life should be understood as “a systematic and constitutive concept within Hegel’s philosophy [systematischer, konstitutiver Begriff innerhalb der Hegelschen Philosophie]”. Sell, A. (2013): Der lebendige Begriff. Leben und Logik bei G. W. F. Hegel. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber Verlag. p. 25.
organization.\textsuperscript{405} And in the same way that the ontological idea of life applies to all forms of organization, natural and spiritual sides of life condition each other.

On the one hand, biological life is always a condition of spiritual life. Among other things, this means that dead things cannot be free.\textsuperscript{406} On the other hand, the second concept of life appears as a negation of biological life. For example, biological conditions (colour, ethnicity, and so on) are not relevant from the position of spiritual life of the State. Life combines two sides of development, on the one hand, the biological, natural side, expressed in the repetition of survival\textsuperscript{407}, on the other, the spiritual side of reason or repetition that represents enrichment and development. The development of the Sittlichkeit recapitulates the development from this base, natural life, toward spiritual life in the movement of the human being from the sphere of the family (where it appears as a biologically reproduced unit), to the bourgeoís, who abolishes the natural bond of the family in order to establish an artificial one, but only insofar as the new bond serves to satisfy the needs of the citizen. In other words, the form immediately connected with the reproduction of natural life is the bourgeoís. He competes on the market, works and earns in order to reproduce himself as a living being. However, at this point, the natural side of reproduction, the base life that simply seeks to satisfy its needs, is also the reproduction of man

\textsuperscript{405} Marcuse points out that life, in all its developments, does not cease or become something else. Instead, all its developments emerge from the capacity of life as such. “When the merely ‘formal Life’ of nature is contrasted with true Life as Spirit, one must note a double meaning here: ‘in-itself’ nature is already Spirit, for it is a moment of the processual totality of Spirit and indeed the moment of its true otherness. The juxtaposition of nature and Spirit then is not that of two substances. Both are modes of Life, and ‘Life as Spirit’ represents only the completion and fulfilment of that Life toward which nature is directed in-itself.’” However, as I already showed in the first chapter, although nature is Spirit in its yet uncompleted form, when Spirit does develop itself from nature, its natural side does not disappear. Instead, it persists in its non-sublated form. Spirit confronts nature not only as its “past form” but also as an excess of violence, which it cannot sublate. Marcuse, H. (1987): Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. p. 225.

\textsuperscript{406} “Life, as the totality of ends, has a right in opposition to abstract right. If, for example, it can be preserved by stealing a loaf, this constitutes an infringement of someone’s property, but it would be wrong to regard such an action as common theft. If someone whose life is in danger were not allowed to take measures to save himself, he would be destined to forfeit all his rights; and since he would be deprived of life, his entire freedom would be negated.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 155.

\textsuperscript{407} “Whatever is confined within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts go beyond its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by something else, and this uprooting entails its death.” Biological life is simple repetition; an organism feeds itself and drinks only to repeat itself as this organism. Hegel, G. W. F. (1977): Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 51.
as such. There is no such thing as a “pure” bourgeois because he is always already a man living in the Sittlichkeit. As shown in the first chapter, the contingency of natural life is unified with necessity of spiritual life: natural needs, drives and so on, are always already included in the trajectory toward spiritual forms of organization. The natural side of life, consequently, is subject to totalization. As a result of this, when the bourgeois reproduces himself as a natural living being, he also reproduces himself as man in totality, because he reproduces his own political form that conditions him as a bourgeois.

The natural satisfaction of needs, as shown in the second chapter, takes the form of property. Property signifies the recognition of the individual will in relation to a thing. This recognition immediately introduces a constitutive moment of freedom into the Sittlichkeit.\textsuperscript{408} By using and consuming things, the bourgeois satisfies needs as a living organism. On the other hand, using things is always a matter of using them as man in the world.\textsuperscript{409} The relationship to an external object constitutes merely possession. Property, as opposed to this, arises as the affirmation of the will in its relationship to an external object as well as the recognition of the will from the side of other wills. I do not only use the thing in its immediacy as a living being. Instead, I can also trade or relinquish it. This is something serfs or slaves could not do.\textsuperscript{410} I use the thing in order to reproduce myself as man in totality and foremost in my determination of the citizen, in which all other determinations find their expression. As a result, natural life should never appear

\textsuperscript{408} “To have even external power over something constitutes possession, just as the particular circumstance that I make something my own out of natural need, drive, and arbitrary will is the particular interest of possession. But the circumstance that I, as free will, am an object [gegenständlich] to myself in what I possess and only become an actual will by this means constitutes the genuine and rightful element in possession, the determination of property.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 76 - 77.

\textsuperscript{409} This already follows form Hegel’s use of the concept of practice. Life within the civil society already presupposes human production and human form of satisfaction of needs. However, bourgeois cannot be abstracted from his citizen-form. One could argue that the two sides of the bourgeois, the one where he emerges as man (in opposition to animals) by working, multiplying his needs and creating mutual dependence, and the other where he dissolves the Sittlichkeit, are predicated on his relationship to his own citizen-form. What makes this dissolving and self-destructive character of the bourgeois productive is the fact that it transcends the form of abstract mutual dependence and becomes sublated in the State. Consequently, what appears as the result - the citizen, is in fact the condition of all other determinations of man. Abstraced from his citizen-form, the bourgeois disintegrates, as is the case with all other determinations of man. \textit{Ibid.} pp. 231 - 232.

\textsuperscript{410} What constitutes property is also the capacity to relinquish things. Serfs or slaves were in this regard not free, because they were bound to things. Hegel, G. W. F. (1989): Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, in: Werke, Bd. 7. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. p. 141.
as such within the Sittlichkeit, because it always already appears as spiritual life. An object should not dominate me in the sense that I use the thing but cannot relinquish it, nor should (what follows directly from the first point) the thing be used in its immediate form as something satisfying a natural need. Spiritual life should be unconditioned by the “thingness” of things, and dialectically this “thingness” should remain an element of relative exteriority. However, this is not the case.

Natural life in the form of the “pure” bourgeois does appear in the Sittlichkeit. Hegel does not relegate this element to relative exteriority, but extends a concept to both the form of subjectivity in which the person is reduced to a living organism that merely satisfies its natural needs – the rabble [der Pöbel]\(^{411}\) - and to subjectivity in which the person is partially bound to external objects – the worker.\(^{412}\) Both the rabble and the worker represent the reduction of human beings to a level of reproduction that does not satisfy the full spectrum of spiritual needs, but signifies a reversal to a lower, naturally conditioned level of needs.

The development of the rabble and the collapse of the division between natural and spiritual life (excess of absolute in relation to relative exteriority) takes place as something immanent to the Sittlichkeit itself.\(^{413}\) In other words, natural contingency in the form of absolute exteriority appears not as an external element, but as something that emerges from within the Sittlichkeit.\(^{414}\) At the same time, this does not take place only within the Sittlichkeit, but also beyond its border. As shown in the first part of this chapter, the civil-society has a built-in tendency to break away from the confines of its own Sittlichkeit, driven by the need to find new populations which it could subject to the laws of the market and in this way create demand for surplus. This process


\(^{412}\) The worker externalizes labour which is his property. At the same time, labour appears as something to which he is tied to. Ibid.

\(^{413}\) “When the activity of civil society is unrestricted, it is occupied internally with expanding its population and industry. - On the one hand, as the association [Zusammenhang] of human beings through their needs is universalized, and with it the ways in which means of satisfying these needs are devised and made available, the accumulation of wealth increases; for the greatest profit is derived from this twofold universality. But on the other hand, the specialization [Vereinzelung] and limitation of particular work also increase, as do likewise the dependence and want of the class which is tied to such work; this in turn leads to an inability to feel and enjoy the wider freedoms, and particularly the spiritual advantages, of civil society.” Ibid.

\(^{414}\) Although the reversal to the lower level of needs leads to higher levels of contingency, this does not mean that the Sittlichkeit is still conditioned by nature from the outside. Rather, the mechanism of the Sittlichkeit itself leads to the development of the rabble. This can be seen, for example, in the fact that Hegel regards “lowest level of subsistence” as historically conditioned. Ibid.
reproduces the conditions of pauperization that are found in the host *Sittlichkeit*. On both fronts, therefore, the civil society tends to dissolve the *Sittlichkeit*. On the one hand, it leads to contingency (absolute exteriority) *within* by extracting the “pure” *bourgeois* in the form of the rabble and worker from the totality of man, and on the other, it drives the citizen *outside* the borders of the host *Sittlichkeit* to conquer and colonize new territories and peoples. Places of relative exteriority, such as India and China, the remnants of world-historical Spirit, become re-activated in order to play a constitutive role in the self-perpetuation of the modern *Sittlichkeit*. Therefore, the “pure” *bourgeois* as the natural life-form appears on both sides: the rabble and the worker on the inside; the colonizer, the colonized and the slave on the outside. Hegel’s solution to this dissolution of the *Sittlichkeit* on both fronts is the State or, in other words, the permanent reconstitution of the totality of spiritual life. The State offers man on the inside the possibility to realize his potentials to the full (unconstrained by any pre-established substantial bondage), it offers the rabble the possibility of exiting its status, since it is not bound by any social bondage to its place.\(^{415}\) On the outside, Hegel argues, the colonies should be given state-hood and populations subjected to pre-established substantial bondage released.\(^{416}\)

Therefore, the break-away of the *bourgeois* from the *Sittlichkeit* is counter-acted by the State on both fronts. The State reconstitutes the *Sittlichkeit* by preventing disorganization both on the inside and the outside. The question, however, is not how does *Sittlichkeit* reconstitute itself but why does this happen in the first place? If the *bourgeois* is the instance in which not only natural life, but life as the totality of purposes [*Gesamtheit der Zwecke*] is reproduced, why does this drive to exit the *Sittlichkeit* in which the State is found appear? What drives the *bourgeois* into poverty, on the one hand, reproducing a form of absolute exteriority within the

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\(^{415}\) Rabble is not made by poverty, but by a specific attitude that emerges from poverty and the inability to satisfy needs. The rabble emerges from the contradiction between the human nature in the *Sittlichkeit* and the inability to realize this nature. It appears when a specific consciousness arises from the condition of poverty. “Poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc.” In relation to poverty the State is placed in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, if it attempts to ensure work for the rabble it would invade the civil society, placing its principle of individual freedom in danger. On the other hand, if it attempts to intervene by social aid it would rob the individual of freedom by making it dependent on itself. What the State offers the rabble is the very idea of generality, the political citizen-form and change in the disposition — not so much the change in the material conditions. *Ibid.* p. 267.

\(^{416}\) “The liberation of colonies itself proves to be of the greatest advantage to the mother state, just as the emancipation of slaves is of the greatest advantage to the master.” *Ibid.* p. 269.
State, and into colonies and new markets, on the other hand, converting world-historical remains of relative exteriority into active and constitutive forms of absolute exteriority?

The most immediate answer to this question is the freedom of the individual. To ensure the full spectrum of freedom, the State must ensure the protection of that sphere of freedom in which the principle of individuality is reproduced. Therefore, the protection of the principle of individuality leads to the inability of the State to prevent colonization, slavery, pauperization, imperialism, and so on. If it acts in any way, it places the principle of freedom in danger. Its inactivity, however, leads to the same results. Therefore, the more precise question is not only why the break-away from the Sittlichkeit takes place, but why is the State as the realization of freedom incapacitated to counter this process.

The answer to this question, from Deleuze’s point of view, lies in the difference between the reproduction of subjectivity and the reproduction of the conditions of subjectivity. What the Sittlichkeit reproduces in all its aspects is neither the needs of natural life nor the transformation of these needs through historical practice. Instead, it reproduces capital as the precondition of the way needs themselves are produced. Because the reproduction of man can be achieved only through the reproduction of the axiomatic, the needs one reproduces are constantly in flux, permanently produced anew and abolished. The emergence of new needs, however, does not follow the historical pattern of practice since it is bound to becoming. The subject does not consciously produce a new need within itself, introducing something it never had and never experienced. On the contrary, the need finds the subject. The need is not a matter of subjectivity that consciously establishes its practical relationship to the object, but the result of that subjectivity itself emerging through the assemblage of things and organisms (and their disorganization, i.e. change that allows for the construction of a novel code). This leads back to the problem of difference between the two concepts of practice. Practice is not only purposive as Hegel argues, it is not a matter of acting in accord with a purpose, be that either on the individual level or the level of the general will. Practice is also not a matter of permanent re-establishment of purposiveness within the State through reterritorialization. Rather, practice emerges as a formation of assemblages, in becoming that precedes the differentiation between the historical and natural.

Deleuze’s main argument here is that the division between natural life that represents flat repetition of the organism negating matter only to repeat itself, on the one hand, and spiritual life grounded in consciousness which is charged with difference, on the other, leaves no room for the emergence of difference that would at the same time be contingent and consequential. By consuming objects, life does not differentiate itself because it does not produce any novelty
or difference. Natural life amounts to dead repetition (immovable identity). By using and exchanging things to reproduce itself as man, life permanently produces difference, but one sanctioned by identity, i.e. difference permanently reterritorialized upon the State-form. When the working of the Sittlichkeit leads to life of the bourgeois appearing outside of its immanent citizen-form, then this surplus of difference must be accounted for. Hegel does not do the obvious, he does not explain lack within the Sittlichkeit as natural because this would be a recognition of the necessity of raw, natural violence (excess of absolute contingency) in the Sittlichkeit. But he also does not account for this lack properly\textsuperscript{417}; instead, he makes a jump toward the State, skipping dialectical exposition that would convert this lack into positive political determination.\textsuperscript{418} The citizen-form simply establishes the possibility for a particular person to abolish his or her individual lack, but not the substantial place of the lack itself.

In Deleuze’s account of universal history, lack is not something that appears when an attempt at reterritorialization fails. Instead, it appears as a result of social conditioning of desiring-production. Lack appears precisely at the point where some form of codification and territorialization takes place. The reason is the fact that it was always the surplus of difference that created the conditions for political practice to emerge (for anti-production to establish itself). In this regard, the presupposition of the substantial existence of the lack leads to the inability to explain the surplus of difference in the form of a surplus in subjectivity (needs), on the one hand, and surplus of objectivities (products of capitalist production), on the other. The inability of these two sides to “meet” and mediate each other is contained in the investment of desire to reproduce capital. However, capital is not a practice which is conditioned only by consciousness; it is not purposive in the sense that it seeks to perpetuate the world and the sphere of spiritual life. Instead, the condition of consciousness appears always after the fact, in the attempt to return the investment to its zero position of subjectivity. The subject of

\textsuperscript{417} “This shows that, despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy enough - i.e. its own distinct resources are not sufficient - to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble.” Ibid. p. 267.

\textsuperscript{418} Frank Ruda points out that Hegel views the rabble as something which “makes itself”. As mentioned above, the rabble is not an automatic result of poverty, but of the subjective attitude (disposition), which is coupled with poverty. One could then argue that only the rabble is responsible for being rabble. However, this is paradoxical, since the rabble has no free will. Its consciousness is bound to the position of poverty. One can then see how this logic leads to Marx’s later inversion of the relationship between material conditions and consciousness. Ruda, F. (2011): Hegel’s Rabble: An Investigation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. New York and London: Continuum. pp. 114, 167.
consciousness can only re-inscribe itself into a process which is not of its doing anymore. Spirit is production in which there is a division between natural and spiritual life, because this division emerges precisely when one burdens life with a conditioned surplus (a demand on life that institutes debt), which when fails to become realized in its general form (e.g. “capital”, “our nation”, “the people”, “our values”) leads to “natural life”. But this natural life is not natural, it is a result of spiritual life itself attempting to posit identity over difference by establishing a legitimate framework of differentiation in the law.

According to Deleuze, life itself expresses surplus. It functions always as an assemblage, therefore, it will always go beyond totalization. It proliferates difference not only on the side

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419 For example, the myth of the “wealth-creator” is one such myth where an assemblage of human beings, things, machines, and so on, are given a personified and deified symbol. Another myth is when processes of learning, experiences, ideas, failures, and encounters, lead to something like a bridge or a tower, but then become condensed into the subject. This is also true on any level of life. For example, when a person decides to go someplace and plans a route, then executes the plan, one could say that a conscious decision was made that led to action. In this regard, little can be contested. However, what is left out are those elements that influenced the decision but that are not traceable to a sovereign decision (e.g. the person choses randomly a route), as well as little things happening on the way that do not come into the framework of the plan because they weren’t planned to begin with (e.g. the person skipped a pond or some noise caught his attention), and the like. Although the conscious decision was there and everything went according to the plan (being reterritorialized onto the subject), multiple contingent elements arose that were not part of the original plan and that would obstruct the idea of self-referential subjectivity. These contingent elements cannot merely become synthetized with necessity as in Hegel, because they can also lead to consequences that obstruct the reproduction of law. Capitalism is a system where precisely these elements come into play and where contingencies become central for productive activity. Risk, unexpected events, novelty, possibility of sickness, and so on, are relevant for capital reproduction. For example, health insurance is a kind of conditioning of contingency to return profit – the disorganization of the human body becomes integrated into reproduction, which is then re-inscribed into the model of subjectivity in the form of capital.

420 The necessary and constitutive role of surplus is one of the central presuppositions of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. This presupposition rejects the idea of scarcity of resources as the central axiom of capitalist economic science. What the axiom of scarcity of resources does not think, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is what scarcity is: how does it come about, in relation to what is it a scarcity, and how do human actions and ways of thought and communication stand in relation to the notion of scarcity? Another important question is: In relation to what does a thing become a resource? Lack, poverty and dispossession in capitalism are predicated on the idea of substantial scarcity. According to Deleuze and Guattari, this capitalist model of thought fails to account for its own tendency to produce not only surplus in relation to existing scarcity, but to invent new resources, which then not only partially satisfy existing scarcities, but also circumvent the existing pair of “scarcity – resource” and establish new ones. Lack presupposes the existing historical framework of existence, because scarcity represents not only lack in relation to existing needs but also lack in relation to unproduced and undiscovered forms of energy,
of things, but also on the side of the subject. This is why when it becomes released from codes, the subject turns to nomadism. If this were not the case, civil society in its contemporary form could not be accounted for. Whereas Hegel still spoke of bürgerliche Gesellschaft (in the form of Arbeitsgesellschaft), today we speak of Zivilgesellschaft, as a sphere charged with subjectivities beyond the confines of mere citizenship where the bourgeois permanently diverges from the reproduction of its citizen-form. This nomadism transformed the civil society of work into a broader spectrum of social events not reducible to either the bourgeois or the citizen as such.

Consequently, the differentiation between spiritual and natural life, according to Deleuze, completely misses the concept of life, because practice as productive activity of life becomes reduced to consciousness. This equation does not account for one essential feature of life as desiring-production: production occurs not only toward consciousness or under its command but permanently and under all conditions. It stagnates only when consciousness attempts to constrain the unconscious. Desiring-production accounts for the production of the real. This is why the condition of production is not the abolishment of nature and the abandonment of the dumb repetition of the body in order to enter the sphere of law, language, meaning, State-power and Spirit, where a world of differentiation would open up. This is not the case because Nature produces from the outset. For Deleuze, practice is not the transformation of nature, it is Nature. The body without organs is a body that produces difference on account of its own


Hegel already acknowledged the immanence of change within the sphere of emerging civil society, i.e. change as something substantive to it. However, he contained this change on the side of things, making any modification within the subject an accidental form. This was a result of the fact that although he perceived change as substantive, the particular forms of things produced by this change were in his view contingent and inconsequential. “Yet this multiplicity creates fashion, mutability, freedom in the use of forms. These things—the cut of clothing, style of furniture—are not permanent. Their change is essential and rational, far more rational than staying with one fashion and wanting to assert something as fixed in such individual forms. The beautiful is subject to no fashion,—but here there is no free beauty, only a charming beauty (eine reizende Schönheit) which is the adornment of another person and relates itself to [yet] another, a beauty aimed at arousing drive, desire, and which thus has a contingency to it” Hegel, G. W. F. (1986): Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805 – 06) with commentary. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. p. 139.

The concept of schizophrenia in the titles of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus refers primarily to a mode of encountering the world and is only as such derived from the clinical experience. It signifies a process of destruction of the dualism between “nature” and “man” as well as the accompanying process of the loss of
nature and not because of its inclusion in the law. The capacity of the body to act and be acted upon cannot become reduced to the framework of sanctioned practice in the law. The body will always be affected in ways that cannot be re-inscribed into either the property form or the citizen-form. As shown in the first chapter, a body engenders an event by default; thoughts, dreams, inspirations, encounters, ideas, and so on, are all workings of materiality that permanently engenders events and through these itself. If this relationship were conditioned by lack posited by Spirit, then no new need could emerge. Production would be conditioned by lack and by the representation determined by lack. The transformation of needs, however, can be explained only on the condition of an assemblage. Something alive permanently “secretes” difference; it is practical before it is conscious because it is alive. Life, therefore, is neither the natural life of satisfaction of needs nor spiritual life as abolition of nature that opens a differential world, but life as permanent production of surplus beyond the division of nature and society.

3. Immanence as judgment and life

Practice as “productive activity in general” effectuates difference. Practice, however, can produce either by establishing a historically conditioned framework of differentiation in the form of the Sittlichkeit, or as a natural power prior to the differentiation between nature as self-identical repetition and Spirit as differential practice. Practice is in both cases a living practice, it is an activity of life. It is either the power of natural life that transforms itself through practice into spiritual life, or the power of life as pure affirmation of difference. Political practice releases this life. This practice is emancipatory in relation to life. In both Hegel’s and Deleuze’s accounts, politics releases life as a practical activity. Hegel views political practice as the emancipation of life from natural conditions (which is at the same time a process of

meaning, which releases desire from pre-determined objectivities and allows it to become mobile. Capitalism is primarily a schizophrenic system; however, one which relies on paranoia and desire’s fixation on certain forms of territoriality (e.g. land, people, individual, family, nation, group, company, etc.). Cf. “The image of thought of the schizophrenic is one that treats nature as a process of production, and this image of thought causes the schizophrenic to run into her own unique set of problems, not encountered by non-schizophrenics. By treating nature as a process of production, the schizophrenic challenges the normal assumption that production is something that is carried out upon nature by man.” Watkins, Lee (2010): Hegel after Deleuze and Guattari: Freedom in Philosophy and the State. Available online at: [http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/51562]. pp. 32 – 33. (Last accessed on: 01. 02. 2016.)
emancipation of politics itself) and its emancipation into the law. Through politics, life becomes unbound from natural repetition and included into the totality of the Sittlichkeit. Politics ensures that this totality does not collapse into itself and in this way prevents life from returning to its natural form. Life is lived in the law, never in immediacy. As lived in the law it appears as life of the family man, of the bourgeois, and finally, as life of the political being where the totality of life is free from all particular determinations but also - precisely through this - free for all of them. In Deleuze’s view, the opposite is true. Political practice releases life, but it does this against the existing framework of territoriality. Politics releases life as an assemblage, i.e. as immediate life prior to the work of the negative.

In both cases, by releasing life political practice establishes immanence. What Deleuze says of immanence can very well be applied to Hegel as well: “We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing more.” However, the context in which this is uttered must be observed. According to Deleuze, immanence is absolute because life is not subjected to a pre-given framework of territorialisation. Instead, life is released as pure affirmation beyond any institution of transcendence (a form to be observed in production). In Hegel, immanence is in law and therefore necessarily “draws” life out of its immediacy, taking away its natural form in order to convert it into spiritual life.

Immanence is the absolute; it is absoluted from exteriority either in the sense that it defeats natural conditions and converts them into State-power or that it releases natural power over the social conditions placed on desire. Immanence defeats exteriority by converting it into a relative one. As a judgment of being, immanence is eminently an ontological category. However, in both Hegel’s and Deleuze’s cases, the ontological refers not to the being as being, but to being in its becoming and power of differentiation. Life is either placed under judgment in order to be lived in law or releases itself from the “Judgment of God” by its own power of differentiation. I judge by being practical, because through my purposive action, which assigns specific values, codes, and so on, I establish the coordinates of my world. However, through my life I also permanently dissolve, abolish and displace that which has been “judged”. The fact that practice establishes immanence carries the highest importance for the subjectivity that is presupposed in practice. In the first chapter I showed that, for Hegel, one of the most important elements of historical development is the internalization of the capacity to judge, to identify with the law, and consequently, not to fear the power beyond me but know it as my

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own emancipated life. As a result, the citizen can sacrifice its individual life for the State, knowing its death will nurture its spiritual life. Fear becomes abolished by integrating all exteriority into the State-form. Death becomes immanent to life; the fear of death becomes the inner work of the negative. “But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it.”

Deleuze attacks this point as the crux of the problem. According to Deleuze, the despot repressed in terror. State is in essence the power of terror. In Deleuze’s view, death places life under the conditions of judgment, it makes life internalize its own contingent product as a precondition of life. However, Deleuze and Guattari are not antagonistic to death as such – death and life cannot be dissociated from one another. Death is merely another name for anti-production and desire as such cannot produce without at the same time blocking and cutting up flows – otherwise nothing would emerge from it. However, on the level of social organization, death or anti-production is historically mobilized against life. For example, in despotism, death towers from above, as a static instance of power that constrains life. As opposed to this, in capitalism death or anti-production becomes internalized. Negativity as the power of judgment begins to internally structure life in a pre-determined way – giving and subtracting being according to the model of negation. This is the meaning of the sentence that Hegel “inscribed death in life”. Life as desiring-production becomes internally conditioned by a feeling of debt, i.e. lack in its released, procesual form – such as in Hegel’s dialectics. Whereas for Hegel

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427 John Russon writes on the relationship of desiring-production and Spirit: “Desire, in other words, is inherently defined by answerability to the other and thus by the immanent demand that its own self-certainty be reconciled to the self-certainty of the other. Desire, then, is not satisfactory to itself in its immediacy, but immanently projects for itself a standard to which it must answer by transforming itself: desire itself has a natural trajectory of growth toward a reconciled experience of inter-subjectivity, or what Hegel calls ‘mutual recognition’ or ‘Spirit’ (Geist), which is itself an experience of shared, objective world. [...] What is lacking in Deleuze and Guattari, though, is the acknowledgment that desire implicates us in the domain of inter-subjective conflict and thereby inaugurates the dialectics of inter-subjective recognition.” This is correct insofar as for Hegel of the Philosophy of Right, there is no mutual recognition that can survive in the world without taking on the State-form. Russon, J. (2013): Desiring-production and Spirit: On Anti-Oedipus and German Idealism, in: Hegel and Deleuze:
political practice reproduces the State-form because this model encompasses the worldly power of negativity, according to Deleuze, this form of negativity serves the reproduction and accumulation of capital. Because practice has the form of the axiomatic, whatever it produces nolens volens reproduces capital. The drive to reproduce capital is not terror in the face of the despotic demand to repay the debt. Deleuze and Hegel agree on this point—the modern State does not function through terror. I do not fear for my life in the face of the despot, because my desire is not his, and I do not lack in relation to his lack. However, according to Deleuze, with the fall of the despot the law continues to function as the anti-producing body without organs by inhabiting the field of production itself. Life becomes permeated by death, of fear of life itself, and of disorganization that cannot be contained through reterritorialization. Fear becomes released from the image of the despot and turns nomadic in the form anxiety.

“At the same time that death is decoded, it loses its relationship with a model and an experience, and becomes an instinct; that is, it effuses in the immanent system where each act of production is inextricably linked to the process of antiproduction as capital. There where the codes are undone, the death instinct lays hold of the repressive apparatus and begins to direct the circulation of the libido. A mortuary axiomatic. One might then believe in liberated desires, but ones that, like cadavers, feed on images. Death is not desired, but what is desired is dead, already dead: images.”

The desired object is not death as such—i.e. the power which is linked with life and which gives life the possibility of perpetuating itself. Death is the power of life to end something, to put an end to X and open the potential for life to start anew. This function of death however becomes closed off when life becomes subjected to that which is “already dead”, i.e. X which is held in perpetuity, a corpse like existence where death internally determines production, instead of production utilizing death as a way to liberate itself. The result of death inhibiting production is fear.

“Desire then becomes this abject fear of lacking something. But it should be noted that this is not a phrase uttered by the poor or the dispossessed. On the contrary, such people know that they are close to grass, almost akin to it, and that desire ‘needs’ very few things—not those leftovers that chance to come their way, but the very things that are continually taken from them—and that what is missing is not things a subject feels the lack of somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the

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Ibid. p. 337.
objectivity of man, the objective being of man, for whom to desire is to produce, to produce within the realm of the real.”

Whereas for Hegel, the State serves as an instance where the subject becomes emancipated from fear, for Deleuze the modern, de-coded State is precisely what ensures that the subject is motivated by “natural violence” to exit into the market and through its productive activity reproduce capital. The State does not impose coded demands, nor does it instil fear, instead it serves to perpetuate the danger of “falling back” into natural violence – the fear of becoming less than that which one owns oneself – fear of becoming an animal, the rabble. The demand of the State to act and think like a modern man, an educated, moral individual, a self-interested bourgeois and a citizen, presupposes the danger of losing all the central features that define precisely these categories – a fear which is not a result of the danger of direct application of violence, but of violence for which seemingly no one is responsible, a violence of one’s own failure.

Therefore, the element of anti-production in modern society is neither lack in relation to a given code nor lack in the desire of the despot, but lack itself that is permanently re-invented, reproduced and re-inscribed. I lack in relation to my dreams, my hopes, the community, my own citizen-form, my own productive and unrealized powers, my history, my family, as well as the ideals and expectations I place on myself. I am permanently in danger of losing that which is integral to my own identity, of falling short in the face of debt/guilt that serves to hold both my “private” personality and society together. Life is lived in permanent fear of betraying itself. However, this identity one is in danger of losing, is not the coded connection to the world in relation to which one lacks specific products, but identity that is axiomatic - in other words, malleable, nomadic and predicated on reterritorialization. I am in fear of losing my very productive capacity as such, not the static, coded product that conditions it (e.g. I lack my own form of capital: money, education, opportunity, skills, transformability, adaptability and so on, through which I lack the world, the sense of being a man).

429 “This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs (manque) amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy.” Ibid. pp. 27 – 28.

430 According to Deleuze, the State-form burdens life with a necessary lack that conditions it to produce for the represented State-form. But there is no lack in life, only surplus. Hegel interestingly speaks in these terms of the State: “The state is not a work of art; it exists in the world, and hence in the sphere of arbitrariness, contingency, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many respects. But the ugliest man, the criminal, the invalid, or the cripple is still a living human being; the affirmative aspect - life - survives [besteht] in spite of such deficiencies,
The argument of overcoming fear is an argument of immanence because it concerns the constitution of political subjectivity: that of the citizen, on the one hand, and that of the nomad, on the other. As political *subjectification* and *de-subjectification*, respectively, these two figures presuppose the abolishment of transcendence as the source of repression. Both philosophers agree on the notion of *politics as practice of those who do not fear*. The problem is that both fail, from each other’s perspectives, to achieve that criterion of practice. In Hegel’s view, fear loses significance once the subject knows itself and knows natural violence as something relative. According to Deleuze, the very subject-form, the form of territorialization, fails to capture life and makes it indebted, re-instituting fear in this way. That the abolishment of transcendence in the form of the despot established only the immanence of capital, is Deleuze’s main argument that fear continues to ground repression.\(^\text{431}\)

### 4. Politics of passions

Deleuze’s argument that fear in the form of anxiety still conditions politics does not presuppose only a fear of death, but fear of life that cannot be reterritorialized onto the State-form. This means that death has already won by internally guiding life. In opposition to Hegel, who views this internalization as the condition for the emergence of the modern ethical attitude and it is with this affirmative aspect that we are here concerned“. Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 279.

\(^{431}\) Fear works together with debt. The axiomatic postulates a specific image of subjectivity to be achieved. It “burdens” life by instituting lack, not only in the sense that there is lack of bread but also in the sense that in this “basic” lack, the citizen-form, the man, the hard-working father, the responsible citizen, the efficient element in our economy, and so on, is reproduced. Lack of bread means nothing in itself. Lack of specific objectivities and subjectivities that are seen as essential to life and directly responsible for productive power of life is what is more at stake. However, because lack is the driving force behind production, it must always be reproduced, re-activated and re-introduced. It is not enough to produce bread, it is necessary to produce the whole, what Deleuze calls “death-cult” around it: the nation, the inherent values, the principles of our community, and so on. The fear of losing this “burden”, the fear of nomadism and life, is the source of fascism. This is why fascism, for Deleuze, signifies fear, the source of which is not always easy to pin-point. Quoting a film-maker, Deleuze writes “perhaps fascism […] is the driving force behind a society where social problems are solved, but where the question of anxiety is merely stifled.” Fear, sad passions, anxiety, hate and loathing, are the work of the tyrant, but all of these open the door to the priest who uses this fertile ground to institute debt. These values promulgated through debt are seen as pre-condition of life and the fear of losing them simply accentuates the work of the tyrant. Fear and debt condition each other in a circular fashion. These figures of fear and debt, tyrant and priest, are what Deleuze credits Spinoza and Nietzsche, respectively, for discovering. Deleuze, G. (2007): *The Rich Jew*, in: *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975 – 1995*. New York: Semiotext(e). p. 13.
in the form of the political disposition [politische Gesinnung], Deleuze views this process as the failure of life. Death, in the form of an internalized death-instinct, becomes immanent to life.\textsuperscript{432} Desiring-production invests a home, a world, an identity; it produces these as history and conditions future upon this history. But because desire produces surplus, something nomadic appears and announces war to the world of man. This knowledge of something foreign beyond the border is the source of fear.\textsuperscript{433} Both Hegel’s and Deleuze’s conceptions of fear and its relation to life attempt to pin-point the source of practice. Is practice a result of fear, of death, or is it something emanating from life itself?

At the beginning of the first chapter it was shown that, in Hegel’s view, fear conditions early man. Early man views nature as a foreign and detached power beyond him. Through practical activity nature slowly re-emerges as a world. Fear becomes eradicated giving way to principles of social cohesion based on freedom. This dialectic leads to the establishment of the modern State, in which man is free from fear. For Hegel, the investment of the subject into its productive capacity is the very thing that releases the subject from otherness that appears foreign and obstructive. In the modern State this investment of the subject into its productive power takes on the form of \textit{interest}. Interest is an investment of the subject in its own practical

\textsuperscript{432} As I will show in the third chapter, there is a positive account of death in Deleuze and Guattari, specifically the idea of death as anti-producton in service of life.

\textsuperscript{433} Deleuze and Guattari consider deterritorialization and nomadisation a violent event. It is the presence of \textit{natural} violence. But this violence stems from the previous exclusion of the nomadic element, not from the violent character of the nomad itself. Therefore, they reject any form of practices that would include a struggle based on violence. The reason is that such a struggle (\textit{e.g.} terrorism) would simply incite more terror, the element on which the State feeds. Terror drives the citizen into the hands of the State, it generates fascism and represents the \textit{par excellence} tool of the State. In this regard, to utilize terror means to emulate the State and attempt State-violence. It creates the same conditions of exclusion and inability for political practice that the nation-state represents through its mere existence. Terrorism appears as a result of the inability of the nation-state to open space for political practice (because of countless reason: converting into capital form, dividing citizens and non-citizens, excluding its citizens, erecting “national” borders, expanding itself into untapped populations through market and dictatorships, confining populations to "their" nation-states, capturing minority to specific forms of under-development for investment of capital, marginalizing its own minorities, and so on). All these actions lead to fear, stupidity, prejudice, racism, and so on, penetrating the heart of minority, making it susceptible to the dream of their own State. Terror is a form of resistance to this simultaneous and permanent creation of outer and inner new grounds for ever-fresh phases of accumulation. However as a form of resistance it that tends to accelerate this process because it strengthens the State-form. Fear “naturally” leads to the reproduction of the State-form, therefore, the application of terror represents for Deleuze and Guattari the same thing Benjamin saw in fascism: a symptom of a failed revolution. Cf. Dosse, François (2010): \textit{Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives}. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 206, 295.
capacity, which is mediated by the State-form. As shown, politics in the modern State has to do primarily with the mediation of interests. However, what is mediated and what becomes an interest is the *passion* as the life-essence of the subject. Passions appeared as the driving force behind the practical transformation of nature into an objective world. Nothing great emerged without passions. This is not true only historically, but also in the present, as a process repeating itself within the *Sittlichkeit*. The process of educating [*Bildung*] a citizen presupposes the formation of a subjective will by abandoning “the immediacy of desire as well as the subjective vanity of feeling [*Empfindung*] and the arbitrariness of caprice.”

This takes place through words, ideas and opinions that mediate knowledge, through education in the family, as well as in the competitive market that sharpens the interests of the subject. However, the result is not only the information or a particular interest, but the “disposition”, the character and the quality of senses, a unison of all human powers – *political disposition*.

“The political *disposition*, i.e. *patriotism* in general, is certainty based on *truth* (whereas merely subjective certainty does not originate in *truth*, but is only opinion) and a volition which has become *habitual*. As such, it is merely a consequence of the institutions within the state, a consequence in which rationality is *actually* present, just as rationality receives its practical application through action in conformity with the state's institutions. - This disposition is in general one of *trust* (which may pass over into more or less educated insight), or the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case, the state), and in the latter's relation to me as an individual [*als Einzelnen*]. As a result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my consciousness of this, I am free.”

Passions do not become abandoned in the modern State. Instead, they become *sublated* and mobilized as an immanent power of the *Sittlichkeit*. They now stand under a disposition to respond in a certain way toward the universal will contained in the law. I do not fear this otherness but know it as myself, I act instinctively to protect it and there is an immediate response when the State is in danger (I am, for example, disgusted or disappointed by incidences of corruption in the government). The subject has a tendency to think and reason in a specific way, in the same way that it has a tendency to feel, emotionally respond and instinctively react to specific events. I can be passionate about whatever thing I lose myself in, but I am

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436 *Political disposition* presupposes the capacity to identify with the State. As a capacity, however, *political disposition* has its roots in morality. It signifies the *sublation* of morality into a higher-order form of social organization of man. This *sublation* of morality in a capacity to identify with the State has been a subject of
passionate in such a way that I know that the realization of the relationship between me and the thing takes place within the confines of the State. Passions become constitutive for an interest and the world-historical passions that established States do not disappear, but turn into subjective interest that are mediated by the objective purpose in which this interest can reappear and re-affirm itself. Political practice as mediation of interests represents a practice through which the subject realizes its purposes, its interests and passions as investments of the totality of its life before the law and under the State.

“However, drive and passion is nothing else than the vitality of the subject, according to which it exists in its purpose and its realization. The ethical concerns the content, which as such is something universal and inactive and which finds its activation in the subject. The immanence of the content in the subject is the interest and when it consumes the subject, the passion. [Author’s translation]”

Critique. Ludwig Siep, for example, asks the question, what does sublation of morality into Sittlichkeit mean? Does it mean that individual capacity for morality becomes abolished, that it disappears into a generalized capacity to act in accordance with State-law? He rejects such an interpretation (proposed by Ernst Tugendhat). This interpretation does disservice to Hegel's concept of Aufhebung - it ignores the constitutive element of preservation of the object of sublation. Before morality and citoyen ever come into opposition or conflict, they stand in a relationship of totality. Modern citizen cannot possess political disposition without having the prerequisite individual moral capacity, the capacity to act as a self-interested, responsible, rationally-oriented human being. Without this individualist capacity to recognize one's own interests and to act according to conscience, the State becomes alienated and despotic. At the same time, without the integration into the general will, the individual moral capacity remains at the level of being sublated into civil society, as a result of which, it degenerates into a self-preservation drive without regard for consequences. This leads to the dissolution of the civil society and the abolishment of the community. However, Siep also shows that the limits of Hegel's concept of Aufhebung become revealed precisely in the relationship between morality and political disposition. As shown, the idea of totality of the moral subject and citoyen must presuppose the primacy of the State and its prerogative to circumvent and suspend the individual in order to reconstitute itself. This prerogative in turn is presupposed by the disorganizing character of bourgeois who exceeds the confines of the State. The relationship between the two is not so much a sublated totality then, but a kind of a pre-established harmony. The totality is not sufficiently unified, it relies on the fact that the moral subject and the citizen will remain amiable to each other and that the contradictions between the two will not go out of hand. Siep, L. (1982): Was heisst: "Aufhebung der Moralität in Sittlichkeit" in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie?, in: Hegel-Studien, Bd. 17. Bonn: Bouvier. p. 95.

Life that is released in political practice is not life consumed by fear, but life consumed by interests. This is the life of the citizen. The idea that passions, as a motor of history, forge the structure of human society, because “nothing great in the World has been accomplished without passion [Author’s translation], extends to the functioning of the modern State itself, in the form of: “Nothing can be achieved without an interest”. Passions, therefore, as the life-essence of the subject, represent the driving force behind practice. However, these passions appear as a force of practice only when they appear as interests, i.e. a form of passion constituted by the life in the State.

Deleuze agrees in part with this idea. Passions, or what is for him desire, represents the driving force of practice.

“Assemblages are passionnal, they are compositions of desire [...] The rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage brings into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them.”

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438 Passions are one reason why it is not easy to accuse Hegel of totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is a system which is based on the destruction of the individual will by the State. For Hegel, however, the general will is in the heart of the citizen, as their passion and an intrinsic element of their character and habit. This is the very opposite of totalitarianism, which has a paranoid fear of any passions, because they resist terror and its manipulative, deforming effects. This is also why Rousseau's example of the mother who scolds the slave for giving her the wrong answer is not an example of a totalitarian mindset. This mother could never be manipulated through fear and no bureaucrat could tell this mother what is good or bad for her. The reason why the example is shocking (to us) is precisely the fact that the mother intrinsically "knows" the good - she reacts without reflection or thought. Totalitarianism cannot survive under these conditions. The danger of totalitarianism, however, lies in the fact that this world is not given, that the citoyen is not born, but must be made and educated - and here the "coercion" to be free, when it fails, can easily pass into destruction of the individual will. Hegel is less prone to this danger, because he always carried an animosity toward coercion (which was one of his great problems with Kant). He not only sought to minimize external coercion, but also attempted to make existing forms of life (such as the civil society) a viable way toward the formation of the citizen (in this way, avoiding the necessity to introduce some non-existing, "utopian", or foreign system of education which often accompanies political philosophies that place the emphasis on the citizen). Rousseau, J. J. (1979): *Emile or On Education*. New York: Basic Books. p. 40.


In line with his notion that desire is productive, passions must be regarded as “absolutely primary”: “In brief, the principles of the passions are absolutely primary. […] Association gives the subject a possible structure, but only the passions can give it being and existence.”

In one regard, the idea that “only the passions” give being and existence echoes Hegel’s notion of nothing great being done without passions. However, whereas for Hegel, “the greatness” relates to the idea of history, to the notion of mediated passions in the form of interests perpetuating the State, in Deleuze, passions are practical when they precede the given (representation), establishing associations (assemblages) of anti-historical becomings. As a result of this, passions in their practical capacity are not subject to pre-established purpose which may or may not be immanent to them. They signify the power to be affected beyond the integration of reason, and indeed, reason itself is given reality only through passions. Consequently, Hegel’s judgment on the original nature of passions, where passions “respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose on them […]” still represents for Deleuze the primary nature of passions. The continuing dissolution of Hegel’s modern Sittlichkeit is proof of this. The “excess” of passions or, in other words, the surplus of desire, remains active and constitutive even in the modern Sittlichkeit. However, as shown, their form is not merely natural violence as a remnant of Spirit’s development, but a form of power that has the capacity to emerge as political practice. Desire, in other words, requires neither law nor purpose to be politically practical.

5. Result

For both Hegel and Deleuze, politics is a form of practice. It is an inherently emancipatory practice. The reason is that it establishes immanence. It does this in Hegel’s philosophy by abolishing the immediacy of natural violence and constituting immanence organized according to the principle of freedom. The law that serves as the principle of this organization represents the stream, the channel, where all living investments of modern man flow, becoming interests or State-mediated productive capacity. Political practice is emancipatory because it perpetuates immanence, it makes freedom unconditioned by any particular form of practice. Politics at the same time divides and unites the elements of the organism, preserving their unity through


mediation. In the modern State passions appear as interests. The element that drove historical change becomes internal to the modern State. Politics emerges as the central form of practice precisely because it serves as the mediating mechanism that enables passions to become constituted as interests. In this way, judgment permeates life, since life becomes subject to the necessity of reason.

However, from Deleuze’s point of view, an excess of fear and an excess of passions proves the falsity of State-immanence. The modern Sittlichkeit still dissolves under the pressure of passions that exceed the confines of the law. Politics cannot become exhausted in interests because desire cannot become subjected to judgment, without surplus necessarily emerging. This surplus points to a more originary form of practice or nomadology. Nomadology is not centred on the human world, because it precedes the division of nature and world. Desire does not signify the flat repetition of the same, which must be subjected to political mediation and conversion into interests, but a motive force of practice as such. Hegel’s paradox of immanence, the fact that the State remains incapable of containing passions re-emerging as “violence” in relation to recognized subjectivities, has its source in the reduction of both freedom to consciousness and practice to purposiveness.

The articulation of the paradox of immanence in Hegel from the standpoint of Deleuze (from the end of the first chapter), can therefore be extended here. The “excess” forms of Spirit cannot be relegated to relative exteriority, because they assume absolute (constitutive) position in relation to the modern Sittlichkeit. Their absolute character is contained in the fact that an excess of contingency both sustains the Sittlichkeit, and what is more important, dissolves it. The disorganizing factor takes precedence. However, the legitimacy of Deleuze’s critique of Hegel relies on one important presupposition. This presupposition is that history has reached a significant point at which one can speak of a paradox emerging. Since history is a process of development through contradiction, it is not possible to speak of a paradox as long as Hegel “has time” to resolve these contradictions. This means that, for example, as long as the State is not fully formed as a modern State and organized according to reason, an excess of violence is legitimate because it drives the development of Spirit forward. However, when the State reveals its developed form as the realization of freedom, then this excess of violence brings an irresolvable paradox with it. This is based on the idea that what distinguishes the modern State is precisely its capacity to internalize passions, to capture the war machine and therefore invert the relationship of powers between history and the State. The State is not a victim of historical passions, but precisely the form that organizes passions in order to sustain itself. Therefore, its internal and external collapse points to the irreducibility of the war machine to the State. This
“point” at which the paradox emerges is what Deleuze calls the *end of history*. The *end of history* reveals the paradox of politics and immanence, because only at this end does immanence emerge. As mentioned at the very beginning of this work, immanence for Hegel has historical conditions, and therefore must appear at the end of history, namely at the limits of historical consciousness. For Deleuze, on the other hand, immanence is antagonistic to its historical conditions and appears precisely anti-historically, *i.e.* not at the end of history but *beyond* it. Consequently, the relationship of politics and immanence in the next chapter will be regarded through the lens of the *end of history*. However, this paradox will not be regarded only as a paradox within Hegel’s philosophy, but also and in the following chapter primarily as a paradox within Deleuze’s work as well.
CHAPTER III: END OF HISTORY - IMMANENCE AND POLITICS AT THE LIMIT
1. **Introduction: practice at the limits**

In the previous chapter I showed that the difference between Spirit and desiring-production resides in the distinction between purposive production of a human world, and production, which precedes the differentiation between world and nature. Both of these forms of production concern difference and the framework in which difference is effectuated. Difference emerges either when the natural, self-same repetition has been abolished or as the immediate power of the body. The production of Spirit necessitates a sphere of differentiation in the form of reason and world, whereas *natural*, desiring-production does not. The result of this difference between the two forms of production is a divergence in the idea of politics present in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies. For Hegel, politics is a power of the negative to hold the sphere of differentiation together and to permanently reproduce the social totality. The points around which difference emerges are the family, the civil society and the political State. In Deleuze’s account, politics is pure affirmation and as such, drawing on the originary desiring-production, it also encompasses the emergence of *a new people and a new earth*\(^\text{444}\) that do not conform to the points of differentiation established by Hegel. In fact, desire dissolves these points and abolishes all dualisms. In other words, from Deleuze’s point of view, Hegel operates only with the concept of politics as anti-production. As opposed to this form of politics that Deleuze terms *macropolitics*, he introduces *micropolitics* as the unfolding of the political in the form of the *war machine*.

So far, I have only hinted at a paradox present in Deleuze’s conception of politics, which would bring him closer to Hegel. This was done at the end of the first chapter where I pointed out that absolute immanence in its concept already contains certain impossibilities. Additionally, at the end of the second chapter, I showed how Deleuze’s opposition of desiring-production and social production articulates the paradox of Hegel’s philosophy. From Deleuze’s point of view, difference cannot conform to law. Immanence, which is established by the law, is confronted by life beyond the law. In other words, the State fails as the mechanism of reterritorialization and indeed, the State-form represents the element which represses desire and “triggers” further deterritorialization.

The aim of the following chapter is to show that not only Hegel, but also Deleuze suffers from a paradox of attempting to ground politics in immanence. This paradox appears in the form of an *excess of natural violence*. Since the paradox in Deleuze is nothing else but an

extension of the paradox found in Hegel, the thesis of this chapter is that there exists an inescapable discord between immanence and politics. This thesis points to the main question of this work: does the grounding of politics in immanence introduce a paradox into politics? However, it is necessary to point out that this discord appears only at a specific point in both philosophies. The paradox appears only at a certain limit.

Political practice in both cases has its limits, the State on the one hand, life on the other. Both of these limits are involved in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s concepts of immanence, but there are no paradoxes as long as an “excess” is possible. In other words, as long as Hegel still has an exterior to conquer, and as long as Deleuze constructs a universal history showing the emancipation of desire from codes and despotism, the process is still not at the limit. It reaches the limit when freedom is revealed as the absolute ground of practice for Hegel, and in capitalism, in the visibility of the identity in nature between desiring-production and social production. Deleuze terms this limit the *end of history* and his usage of this term, I will show, is applicable to Hegel as well.

Therefore, the following chapter will examine the limit of political practice, which resides either within history (Hegel) or beyond history (Deleuze). I will examine why politics cannot establish immanence within the context of this limit. In Hegel, as shown, the reason lies in the inability of the State to resist the dissolution of the *Sittlichkeit*. In this chapter, this theme will be expanded on within the context of the *end of history*. In Deleuze, the reason lies in the fact that emancipation of life from the confines of the law has no mechanisms of organization which would not be overpowered by *determinitorialization*. The chapter will then focus on the mechanisms through which organization and disorganization proceed, in other words, the historical synthesis, on the one hand, and the movement of *becoming* which breaks this synthesis, on the other. These mechanisms are found in the temporal dimensions of differentiation: *absolute knowledge* and *eternal return*. These two instances of differentiation directly place political practice within given limits (the State) or release it. The understanding of these two concepts will reveal that Deleuze’s critique of Hegel is sound, but that it does not escape the same paradox contained in the relationship of politics and immanence, Hegel himself encountered.

The examination of these problems will finally allow me to answer the main question of this work.
2. Two ends of history

Both Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies of history make a claim that a significant shift occurs in practice with relation to history. In both philosophies practice gains something through historical development. Hegel argues that this gain is in the consciousness of freedom. Deleuze, on the other hand, views the gain on the side of desiring-production, which becomes released from the confines of coded demands. As a result of these processes, history reaches a significant turning point in both philosophies.

According to Hegel, freedom that realizes the modern State signifies the dissolution of the pre-given, natural framework of production. Practice becomes capable of grounding its particular purposes in freedom. This idea of practice comes under Deleuze’s critique. The limit of all desiring-production is the body without organs. He agrees with Hegel that the body without organs in the form of the State constitutes a historical framework of production, but he disagrees that this limit is the ground of political practice. Because practice is primarily a productive activity of life beyond the division between nature and Spirit, it necessarily transcends the State.

The question that emerges here, therefore, concerns the limits of society, and more specifically, the limits of historical organization of life. In both Hegel and Deleuze, historical development tends to reveal ever more the “main actor” of history. Hegel understands history as the rise in the consciousness of freedom and Deleuze marks capitalism as the formation where the identity of social production and desiring-production becomes visible. Both principles, freedom and desire, present an ultimate instance of production. Their visibility as highest instances of production, consequently, signify a shift in historical development.

“Schizophrenia as a process is desiring-production, but it is this production as it functions at the end, as the limit of social production determined by the conditions of capitalism. It is our very own "malady", modern man's sickness. The end of history has no other meaning. In it the two meanings of process meet, as the movement of social production that goes to the very extremes of its deterritorialization, and as the movement of metaphysical production that carries desire along with it and reproduces it in a new Earth.”

An end here does not signify a termination of the process, but its limits, the “extremes” of deterritorialization. Capitalism is at the end of history because it presupposes a general decoding and axiomatization of practice. When this takes place, the idea of a historical, memorial

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condition of practice loses its organizing capacity. To understand why this happens, one needs to examine how history in fact ends. What does Deleuze mean under the term “end of history” and does this term have its source in Hegel?

Hegel, for example, writes of “the rational, ultimate purpose of the world [vernünftiger Endzweck der Welt]”, the “the absolute, ultimate purpose of history [absoluter Endzweck der Geschichte]”, and “the realized freedom, the absolute, ultimate purpose of the world [die realisierte Freiheit, der absolute Endzweck der Welt]”. And end or purpose represents a limit and a limit to all practice is freedom. Practice and freedom are intrinsically linked. Without freedom, practice becomes mere activity, such as in the reproduction of natural life. Without practice, freedom is an abstraction, it has no world in which it can realize itself. What unites these two concepts is history. Historical development in the consciousness of freedom transforms practice into a productive activity. By becoming ever more productive, practice at the same time becomes free – it creates its own world. In this way, the end of history, its limit and as Hegel states, ultimate purpose, is precisely the unity of practice and its self-conscious productive activity. This unity represents a limit of history, because to appear as a historical being means to appear as a free being.

However, in Hegel’s view, freedom, as the limit of history, does not appear as a mere ought [Sollen]. The development in the consciousness of freedom reaches a point where freedom is not thought as the autonomy of the polis, the freedom of the individual isolated from the State or freedom of property, but freedom as such and in all its instantiations. However, to know freedom as the organizing principle of life, means to find this freedom realized in different institutions of the State. The end of history, therefore, signifies both a stage in the consciousness of freedom as well as its corresponding realization. Both of these sides condition how future events will appear. Freedom allows the subject the capacity to pass judgment on events – to view them as something distinct from itself and at the same time as something emerging from

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within the world of Spirit. The position from which the judgment is passed is always the position of the achieved and established world of freedom. Future wars will not be judged by the criteria of the Roman Sittlichkeit but from the position of the modern concept of freedom. For example, the presence of individual freedom in the modern world will provoke a judgment capable of acknowledging harm against such freedom.

This level of purpose leads practice along a trajectory of its inherent conditions, realized in the modern Sittlichkeit that, insofar as it embodies the present stage of world-spirit, gains absolute right. However, it is also precisely at this point, at the limits of history, that a paradox emerges. If freedom is the limit of practice, and as such is known as the purposiveness of history, why does production exceed the confines of the modern Sittlichkeit? More precisely, the problem is not so much the fact that the Sittlichkeit dissolves, but the fact that the State is incapable of containing this process and reproducing the limit of purposiveness which it purports to represent. The modern State is confronted with an excess of differentiation, both within and outside its borders. This excess, furthermore, emerges from within the State itself, resulting both in the abstraction of the bourgeois from its unity with the citizen and in the drive to extend the State over untapped populations and territories. If the end of history signifies the achieved instance of judgment or, in other words, the capacity to recognize different forms of freedom, why does the State engender forms of non-freedom that stand in direct contradiction to the model of freedom it realizes? One could of course argue, as Hegel in some places does, that such a contradiction points to a future development in the idea of freedom. However, if this is the case, what kind of a conflict and what kind of a State would have to emerge for this contradiction to become resolved? This question is pertinent because of the difference between past and modern States. The difference is related to the peculiar relationship between the modern State and the war machine.

As shown, all historical States were victims of world-history. States collapsed under the pressure of passions of world-historical individuals, who were the instigators of conflict and change. The moment the State “encountered” change, it collapsed and had to give way to


another, more developed State. The modern State, on the other hand, internalizes conflict because it appropriates the war machine.

First, the State appropriates the war machine because it makes conflict and competition its internal engine of differentiation. Passions that drove all previous States into destruction are now the inner engine of the modern State. The family, the civil society and the political State represent modern forms of internalization of passions. Consequently, the modern State is fuelled by inner war and competition, by processes of love, work, production, passionate investments - all of which forge the modern citizen. War is the *agoge* of the State. Second, the State utilizes external conflicts to re-forge internal unity. According to Hegel, external inter-State wars can support the State insofar internal conflict and the disorganizing process of the *bourgeois* becomes counter-acted by forcing the private man to defend the State as a citizen.

If the modern State internalizes conflict, this means that the State internalizes the mechanism of world-historical change. Consequently, the contradictions with which the modern State is confronted should be resolved internally. As opposed to past States, whose contradictions were resolved by another social organization, the modern State is not doomed to

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451 For example, it is not the ancient ideal of education that forms the citizen, but the market that takes over the role of competition as constitutive for citizenship. The rabble lacks political disposition because it fails as bourgeois and does not achieve the position of economic and spiritual independence. This independence from the State is a necessary pre-requisite to regard the State not as a fatherly figure one depends on, or as an alienated and foreign power (these two often go hand in hand) but as something in which my will realizes itself. Hegel introduced civil society on a theoretical level by focusing on the State. He asked the question: what makes the State in a world where the old *polis* is dead? In order to answer this question, he had to remove all elements not belonging to the State from it, which in order to think the *Sittlichkeit* as a totality couldn’t merely be rejected (as Rousseau did with the bourgeois), but positively integrated into it. But in order to integrate the civil society into the *Sittlichkeit*, he yet again applied an ancient, Platonic model. The civil society takes over some roles of education and competition constitutive for the citizen. This is why the question, how much is Hegel a conservative and how much a liberal, is legitimate insofar as Hegel thinks modern problems. But the way he formulates and solves these problems is an ancient one.

452 The inability of the State to contain war and to prevent the dissolution of the *Sittlichkeit* both on the inside and the outside results in an excess of conflict. War engulfs the State, but then it becomes re-appropriated by it for the purpose of re-forging its unity. Through war, the State engenders inner unity and conformity, forcing the private man, who dissolves the *Sittlichkeit* on the inside, to sacrifice himself as a citizen in outer conflict. The State utilizes outer conflict to stem its own inner collapse. Through war “the ethical health of nations [Völker] is preserved in their indifference towards the permanence of finite determinacies, just as the movement of the winds preserves the sea from that stagnation which a lasting calm would produce - a stagnation which a lasting, not to say perpetual, peace would also produce among nation.” Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 361.
collapse. However, insofar as the modern State is incapable of resolving these contradictions, conflict would again have to take its world-historical and transformative role. But because the modern State has monopoly over war, this does not seem to be an option. Hegel himself does not take this direction.\footnote{According to Hegel, the external appearance of war between States is already pre-ordained and captured, because for Hegel, future wars should conform to the principle of mutual recognition between States. In other words, even in war, mutual recognition between States is perpetuated, because soldiers should not kill out of hatred, but out of duty to their State. The State itself in turn should not attack private persons or property, the family or civil society, but only another State. In this regard, Hegel views future wars between modern States as already structured in a rational way. Hegel, G. W. F. (2003): Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 370.} Therefore, not only is the modern State confronted with an internal contradiction as was the case with past States, but it also encounters a new kind of contradiction. This contradiction is between the necessity for the modern State to transform beyond its modern form and the fact that the mechanisms of resolving the contradiction are not present. Because the modern State internally appropriates the war machine, it abolishes the world-historical capacity of conflict to exert transformations.\footnote{A similar argument is given by Karin de Boer. She argues that whereas Hegel “intimated the disruptive implications of the modern conception of freedom, the principle of his philosophy did not allow him to comprehend these implications in the same way as it allowed him to comprehend the past”. De Boer, K. (2009): Hegel’s Account of the Present: An Open-Ended History, in: Hegel and History. Albany: State University of New York. p. 62.} Therefore, the end of history can have two meanings in Hegel. On the one hand, it relates to the purpose in history, its present limit embodied in the achieved level of freedom. The end of history in this regard signifies the highest instance of judgment history can provide in a certain epoch. For example, the Roman Empire was at the end of history of its time insofar as it represented the limits of freedom, in the same way that modern democratic States serve as a limit and benchmark for all “backward” States.\footnote{A similar argument on the end of history is provided by Reinhart Maurer, who regards the end as something internal to each epoch. The end Hegel speaks of is the end of his epoch marking a passage to a new one. Maurer, K. R. (1996): Hegel and the End of History, in: The Hegel Myths and Legends. Evanston, Illinois: Northwest University Press. p. 215.} At the same time, the end of history in Hegel has another meaning. This other end relates to the fact that Hegel encounters a contradiction of another order than those found in world-history. This contradiction is between the contradictions of modern freedom, on the one hand, and the inability of conflict to resolve this contradiction, on the other. Therefore, history ends insofar as it becomes blocked in its capacity to further develop the principle of freedom. In a sense,
history ends for Hegel in a way he never intended and in a more literal sense than he ever explicitly expressed.456

However, this is expressed in Deleuze. The end of history for him signifies in the first instance the fact that capitalism marks an expansion of war bringing society to its “limits”. The nomadic war machine no longer circles around the borders of the State, testing its fortifications and provoking it. Rather, nomadism enters the State itself, opening way for internalized disorganization and axiomatization. However, in the second instance, the meaning of the end of history for Deleuze takes on an even more literal form. The moment the modern State internalizes conflict, conflict reveals its true nature — it has nothing to do with contradiction and resolution. What the end of history reveals, instead, is the irreducibility of the war machine to State-institutionalized conflict. Therefore, what it reveals is that the contradictions the State presupposes have their source in the paradoxical nature of the war machine. The appearance of a second order contradiction in Hegel is nothing else but its overdetermination or, in other words, the revelation of the paradoxical nature of the relationship between the State and the war machine. In the visibility of this paradox, history finally reveals its contingent, non-historical character.

“Primitive societies are not outside history; rather, it is capitalism that is at the end of history, it is capitalism that results from a long history of contingencies and accidents, and that brings on this end. It cannot be said that the previous formations did not foresee this Thing that only came from Without by rising from within, and that at all costs had to be prevented from rising. Whence the possibility of a retrospective reading of all history in terms of capitalism.”457

The reason why capitalism is at the end of history and why it is possible to read all history in retrospect as the history of capitalism is the fact that, as Jay Lampert notes, capitalism is at the same time par excellence historical and thoroughly non-historical.458 The pre-capitalist State

456 Because I interpret the concept of the end of history in light of Deleuze’s concept of the limit, I do not subscribe to the view of a “static” end to history. This idea of an end has no support in Hegel’s texts, even if he explicitly speaks of an end. When he uses the term “end” he either places it in relationship to the concept of purpose (such as in the case of an Endzweck) or views it in a dialectical relationship with the beginning. On this problem and on the genesis of the traditional concept of the end of history from Nietzsche and Engels to Kojève, see: Dale, E. Michael (2014): Hegel, the End of History, and the Future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 50 – 53.


over-coded temporality by forging a common memory, existing always already there, eternal, divine and reaching into time before time. However, precisely because this common memory made everything present, any change beyond the confines of despotic “history” was seen as threatening. There was an excess of temporality which drove society into its death. The modern capitalist State, on the other hand, internalizes the disorganizing element of desire. This transformative, “historical” element invades the inner space of the State, it forces it to historicize, but at the same time makes this possible only on account of making temporality itself frozen. Jay Lampert explains this paradoxical situation:

“A coded society can only compare itself to other societies, or colonize them by force; capitalist society is beyond historical comparison, since it decodes differences and sees universality everywhere. Capitalism is therefore the only schema that can date events in history on a commensurable time-line. It conducts universal history not only because it lies at the end of history so far it does so because its decoding mechanisms make retrospectively possible. Capitalism is the first historical age, treating all precedents as its gradual becoming; and it is also the first non-historical age, since from its perspective nothing has ever changed, and history itself is decoded; and it also includes all ages, constituting history retrospectively as co-existence rather than succession.”

The fact that the modern State is capable of “decoding history”, reveals not only the non-historical attitude which is tied into the attempt to mobilize history in order to legitimize the present State, but also that this non-historical capacity is a result of the fact that history has its ground in becoming. In the visibility of the identity of nature between social production and desiring-production, history as an isolated temporality of “human affairs” organized by the State loses its significance and collapses into Nature. What the end reveals is that “Nature = History”. But this end does not signify a limit internal to history as the freedom that establishes historicity. Rather, it signifies the impossibility of mobilizing history in order to forge a “common memory” in capitalism. It reveals the falsity of history and the fact that in order to mobilize history to legitimize the State, one must also end it and place a purpose within it. The historical nature of capitalism, the fact that it is capable of accepting divergent histories is based on the fact that it does this from the position of the axiomatic and de-coding, i.e. from a non-historical instance, which is universal and eternal. This is the reason why, when the State appropriates the war machine and internally “historicizes” itself, suddenly what is revealed is

459 Ibid.

the fact that the war machine was never a matter of history, of contradiction and resolution, but of desiring-production which exceeds historical forms of life and follows the line of becomings. Desire is not intrinsically historical in the form of the consciousness of freedom, it is natural and its emancipation in capitalism is precisely what allows for de-coded temporality and universal history. This means that the internalization of the engine of history will not protect the State from destruction, since the State, in its appropriation of the war machine, misses the “target”. The State views history as a movement toward its own development and views this as a process of “taming” passions, internalizing conflict, and so on. But it misses the “target” because it does precisely what the despotic State did, it covers up the true nature of conflict by imprinting on it its own model of temporality – it subjects it to the historical conditions of life, when in fact, desire knows no history and no memory. Consequently, the moment the modern State internalizes historical change, it is revealed that change does not proceed historically and conflict yet again expands beyond its borders. When the State thought that it could shape the world and man in its own image, to imprint on conflict its own despotic essence, conflict yet again escapes its control and turns against it, revealing at first the world-wide axiomatic nature of capital and then the war machine itself – the fact that history as such dissolves into becomings.

Therefore, the modern State for Hegel differs from past State insofar as it resolves contradictions internally (without necessitating a passage to another State), at the same time, these contradictions exceed its capacities, signalling again the necessity for a passage to another form of State. Any future State could resolve the contradictions of the modern State only insofar as it further expands conflict, as well as the capacity of the totality to integrate new forms of practices. However, this way is closed off for Hegel, insofar as conflict becomes “pacified”. Even if one could somehow escape this contradiction, one would enter what Hegel calls “bad infinity”\footnote{Hegel, G. W. F. (2010): The Science of Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 109.} - States permanently integrating conflicts and resolving contradictions, only for more contradictions and conflicts to emerge. Both alternatives, however, the contradiction between the necessity for change and the pacification of conflict, on the one hand, and the danger of “bad infinity”, on the other, can be rejected if one recognizes the irreducibility of the war machine to the State, and consequently, the irreducibility of conflict to contradiction.
3. The paradoxes of organization

My thesis is that the end of history reveals a discord of immanence and political practice. This discord appears at the limit of practice, at the point where both Hegel and Deleuze claim practice exhibits highest productive capacity. For Hegel, this limit is freedom which produces a historical world. Practice is historical in its essence, beyond history practice dissolves into activities without purpose. Deleuze, on the other hand, releases practice from purpose. The indifference of nature and world is presupposed in practice, which is never found only on the side of the limit (within history), but always and unconditionally beyond it. The limit or the end of history therefore represents a border where practice reveals its necessities. It reveals its nature when faced with exteriority, it either remains at the limit of history, as that which constitutes history, or abolishes this limit, revealing history as memorial life to be only a reduction of practice. The paradox that emerges for Hegel at this limit has already been explicated: it is a paradox of exteriority re-emerging in the form of violence that cannot be totalized. This violence, I showed, is not merely natural violence in the sense of past instances of Spirit, but violence immanent to the modern Sittlichkeit. Hegel is faced with an excess of violence that dissolves a world.

I now wish to argue that the same paradox emerges for Deleuze as well. To show this however, I will commence from the point explicated above. As shown there, Hegel encounters at the end of history contradictions in the modern world that appear irresolvable. This paradox found in Hegel reveals the problem of grounding politics in immanence, because politics as such extends beyond the State. What I left out, however, is that Hegel is very much aware of the problem. Indeed, precisely the presence of this problem shapes some of the most central features of his philosophy. The grounding of politics in immanence in Hegel’s cases presupposes an inherent discord between the two. It presupposes the fact that immanence extends beyond politics and includes non-political elements or expressions of Spirit. These non-political elements are what is collectively termed the absolute Spirit, which includes art, religion and philosophy. The next part of this chapter will examine how these elements, which express immanence pure and simple, function in relation to politics. I will show that Hegel is capable of partially resolving his problem insofar as the contradictions of the State become sublated into absolute Spirit. This means that the grounding of politics in immanence is in itself partially non-political. At the same time, I will show that a Deleuzian critique already presupposes this solution and contains implicit answers to it. At the same time, I will show that Deleuze’s answers at the same time re-introduces a paradox between politics and immanence.
a) **Absolute Spirit**

Politics, as an already determined sphere of human action, establishes a sphere of immanence. In Hegel’s case, the immanence proper to politics is the objective world or the *Sittlichkeit*. However, because immanence is always absolute, it cannot be reduced to an objective world. Similarly, practice for Deleuze always emerges and “falls back” into the historical state of affairs. For this reason, the grounding of politics in immanence is not a matter of simple deduction. Instead, for both Hegel and Deleuze the relationship of politics to immanence necessarily includes other spheres of human practice. As shown, in Hegel’s case, these practices include morality, economy, family life, and so on. In Deleuze’s case, historical politics never appears without having further qualifications, such as overcoding, axiomatization and so on. However, the relationship of immanence to politics also includes practices which concern the absolutization of immanence. The most immediate practice both Hegel and Deleuze take as the expression of immanence is philosophy. Furthermore, they both include other practices, such as art or religion in Hegel’s case, or art and science in Deleuze’s, as commensurate to philosophy in their relationship to immanence. Hegel views the sphere of objective Spirit as necessarily passing into absolute Spirit, a term he uses to signify the sphere of art, religion and philosophy. Similarly, Deleuze examines art, science and philosophy in their relationship to politics. The importance of these practices becomes clear precisely in view of the problem of violence. Politics in its relationship to immanence necessarily presupposes the question of violence. As shown so far, it seems that, on the level of the relationship of politics and immanence, the problem of violence persists. This is why the question of violence must also be placed within the framework of art, religion, science and philosophy. The reason for this is that precisely these practices signify a more veritable relationship to immanence. The preceding examination of politics, therefore, represents merely one aspect of the relationship of politics and immanence. This aspect concerns primarily the relationship from the side of historical politics. The other side, however, takes up the problem from the position of immanence itself. Both Hegel and Deleuze view historical instantiation of politics as relative immanence, one which is either conditioned by the historical world, such as in Hegel, or one that fails in relation to immanence, such as in Deleuze. More precisely, for Hegel world-history is a history of immanence, but as such it views immanence in relation to a given world plagued by contingency. The inability of the State to contain violence both within its borders and outside of them can be understood as a constitutive element of the passage from objective to absolute
Spirit. In Deleuze’s case, the immanence of capitalism proposed in *Anti-Oedipus* becomes revealed in *What is Philosophy?* as a relative milieu in relation to absolute immanence:

“Modern philosophy's link with capitalism, therefore, is of the same kind as that of ancient philosophy with Greece: the connection of an absolute plane of immanence with a relative social milieu that also functions through immanence.”

“Philosophy”, furthermore, “takes the relative deterritorialization of capital to the absolute; it makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and suppresses it as internal limit, turns it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth, a new people.”

That the relative social milieu functions through immanence presupposes merely the immanence of capital. In art and philosophy (Deleuze excludes religion, insofar religion still relates to transcendence), this relative immanence of capital is connected to absolute immanence.

However, at the same time, the passage from the sphere of politics into philosophy opens up several new questions, the most important being that politics could lose its worldly character and become utopian. It is not a coincidence that both Hegel and Deleuze encounter this problem. Philosophy, when brought into a relationship with politics could transform this practice into a utopian endeavour. This means that the question of grounding of politics in immanence could be reduced to the problem of utopias. Hegel is very quick to reject such an idea. He clearly discredits any idea of philosophy constructing an image of how society or the State should appear.

„To comprehend what is is the task of philosophy, for what is is reason. As far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any case a child of his time, thus philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as that an individual can overleap his own time or leap over Rhodes. If his theory does indeed transcend his own time, if it builds itself a world as it ought to be, then it certainly has an existence, but only within his opinions - a pliant medium in which the imagination can construct anything it pleases.”

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464 Although Hegel regards art, religion and philosophy as the components of absolute Spirit, and Deleuze and Guattari focus on diverse practices such as art, science or philosophy in their relation to politics, I will primarily focus on philosophy, since it is here that the strongest link to immanence is established, but also because it will make the text more manageable.

The task of philosophy is not to serve as a utopian outlet for an imperfect world but as the realization of worldly freedom – as the confirmation of the reality of the world and as “reconciliation with actuality”.\textsuperscript{466} What this means is that philosophy has no utopian function, furthermore, philosophy itself, precisely when entering into a relationship with politics must resist the urge of becoming utopian. The question of immanence, instead, must be sought not in abandoning the here and now for the sake of utopian ideals, but acting in the here and now from the conceptual reality of the present – \textit{i.e.} acting in accordance with the concept which is already realized. Philosophy conceptualizes politics and in this way shows the basic rationality of how it appears in the world.

For Deleuze on the other hand, the problem is more complex. Although Deleuze and Guattari criticize the term “utopia”, the term points etymologically to absolute deterritorialization\textsuperscript{467}. Since absolute deterritorialization is the limit of every movement of deterritorialization, capitalism, which relies fully on this process, is inherently a utopian system. Utopias serve both a stabilizing and repressive function, as well as an immanent function in emancipation.\textsuperscript{468} It is impossible to “ban” utopias, since they signify investments of desire beyond its given form. To this effect, Hegel’s attempt to constrain philosophy by political reality and to constrain political reality by the relegation of excess violence into absolute Spirit and philosophy – in this way avoiding utopias - is impossible. However, that utopias are unavoidable does not mean that emancipatory politics as such is merely utopian. Instead, utopias are an index of an investment which seeks to go beyond the historical conditions of politics. This \textit{going beyond} loses its utopian character precisely because Deleuze does not reduce temporality to history. To understand therefore in what way philosophy is not utopian (or ideological), and by extension, how absolute immanence is not merely an ideological opium for the relative immanence of worldly politics, it is necessary to examine in what way does politics relate to immanence from the position of philosophy in both Hegel and Deleuze.

\textsuperscript{466} Ibid. p. 22.

\textsuperscript{467} This, of course, does not mean that philosophy should not also have a normative and critical function, but this function is also contained within the framework of what is. Critique should not reject the world, instead it ought to better it in accordance with the concept of what is already real. On the relationship of normative and descriptive approach in Hegel’s political thought, see: Hösl, Vittorio (1998): \textit{Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität}. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. p. 422.; Vieweg, Klaus (2012): \textit{Das Denken der Freiheit. Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts}. München: Wilhelm Fink. p. 43.

In Hegel’s case, philosophy signifies absolute knowledge. Nature in philosophy does not figure as a reference point of knowledge, because the process of knowing is not mediated by anything but Spirit itself. Philosophy represents the standpoint of knowledge where the object of knowing is nothing else but the subject itself. In contradistinction to politics, which is still bound to contingent realm of worldly practice and as such, sublated natural violence, philosophy is pure thought, absolved from exteriority. At the same time, philosophy (and by extension, art and religion) cannot exist without a world and nature. For this reason, absolute Spirit must refer to its own historical, political conditions. As already mentioned, philosophy reveals the rationality of the present world, it does not escape it. Philosophy is both pure negativity and absolute freedom, as well as something emerging from a historically conditioned world. There are several aspects to this relationship of philosophy to politics.

Because philosophy is the power of thought and universality, it can appear hostile to particular or individual instances of Spirit. For example, when philosophy seeks to release itself from its historical conditions and immediately determine reality, it can annihilate particular determinations. The French revolution for Hegel was exemplary because this event showed how philosophy attempted to enforce the universal by directly shaping reality beyond its historical conditions. Thought sought to circumvent history and install itself as valid for eternity. This resulted in terror and destruction. (e.g. the attempt of the revolutionaries to establish new history, new time and calendar).\textsuperscript{469} Absolute negativity acted as absolute freedom released upon existing determinations, attempting to skip dialectical development and install itself immediately. This danger is inherent every time philosophy, art or religion become politicized and \textit{vise versa}, and when different forms of freedom exit their proper limits and collapse into each other.\textsuperscript{470}

History plays for Hegel a perennial role because it counter-acts this process, it serves as a mediating instance which distances different determinations of Spirit from each other. As shown in the second chapter, history results in the breakdown of immediate synthetic unities,


\textsuperscript{470} This can also be applied to religion or art in their attempt to fuse with politics. In the case of religion, instead of political disposition, faith and belief would become the main driving power in politics, opening way to fanaticism. In the case of art, politics and the State would succumb to their own aesthetisation and art to politicization, abolishing both forms of freedom. In all cases, what is at issue is the imposition of a philosophical principle, religious belief and aesthetic ideal to politics, which subverts both sides of the synthesis. This is why for Hegel, philosophers, religious leaders or artists can influence politics, but never should they direct the State, nor should the State under any circumstances dictate to philosophers, the faithfull or artists how to act.
independent development of different principles and their later synthesis into a totality. Natural repetition is merely flat time. History, on the other hand, can be termed as what Hegel in his earlier works named “filled and fulfilled” time. The “filling and fulfilling” of time represents a process whereby events leave an imprint on temporality in such a way that time becomes memorial. The process is one of immanentization and inwardizing [Erinnerung] of Spirit, which cannot sustain itself in the mere repetition of nows. Since history does not present mere repetition under which events take place, but repetition which is internally shaped by events, time is never “empty” or natural, but always historical and contextual. Since this is the case, the structure of eventfulness is not bare, but always contextually determined by particular differences internal to Spirit. The world, in other words, is inherently structured through events and the constitutive memory of these events. There are two results of this.

In the first instance and as mentioned, Spirit always carries an internal division within itself. Natural determinations remain within the sphere of nature, religious belief remains within the confines of absolute Spirit as religion, most importantly, political practice is found within the confines of the Sittlichkeit, and more precisely, within the political State as well as the political disposition of the citizen. Within the context of the Sittlichkeit, love constitutes the family, self-interested individuality the civil society, and political consciousness the political State. In the second instance, this internal division and mediation between particular expressions of Spirit conditions time itself to repeat in a historical fashion, i.e. in an internally structured way. This means that not only do particular expressions of Spirit always retain their own identity through time, where for example, philosophy as such has its own future, in the same way that political practice follows its own trajectory, but future itself is determined by the contours of existing totality. Future is not empty, devoid of what is to come, instead it is already contained in the present and has its source in the past. Certainly, since it is purposiveness and freedom that

471 For example, in the Jena manuscripts one can read the following passage: “Time is the pure concept [der reine Begriff] — the intuited (angeschaut) empty self in its movement, like space in its rest. Before there is a filled time [ehe die erfüllte Zeit ist], time is nothing. Its fulfillment is that which is actual, returned into itself out of empty time [aus der leeren Zeit]. Its view of itself is what time is — the nonobjective. But if we speak of [a time] “before” the world, of time without something to fill it [Zeit ohne Erfüllung], [we already have] the thought of time, thinking itself, reflected in itself. It is necessary to go beyond this time, every period — but into the thought of time. The former [i.e., speaking about what was “before” the world] is the bad infinity [schlechte Unendlichkeit].” Hegel, G. W. F. (1986): Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805 – 06) with commentary. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. p. 182.

determine what Spirit is, future has precedence, but this future is not merely “time”, but filled and fulfilled time. Insofar as Spirit has a history, it also has a future in the true sense of the word, because its own internal divisions and determinations are what allow for future to appear at all. That a State becomes capable of distinguishing itself from private man, who might be a philosopher or a religious person, and who in turn might express absolute Spirit as distinct from objective Spirit, and that at the same the State cannot impose religious belief or philosophical principles on its subjects, and religion or philosophy cannot impose their own principles onto the State – all of this allows for future as something distinct from merely “more time” to take place. Without this internal division, the world collapses, freedom becomes abolished and history as such ceases in the most literal sense of the word, since such a collapse would mark the death of Spirit.

The important consequence of this is that because the future is not empty and because time is never simply natural repetition of nows, the State has ontological validity and is a necessary element of immanence. By containing political practice in the State as its proper element of internalized violence, Hegel in effect protects politics both from violence internal to the State, but more importantly, from the future of Spirit or the sublation of the State into absolute Spirit. Without this protecting feature of the State, politics would lose its “anchoring point” and extend itself into philosophy or vice versa. Since politics signifies mediation that sustains a world by allowing the reproduction of particular spheres of human life, the State, which contains politics, serves as the anchor that prevents politics itself from merging with higher forms of Spirit. In other words, the State protects politics from all other forms of Spirit and vice versa, it establishes a necessary distance between them and in turn allows politics to perpetuate

473 I have been using both the concept of absolute knowledge from The Phenomenology of Spirit and the concept of absolute Spirit as found in Hegel’s later works. Both of these concepts are the same (e.g. Hegel equates absolute knowledge from Phenomenology with absolute Spirit). They are one and the same concept based on Aristotle’s idea of God as self-thinking reason (noeseos noesis). However, my use of this term from Hegel’s early and later works brings forth a question relating to the sublation of the State into absolute Spirit. This relationship is not straightforward. Sometimes Hegel speaks of this sublation as being immediate, at other times, the State is not directly sublated into absolute Spirit but initially into world-history. However, since world-history eventually ends “tragically”, forcing Spirit to abandon the worldly realm and find its truth in art, religion and philosophy, the “final” trajectory of the State is in all cases absolute Spirit. Therefore, since the nuances of Hegel’s different solutions to the problem of sublation of the State is not my concern here, I will simply address the subject on a level that is “valid” for all of Hegel’s variations on the subject. Cf. Hegel, G. W. F. (1977): Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 493; Hegel, G. W. F. (1989): Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Dritter Teil., in: Werke, Bd. 10. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. p. 347.
the world as a mediating practice. Without the State, politics would fuse with other forms of Spirit and abolish the internally mediated totality.

Hegel views the State as the limit of politics, the place to which it must return in order for the world to sustain itself – if it comes into a direct synthetic relationship with art, religion and philosophy, the world is in danger of collapsing. Conversely, since philosophy is free from the politics of the State, it can fulfil its own function, which is to represent a limit to all violence by theoretically legitimizing the violence of politics. As a consequence of this, there is no point of violence, no matter its extent, that can resist the power of Spirit, because this power is nothing but the limit to all violence. The most destructive violence of the absolute is already infused with a capacity to re-organize and protect, because violence will always be re-inscribed into a register of human Spirit. This is why Hegel would write that “the wounds of the Spirit heal and leave no scars behind”.474 The task of philosophy is not to supplant or extend politics, where politics would attempt to resolve the imperfections of the world, of inequality and non-freedom, as well as of the violence of unending wars between nation-states. Its role is to retroactively conceptually legitimize the world, to transcend the world of politics and operate from a position of non-political freedom. Only from this position can immanence be sustained, since there is a mutual presupposition in the distance established between politics and philosophy. Politics as the practice which reproduces the State is the worldly condition of philosophy, which in turn is the condition of the sublation of violence which persists in the world. The scars of Spirit will heal – through religion, art and philosophy, where these will not have a direct political function. And because absolute Spirit has its worldly condition in the political State475, the violence of the world will always be overcome by those forms of Spirit which necessitate a State.

The initial problem of the incapacity to contain the war machine could be supplemented with the argument that absolute Spirit sublates this expansion. In the first instance, conflict is for Hegel already contained by the State itself on multiple fronts. A Deleuzian critique revealed that this containment fails insofar paradoxes emerge Hegel cannot resolve. The Hegelian answer would in this case be that the State or politics are in fact not the location of the resolution

474 Ibid. p. 407.

475 Walter Jaeschke claims that Hegel’s world-history represents a reduction of the concept of history insofar as it reduces the concept of freedom to political freedom. However, as I have shown throughout this work, political freedom for Hegel is not an isolated form of freedom. Rather, this form of freedom represents the mediating and unifying element of all freedom. Therefore, although Hegel certainly regards philosophy as a higher form of freedom, philosophy as such is not possible without political freedom. Jaeschke, W. (1996): Die Geschichtlichkeit der Geschichte, in: Hegel-Jahrbuch 1995. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. p. 370.
of the paradox, but absolute Spirit. And absolute Spirit achieves this by retroactively legitimizing events of history which might emerge from conflict gone awry. As a result, politics must be anchored in the State, same as philosophy, art or religion. But precisely this internal division within the State protects all these elements from each other and allows them to perform different functions. This feature is prominent historically as well, since even if events would take place that could subvert this mediated totality, the State would always be the horizon of the future, because the State represents the condition of historicity and memory as such. The problem, however, as will be promptly shown, is that even such an appropriation fails from a Deleuzian standpoints.

b) The eternal return

As shown, in Deleuze’s case, the modern State cannot succeed in resisting natural violence. Immanence in the form of absolute Spirit cannot remain divided from politics because the main feature of politics is precisely to abolish such distinctions. Politics invites into the world that which sublates violence into religion, art, philosophy, or anything else, which might figure as a form distinct from political practice. Practice is, as previously mentioned, cancerous, because it engulfs particular and distinct organs and dissolves the organism by permeating the social field. The private “love” of the family can explode into a “disinterested love” of the social machine in the same way that “public” political practice can spread onto the family. Furthermore, philosophy, art, or religion will exhibit political capacity. Such an idea of politics is most apparent in *What is Philosophy?*, where on the one hand, politics takes a more reserved role, but at the same time philosophy (together with art) is placed in a direct relationship to their political potential. In other words, politics for Deleuze and Guattari is not an isolated “sphere of practice” but a feature of all practice, its mode of manifestation, when established positions tend to break down. Politics does not keep different spheres of practice united through mediation, but is precisely the “disease” through which any mediation and division breaks down. Consequently, political violence cannot remain sublated into higher forms of Spirit, since politics signifies the incapacity of anti-production to sustain itself on grounds of mediation.

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As a result of this, Hegel’s ultimate attempt to contain violence must, from Deleuze’s point of view, fail. The emergence of absolute Spirit as a form that seeks to rationally organize and legitimize reality is unsustainable. Philosophy, religion or art cannot serve to legitimize an excess of violence because they are not events that necessitate a State. In fact they, together with politics, go beyond their “proper place” and abolish the State.

The reason why this is the case, same as in Hegel, lies in the nature of immanence. Time and immanence, for Deleuze, are intrinsically linked. Insofar as absolute immanence signifies the absence of transcendence, immanence and subjectivity exclude each other. There is no subject of immanence. Because this is the case, there is no history of immanence, since history is determined by the capacity of time to appear as subjective, as identifiable and eventful. However, time is for Deleuze something more than history – it does not rely on memory. Instead, Deleuze regards time as empty, and this emptiness explains why Hegel’s solution must fail. In the first instance, Deleuze explicitly focuses on the future in his examination of time. However, in opposition to Hegel, future for Deleuze is not contextualized or determined by events. Instead, future represents the eternal return or pure form of time. It is pure, because it is unhinged from events.

“Time out of joint means demented time or time outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated from its overly simple circular figure, freed from the events which made up its content, its relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure form. [Emphasis added]”

The future for Deleuze is the eternal return of difference, the abolishment of any content which might “fill” time. It signifies the liberation of time from its historical conditions. This return of difference is not only the return of differentiation in memory according to the principle of absolute knowledge and practice that transforms its past as it produces its future. Instead, time “must be understood and lived as out of joint, and seen as a straight line which mercilessly eliminates those who embark upon it, who come upon the scene but repeat only once and for all. […] Not only does the eternal return not make everything return, it causes those who fail the test to perish.” In other words, all the memory in the world will not hold down time to history, because there will always be more time. Deleuze quite clearly demarcates “pure time” or time as such, from two other forms of time – the living present and the pure past. The living present most closely resembles natural time, the repetition of nows, where past and future appear as dimension of the present. In the living present, past is the recollection of nows and

477 Ibid. p. 88.
future is anticipation. This time is habitual. *Pure past* is the second form of time, where the present itself signifies merely the most contracted point of the past. This is the historical time of memory. Future as a dimension of pure past is deduced from memory. However, time as future, or time as such, where the present and the past are dimensions of the future, is not based on memory, but on a break with it.

“Eternal return 'makes' the difference because it creates the superior form. Eternal return employs negation like a *Nachfolge* and invents a new formula for the negation of the negation: *everything which can be denied is and must be denied. The genius of eternal return lies not in memory but in waste, in active forgetting.*”\(^{479}\)

The selection process of the eternal return is *death*, which is not internalized as in the case of negation where selection selects that which shall be preserved as *sublated*. Future is the work of death beyond mediation – it annihilates without preserving and makes everything identical perish. As shown in the second chapter, death is not the field of inanimate matter, the end of life\(^{480}\), it is a force of life itself through which life is capable of being fully lethal – it can and does destroy beings in such a way that they will never return, no thing and no being will return, only difference. Death does not make life permanently dying, confined to anxiety, to negation and sadness, instead it makes death the power of life to destroy without preserving, to die properly so that something new can emerge.

“All that is negative and all that denies, all those average affirmations which bear the negative, all those pale and unwelcome 'Yeses' which come from 'Nos', *everything which cannot pass the test of eternal return* - all these must be denied. If eternal return is a wheel, then it must be endowed with a violent centrifugal movement which expels everything which 'can' be denied, everything which cannot pass the test. *[Emphasis added]*\(^{481}\)

For Deleuze, there is no inherent mechanism to the ontological fabric of the world where beings emerge constituted by a specific distribution of self-consciousness. Instead, death or the negative is immediately cotemporaneous with affirmation, because the eternal return excludes the subject. Event and time “squeeze out” the subject, breaking the historical form of time, reorganizing the Before and After.\(^{482}\) This reorganization is the “falling back” [*retomber*] of *becoming* into history. It is the permanent re-transformation of the temporal line according to


\(^{480}\) “Death does not appear in the objective model of an indifferent inanimate matter, to which life would ‘return’; death is present in the living, as a subjective and differentiated experience endowed with a prototype”. *Ibid.* p. 112.


\(^{482}\) *Ibid.* p. 89.
the power of affirmation of life. The processuality of life and practice, as a result, extend beyond the historical world and do not guarantee a return to spiritual forms of life.

4. The problem of fascism

The idea of future as freed from events corresponds to the concept of becoming as something which cannot be traced historically. Becomings emerge from history and fall back into it, however, they in themselves are not historical process. There is no purpose in becoming, which is precisely why this temporal process corresponds to the eternal return – it signifies differentiation beyond any aims and goals which might be at work in history.

Two distinct problems emerge at this point from such a relationship of historical time to the eternal return. In the first instance, since the future is empty, no fixed, end-point to practical action can be given. Practice cannot be exhausted in its aims and goals. To this effect, practice precedes the formulation of interests, even those which might be hidden and at work “behind the back” of the actors. At the same time, however, practice is not detached from historical life, indeed, it refers to it in order to locate its starting position, to emerge from something already present here and now and determined by the past, as well as to return to it, since it is here and now of historical life which in the last instance appropriates and is transformed through becomings. Whereas Hegel views practice as a process embedded in history, emerging and taking place within history, Deleuze creates a rift between practice itself and its historical conditions. As a result of this, the unpredictability and the impossibility to track the trajectory of practice becomes an issue. The question can be asked if the falling back of becoming into history could also be a violent event. Certainly, from a broader perspective this process is necessarily violent. Deleuze does not shy away from speaking of differentiation as something which is not devoid of “bloody struggles”, merely because the negative is absent. Precisely the absence of the negative, Deleuze explains, the absence of purpose in affirmation makes difference more violent since no trajectory toward reconciliation can be found in the future. The eternal return is impersonal and without meaning. As a result of this, there are no “hard-breaks” in Deleuze’s political philosophy as in Hegel. The role of a “hard-break” in Hegel is played by the State, which possesses ontological legitimacy because it protects both determinations of Spirit within it, and the realm of absolute Spirit by containing politics in the

\[483\] Ibid. p. XX.
State. Since Deleuze’s politics is non-localizable in the sense that it does not have a fixed role and place in the *Sittlichkeit*, and represents the process through which mediation and divisions between determinations collapse, it has no limitations. This is of course on the one hand the point of Deleuze’s idea of politics—it’s open-ended, contingent and *micro* character. On the other hand, it is also the reason why politics in Deleuze not only cannot be dissociated from violence, but in fact permanently carries this danger within itself. This inherent violence is not merely the violence which might relate to the “falling back” of *becoming*, the encounter between a given subject and the process of differentiation which dissolves subjectivity, but also the violence which might emerge from the fact that the undecidability of the eternal return can reinforce the fixation and involution of the subject.

This possibility of an excess of violence, of resurgence of transcendence which is immanent to immanence, is most apparent in fascism, where the inability to reconcile *becomings* and history reveals itself. Fascism has a central place in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. The reason for this lies in the fact that fascism appears as a problem of politics and its relationship to immanence. In this regard, it figures as an inherent feature of modern politics which is defined in its relationship to immanence. Because it signifies an inherent feature of modern politics Deleuze and Guattari do not view fascism as a phenomenon confined to its specific manifestations, in other words, it is not a problem which can be reduced to the different authoritarian or totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Instead, they view fascism as a tendency permeating the modern, capitalist society and as a general feature of democracy. For example, they insist that fascism cannot be explained without a recourse to *micropolitics*, because these two are intertwined.

“We would even say that fascism implies a molecular regime that is distinct both from molar segments and their centralization. Doubtless, fascism invented the concept of the totalitarian State, but there is no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: there are totalitarian States, of the Stalinist or military dictatorship type that are not fascist. The concept of the totalitarian State applies only at the macropolitical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State.”

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Deleuze and Guattari define fascism in a sharp distinction to totalitarianism for a reason. Totalitarianism is, as Deleuze and Guattari note, a “State affair” particular to modern society. What this means is that totalitarianism emerges through the activity of the modern, capitalist State. The specific activity concerns the attempt to convert social relations into state-relations. Totalitarianism becomes possible when conflict is not limited by a State external to it, but determined by a State immanent to the social field. However, as a movement which has its source in the State, totalitarianism carries all of the features of the State: it is a movement toward establishing segmentarities, stability, predictability, and in one word – peace. Fascism, as opposed to this, is a movement which begins from within the social field itself and concerns not a process of the State, but desire. Fascism, same as totalitarianism, presupposes that the sharp distinction between society and the State is absent. This means that anti-production is not concentrated within an isolated and external State, but present within the social field, permeating it. Since anti-production permeates the social field, when conflict expands or becomes volatile, the reactionary movement of anti-production will not be concentrated in the State, but will emerge on many different points of the social assemblage. This is why fascism is micropolitical, it concerns relations between disparate elements, resonances between elements and in general, minute differentiations which elude over-sweeping and general segments.

“What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism.”

However, although fascism has primarily a micropolitical character, at the same time it reveals the centrality of the State in capitalism, namely its immanence insofar as fascism represents a love for State-power which operates on a molecular level. As opposed to totalitarianism, therefore, which concerns the State in a direct fashion and appears as a process of establishing peace, fascism is a love for the State which appears from the war machine itself. In this regard, fascism is paradoxical, it represents anti-democratic democracy, a phenomenon which seeks to reject its own form in order to establish itself as a State. And as Deleuze and Guattari note, even when fascism does become totalitarian, it cannot reject its own nature. In opposition to “pure” totalitarianism, which shies away from war, fascism never ceases being a war machine, which is evident in the fact that fascism is obsessed with war, conflict and expansion, even when this obsession might result in loss of power – something totalitarianism would never accept.

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485 Ibid. p. 230.
486 Ibid. p. 215.
“Totalitarianism is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, involves the war machine. When fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of the State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State” 487

Already here, the sharp distinction Deleuze and Guattari make between totalitarianism and fascism points to the above explicated problem of the relationship between the State and politics. As opposed to totalitarianism, which in essence seeks to confine politics to the State, which acts as the model for all social relations, fascism points to the violence of political practice which appears beyond the State. The emancipation of politics from the State creates the conditions for new forms of politics, it releases desire and allows for politics to appear unconstrained by State-law. Under these conditions, Hegel’s thesis on the internal division of society sustained by politics anchored in the State, and the division between the forms of Spirit, which divide politics from other practices, cannot be maintained. Art, religion or philosophy gain immediate political significance and role in society, in the same way that institutions that are “political” become invaded by non-political phenomena. The fusion of different elements, and the abolition of borders between these elements is one of the necessary components of any emancipatory politics. 488 However, the counter-emancipatory movement might not only

487  Ibid.
488  Philippe Mengue criticizes Deleuze for his self-alienation from politics. According to him, because Deleuze establishes a clear division between the actual and the virtual, between the plane of immanence and the realm of history, politics loses its relation to the historical „here and now“ and detaches itself from the existing peoples, territories and States. As a consequence of this, politics becomes absent in Deleuze, since neither are existing historical conditions viewed as authentically political, nor can politics as something existing in a permanent process „to come“, manifest itself. However, such an interpretation is based on a strict division Mengue establishes between majority and minority, assigning to these concepts defined and delimited populations. Deleuze always repeated that the majority is not primarily a numerical majority, but a model – and the nature of this model does change.

„It is important not to confuse "minoritarian," as a becoming or process, with a "minority", as an aggregate or a state. Jews, Gypsies, etc., may constitute minorities under certain conditions, but that in itself does not make them becomings.“

What is majoritarian is not a specific population against this or that numerical minority, but a model of thought and debt that permeates social life. Similarly, a minority is not a factual minority, but becomings which permeate the majority itself, in other words, minoritarian phenomena that escape the dominant model of debt. In this regard, the absence of politics cannot be claimed based upon Deleuze’s „romantic“ relationship to minorities who at the same time reveal a „temptation to withdraw into separate communities, their intolerance, their latent micro-fascism“. It is not the minority as an identifiable group who has a tendency toward fascism, but the majority (under which all count) itself who represses its minoritarian becomings. In this regard, the danger of the absence of politics is contained in the minoritarian as an element of majority. Fascism is a form of democracy, of politics in its non-
proceed from the State as a distinct institution, but from anti-production already present in the system. In other words, counter-revolutions do not take place in the same way a despot placed an external limit to desire, (e.g. supressing peasant uprisings, resolving conflicts from outside, instilling terror to set examples, etc.). Instead, counter-revolution always emerges from the revolutionary desire itself. Fascism signifies precisely the emergence of anti-revolutionary, reactionary tendencies from within desire, which as a result of this retains conflictual, quasi-revolutionary and democratic form.

For this reason, fascism reveals the problematic nature in the relationship of immanence and politics. Fascism can emerge only in a society in which the State is immanent to the social field, where the social field is determined by internal conflict and where there are no external limits to conflict (e.g. the despotic State). Fascism relates to the immanence of capital, or relative immanence which carries within itself transcendence, i.e. the State. At the same time, fascism is not merely the appearance of transcendence, because it is not a process of the State, but of micro-politics and becoming-democratic. Fascism is a micropolitical phenomenon, something which has a trajectory toward the State, but it is primarily a feature internal to desire. Therefore, fascism is a problem that frames the relationship of immanence and politics as one between immanence and the problem of transcendence. Why is there transcendence? And if transcendence always returns, what is the relationship of absolute immanence, which has no “outside”, no “transcendence” and transcendence that always returns? To underscore institutionalized form, a form conflict takes and this is revealed precisely insofar as fascism opens up the problematic of the relationship of minority and majority (as any democracy does). This is where fascism again differs from totalitarianism, which is not a form of democracy, but an anti-democratic State project (which seeks not only to abolish anything minoritarian, but strives to transcend the division of majority / minority altogether). However, fascism problematizes the relationship of minority and majority precisely in a way that assigns these attributes to determined groups, pitting them against each other. So what Mengue is accusing Deleuze and Guattari of is precisely what takes place in fascism. This accusation, however, is not altogether without merrit. Deleuze and Guattari’s fascination with guerrilla warfare, with fringe groups and the „war machine“ could be countered with their own warning that it is hard to see the „fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective“. Not that Deleuze and Guattari were in any sense fascist, but the danger of fascism is the danger of politics turned against itself, blinded by the State – and this is precisely the problem Deleuze and Guattari confront in their work. They are aware that as thinkers of micro-politics, fascism represents a danger contained in their own work – but only here does the danger of anti-politics become apparent, not in the supposedly rigid distinction of minority and majority. Democracy, in any case, is not the rule of one or the other, but the problematization of their relationship, and fascism, as a form of democracy, does the same with the intent to abolish the problem. Ibid. pp. 215, 291; Mengue, P (2008): People and Fabulation, in: Deleuze and Politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 238 – 239.
this problem I will focus on the difference between two analysis of fascism in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. The difference between the two analyses will show that the problem of fascism becomes more immediate for Deleuze and Guattari, as something which inherently concerns their own work. This in turn will directly problematize the relationship of politics and immanence.

5. Two analysis of fascism

Deleuze and Guattari analyse fascism in both *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. The analysis in both works supports the general idea that fascism represents a counter-revolutionary movement. However, as Eugene W. Holland pointed out, these two analysis also differ to a significant degree. The difference between them, I will show, is also an index of the problem which relates to politics and immanence.

To begin with, Holland claims that “whereas *Anti-Oedipus* construes fascism (along with paranoia) as a fixation opposed to the fluidity of desire, *A Thousand Plateaus* presents fascism as a peculiar kind of acceleration of desire […]”

The analysis in *Anti-Oedipus* which construes fascism as a fixation of desire relates to the general theme examined throughout this work, the difference between the nomadic, fluid nature of desire on the one hand, and the reproduction of socially legitimate aims and goals, on the other. The nomadic, fluid nature of desire appears only when desire is de-coded in capitalism (the absence of the primary role of codes in capitalism allows for the emergence of fascism in the first place). Deleuze and Guattari argue in *Anti-Oedipus* that the opposition between de-coded desire and social aims and goals has the form of an opposition between passions and interests that animate society.

“The task of schizoanalysis is therefore to reach the investments of unconscious desire of the social field, insofar as they are differentiated from the preconscious investments of interest, and insofar as they are not merely capable of counteracting them, but also of coexisting with them in

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489 “What has happened here? Why the sudden appearance of concepts that preclude experimentation, that come with value-judgements built in? We now have a ‘cancerous’ body without organs somehow producing fascism ‘inside us’; we have a line of flight somehow turning to ‘abolition pure and simple’…” Holland goes on to argue that *Anti-Oedipus* presents a much more nuanced and powerful conception of fascism. Holland, W. E. (2008): *Schizoanalysis, Nomadology, Fascism*, in: Deleuze and Politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p. 77.
opposite modes. In the generation-gap conflict we hear old people reproach the young, in the most malicious way, for putting their desires (a car, credit, a loan, girl-boy relationships) ahead of their interests (work, savings, a good marriage). But what appears to other people as raw desire still contains complexes of desire and interest, and a mixture of forms of desire and of interest that are specifically reactionary and vaguely revolutionary.\textsuperscript{490}

There are three main layers at work here: 1) the layer of interests that express recognized social aims and goals, 2) the layer of non-recognized, pre-conscious interests that are found on the margins of society \textit{(e.g.} minoritian interests\textit{)}, and 3) the layer of desire itself that operates beyond any aims and goals. Conflict is determined by all three layers simultaneously. Not only is there a conflict between recognized interests, but also between recognized interests and the pre-conscious aims and goals that find themselves on the fringes of society. Both of these relate to desire and its fluid capacity to disorganize and mutate. Desire, which in itself operates beyond aims and goals is never encountered “as such” within the social field. This means that there is no level of raw desire which can be reached without being already “a mixture of forms of desire and of interest”. Passions appear always as interests under the determined form of subjectivity, and in relation to a specific social form. But since desire is non-purposive in its essence, its rupture and volatility under the “guise” of interests threatens social formations. For this reasons, it is usually the unrecognized, minoritian interests which introduce instability into the social field, because here desire is more visible. These minoritian aims and goals are often not defined and delimited, and as a result, conflicts are more volatile and their trajectory more unpredictable.

The suppression of desire comes in the first place from the sphere of recognized interests, which are established and fixed. However, suppression, Deleuze and Guattari argue, does not only come from the sphere of actual relations that constitute the social field, \textit{i.e.} interests, which are already mediated. Instead, suppression can also appear in the form of those interests under which desire erupts. In other words, desire can be confronted on two fronts: 1) the existing system of recognized interests, 2) the form of interests under which desire breaks its own social conditions.

“Truly revolutionary preconscious interests do not necessarily imply unconscious investments of the same nature; and apparatus of interest never takes the place of a machine of desire”\textsuperscript{491}

\textsuperscript{490} \textit{Ibid}. p. 350.
What Deleuze and Guattari are saying is that the “fixation” of desire does not necessarily come from the sphere of recognized interests, but also from the interests that are in the first instance animated by desire. To put this in other terms: the content of a revolutionary movement (e.g. its formulated interests and ideas on a future society) certainly carry weight and determine how revolutions unfold. However, the content is not the only element which is determinative, but also the investment of desire itself, i.e. the power desire takes hold of by investing the social field.

Fascism, according to Deleuze and Guattari, arises precisely when an investment of desire is not immediate, “its own”, but blocked off and re-routed by interests. Whatever the content of these interests, if molar form of power gains primacy in relation to desire, the investment itself will lack the revolutionary capacity on the unconscious level and would in effect become deformed by whatever molar form of interest is at hand. The fixation on these interests would petrify the movement of desire. Since desire is non-purposive and beyond interests as such, and since interests represent the molar expression of an unconscious investment, the realization of interests is not necessarily a realization of desire’s revolutionary capacity. The failure to realize interests could then prevent desire’s revolutionary realization, petrify its movement and ever more widen the gap between desire and interests, where in the end the paranoid wish to accomplish the interest would lead to a reaction. Conversely, the primacy of desire over interests would accomplish a revolutionary break.

“The bringing to light of the unconscious reactionary investment as if devoid of an aim, would be enough to transform it completely, to make it pass to the other pole of the libido, i.e., to the schizorevolutionary pole, since this action could not be accomplished without overthrowing power, without reversing subordination, without returning production itself to desire: for it is only desire that lives from having no aim. Molecular desiring-production would regain its liberty to master in its turn the molar aggregate under an overturned form of power or sovereignty.”

Anti-Oedipus views fascism as a peculiar phenomenon emerging from the struggle between micropolitics and its instantiation in society – the question here is: what is primary? If politics has primacy, and desire prevails, society will be more fluid and open to change. If opposite is the case, desire will become petrified and fixated, infected by a permanent fear that the reproduction of specific aims and goals will fail. The main dividing line is between the molecular desire and its molar expression of interests. Again, not only is the content of these interests important, but also how they are pursued: is their formulation more democratic, open and fluid, or is the reproduction of aims and goals as well as the interests attached to them the

492 Ibid. p. 367.
perennial telos of all practice? Insofar as the second is the case, a society is more closed, paranoid of change and more in danger of plunging into fascism.

The analysis in *A Thousand Plateus* differs significantly. As Holland notes, fascism is there regarded as an acceleration of desire. Specifically, here it seems as if desire itself gains suicidal and destructive trajectories. Fascism is understood not as a fixation of desire coming from the sphere of interests anymore, but as a phenomenon that emerges from within the movement of desire itself. Whereas *Anti-Oedipus* speaks of fascism more in the tone of something which appears on the side of the object of critique (*i.e.* the nuclear family, capitalist nature of anti-production, *etc.*), *A Thousand Plateus* speaks of fascism more as a danger present in emancipatory political practice. The idea that fascism is micropolitical, as well as the stark differences to totalitarianism appear here in order to support this thesis. Instead of the sharp distinction between molecular desire and its molar expression, the analysis shifts to the molecularity of fascism itself. In other words, fascism in *A Thousand Plateus* does not appear as a molar fixation of molecular processes, but as something which in itself already operates on micropolitical, molecular level.

“We may well have presented these lines [of flight] as a sort of mutation or creation drawn not only in the imagination but also in the very fabric of social reality; we may well have attributed to them the movement of the arrow and the speed of an absolute – but it would be oversimplifying to believe that the only risk they fear and confront is allowing themselves to be recaptured in the end, letting themselves be sealed in; tied up, reknotted, reterritorialized. They themselves emanate a strange despair, like an odor of death and immolation, a state of war from which one returns broken...”[^493]

At the same time, however, Deleuze and Guattari do not take away desire’s “innocence” in *A Thousand Plateaus*, they reject the idea that desire is animated by any kind of an internal death-drive.[^494] Therefore, on the one hand, they maintain that desire concerns “only assemblages”, but on the other, they attribute to it an internal danger toward self-destruction. This danger is not merely a matter of molar interests constraining desire’s fluidity. Instead, the fluidity of desire becomes itself dangerous, reflected in the notion that deterritorialization gains more pronounced negative connotations, and reterritorialization certain positive ones.


“This, precisely, is the fourth danger: the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, *turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition.*”

Although these two analysis of fascism differ, however, the position in *A Thousand Plateus* closely follows in the path of *Anti-Oedipus*. The change in the analysis in *A Thousand Plateus* still concerns the role two elements, desire and interests, have in the emergence of fascism. The idea that fascism emerges through the interplay of desire and its social organization is still in effect. Conversely, the problem of the destructive nature of desire, which is underscored in *A Thousand Plateus*, has already been touched upon in *Anti-Oedipus*, although it remained unelaborated:

“Given a socius, schizoanalysis only asks what place it reserves for desiring-production; what generative role desire enjoys therein; in what forms the conciliation between the regimes of desiring-production and social production is brought about, since in any case it is the same production, but under two different regimes; if, on this socius as a full body, there is the possibility of going from one side to another, i.e. from the side where the molar aggregates of social production are organized to this other side, no less collective, where the molecular multiplicities of desiring-production are formed; *whether and to what extent such a socius can endure the reversal of power such that desiring-production subjugates social production and yet does not destroy it*, since it is the same production working under the difference in regime […] [*Emphasis added.*]

The shift between the two analysis of fascism in *A Thousand Plateus* is not so much a stark departure from a previous position, which was already implied in *Anti-Oedipus*. However, the role of desire in the emergence of fascism certainly becomes more prominent. *A Thousand Plateus* shares the blame for fascism with desire itself and its acceleration in relation to the attempt to escape its own fixation. This is also why Deleuze and Guattari maintain that fascism is not a matter of an internal “death-drive”, but of an attempt to establish a line of flight, which through its attempt to avoid being re-axiomatized and re-captured, plunges into its own self-abolition.

“[…] No one, not even God, can say in advance whether two borderlines will string together or form a fiber, whether a given multiplicity will or will not cross over into another given multiplicity, or even if heterogeneous elements will enter symbiosis, will form a consistent, or cofunctioning, multiplicity susceptible to transformation. No one can say where the line of flight will pass: Will it let itself get bogged down and fall back to the Oedipal family animal, a mere poodle? Or will it

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succumb to another danger, for example, turning into a line of abolition, annihilation, self-destruction, Ahab, Ahab...?\footnote{Ibid. p. 250.}

Whereas desire in both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus retains its “innocence”, \textit{i.e.} the fact that it has no internal death-drive, its non-limited, non-purposive character becomes more ambivalent in A Thousand Plateus. It is here that violence becomes not only a matter of repression and reduction of a creative process, but also of creation itself, in other words, it becomes directly connected with features such as surplus, excess and fluidity. Whereas in Anti-Oedipus, the idea of the end of history, the end of memory and the emancipation of desire from intrinsic codes appears in a positive context, A Thousand Plateaus confronts the other side of the problem, which is desire’s own potential for violence contained in emancipation that seeks to escape the paradoxical nature of capitalism, where the past has no intrinsic world-supporting, memorial role, but is at the same time mobilized to obscure the emptiness of the eternal return. What A Thousand Plateaus explores is an excess of natural violence which emerges between the encounter of desire, which knows no difference between world and nature and its own social form that preserves and artificially protects this division. The problem was already announced in Anti-Oedipus, but it is here that it becomes immediately taken up. In an attempt to return to itself, to produce without aims and goals, without the domination of interests, desire constantly reproduces the divisions and dichotomies in social life that repress it, which opens the possibility for excess movement and speed and introduces the danger that desiring-production will destroy social production. So what Anti-Oedipus problematizes as a relationship of interests and social aims and goals that constrain the emancipatory movement of desire, A Thousand Plateaus regards from a position of desire’s reaction to this process, \textit{i.e.} its attempt to resist the appropriation through excess deterritorialization.

The question is, how does this reflect on the problem of immanence and politics, and specifically, on the relationship between absolute immanence, the limit and purity of life and relative immanence of capital that always reproduces transcendence within itself? The answer to this question lies again in fascism, and specifically in relationship to how the State appears in fascism.
6. **The State and fascism**

As shown, the State, in Hegel’s view, represents the anchoring point that contains politics and serves both as the realized “hard-limit” to politics, and as the seat of all practices through which violence can be reappropriated. Deleuze rejects such a model of the State, since State-violence is what he seeks to discredit in the first place. However, insofar as the absence of “hard-limits” on politics leaves the trajectory of practice undecidable, the State tends to reappear in Deleuze in a similar fashion as in Hegel – as the horizon of practice. Deleuze and Guattari, both in *Anti-Oedipus*, as well as in *A Thousand Plateaus* operate with a very peculiar concept of the State. In both works, the State has almost Platonic features, figuring as a transcended idea. And instead of attacking Hegel for his statements about the divine and eternal nature of the State, Deleuze and Guattari are here in a rare agreement with Hegel.\(^\text{498}\)

In the first chapter, I posed the question why - of all the possible assemblages - do we find ourselves in a world dominated by States? I will again quote the pertinent passage from Deleuze, where one can read the following:

> Everything is not of the State precisely because there have been States always and everywhere. Not only does writing presuppose the State, but so do speech and language. The self-sufficiency, autarky, independence, preexistence of primitive communities, is an ethnological dream: not that these communities necessarily depend on States, but they coexist with them in a complex network. [...] And in primitive societies there are as many tendencies that ‘seek’ the State, as many vectors working in the direction of the State, as there are movements within the State or outside it that tend to stray from it or guard themselves against it, or else to stimulate its evolution, or else already to abolish it: everything coexists, in perpetual interaction.\(^\text{499}\)

This passage does not refer to the State as a distinct institution. As such, it would be senseless to claim that primitive communities were always surrounded by States. Instead, it expresses the idea that at the moment the community is incepted, the State appears as an abstraction to be feared and exorcized, as a monstrosity looming over the primitive populace. Eventually, the State is realized in its transcended, alienated and despotic form and finally, it becomes concrete in capitalism. A similar idea is found in *Anti-Oedipus*:


“The State was not formed in progressive stages, it appears fully armed, a master stroke executed all at once; the primordial Urstaat, the eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires.”

What do Deleuze and Guattari claim here? On the one hand, since history is fully contingent, they cannot mean that the State represents the necessity of human life. On the other hand, it seems as if there is some fate or destiny attached to the appearance of the State. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, for example, the image emerges of a dualistic, almost Manichaean struggle between the war machine and the State. On the one hand, the war machine or the capacity for conflict are undetermined – there is no internal trajectory in war toward the State because war tends to prevent the formation of States. Contradiction is not the primary organizing model for conflict from which a resolution in the form of the State would appear. Although the State presupposes itself in all conflict, as the model around which contradictions can be resolved and *sublated*, the State is not something that appears as a natural trajectory of war. On the other hand, the State emerges through the working of desire, and it is a form desire takes. The dissociation of the State from the war machine, however, results in an ontological framework, where neither the State nor the war machine can be deduced from the other. At the same time, both seem unavoidable. As Krause and Röllo point out:

“The State-form as a form of sovereignty and appropriation *always already* possesses a kind of an ideal truth, which cannot be explained by the socially necessary overcoming of economic and political tasks. At this point, the authors evoke Hegel’s philosophy of right and attest the fact that it rigorously articulated the negative truth of the actual. [Author’s translation]”

This observation, as already mentioned, is based on Deleuze and Guattari’s acknowledgment that “if there is even one truth in the political philosophy of Hegel, it is that every State carries within itself the essential moments of its existence”. Although there are many different forms of State, all with their own particular historical developments, they all relate back to the *Urstaat*, a position from which the “particularity of States becomes merely an accident of fact, as is their


possible perversity”. What remains “eternal” in this diversity of States is the principle of “rational and reasonable organization of a community”.

This position of the State in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, I argue, seems to emerge from their own internal problem of natural violence. As long as the dichotomy between becomings and history persist, the relationship of politics and the State will also remain unresolved. The reason for this is that the violence inherent in the dualism of becoming and history must be necessarily counter-acted by the State itself. The dichotomy between history and becoming, desire and its social organization and in general, between life and its social conditioning results in a dualism between the war machine and the State. Because life cannot be exhausted in any social organization, resistance must be taken as the necessary constant of society. No society can emerge which can eradicate resistance through suppression and violence. Any attempt to remove resistance from social life is futile. This consequently means the permanency of conflict. The permanent nature of conflict is what allows for historical temporality to emerge in the first place. Conflict and resistance are the conditions of historicity itself. But this historical nature of human life, the fact that it is always determined by the state of affairs, places conflict into an antagonistic relationship to social life. Society represents a paradox, because it cannot appear without desire, or life, yet precisely this element tends to subvert social organization, exceeding any given form.

Ibid. p. 375.

The concept of the State connects Hegel’s concept of absolute knowledge and Deleuze’s concept of the axiomatic. Absolute knowledge represents the standpoint of Spirit where it does not reference anything else in its constitution but itself. The community does not reference natural events or distant myths to organize itself, only its self-conscious relationship to the world it creates. In this way, immanence is achieved that is presupposed in the State as the mechanism through which this self-consciousness is established. The axiomatic expresses a similar idea. Capitalism establishes immanence insofar as a community does not reference coded organization of life, such as despotic or divine demands, external events, and so on, but only its own internal limit – capital. Laws in capitalism relate to a limit internal to the community and are derived from within. The State imposes a law which emerged through the conflicts and internal struggles of the community, not by referencing God from a position of transcendence. However, absolute knowledge transcends the community and reveals that the immanence of the State is still subject to historical contingency, necessitating passage to higher forms of freedom (religion, art, philosophy). Similarly, the axiomatic represents a false immanence of capitalism. Politics does not end with the State and that it signifies a form of freedom beyond its axiomatic form. This is why, for Hegel, politics remains internal to the objective world, whereas for Deleuze, it also has a nomadic form of exteriority. And whereas for Hegel religion or philosophy affirm the existing freedom of the world through different forms of expression, in Deleuze, art or philosophy as well as other practices arrive together with politics, affirming from beyond the indifference of world and nature. Ibid.
Insofar society represents a paradox, the State appears as an even more problematic phenomenon. The State seeks to resolve the paradox in one direction – by stabilizing and fixating the problematic nature of society, the State is geared against conflict. The primacy of social production serves the purpose of fixating anti-production in order to reproduce the state of affairs. However, with the downfall of despotism, the State did not disappear – it became problematized, subjected to conflict and at the same time it appropriated and internalized conflict. Insofar as this is the case, the position of the State in capitalism goes beyond the idea that this form is merely a repressive mechanism of social production. It would seem that the State is in fact internal to the war machine itself, not as a real, existing tendency of conflict, as something which can be deduced from it – but as a result of the impossibility of resolving the paradox of desire itself, of its own internal gap between it pure form - life and its necessary social organization. If we look back at the quote from Anti-Oedipus, where they underscore the potential destructive capacity of desire, they do this precisely when speaking of a possible alternate social organization.

“ [...] Whether and to what extent such a socius can endure the reversal of power such that desiring-production subjugates social production and yet does not destroy it, since it is the same production working under the difference in regime […].”505

Could this be a viable solution to the paradox of desire? Would the primacy of desire and life over social aims and goals, in other words, a society of permanent revolution, resolve the paradox internal to life? The answer must be in the negative. The reason for this is that life is not rational and that any rational organization which would seek to “accommodate” as opposed to “repress” desire would run into the same problem a repressing society has – that resistance and conflict would perpetuate themselves. In other words, not only can no society emerge which would eradicate resistance through repression and violence, but no society can emerge that could eradicate resistance through any means – even its accommodation. How could a non-repressive society accommodate desire when desire as such signifies excess and surplus to any given organization of desire? In other words, the organization of life that would seek to accommodate desire’s primacy in relation to social aims and goals would still retain the underlying problem of the dichotomy of desire as such: metaphysical production, on the one hand and the fact that social organization remains precisely that – organization which cannot exhaust desire. It is in this sense that desire will never be rid of the danger of “turning into a line of abolition, annihilation, self-destruction”. Desire would always appear as an index of surplus to

what is given and organized, even if this organization were not external and transcended but immanent to desire itself.

To exemplify this, we should once again look at fascism. Fascism is both turned against the State – it reveals a hatred for transcendence and alienation (e.g. expressed in the multitude of its conspiracy theories about external governments, secret organizations, international cabals, etc). It construes its enemies in such a way that they figure as external, alienated, despotic factors. This is the index of resistance, no matter how perverted, present in fascism. Precisely in this sense is fascism a war machine and everything totalitarianism is not. Totalitarianism is a State project, it reveals a paranoid fear before passions (even those which might support it), a fear of any conflict, excess or deviation. Fascism, on the other hand, is fuelled by passions and is as much antagonistic to the State, as it seeks to become the State. The fact that fascism seeks to become the State, however, is not merely a question of hypocrisy, of being a “bourgeois” trap for the revolution, where the revolution has only to learn the “truth” and know that it should dispense with the State. One can very well maintain, both on a conscious and an unconscious level the revolutionary élan – but conflict knows no “subject” as such and because of this, it reproduces the State, always already there in relation to someone. Its appearance might take on the form of an object to be conquered, an object of conflict, or indeed it might take on the form of an alienated other. But even if the State as a distinct institution were to wither away, resistance would reproduce it as a side-product. For example, in the same way the State instituted repression in the primitive society before its birth, insofar as these societies mobilized war to stave off the State, so would the collapse of the State as the exemplary primacy of social production not banish the abstraction and the threat of the State. Every democracy is in this regard haunted by the State (tyranny, Asiatic despotism, Roman rex, totalitarianism, fascism, etc.). Although the war machine permanently mutates, and the State always retains its identity, the mutating character of the war machine would always find itself in relationship of comparison to the “identity” of the State.

The State is both an index of necessity of organizing conflict – it is something ours, something I may view as mine, as well as an index of transcendence, something foreign and alienated. It serves as an instance of fixation of conflict and resistance, the centre of the world that reduces conflict and serves to abolish its excesses, but also as an instance that appears in conflict as an alienated and de-coded power, an enemy and a threat. Finally, it is an object of conflict – precisely that which must be appropriated in order to reduce conflict. The State is both the antithesis of resistance, but also a tendency internal to resistance, and resistance cannot be removed from a system.
Fascism is the point where this problematic relationship between the war machine and the State becomes most visible. Fascism represents resistance against the State, which paradoxically seeks to become the State, precisely in order to guard itself against it. The more conflict expands and subverts the State, the more the State appears as a necessity, as a safe-point which will guard against the alienating side of conflict. Because fascism is a conflictual, micropolitical phenomenon, which at the same time seeks to abolish itself as such, to centralize and isolate, it reveals as a form of conflict an anti-State trajectory, which moves in the direction of the State. The reversal of the relationship between desire and social production, *i.e.* the primacy of desiring-production could not resolve this paradox, because an excess and surplus would always remain. In other words, the primacy of desire would not prevent the possibility of further deterritorialization, because when desire is accommodated, the scope of social organization would still fall short of life as such. This is where fascism reveals the paradoxical nature of politics and absolute immanence. Absolute immanence will always influence the realm of relative immanence in a paradoxical fashion. On the one hand, the gap between the two cannot be bridged – immanence in its trajectory toward absolutization gives birth to transcendence.

Deleuze’s impatience for notions such as “end of metaphysics” or an “end of philosophy” gain a new prominence in this light. Such an end could only take place when the gap between the relative immanence of the social milieu and absolute immanence would become closed. The necessity of metaphysics and philosophy lies precisely in the inability to realize absolute immanence. However, the same inability gives birth to all the dangers of deterritorialization – most prominently – fascism. At the same time, the movement of immanence towards absolutization beyond the internal limits and mediating structures proposed by Hegel, cannot be prevented. No one can “ban” a revolution, in the same way that no can “ban” politics becoming philosophical and *vice versa.* Therefore, whereas in Hegel politics on the one hand, and philosophy on the other, are mediated by the State, in Deleuze the two intertwine and abandon their established social roles against the State. However, insofar politics has a trajectory toward absolute immanence, toward further deterritorialization through philosophy or art, it also carries the greatest danger within itself. Because there are no “hard-breaks” on politics, because it is open ended and emancipatory, it will always reveal the gap that separates our historical time and the eternal return. In other words, precisely politics, and its philosophical expression, will open the

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trajectory toward absolute immanence, an escape from transcendence, and in this way reveal the gap and the inadequacy of living “a life” as immanence. This brings me back to the previous point – insofar as this gap remains, resistance and conflict will never cease. This is the necessary pre-requisite for politics as such. However, the other side of this is that transcendence will always install itself back into immanence. Transcendence is a confusing and ambivalent companion of immanence. Indeed, the very pronouncement of absolute immanence, which “has no transcendence”, invites transcendence in the negative. The qualifier “absolute”, the need to add it to the concept of immanence reveals the ambivalence of absolute immanence. It is an absolute immanence, but only insofar it acknowledges transcendences in the negative, as absent. And precisely in this sense does the State as the fulcrum of transcendence appear – as something absent, but always arriving as a danger, something to be staved off and something to be appropriated as a safeguard.

Consequently, insofar as an excess of conflict and resistance can be neither destroyed nor accommodated – the State remains a necessity. This necessity is not psychological or natural, but one simulated by history. Since capitalism lacks a contextual future, and only has a future determined by undecidable conflict, the State becomes an anchoring point. The State is therefore completely contingent – simply speaking – there is nothing preventing us from living without a State, there is no necessity in this form of organization of life. Paradoxically, however, the State is, as Hegel observed, eternal and divine – because it persists and reproduces itself despite its contingent character, revealing itself as a tendency present in that which subverts it. It is both historical and contingent and because of its historical character necessary. To this effect, politics, properly speaking, never has an immediate link with absolute immanence, but in the same way as in Hegel, only in unison with other practices. Whereas in Hegel the State serves to establish immanence in such a way that it prevents absolute immanence and politics from merging, in Deleuze and Guattari, the State reveals itself as the point in which the ambivalent nature of the relationship between politics and absolute immanence is contained.

The main question of this work was, does grounding of politics in immanence introduce a paradox into politics. In Hegel’s case, I have shown that the attempt to relate politics to immanence can succeed only through other forms of practices – in grounding as the establishment of totality. Politics and immanence presuppose the existence of the State and the fact that politics has its limits in the State. Politics opens the field of immanence of objective Spirit and relates to absolute immanence through philosophy, art and religion. A Deleuzian critique has shown the weak elements of this standpoint, specifically, the fact that passions, and therefore, political practice, extend beyond the State and subvert its limiting role. Politics has a
tendency toward absolute immanence, specifically, art or philosophy take up the role of annulling the limiting role of the State, making philosophy political and politics infused with the capacity to open up possibilities beyond the actual and rational. The grounding in immanence is an ungrounding of memory and history – the eternal return. However, insofar as politics gains this capacity, that it lacks in Hegel, another side of the paradox emerges, which is visible in fascism. In fascism, the problematic nature of the relationship between immanence and politics in Deleuze comes to the forefront. Fascism is the appearance of transcendence within the field of immanence itself, precisely in this movement toward absolutization. The argument that fascism reveals the false immanence of capital, however, cannot exclude the problematic nature of the relationship of politics to absolute immanence. The reason for this is that the moment this relationship is problematized, the gap between politics and immanence re-appears – namely the impossibility of an absolute immanence proper to politics. Insofar as conflict and resistance cannot be removed from any given system, transcendence will always install itself – which means that the nature of politics itself, its grounding in immanence or difference as such, presupposes the necessity of conflict, the possibility of bloody struggles and as such the possibility of anti-politics and the State. In this regard the dichotomy between desire and its social organization, between absolute immanence and transcendence only re-affirms itself.
CONCLUSION

1. The paradox of politics and immanence

The main question asked at the beginning of this work was: Does Hegel’s and Deleuze’s grounding of politics in immanence introduce a paradox into their conceptions of politics?

The answer resulting from this work is yes. Both Hegel and Deleuze encounter a paradox in their works. This paradox concerns the status of natural violence in their philosophies. They are both confronted with an excess of natural violence, which means that both thinkers fail to establish proper limits to it.

Hegel’s limit to such violence is embodied in the State. The State represents a border in relation to nature that constitutes an objective world. In the first chapter I showed that this border establishes itself as a historically conditioned formation. The State establishes the possibility of historicity, it converts natural violence, represented in flat and non-transformative repetition, into lawful power. As a lawful power the State is capable of holding together all the constitutive elements of the human world, which include art, religion, custom, and so on. This capability is based on the capacity of the State to record events and impart them a form of consciousness which views these events as its own product. A capacity to pass judgment slowly emerges. Judgment is internal to life, which through its passions and the emerging spiritual nature based on reason becomes capable of establishing co-ordinates of an objective world. By being subjected to judgment, passions transform into interests that are capable of sustaining both individual freedom and the freedom of the State.

This outer development of the State in relation to nature has a corresponding inner one. The inner development of the State follows its internal division through which political practice emerges as an independent power. Politics appears against the background of other practices and serves as a mediating point through which all practices become capable of pursuing their particular purposiveness. In this regard, politics is a practice unlike other practices. Its task is to sustain and reproduce all other activities within the Sittlichkeit – it prolongs their productive capacity because it enables them to shape the world. In this way, political practice is itself productive, precisely because without it the whole system of the Sittlichkeit would collapse. Political practice shapes the State because it enables the mediation of distinct interests. The
outer force of “passions”, which disappeared the moment a State became constituted, becomes
the internal engine of the modern State. What enables this internalization is the mutual
divergence and synthesis of practices.

However, the first and second chapter revealed a trajectory in Hegel’s argumentation that
runs counter to his political project. The sublation of natural violence into State-power as well
as the transformation of natural, flat repetition into a spiritual one, reveals a remnant of
development. This remnant is represented in a surplus of social forms that became expelled
from Spirit’s development both within and outside the State. Beyond the State these forms are
represented by past States that remain in a “vegetative” state. Within, the inner constitution of
the modern Sittlichkeit causes its own internal structure to dissolve by extracting the bourgeois
from its inherent unity with the citizen. This drive to contingency, both on the outside and the
inside, is located in the nature of modern freedom, because the Sittlichkeit cannot sustain itself
in the face of individual interests (i.e. passions that have been “internalized”). The problem,
however, as I have shown in the third chapter, is not only that the Sittlichkeit dissolves (this is
already presupposed in the modern family and the civil society), but that the modern State
remains incapable of controlling this process. Furthermore, the State is not only incapacitated
in counter-acting the process, it also becomes fully integrated into it. At the limit of history as
a limit of freedom, the State becomes incapable of reproducing this limit and permanently tends
to extend itself beyond it.

Hegel’s solution to the problem is to extend the development of Spirit into absolute
immanence. Absolute immanence, as has been shown, signifies a point at which negativity
becomes pure affirmation, in other words, where the negative releases all content. This capacity,
which is internal to the temporal nature of Spirit, signifies its full immanence. However, in
order to function as immanence, Spirit must permanently re-activate and re-live the historical
content of its memorial fabric. Spirit stands in relation to all its past forms and, therefore, in
relation to objective Spirit in the form of the Sittlichkeit. This means that, on the one hand, the
State represents a border in relation to natural violence but, on the other, is itself a form through
which political practice becomes independent and free from absolute Spirit, protected by
Spirit’s absolutization, which is reserved for religion, art, and philosophy. Politics remains
politics, it can and does sustain religious, artistic, and philosophical developments (since these
are present and possible only in the State), but it can never become indistinguishable with them.
This means that Hegel’s grounding of politics in immanence already presupposes a shift
between the two. Politics is grounded in absolute immanence insofar as it is removed from it;
it occupies its own space delimited by the State on both borders and it reproduces this space by
sustaining the State. This position of politics in relation to immanence should have prevented violence on both fronts – the violence of raw, brute nature, as well as the violence of Spirit ripping apart society by fusing the elements of absolute Spirit, such as religious or philosophical principles, with political practice. But as shown, this is not the case.

In Deleuze’s account, violence persists after the limits of history have been reached. It persists in all forms of organization, pre-modern as well as modern ones. However, “violence” here does not only refer to natural repetitious power, which subdues the subject. Instead, the natural is not differentiated along the lines of “society” and “nature”. It relates to the “plane of immanence” that precedes such differentiations. The natural refers to becoming and since becomings, as shown, do not follow the historical line of development nor the conditions of contradiction and resolution, there are no pre-determined points from which movement proceeds. Becomings “trespass” the division of genera and species, because they do not conform to the delineations established through historization. Violence, therefore, cannot become reduced to “relative exteriority”, i.e. natural repetition unified with necessity, because “relativization” of exteriority is not possible. Immanence which would sustain itself through relation to transcendence is no true immanence, precisely because it purports to construct a sphere of development that makes certain other, “natural” forms of development illegitimate or sterile. Immanence is constituted by “relations of exteriority”. What this means is that violence as such is necessarily in “excess” when social production has priority in relation to desiring-production. When social conditions constrain and regulate desire, violence that appears is not the violence of absolute exteriority but violence provoked by the reduction of becomings. The result of this is that practice cannot be reduced to the knowledge of Spirit. It relates to the knowledge of the body as well, where the body signifies the multiplicity of life, i.e. a mental, spiritual, but also corporeal body. Practice “draws” on productive powers that are not localized in a specific form of immanence in relation to an exterior, but rather in immanence as devoid of an exterior, because it signifies nothing less than absence of any closure or totalization. In relation to such a socially conditioned closure, production results in a necessary surplus. Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history is not so much a history of development as it is a history of the gradual collapse of different forms of social conditions placed on desire. From savagery to capitalism one can trace the degeneration of history up to the end of history, signified by the incapacity of the axiomatic to sustain a coded temporality. Becomings flee from historical closure and disperse, recaptured only by the non-historical and axiomatic form of capital.

248
However, the paradox of the excess of violence appears in Deleuze precisely at the point where a gap between *becoming* and history reveals itself. Since *becomings* and history operate on distinct levels, a dualism remains, which cannot be regarded merely as an illusory appearance of a deeper monism. The reason is that, as shown in the first chapter, *becomings* presuppose history. This presupposition is necessitated by the indeterminacy of *becomings* that require an organized form of temporality through which they can effectuate difference. *Becomings* “return” to history, and this return can be thoroughly violent. So long a subject is presupposed, *becomings* can impact historical life. When this impact takes place, something external must appear to the subject, which will necessarily provoke involution – fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and so on. In other words, when Deleuze releases “natural violence” from its raw and reductionist form, when he makes Nature a plane of immanence, violence loses its inherent trajectory toward the establishment of the world. This violence can now very well lead to a *body without organs* which becomes completely static or dissolved. The reason is that politics in the register of *micropolitics*, as practice tied into *becoming* and not primarily to the institutions (*macropolitics*), releases forces of production and seeks to reach immanence without the “buffer zone” of the institutional framework present in Hegel (the border of the State in relation to absolute Spirit). Immanence and politics fuse, and in this fusion violence is released which has no trajectory toward spiritual forms of life, since Nature, in opposition to “Spirit”, has no inscribed DNA that would lead to a world. When given primacy in relation to the institutions they establish, passions, as Hegel noted, tend to destroy all the limits morality and law place on them. To view passions as inherently productive rather than merely a raw form of interest, does not change the fact that these passions always play out in an institutionally constituted space, thereby transforming these institutions. The pertinent question is: why would their primacy make them any less violent? More problematic even, as shown, is the fact that passions not only appear “more violently” than imagined by Hegel, but that this excess of violence in itself re-gains a trajectory toward the State, precisely through the fact that “terror”, as the mark of this excess, invites its historical political form. Even in a condition of the *primacy of desire* the threat of an excess of violence would merge with the threat of the State – the fear of violence that cannot be judged and internalized would become the fear of the State.

Therefore, same as in Hegel, an excess of violence persists; an excess that is not a surplus of dead repetition, but an excess that is presupposed by the very “macro” level of political practice. The primacy of desiring-production over social production, as shown in the third chapter, does not guarantee a survival of society.
Therefore, an affirmative answer to the main question of this work must be qualified. Yes, the grounding of politics in immanence does introduce a paradox into politics in Hegel’s and Deleuze’s philosophies. The question can be asked: can the paradox be removed by a synthesis of elements of Hegel’s and Deleuze’s position? Hegel could accept an excess of differentiation beyond Spirit, theoretically presupposed by Deleuze, whereas Deleuze could accept some inherent organizing capacity, which would not invariably be a process of disorganization. In other words, Deleuze could impart desire some organizing capacity that would not always be “its most deterritorialized component, a cutting edge of deterritorialization.”

However, their acceptance of these presuppositions would reveal another problem. Both philosophers operate within the register of immanence, the concept of *absolute immanence*. This means that any middle ground is in effect impossible. There is no synthesis of a Deleuzian and Hegelian position, because absolute immanence in the form they develop it rejects the notion of some external mechanism of development, which would resolve the problems of immanence as such. The nature of *absolute immanence* cannot accept transcended determination; it always refers to its own conditions. Dualism of immanence and something that “falls outside the plane” is unacceptable for both, since this would defeat the idea of *absolute immanence*. On the other hand, dualism within immanence would defeat the political project Hegel and Deleuze pursue. In Hegel’s case, an internal dualism would allow absolute contingency to persist in Spirit, thereby relativizing its development and legitimizing all forms of (what from Hegel’s perspective appears as) non-freedom that emerge from this contingency. In Deleuze’s case, dualism in immanence would make desire itself inherently repressive, since it would legitimize the historical State-form and introduce an instinct to subject to law which would be internal to *becomings* themselves. Consequently, even if they did accept the presuppositions of the other author, they would still face irresolvable paradoxes, since they would necessarily be forced to either abandon the project of absolute immanence or follow the position of the other author. Consequently, neither of the philosophers is capable of theoretically containing violence that emerges from the relationship of politics and immanence.

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2. The limits of immanence

My examination ends with a paradox. However, as shown throughout this work, paradoxes are not necessarily bad. They can also be productive. The possibility for making the paradox of politics and immanence productive resides in the way one looks at their relationship.

During the course of this work, the concept of immanence became equated with the idea of the limit. Immanence represents the absolute limit. If immanence is viewed as the limit, the grounding of political practice in immanence places this practice in relation to its limits. This means that the concept of immanence stands in a primary position in relation to politics.

However, one can also look at this relationship from the opposite side. This other side of the equation shows that politics itself places certain limits on the concept of immanence. In other words, the attempt to ground politics in immanence reveals not only that immanence serves as the limit to political practice, but that politics itself puts limits to thinking immanence. When placed in a relationship to politics, immanence as the “ground” begins to disintegrate. In Deleuze’s view, the ground is difference and always an ungrounding. But with politics, transcendence becomes re-introduced and a fixation of the ground. For Hegel, immanence is pure negativity, which sustains a political world of the State. At the same time, it is politics which dissolves the world of the negative. Therefore, to ground politics in immanence presupposes not only a grounding of politics, but an impact on the ground itself. Political practice gives shape to immanence. Every time politics appears within a given historical milieu, immanence gains a different character. The Greek city establishes its own immanence, in the same way that capitalism represents a determination of immanence. To this effect, history does not only reveal the emergence of immanence (either through or against itself), but also the relativization of immanence. The moment the concept of immanence “steps out” of its philosophical arguments, that is to say, the moment it encounters politics, it loses its absolute character. The reason is that the grounding of politics in immanence also presupposes that politics establishes immanence. Absolute immanence would call for absolute politics. But neither Hegel nor Deleuze wish to go to the extreme of “absolute politics”. Hegel absolves politics from this burden by relegating pure immanence to art, religion, and philosophy. Deleuze, on the other hand, speaks of history as something which always already determines becomings, in the same way that desiring-production always already appears as an interest. This is why in both Hegel’s and Deleuze’s cases, politics must take on a specific relationship to art, religion, poetry, or philosophy. Its attempt to reach “immanence” at the same time invites other
forms of practices. However, politics as such never actually reaches immanence. There is no absolute politics.

Therefore, if politics establishes immanence, its absolute form will always differ. This is why although both Hegel and Deleuze operate with the same concept of absolute immanence, its relationship to different concepts of politics produces incompatible theoretical frameworks. And what appears to one author as a solution to the problem of politics and immanence, represents for the other the abolishment of immanence. Therefore, both authors reveal in each other’s work a relativization of immanence.

One could then place the question: Is not the fact that immanence is always established through political practice precisely the limit of immanence? Although absolute immanence extends itself either beyond politics or through politics to other forms of practices, it changes its character depending on what kind of politics is mobilized for its establishment. Politics prevents the absolutization of immanence by permanently revealing surplus in the form of something that has been theoretically “banned”. Any attempt to re-capture this surplus only shows the persistence of politics in creating more surplus. This, in a sense, confirms the thesis of both authors, that politics as such is always productive. Neither of them can legitimately claim that the other author operates with a non-productive idea of politics. Deleuze cannot claim that Hegel’s politics represents anti-production, in the same way that Hegel cannot regard natural production as sterile repetition.

Therefore, although there is no mediating point between Hegel and Deleuze, they both share a common understanding when it comes to the nature of politics. The fact that their concepts of politics differ so much does not go against this fact, on the contrary, it confirms it, insofar the productive nature of politics reveals its own capacity to mutate and transform. Both authors reveal this mutating capacity not only within their own works, but also when placed in relation to the work of the other author.

Therefore, the paradox of immanence and politics does not represent the “dead-end” in the relationship of the two. Rather, it signifies, as Deleuze states, the condition of possibility of the problem. The paradox does not even necessarily call for the abandonment of absolute immanence, since it is precisely in relationship to absolute immanence that certain limits and problems become visible. However, insofar as politics places limits on immanence as well, the productive nature of the relationship between immanence and politics will always lead to the relativization of immanence. Only through this relativization of immanence does the relationship remain open – indeed, only a relative immanence can be a proper immanence of politics. Deleuze’s concept of politics emerges through the relativization of Spirit, the
acknowledgment of the outside and its productive capacities, in the same way that Hegel’s concept of politics emerges through the relativization of the outside and the establishment of immanence in the form of Spirit. This is also the reason why violence took such distinct forms throughout this work. What to Hegel appears as violence is for Deleuze the true source of production and vice versa. Yet is this not a sign of the productive nature of violence? Not violence as “destruction”, “repression” or “natural repetition”, but as a challenge to immanence, as the sign of the impossibility of complete closure or disorganization. Politics emerges precisely in this sense violently. It emerges as grounded in immanence, as that which establishes immanence, and finally as that which relativizes immanence. The paradox of politics and immanence, therefore, should not be regarded merely as a problem which calls for a solution. Rather, it should be thought (to follow Deleuze) as the condition of possibility of the problem’s mutability, without which we would always be stuck with the same problem and the same solutions.
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