

## **Title Page**

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### **Biographical note**

Pieter Troch is a social historian of Yugoslavia. He obtained a PhD in East-European Languages and Cultures from Ghent University in 2012 with a study on Yugoslav nation-building in the domain of education and associational life in interwar Yugoslavia. A thorough revision of the dissertation was published by IB Tauris in 2015. He worked in civil society in Serbia and Kosovo before joining the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg as a Postdoctoral Researcher. Troch conducts a micro-historical study of social change in the city of Mitrovica in northern Kosovo during the 1960s. He is particularly interested in local economic policy and urban development.

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## **Social Dynamics and Nationhood in Employment Politics in the Trepça Mining Complex in Socialist Kosovo (1960s)**

### **Abstract**

This article analyses the interconnection of socio-economic divisions and nationhood in Socialist Kosovo through a case-study of employment politics in the Trepça mining complex during the 1960s. The article first describes the shifting cadre politics in Trepça, which aimed to increase the degree of skills of the work collective and to address the dramatic underrepresentation of Albanians in management and specialist positions. It then analyses the departure of Serb and Montenegrin specialists from the enterprise and the internal dispute over the proportional relevance of socio-economic and national grounds for this trend. The second half of the article situates these developments against two levels of social division in the enterprise: vertical social divisions between manual production workers and specialist cadres and horizontal divisions at the top management level. The article argues that the divisions between low-skilled production workers and management personnel was not politically relevant. Such vertical social divisions were depoliticised and denationalised. The outspoken national dimension of cadre politics for specialist personnel and the pluralist tendencies in the management culture of Yugoslav enterprises during the late 1960s, on the other hand, nationalised and politicised the competition between a new generation of Albanian technically schooled specialists and the predominantly Serb, politically appointed managers in function.

### **Keywords**

Kosovo, Socialist Yugoslavia, employment politics, Trepça, nationhood

## Introduction

The interconnection of national and socio-economic divisions counts as a key destabilising factor of Socialist Yugoslavia. Most literature has focussed on the economic and national divergences between republics and provinces, which were rooted in the political and economic decentralisation of the 1960s and continued to burden the Yugoslav federation until its ultimate collapse (Jakir, 2013; Kežić, 2017, pp. 92–133; Pleština, 1992; Ramet, 2006, pp. 263–284; Unkovski-Korica, 2016, pp. 165–219; Woodward, 1995, pp. 352–367). An assessment of the relevance of nationhood in economically motivated social conflict at the level of the locality lacks.

Employment is a particularly useful domain to analyse economically motivated social conflict. Referring to the post-Soviet space, Pål Kolstø (2008, esp. p. 152) states that population growth and job equalisation upset ethnically stratified systems and create socio-economically motivated ethnic division. The ethnic stratification of employment and demographic developments in Kosovo suggest that these conditions were met in Yugoslavia's least developed region. Serbs and Montenegrins were overrepresented in the privileged public sector, while Albanians provided the bulk of the unemployed and the private sector (Ströhle, 2016b; Woodward, 1995, p.342). Kosovo's population almost doubled in the three decades after the Second World War and witnessed significant changes in ethnic proportions, because of the boom of the Albanian population (Clewing, 2000, p. 51, pp.55–57). In the same period, state education was developed practically from scratch and by the early 1980s, Kosovo had the highest share of higher education students of all Yugoslav units (Kostovicova, 2005, pp. 40–43; Ströhle, 2016a, pp. 289–362). Yugoslavia's regional development policy guaranteed high funding priority for Kosovan industry despite underperformance and often limited economic justifications. Yet, the province remained the most underdeveloped region in Yugoslavia (Palairat, 1992; Pleština, 1992). The stagnation of economic growth in the mid-1960s concurred with the graduation of the first generations of higher education students. Registered unemployment rates were the highest in Yugoslavia at over 25%, while the economically active population and the rate of employment were the lowest of the country, at 30 and 16% respectively (Woodward, 1995, pp. 200–208).

The failure of Yugoslav socio-economic policy to employ the educated youth of Kosovo, an essential aspect of the failure of Kosovan socialist modernity, generated ethnically based political fault lines. Nearly full unemployment of Kosovo Albanians provided 'the economic basis for an alternative community centred in family-based social organization and ethnically based political identities' (Woodward, 1995, p. 342). In 1968 and 1981, Albanian students took to the streets of Pristina with a blend of socio-economic and national demands for equal access to education and public employment and political autonomy, indicating the mobilising force of Kosovo Albanian political identity (Ströhle, 2016a, pp. 335–60; Woodward, 1995, pp. 282–98, pp. 342–4). At the same time, censuses indicated a stagnation and then drop in the numbers of Serbs and Montenegrins in the province from the 1960s onwards. This trend has been ascribed to a combination of national and economic factors. Serbian historiography generally relates the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo to Albanian economic and political pressure, while Kosovo Albanian interpretations usually situate these developments within broader economic migration patterns (Clewing, 2000, pp. 58–59).

In order to make a sensible contribution to the discussion over the relation between socio-economic and national divisions in Socialist Kosovo, I take as a starting point Kolstø's (2008) concluding claim that although socio-economic structures strongly influence nationalism, structure should not be favoured over agency (p. 167). I decrease the scale of analysis from the macro-level of republics and provinces to the locality, which was a crucial site of employment politics in the economic policy of Socialist Yugoslavia (Woodward, 1995, pp. 173–180).

The article presents a thick analysis of social agency in the mining, metallurgy, and chemical industry enterprise of Trepça (Serbian: Trepča),<sup>1</sup> with seat in multi-ethnic Mitrovica in northern

Kosovo. Under British ownership in the interwar period, the historical mining site was reactivated at Stanterg (Serbian: Stari Trg), just east of Mitrovica, and expanded with processing, smelting, and refinery capacities in Zveqan (Serbian: Zvečan), north of Mitrovica. Trepça was further developed as a prime extraction site of lead for Nazi Germany during the Second World War. In Socialist Yugoslavia, the complex was integrated into a conglomerate for mining, metallurgical, and chemical industry, which was the top producer of lead and zinc in the country with a maximal employment of over 20,000 people. It was a typical example of a Yugoslav big system enterprise, with wasteful investments, oversizing, extensive production increase by expanding production sites and activities, low productivity performance, and disastrous profit records covered up by constant subsidisation from the federal development funds. Nevertheless, the enterprise has an iconic significance for the Serbs and Albanians of Kosovo as the province's major natural economic asset and guarantee for well-being (Palairt, n.d., pp. 5–13).

The enterprise has been the subject of Serb-Albanian dispute at least since the second half of the 1960s, when the departure of Serb experts initiated the discussion on national tensions in the province. Trepça re-emerged as a prominent site of ethno-political conflict in Kosovo and Yugoslavia as a whole in 1989, when Albanian miners in Stanterg struck against the suspension of Kosovo's autonomy. The strikers gained the support of the Kosovo Albanian and Slovenian political leadership in their common battle against the centralisation politics of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. The post-1989 period was characterised by the massive dismissal and departure of Albanians from Trepça. The enterprise was on the verge of collapse when it was ultimately brought under United Nations administration in 1999 and closed down in August 2000 (Palairt, n.d., pp. 13–83). At current, Trepça is not operational, but the Serbian and Kosovan governments continue to lay claim on the enterprise.

This study focusses on socio-economic and national divisions in the enterprise in the 1960s. In an early study, Wolfgang Höpken (1984) identified the second half of the 1960s as a period of pluralist challenges to the monistic systemic structure of Socialist Yugoslavia. Among the 'pluralist niches', he identified labour divisions in the enterprise and the increasingly formalised strike phenomenon (pp. 231–281). Recent historical research on internal democratisation and conflict-management in self-managing enterprises has confirmed the rising social divergences in Yugoslav enterprises during the 1960s (Rutar, 2015; Schult, 2017, pp. 216–274; Suvin, 2016, pp. 180–205).

Although the literature has provided sufficient evidence of increasingly open nationalist disputes at the level of the political and intellectual elites in the second half of the 1960s (Haug, 2012, pp. 213–283; Ramet, 2006, pp. 285–324), the coincidence of national and socio-economic divisions has not been studied at the micro-level of the enterprise. A rare business history of industrial development in Socialist Kosovo in the Ramiz Sadiku automotive supply factory in Peja (Serbian: Peć) argues that 'ethnic jealousy' posed an additional obstacle for the functioning of the enterprise (Palairt, 1992, p. 909). Apart from references to violent disturbances in the late 1960s, 'probably of an interethnic nature', and 'almost certainly intentional' obstruction of Serb qualified personnel in the chronically underqualified factory, the study, however, fails to provide a detailed account of how this actually worked (Palairt, 1992, p. 903). This study aims to fill this gap. It is based on in-depth research of the local and enterprise newspapers, relevant archival sources in Belgrade and Mitrovica, and a series of semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with former workers of Trepça during extended periods in July and October 2017 and March 2018.

### **Employment politics in Trepça: Between national proportionality and technical expertise**

In the 1960s, Trepça undertook an ambitious programme of modernisation and expansion. The economic reforms of the early 1960s transformed the enterprise into a conglomerate of mines and processing factories. The *Kombinat* integrated all zinc and lead mines in the Republic of

Serbia, most of which were located in Kosovo. It also invested in new metallurgic processing factories and chemical industry. Against this background, the shortage of skilled labour in the enterprise was a continuous concern. Table 1 shows that in 1960, more than 50% of all production workers were semi- or unskilled, which implied that they were without any vocational training. What is more, among over 6,000 production workers, only 441 were high-qualified. The entire enterprise counted only 86 university-schooled specialists.<sup>2</sup>

[Table 1 somewhere here]

Due to the absence of technical higher education in Kosovo up to the early 1960s, the enterprise had to bring in engineers and technicians from outside the region. In fact, this trend dated from the interwar period, when Trepça hired engineers and expertise from Britain and more developed parts of Yugoslavia. Engineers who were trained in the more developed northwest of Yugoslavia also took the lead in the reconstruction process in the first post-war decade. From the mid-1950s, Serbs and Montenegrins schooled in Belgrade began to dominate the management, while engineers from the more developed parts of Yugoslavia returned to their home regions.<sup>3</sup>

Specialists were attracted with financial and extra-financial privileges. In line with the symbolic and economic importance of mining in Socialist Yugoslavia, employees of Trepça generally enjoyed income that doubled the local standards. Yet, on top of this, specialists received incomes that surpassed the 'illogical proportion' of 10:1 compared to those of manual workers.<sup>4</sup> Such wage differentiation measures to attract specialists created social unrest (workers apparently pasted banknotes on the walls of the factories in protest against the award system for specialists) and 'strong frontal resistance from the [Communist League] committee, trade union, and workers' council'.<sup>5</sup>

Trepça also allocated large sums for the construction of modern apartment buildings and provided loans for the building of private individual houses. By the early 1970s, the enterprise financed more than 3,000 flats and over 900 alone-standing houses in the Mitrovica area.<sup>6</sup> As in other Yugoslav enterprises (Schult, 2017, pp. 188–193), the distribution of flats was based on a points system, which prioritised high-qualified workers. The granting of credit was conditioned on own contribution, which again favoured qualified workers with higher incomes.<sup>7</sup> Interviews confirm that engineers and doctors were the primary beneficiaries of the urban development of the city.

In the early 1960s, a policy shift took place toward training local Kosovan technical specialists. The first technical high schools in Kosovo were opened in Mitrovica and Pristina in 1961–62. Trepça provided scholarships to students.<sup>8</sup> The underrepresentation of Albanians in skilled labour was a related policy theme. Local authorities noted that although 70% of the total workforce were Albanian, they comprised less than 10% of the high-qualified workers.<sup>9</sup> From the mid-1960s, the provincial leadership paid increased attention to proportional representation of the nationalities at expert and management positions in enterprises.<sup>10</sup> The Brioni Plenum of July 1966 was a major catalyst in this process. Mostly remembered as the final stage of an internal power struggle between liberal decentralists and conservative centralists within the Yugoslav League of Communists, the Plenum identified discriminatory practices against Kosovo Albanians as one of the major 'deformations' of the conservative and centralist wing of the party and state apparatus (Petranović & Zečević, 1988, p. 1109, pp. 1112–1125; Ströhle, 2016, pp. 246–258, pp. 298–334).

Post-Brioni discussions in Mitrovica revealed and openly discussed violations and discriminatory practices against Albanian workers in Trepça.<sup>11</sup> The municipal party committee found that the Serb-dominated cadre department (*kadrovaska služba*) did not accept application letters in Albanian and withheld Albanian students who had received a scholarship. Positive legal measures for improving the national composition of the management were not implemented.<sup>12</sup> Workers' assemblies and party meetings in the enterprise criticised the cadre department as particularly inefficient, corrupt, and discriminatory.<sup>13</sup> In a typical gesture of self-

criticism, the cadre department recognised that employment had often been a case of connections and bureaucratic interference. The ongoing transfer of employment competences to the workers' self-management organs, however, would address this issue. As for the national composition of the work collective, illiteracy courses and scholarship programmes would improve the qualification of the Albanian workers.<sup>14</sup>

The Party's ideological starting point that nationalism was redundant in developed socio-economic structures and that quality should always have priority over nationality, however, provided possibilities to block proportional representation of Albanians in management cadres and pertain Serb domination because of Albanian underqualification.<sup>15</sup> The cadre department justified Serb overrepresentation in management as followed:

The needs of the enterprise required that specialist cadres be secured from various parts of the country, and thus the recruitment of specialists mostly involved Serbs and Montenegrin specialists.<sup>16</sup> The unfavourable start and the lack of elementary education among members of nationalities [Albanians and Turks, P.T.] hindered their education and specialist training, which obstructed faster changes in the national structure of workers from the ranks of the nationalities.<sup>17</sup>

In a similar line of reasoning, Miljan Petrušić, a leading local Communist and manager in Trepça, criticised chauvinist practices to employ Serbs at management positions when there were sufficient qualified Albanian cadres. However, he added the important reservation that there was a lack of qualified Albanian cadres and that quality should have priority over nationality, which in practice implied that there mostly was no other choice than to employ Serb and Montenegrin specialists.<sup>18</sup>

The cadre department provided a detailed analysis of the structure of the work collective and pointed to improvements in terms of qualification and national composition (see table 1). For both blue- and white-collar workers, by 1967, the number of qualified workers increased in absolute and relative numbers. The number of un- or semiskilled production workers dropped from more than 50% in 1960 to around 39%, while the number of high-skilled workers more than doubled to almost 15%. The number of specialists with university degrees increased from 86 to 260.

In terms of national composition, the share of Albanians increased, as part of the total work collective and the population of qualified workers. The national composition of the blue-collar workers roughly corresponded to the national composition of the general population in the region, but the proportion of Serbs notably increased for skilled workers. For white-collar workers, the national disproportion remained outspoken. In the category of experts with university degrees, the share of Albanians was 9% against 71% Serbs. The share of Albanian in management positions increased from 16 to 30%, while the share of Serbs dropped from 67 to 56%.<sup>19</sup> The Central Workers' Council initiated an ambitious programme to reach 'a faster solution for the cadre problematics, taking into consideration more adequate structural relations between nationalities.'<sup>20</sup> The plan did not set numerical targets, but stated that the national composition of the work collective should reflect the composition of the population.<sup>21</sup> In selection procedures for scholarships or employment, members of underrepresented nationalities received priority in case of equal qualifications.<sup>22</sup> A new regulation on bilingual administration prescribed that all workers of Trepça had the right to communicate in their own language and that all enterprise documents should be set in Albanian and Serbo-Croatian.<sup>23</sup> For this purpose, bilingual administrative job positions and a translation unit were created.<sup>24</sup>

### **The 'exodus' of specialists: National or economic emigration?**

As in Yugoslavia as a whole (Schult, 2017, pp. 206–216), labour turnover posed a tremendous problem in Trepça. In 1966, turnover jumped from 12% to 20–25% of the total labour population. For high-qualified workers, there was even a negative balance, while open and countrywide vacancies in the major Serbian- and Albanian-language newspapers failed to

attract applicants.<sup>25</sup> In 1968 and the first months of 1969, 336 specialists left Trepça, including 70 from managerial positions. Most were engineers and technicians or high-skilled production workers. The absolute majority of them left factories in Mitrovica.<sup>26</sup> Even considering the disproportionally high share of Serb and Montenegrin specialists with university degrees, the number of Serbs and Montenegrins was out of proportion.

[Table 2 somewhere here]

What were the reasons for this development? The cadre department suggested that both push and pull factors were relevant. It called for measures to make the position of specialists more attractive (increased wage and promotion opportunities) but also energetic action against 'lack of discipline, negligence, anarchy, irresponsible use of means of production, and, especially, an incorrect and primitive relation towards specialised cadres', which apparently made the position of specialists difficult.<sup>27</sup>

The most sensitive question was whether national tensions played a structural role. The official argumentation of the League of Communists was that the structural background for the emigration was the underdevelopment of the region, which resulted in economic difficulties for enterprises, relatively low wages, and limited opportunities for promotion and further qualification. In addition, self-management was not yet properly developed, leading to flawed income distribution mechanisms, bureaucratic tendencies in cadre politics, 'an artisan and peasant-like primitivistic mentality' of resistance against specialists, and hooliganism. Against this background, nationalist extremists on both sides destabilised the situation and created discord (Ströhle, 2016a, pp. 330–333).<sup>28</sup>

However, opinions differed in the Party. In May 1968, Dobrica Ćosić was expelled from the Serbian League of Communists for arguing that rising Albanian chauvinism caused the emigration of Serb experts (Gatalović, 2014, pp. 332–333, pp. 339–345; Ristanović, 2012). Within the provincial committee of the League of Communists, Miloš Sekulović and Jovo Šotre crossed the official line of argumentation when they related the emigration of Serb and Montenegrin specialists to an organised Albanian nationalist attack against the political order in Kosovo. They also questioned the nationalities policy in Kosovo after the Brioni Plenum, arguing that it had led to Albanian majorisation and job insecurity among Serbs and Montenegrins. They gave examples of employment based on nationality only and absurd demands for bilingualism in job descriptions.<sup>29</sup>

In early 1969, a number of newspapers from Pristina and Belgrade picked up the news of the emigration of specialists from Trepça. They interviewed General Director Časlav Živković, who related the departure of experts to their unclear status, the lack of perspective, and the relatively low incomes. When the journalists raised the national element, Živković replied that this question was treated simplistically and with unnecessary nervousness. However, he cryptically recognised that the affirmative politics for establishing national equality after 1966 had led to 'certain excesses'. On the one side (Živković doesn't state which but he clearly means the Albanian), there was no respect for post-war achievements and the self-sacrificing efforts of engineers in difficult conditions. Excessive insistence to change the entire cadre overnight, regardless of technological and qualitative capacities, had led to some 'precedents' and Albanian chauvinist attacks, which caused nervousness, fear, and insecurity. On the other – Serbian – side, there was reactionary resistance against the affirmative measures to promote national equality in the enterprise. 'In that way, the noble socialist principle of equality of nations and nationalities has turned in its own reverse – in direct confrontation on national relations.'<sup>30</sup>

Also in February 1969, the Central Workers' Council adopted a strategy for cadre policies, which aimed to address the shortage of specialists in mining and metallurgy and get rid of the surplus of almost 2,000 unskilled workers by 1970. The enterprise set up an ambitious scholarship programme, which gave priority to Albanian students in particular.<sup>31</sup> However, the positive discrimination of Albanians in selection procedures for the employment of specialists

was revoked. Živković and the central cadre department recognised that the national composition of specialist cadres did not yet reflect the population structure, but noted that the transition would be a long-term endeavour, which could not come at the expense of the general technological progress of the enterprise.<sup>32</sup> This policy change addressed reported excesses where national proportionality had received priority over expertise and was an obvious countermeasure to stall the emigration of Serb and Montenegrin specialists. It can also be interpreted as a Serb national reaction against increased employment of Albanian specialists, under the guise of the Communist dictum that expertise should always outweigh nationhood.

The Central Workers' Council came out divided on the issue. The Albanian President of the Workers' Council, Fadilj Mumini, and some prominent other Albanian delegates argued that the departure of specialists was part of ongoing fluctuation patterns and economic and individual decisions.<sup>33</sup> Talks about national pressure were tendentious and harmful for the collective. Some Serb delegates in the council, on the other hand, insisted that 'national intolerance was one of the reasons why people are leaving the enterprise'. This provoked a fierce reaction from Mumini against

the conclusion that the Albanian nation exerts pressure on others. If such a decision is taken here, I can say here and now that I would consider to resign and to return my party booklet. I cannot agree that the Albanian nation is blemished, when it is not the case.'<sup>34</sup>

At the same session, the enterprise journal organised an anonymous questionnaire asking the delegates for their opinion on the matter. Four mutually non-exclusive lines of reasoning came out. A first group of answers referred to a lack of loyalty and work ethics among specialists. The specialists that left came from outside of the region and were only interested in making a lot of money in a short time. They were selfish in general, not eager to work, and quarrelsome. This particularly applied to young specialists, who lacked any sense of loyalty to the enterprise. A second group blamed the collective for a lack of respect for specialists, as expressed in the low wages, obstruction to the hiring of young specialists, and hostility from the part of the direct producers, including physical threats and insults. A third argument referred to the economic difficulties in Trepça, which limited the prospects for specialists and kept wages low. In addition, broader fluctuation patterns in Yugoslavia saw specialists moving from the industry to easier and better-paid jobs in banks and institutions. The fourth group of answers pointed to nationalist tensions and job insecurity, in particular after instances where Albanians replaced Serbian specialists. In Mitrovica in particular, it was said, national relations were omnipresent and interfered in every possible discussion.<sup>35</sup>

The League of Communists, itself increasingly dominated by specialist cadres and managers (Schult, 2017, pp. 239–243; Suvin, 2016, pp. 129–39; Woodward, 1995, pp. 322–325), prioritised the second line of reasoning and activated its membership to promote a correct position toward specialists. Fatmir Agolli, one of the first Albanian engineers and at the time director of the smelter and refinery, said that 'the relation towards specialist cadres at all levels in Trepça is extremely bad, which has an impact on the fluctuation of cadres'. He referred to low wages, the lack of prospects for promotion and specialisation, and ungrateful job requirements. Dušan Šurbatović of the Stanterg mine referred to 'groups of non-workers who try to create unrest and divisions and distrust within the collective'. He warned:

If I were forty, I would leave if I could, although I was born here. I have many reasons for that. They threaten me directly and indirectly. The worker threatens me and says that he will kill me. For my son to see a brighter day.

Deputy General Director Radovan Manojlović spoke of a gap between specialists and direct producers and testified that it was impossible to carry out management tasks in the current atmosphere. Svetozar Čamilović, the director of the chemical industry factory, referred the production problems, apathy, and the lack of discipline, which led to the departure of cadres.<sup>36</sup> Although the accuracy of these statements cannot be taken at face value and is impossible to



verify, they all indicate a wide gap between the management personnel and the production workers in the enterprise.

The national element was not completely absent in the discussion, but seemed to be primarily connected to employment at the management level. The communists in the enterprise were tasked to intervene against ‘unhealthy occurrences where individuals and informal and uninvited groups evaluate and demand a change of the national structure of certain management cadres’ without taking into consideration expertise.<sup>37</sup> Duško Vukosavljević, representative of the communist party organisation in Trepča, felt obliged to assure ‘journalists and comrades’ that cadre positions in Trepča were not closed for any nation and denounced the oft-heard claim that Croatian, Serbian, or Montenegrin cadres were not able to get employed in Trepča.<sup>38</sup>

Rather than taking a direct position in this discussion, the remainder of this article will contextualise the discussion against broader social dynamics in the enterprise. In the late 1960s, divisions increased between function- and skill-based groups in the enterprise, as all over Yugoslavia (Allcock, 2000, pp. 188–90; Schult, 2017, pp. 243–257; Suvin, 2016, pp. 52–71, p. 255). The discussions sketched above suggest that these divisions could potentially take a national character in Trepča at two levels.

First, the gap between Serb-dominated specialist and management elites and the large, predominantly Albanian group of unskilled production workers could obtain a national tone. It is a common feature in global coalfield history that migration of skilled labour leads to the coincidence of ethnic division with divisions of skill and hierarchy (Knotter, 2015, p. 39). In Trepča, divisions of skill and hierarchy potentially overlapped with divisions of origin and ethnicity between the “imported” elite of Serb and Montenegrin engineers and managers and the “local” predominantly – but not exclusively – Albanian workforce. Second, positive discrimination measures could lead to excesses at the management level, as when Serb or Montenegrin cadres were denied employment through direct (Albanian directors only hired Albanian specialists) and indirect discrimination (Albanian-language requirements and outvoting on national basis).<sup>39</sup>

In what follows, I will analyse the interconnection of national and socio-economic divisions in Trepča in more detail at these two levels. I will first look at vertical divisions between the large majority of un- and semiskilled workers and specialist cadres and then turn to horizontal divisions at the management level.

### **Managing a hostile shop floor**

As part of the ongoing liberal economic policy to establish internationally competitive enterprises, firms were authorised to strengthen management autonomy to reduce production and labour costs and raise the skill credentials of the work collective (Woodward, 1995, pp. 272–273). The resulting social unrest widened the gap between production workers and management elites in the enterprise. Manual workers increasingly retreated from official self-management organs, opting for informal channels to express their grievances (Höpken, 1984, pp. 231–281; Rutar, 2015; Schult, 2017, pp. 152–236, pp. 255–272; Suvin, 2016, pp. 253–263).

Facing limited return on investment and failed production plans, the Trepča management took measures to cut labour costs. Over halfway through 1967, the Central Workers’ Council rejected the financial plans that had been adopted by the workers’ councils at the level of the individual factories. It particularly criticised irrational income distribution, which showed a tendency of linear increases of personal income, regardless of failed realisations of production plans.<sup>40</sup> The management board, the executive organ of the workers’ council where the General Director had a seat and a particularly strong influence, imposed a decrease of the planned personal income. Živković clarified that this had come as a shock, because there was a general idea that ‘lead was pouring’ in Trepča and that income would never fall below plan.<sup>41</sup>

Social unrest against managerial interventions rose. Management organs constantly criticised so-called subjective resistance against the economic reforms: lack of discipline,

sabotage, negligent use of enterprise goods, insubordination and refusal to carry out work tasks, demagogic appearances, and threats against specialists and managers. It came to 'negative events' under the leadership of 'non-workers and vandals' ('neradnici i izgređnici').<sup>42</sup> In September 1969, for example, a group of workers, including Communist League members, laid down work in the smelter and approached the director and factory secretary of the League of Communists to demand the distribution of income surplus among all workers.<sup>43</sup> Seven troublemakers were dismissed.<sup>44</sup> In the mine of Stanterg, the Communists were forced to intervene against a decision of the Workers' Council to pay out full personal incomes, although production had been only realised by 41,7%.<sup>45</sup> Interviewed workers of the Stanterg mine recalled that so-called work stoppages over questions of wages and nutrition were frequent, but typically lasted only for a couple of hours and were quickly resolved with promises of food coupons or slight wage increases.

The evaluation of the cadre strategy in 1970 showed that the numbers of qualified labour had increased only minimally. The number of specialists with university degrees even dropped, while that of unskilled new workers and workers who occupied a position for which they were not qualified increased (see table 1).<sup>46</sup> In the smelter and refinery, for example, only one engineer remained in place. Two others had left and one moved to an administrative position, reportedly because of the bad atmosphere on the shop floor.<sup>47</sup> The general management took wage differentiation measures to address the situation. It first introduced a 7–8% linear increase of the aggregate income to cover increased living costs. In addition, however, the business board (new name for the management board) recognised that the wages for specialists were not sufficient to attract them to come working in Mitrovica. It therefore suggested an additional differential increase of wages for specialists of 4–5%. The higher wage costs for specialists were compensated by cutting on socio-financial benefits for the workers, such as paid holidays.<sup>48</sup> The general management also recentralised cadre politics in order to inhibit 'narrow-minded' and 'sectarian' excesses of decentralisation. In the smelter, the general director was authorised to take all required measures to appoint specialist cadres.<sup>49</sup>

The Central Workers' Council opened an unrestricted job announcement for specialists (no experience required) and provided scholarships to all students of mining, metallurgy, and technology in Kosovo.<sup>50</sup> New General Director Božidar Radunović, who replaced Živković after the latter moved to Belgrade in April 1970,<sup>51</sup> promoted Trepča as an excellent place for young specialists to gain experiences. Beside good payment, the enterprise offered flats and a secured job for partners. Radunović also clarified that Trepča strove to have a nationally proportional work collective, but that the invitations to apply were directed to all nationalities and that skills were more important than nationality. Trepča also introduced cadre bonuses to attract specialists with higher wages.<sup>52</sup> The dramatic response to the open vacancy – only 15 inexperienced specialists accepted the offer – confirmed that the financial and extra-financial conditions at Trepča were not competitive. In order to solve the cadre problem in the long run, Trepča cofounded a new faculty for metallurgy in Mitrovica, which started operating in 1970–71 as a branch of the Technical Faculty in Pristina and from 1974–75 as an independent faculty.<sup>53</sup>

At the same time as it introduced wage differentiation measures for specialists, the general management intervened against the discrepancy between personal incomes and the actual production results and introduced wage cuts.<sup>54</sup> There were also problems with payment of income. In May 1970, for example, the bank accounts of the smelter and refinery factory were blocked, which resulted in delays in income payment.<sup>55</sup> The combination of bonuses for specialists and wage cuts for the manual workers caused resentment at the shop floor. In October 1971, the miners of Lece, near Medveđa in southern Serbia, stopped work against a decision to introduce a cadre bonus of 20%. The political leadership and management quickly intervened and reduced the number of specialist who would receive bonuses.<sup>56</sup> On 18 February 1971, thirty workers dropped work at the smelter and refinery. The strike lasted for an entire

day – which was relatively long for Yugoslav standards – and had dramatic economic consequences, because it put the furnace out of operation for 45 days (Pushkolli, 1977, p. 316). The elements of politicisation in the strike were particularly unusual: Communist members were among the leaders of the strike, there had been attempts to spread the strike to the Stanterg mine and the zinc electrolysis factory, and there had been political agitation against high political representatives.

The direct reason for the strike was a delay in the payment of personal income and rumours that the personal income would go down. The League of Communists directly addressed the complaints and guaranteed advance payment of the personal incomes. However, the workers also had more structural complaints against perceived privileges for specialists. Workers' assemblies held after the strike criticised the systematisation of working places (which often implied that workers were transferred to positions for which they were qualified but with lower start incomes) and questioned the payment and other privileges of 'coffee-drinking' and 'travelling' specialists.<sup>57</sup> Director Slobodan Kočović defended the specialists, arguing that they did make considerable contributions to production. It was the collective, which was not sufficiently trained to realise their tasks. Kočović found it worrying that the workers were not self-critical, as there was no mentioning of theft, fights, and the enormous lack of discipline at the shop floor.<sup>58</sup>

### **Nationhood and vertical unrest**

The cadre politics clearly exacerbated social divisions between specialist cadres and the large majority of semi- or unskilled production workers in Trepça. Although there was ethnic disproportion in Trepça – Albanians were badly underrepresented among skilled production workers and qualified white-collar workers, while for Serbs the opposite counts – the available sources suggest that nationhood was less relevant as a category of practice to make sense of divisions of skill and migration. At the workers' assemblies held in the wake of the strike of 1971, only two national comments were made by Albanian foremen, who called for prioritisation of Albanians in employment and expressed dissatisfaction with the appointment of five Serb foremen.<sup>59</sup> The apparent absence of nationhood in reports on social unrest from below does not tell so much about the national consciousness of the workers or the relevance of national divisions in social unrest from below. This is a question, which remains difficult to assess with the available sources and the distortive hindsight of ethno-political conflict in Kosovo since the 1980s.

It does tell us that any sign of national division in social unrest from below was defused and depoliticised. Director Kočović did not dwell upon the demand for national proportionality at the workers' assemblies after the 1971 strike, but briefly noted that this was not the current practice and that such measures had to be discussed in the collective.<sup>60</sup> In reporting to the provincial committee, the leading local political functionary Bahri Oruqi noted with satisfaction that national division was no motive behind the strike of 1971.<sup>61</sup> One of the Albanian miners, whom I interviewed, recalled how he had once asked for an Albanian translation of the development plan, which was under discussion at the workers' assembly. His question was clearly unusual. He stressed several times that he had first asked permission to pose the question and the meeting was paused as political functionaries withdrew *en petit comité* to discuss the issue. Translation was assured for next time. Such a practice is part of the broader policy of Socialist Yugoslavia toward social unrest. As the social question had been officially solved, the slightest sign of social unrest was immediately dealt with by small concessions to the workers and was consecutively marginalised, individualised, and depoliticised (Rutar, 2015, pp. 286–287; Woodward, 1995, pp. 320–339). The same argument can be made for elements of national division in social unrest from below.

This also explains the limited durability of these social and potentially national upheavals in the collective memory of the enterprise and city. Whereas dissatisfaction from below was

relatively prominent in the contemporary press, none of my interviews with managers and workers from Trepça recalled any particularities about social unrest in the period – it is blurred together in an undefined series of work stoppages of very limited relevance. Of course, nostalgia for better times and lost dignity and modernity in Socialist Yugoslavia, which I encountered in my interviews with pensioned miners, in spite of Albanian national narratives of Serb oppression, interfere here in minimalizing the degree of social dissatisfaction (Petrović, 2010). I would argue, however, that the fact that instances of social unrest among the local Albanian unskilled labour against Serb-dominated and imported cadres are not appropriated as a resource to historicise the current ethno-political division of Trepça, Mitrovica, and Kosovo goes back to and confirms the successful depoliticization of social and national vertical unrest in Socialist Yugoslavia's socio-economic policy.

This becomes even more apparent when compared to the politicisation and nationalisation of social strikes in the political context of the late 1980s (Cvek, Ivčić, & Račić, 2015; Mušić, 2016). As elsewhere in Yugoslavia, elements of socio-economic dissatisfaction over low and belated payments are forgotten and the series of strikes at Stanterg of 1988–90 is narrowed down to one iconic strike for Albanian national autonomy against Serbian authoritarianism and the violent and authoritarian Serbian reaction against it (Palairat, n.d., pp. 14–15).

### **Competition at the top management level**

Diverging social interests also emerged at the top management level. The Central Workers' Council was the scene for many of these divisions. Although theoretically the final decision-making organ of the self-managing enterprise and the representative organ of the work collective, the workers' council in practice served as a proxy for management cadres with increasingly diverging interests. First, directors, who did not have the right to vote in the council, but usually attended meetings, steered the work of the council through the management board, where they had a seat. Although the management board in theory executed decisions taken by the council, the practice often went the other way (Schult, 2017, pp. 34–35, pp. 61–65; Suvin, 2016, pp. 189–190; Županov, 1985, pp. 129–152).

The economic reforms of 1965 strengthened the competences of the self-management organs in the appointment and evaluation of directors in an attempt to professionalise the management. Up to then, the appointment of directors had been a political-administrative affair with no involvement of the workers' councils. The reforms introduced obligatory re-election of directors and urged the workers' councils to evaluate the managerial and technical expertise of the directors. The workers' council could itself nominate new candidates.<sup>62</sup> This concurred with rising competition between technically-schooled and politically-appointed managers. The focus on qualification and skills in the economic policy of Socialist Yugoslavia entitled the new generation of technically schooled cadres higher social status, wage rate, and social benefits (housing) based on their qualifications. These schooled specialists increasingly challenged the position of the older generation of political cadres (Rutar, 2015, p. 282; Suvin, 2016, pp. 239–244; Woodward, 1995, pp. 319–320; Županov, 1985, pp. 291–323).

Beside the professional management, the enterprise branches of the League of Communist and the trade union served as parallel decision-making factors. The enterprise organisation of the League of Communists often determined the agenda of the self-management organs. It did not hesitate to intervene in case decisions were not in line with party regulations (Allcock, 2000, pp. 192–193; Suvin, 2016, p. 187, Woodward, 1995, pp. 322–325). The League of Communists also had the last word on the appointment of management, although this role was put in question in the period under scrutiny. My interviews suggest that technically schooled managers were member of the LCY, but not politically active, indicating relative distance to the core group of Communist decision-makers in the enterprise and municipality.

Although initially conceived as a transmission belt of party politics, especially in the late 1960s, the trade union profiled itself as the protector of workers' self-management against

managerial encroachment. In this capacity, it criticised the LCY in its role as ‘a craft union of managers and politicians’ (Woodward, 1995, p. 273, pp. 325–327, quotation on p. 325; see also Höpken, 1984, pp. 160–187, pp. 209–221; Pushkolli, 1977, pp. 286–317). However, this not necessarily meant that the trade union represented the collective interests of the workers against the elite. The trade union preserved the authority of the workers’ council and its own right to nominate candidates for the council (Woodward, 1995, p. 326).

Finally, in the particular case of conglomerate enterprises like Trepça, the central workers’ council consisted of delegates of the workers’ councils at the level of the individual factories. An interviewed top manager stated that highest management cadres of the sections made sure that ‘their’ workers’ councils nominated delegates to the central workers’ council that were easy to influence. As such, the council was a platform for broader conflicts between increasingly competitive and autonomous constituent factories of conglomerate enterprises (Schult, 2017, pp. 72–80).

In the unprecedented and unequalled liberalism of the late 1960s, these various interest groups—central management, factory managements, political and technically schooled managers, socio-political organisations—engaged in an increasingly pluralist management culture. A first point of division concerned the correct implementation of self-management. The first managerial interventions of 1967 in income distribution not only caused informal resistance from below. The Central Workers’ Council accepted the interventions, but held the general director and two of his deputies accountable for violating self-management regulations.<sup>63</sup> The main criticism came from the trade union, which even called for the removal of managers for failing to respect self-management decisions.<sup>64</sup> In an interview with the local newspaper *Zvečan*, the President of the trade union, Shefqet Jashari, presented the trade union as the driving force behind workers’ self-management in the enterprise, against ‘convulsive’ resistance from the management itself. From this point of view, Jashari criticised the managerial interventions, which showed that for ‘one group of managers, self-management is only a word on paper?’ Jashari also reproached the League of Communists for being passive and indifferent to the demands of the workers.<sup>65</sup> At the same time, gossips circulated in the enterprise that Živković had over a million dinars in foreign exchange at a Swiss bank and there were frequent paroles to fire the general director. Allegedly, the gossips were spread by provincial functionaries in the trade union, whose names circulated as possible successors to Živković.<sup>66</sup>

The municipal and provincial leadership of the League of Communists had to intervene. At an extraordinary meeting in Trepça, Veli Deva and Fadilj Hoxha, two prominent leaders of the Partisan generation of Kosovo Albanian Communists, paid lip service to the criticism against managerial encroachments of self-management, but said that resignations would not solve anything. The trade union’s generalising criticism against directors only created divisions in the work collective and in fact amounted to a lack of responsibility and ‘fake avant-gardism’.<sup>67</sup> Jashari had to agree that the criticism of the trade union had been too sharp, but repeated that the work collective had not been sufficiently informed and included in decision-making. He added that the national structure in the enterprise was bad, introducing the element of national proportionality to his criticism of the management. Časlav Živković recognised that he had overruled the irrational income distribution decisions taken by the self-management organs and added that he would do the same again ‘because ... we cannot distribute what is not earned’. Živković replied that the national composition and skills of the work force had improved, notwithstanding various negative talks on this topic. He asked for more respect for experts and criticised tendentious claims and campaigns to discredit the management of Trepça, especially by the provincial trade union.<sup>68</sup>

On later occasions, the trade union continued to position itself as the protector of self-management interests. In June 1969, the union rallied against a proposal for amendments of the enterprise’s normative acts. Accordingly, the amendments did not guarantee direct participation of working people in management, decision-making, and income distribution and centralised

self-management functions. Jashari got 'the impression that we are not all mobilised to bring down the income to where it is created'.<sup>69</sup> The union again failed to secure sufficient support in the Central Workers' Council.<sup>70</sup> In December 1969, the trade union made a dramatic evaluation of the performance of the enterprise and added that the management hid behind the financial situation in the enterprise to cut short the self-management rights of the workers. This was 'proof of the incapability to regulate appropriate relations in production and distribution in the enterprise'.<sup>71</sup>

Such calls for accountability for managers increasingly resonated with internal frictions in the top management. At a meeting of the sectional directors of Trepça in November 1969, representatives of profitable factories criticised that they had to cover the losses that were piling up in other factories. They reprimanded directors of loss-making factories for not providing any solutions. The division pitted the new generation of technically schooled managers against the established political managers. Minir Dushi, one of the first Albanian university-schooled engineers and a representative of the former group, was particularly critical and stated that 'there have to be limits for tolerating such losses which affect all of us'. Svetozar Čamilović, a typical political manager, who at the time managed the chronically loss-making chemical industry factory, declared that the only way out of the crisis in his factory was the introduction of provisional receivership. Although this was an unpopular measure, 'with the existing composition of the workforce, with such cadre potential, habits, work discipline, negligence, it is impossible to find a way out'.<sup>72</sup> A sanitisation programme was introduced,<sup>73</sup> but Čamilović himself left Trepça for Belgrade.<sup>74</sup>

### **Nationhood at the top management level**

The introduction of obligatory re-elections of managers formalised and politicised competition within the top management. In October 1968, the Central Workers' Council voted for the re-election of Živković. In line with the new legal prescriptions, the council nominated two challengers, the engineers Minir Dushi and Enis Presheva. These were typical representatives of the new generation of (Albanian) technically-schooled managers. The selection committee ranked Živković first, but the narrow majority of 36 against 31 votes in favour shows the weak position of Živković. Amongst those who had voted against Živković were the Albanian President of the Workers' Council Fadilj Mumini and his Deputy Osman Biševac. The enterprise newspaper noted that the vote was conducted 'almost exclusively on a national basis'.<sup>75</sup> An Albanian top manager who attended the meeting confirmed this in an interview.

In early 1969, Živković suggested that a Serb engineer would replace Fatmir Agolli, the Albanian director of the smelter and refinery factory. It is not clear if this had something to do with the dramatic news about the emigration of Serb and Montenegrin cadres. Whatever the reason, the workers' council came out divided on a 'chauvinist basis'. At the meeting of the council, a high representative of the enterprise organisation of the League of Communists even openly said that he voted for Agolli because he was Albanian. The Albanian president of the council afterwards admitted that he himself had voted for Agolli to stay. He found that the political leadership approached this 'sensitive question' from their offices chairs ('kancelarijski') and 'created chauvinists and nationalists for no reason'. After the meeting, a certain Azem Azizi threatened to deal with Agolli and the Serb candidate physically, in order to protect Albanian national interests in the enterprise.<sup>76</sup>

These instances show that nationhood became a category of practice and vision and division at the management level in the late 1960s. Even more significant is the fact that voting patterns in workers' councils were publicly categorised as 'chauvinist'. Unlike social unrest from below, which was depoliticised and denationalised, divisions at the management level were *allowed* to be politicised and nationalised. The particular and explicit national dimension of cadre politics implied that the new generation of specialists were overwhelmingly Albanian. In line with the focus on skill and qualification in Socialist Yugoslavia's employment policy, these Albanian

technically-schooled pioneers were entitled to high-status managerial positions in the enterprise. In their upward mobility, they competed with older generations of politically-appointed managers, who were predominantly Serb and often administratively assigned to Trepça. In case of competition for increasingly scarce top cadre positions, it was logical to assume that there was discrimination on non-professional, that is, political and national grounds (Woodward, 1995, pp. 318–319).

This process concurred with increasingly open and formalised divisions in the management of Yugoslav enterprises, particularly in the re-election procedures for managers. At least in Trepça, these were not a mere formality where the workers' council symbolically and unanimously accepted the only candidate, who had been proposed by the Communist decision-makers. As we have seen above, there were several candidates with different (including national) profiles and the outcome of the voting was not set in advance. These pluralist practices at the management level explain the politicisation of these national competitions for high-status management jobs in Trepça.

The retrospective nationalisation of the management divisions of the late 1960s in the Kosovan League of Communists confirms this finding. Speaking at the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, the leading local Communist of the new generation Bahri Oruqi contextualised the strike of 1971 in a broader struggle between progressive self-management forces and conservative bureaucratic tendencies. Oruqi stated that the former management under Živković had led the bureaucratic reaction through informal structures of privileged people who hampered the implementation of the cadre politics, and in particular the increase of professional cadres from the ranks of the Albanian people. Accordingly, the election of new management organs in 1970 had finally broken the power of the old bureaucrats.<sup>77</sup> Oruqi thus clearly, although within the boundaries of the correct self-management language, made sense of the managerial divisions of the late 1960s along national lines (put simplistically, Serb bureaucratic conservatism against Albanian technical progress and self-management).<sup>78</sup>

This interpretation continues to hold in the collective memory of Trepça. The dominant narrative among Albanian engineers and managers is that the economic difficulties of the 1960s were only overcome after Albanian specialists were accepted at managerial positions in the early 1970s, which initiated a golden era in the history of the enterprise. Serb specialists, on the other hand, state that the performance of the enterprise dramatically dropped from the late 1960s, due to the domination of less qualified Albanian cadres in management positions. Of course, the current ethno-political divisions of the enterprise and the city and my status as an outsider who is by default expected to be interested in national tensions when it comes to Kosovo, determine such a nationalisation of the enterprise's history. Still, I think the discourse goes back to the particular cadre politics in Kosovo in the 1960s, which allowed for the politicisation and nationalisation of competition at the top management level, while it denationalised and depoliticised potentially national social unrest from below.

To conclude, I would argue that *politically relevant* labour divisions in Trepça did not occur between the mass of unskilled or semiskilled production workers and management cadres, but between political and technical, and, in the particular case of Kosovo, imported Serb and local Albanian cadres at the management level. These divisions were allowed to happen in the employment and economic policy of Socialist Yugoslavia in Kosovo and consolidated in the politicised pluralist tendencies in the management culture of Yugoslav enterprises in the late 1960s. This finding historically substantiates Kolstø's (2008) hypothesis for the post-Soviet space that elite level job competition leads to articulate political elite nationalism, while mass level job competition remains non-political.

1. I will use the Albanian writing of place names and give the Serbian variant when first mentioning the name.  
2. Archives of Serbia (Further, AS) / Đ2 – League of Communists of Serbia (LCS)/Box 177: General Director Miša Mićković at the Plenary Session of the Regional Committee of the LCS for Kosovo, 19 February 1959.

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3. The memoirs of Arsen Pensa, who worked as mining engineer and later director in Stanterg from 1948 to 1956, provide valuable anecdotal evidence. Pensa himself was a Slovenian engineer who graduated in Ljubljana and was appointed to work in Trepča by the central directorate for mining in Belgrade. Until 1956, his requests to get transferred to the Trbovlje mine in Slovenia were rejected by high political decree. In the immediate post-war years, general directors in Trepča were political functionaries from Kosovo. In 1953, Branko Glušćević became the first technically-schooled general director. He was a Dalmatian Serb who had graduated as engineer in Ljubljana and worked in Trepča before the war. Most engineers were graduates from Ljubljana, including Slovenes but also Serbs. Three geologists from East Germany assisted the Yugoslav engineers. In 1952, the first graduates from Belgrade were employed as engineers. Pensa states that there were no Albanians at all among the managing personnel. All supervisors were Serbs who had come to Kosovo in the interwar period from Lika and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Politically loyal Albanians were appointed in the self-management and trade union organs (Pensa, 2016, pp. 39–63).
  4. Regional Archive of Mitrovica (RAM) / fond 6 (Municipal Assembly) – 1962 / box 1: Municipal Assembly of Mitrovica, *Informacija o radu na raspodeli čistog prihoda i ličnih dohodaka u privredi i društvenim službama* [Information About the Work on Distribution of Pure Income and Personal Earnings in Economy and Social Services] (25 June 1962); RAM/6–1964/2: Municipal Assembly of Mitrovica, *Analiza o raspodeli čistog prihoda i kretanja ličnih dohodaka i ostalih pokazatelja poslovnog uspeha privrednih organizacija* [Analysis of the Distribution of Pure Income and Development of Personal Earnings and Other Indicators of the Economic Success of Economic Organisations] (8 April 1964).
  5. AS Đ2 – LCS/174: District Committee of the League of Communists in Mitrovica, 30 January 1957; AS Đ2 – LCS/175: Dušan Mugoša at the Plenary Session of the Regional Committee of the LCS for Kosovo, 21 May 1958.
  6. Stanbena problematika: Ko i kako (ne) gazduje [Housing Problematics: Who Does or Does Not Manage His Flat Properly and How], *Trepča* 10.03.1971, p. 10.
  7. Pravilnik o izgradnji i raspodeli stanova [Rulebook on the Building and Distribution of Flats], *Trepča* 25.03.1965, p. 4; Stanbena problematika: Ko i kako (ne) gazduje [Housing Problematics: Who Does or Does Not Manage His Flat Properly and How], *Trepča* 10.03.1971, p. 10.
  8. Pravilnik o stipendijama i položaju lica na plaćenom odsustvu zbog školovanja [Rulebook on Scholarships and Position of People on Paid Leave for Schooling], *Trepča* 10.01.1962, p. 3; Preko 500 stipendista [Over 500 Bursars], *Trepča* 25.07.1962, p. 4.
  9. AS Đ2 – LCS/177: Municipal committee of the League of Communists in Stanterg, 1 March 1959.
  10. AS Đ2 – League of Communists of Kosovo (LCK)/Box 3: *Neka pitanja međunarodnih odnosa na Kosovu i Metohiji* [Some Questions on International Relations in Kosovo and Metohija] (May 1966), pp. 8–9; AS Đ2 – LCK/2: *Predlog zaključaka o oceni aktivnosti SK na sprovođenju društvene i privredne reforme* [Draft Conclusions on the Evaluation of Activities of the LC for the Implementation of Social and Economic Reforms] (May 1967), pp. 14–15. In the language of the Yugoslav League of Communists, nationalities (*narodnost*) were nations whose national polity was located outside of Yugoslavia, in contrast with the constituent nations (*narod*). For Kosovo, Albanians and Turks had the status of nationality.
  11. AS Đ2 – LCK/1: Seventh Plenum of the Provincial Committee, 12 October 1966.
  12. Mbledhja e hapet [Open Meeting], *Zvečan* 15.10.1966, p. 4; 22.10.1966, p. 3; Političke bure u Trepči i Kolubari [Political Storms in Trepča and Kolubara], *Zvečan* 22.10.1966, p. 2.
  13. Sa plenuma fabričkog komiteta SK: Ocenjena aktivnost komunista [From the Plenum of the Factory Committee of the LC: The Activities of Communities Evaluated], *Trepča* 28.10.1966, p. 2.
  14. Samoupravljanje na ispitu [A Test for Self-Management], *Trepča* 21.07.1967, p. 3.
  15. AS Đ2 – LCK/3: *Neka pitanja međunarodnih odnosa na Kosovu i Metohiji* [Some Questions on the International Relations in Kosovo and Metohija] (May 1966), pp. 8–9.
  16. The logical equalisation of Serbs and Montenegrins with ‘various parts of the country’ in this quote is not so self-explanatory. It indicates the gradual replacement of specialist cadres from Western Europe (interwar period and World War II) and Slovenia (post-war reconstruction period) by Serbs and Montenegrins schooled in Belgrade.
  17. Samoupravljanje na ispitu [A Test for Self-Management], *Trepča* 21.07.1967, p. 3.
  18. Vanredni plenum Opštinskog komiteta SK u Kosovskoj Mitrovici: Neslomljivo je jedinstvo Srba, Šiptara i Crnogoraca [Extraordinary Plenum of the Municipal Committee of the LC in Kosovska Mitrovica: The Unity of Serbs, Albanians, and Montenegrins is Unbreakable], *Trepča* 23.09.1966, p. 2.
  19. Samoupravljanje na ispitu [A Test for Self-Management], *Trepča* 21.07.1967, p. 3.
  20. Zaključci Radničkog saveta o reformi, proizvodnji, samoupravljanju, raspodeli: Reforma svih područja života kolektiva [Conclusions of the Workers’ Council on Reforms, Production, Self-Management, Distribution: Reforms in All Spheres of Life of the Collective], *Trepča* 10.02.1967, p. 1.
  21. Nacionalna struktura uposlenih treba da odgovara strukturi stanovništva [The National Structure of the Employees Should Correspond to the Structure of the Population], *Trepča* 29.06.1967, p. 2.
  22. Poboljšati nacionalnu strukturu kadrova [Improve the National Structure of the Cadres], *Zvečan* 12.03.1968, p. 4.



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23. Ne Trepce po bahet kthese [Demands Are Being Made in Trepça], *Zvečan* 02.03.1968, p. 3.
24. O dvojezčnoj administraciji [On Bilingual Administration], *Zvečan* 23.03.1968, p. 1.
25. Naši planovi: Za kadrove trinaest (novih) miliona [Our Plans: 13 Million (New) Dinars for Cadres], *Trepča* 23.01.1969, p. 2; Kadrovska politika na ispitu [A Test for Cadre Politics], *Trepča* 26.11.1969, p. 11.
26. Kadrovska politika na ispitu [A Test for Cadre Politics], *Trepča* 26.11.1969, p. 11.
27. Kadrovska politika na ispitu [A Test for Cadre Politics], *Trepča* 26.11.1969, p. 11.
28. AS Đ2 – LCK/9: Sixth plenary session of the Provincial Committee, 5 April 1969.
29. AS Đ2 – LCK/14: Secretariat of the Provincial Committee, 11 February 1969; AS Đ2 – LCK/11: 28th session of the Provincial Committee, 21–22 June 1971. Šotre and Sekulović were later excluded from the LCY, but were rehabilitated in 1987 (Gatalović, 2014, pp. 558–564).
30. Na Kosovu, zimi... Inženjeri kupuju vozne karte. U čemu je pravi interes radničke klase na Kosovu? [Winter in Kosovo... Engineers Are Buying Train Tickets. Where Lies the True Interest of the Working Class in Kosovo?], *Politika* 29.01.1969, p. 8; Generalni direktor Trepče govori o seobi stručnjaka [Trepça's General Director Talks About the Migration of Experts], *Zvečan* 01.02.1969, p. 2; Zašto stručnjaci odlaze iz Trepče: Opasno samozadovoljstvo [Why Are Experts Leaving Trepça: Dangerous Self-Satisfaction], *Trepča* 06.02.1969, p. 2.
31. Naši planovi: Za kadrove trinaest (novih) miliona [Our Plans: 13 Million (New) Dinars for Cadres], *Trepča* 23.01.1969, p. 2.
32. Generalni direktor Trepče govori o seobi stručnjaka [Trepça's General Director Talks About the Migration of Experts], *Zvečan* 01.02.1969, p. 2; Zašto stručnjaci odlaze iz Trepče: Opasno samozadovoljstvo [Why Are Experts Leaving From Trepça: Dangerous Self-Satisfaction], *Trepča* 06.02.1969, p. 2; Usvojen plan kadrova [Plan for Cadres Approved], *Trepča* 21.02.1969, pp. 1–2.
33. My interviews with Albanian managers confirm the unwritten rule that Albanians were well-represented in the leadership of self-management organs and trade unions. Given the limited real power of the workers' council and the trade union, this was largely a symbolic gesture.
34. Usvojen plan kadrova [Plan for Cadres Approved], *Trepča* 21.02.1969, pp. 1–2.
35. Tehnologija i proizvodnja ne znaju za jezike i nacionalnosti [Technology and Production Do Not Know Languages and Nationalities], *Trepča* 21.02.1969, pp. 4–5.
36. Preduzetna konferencija SK [Enterprise Conference of the LC], *Trepča* 14.03.1969, pp. 1–5.
37. Preduzetna konferencija SK [Enterprise Conference of the LC], *Trepča* 14.03.1969, pp. 1–5.
38. AS Đ2 – LCK/9: Sixth plenary session of the Provincial Committee, 5 April 1969.
39. AS Đ2 – LCK/14: Meeting of the Secretary of the Provincial Committee, 11 February 1969, in particular the contributions of Veljko Tadić and Luka Vlahović.
40. Odbijen finansijski plan [Financial Plan Rejected], *Trepča* 04.08.1967, p. 6; Svi na svoja mesta [All at Their Places], *Trepča* 18.08.1967, p. 1, p. 7; Problemi u svim oblastima rada [Problems in All Domains of Work], *Trepča* 13.09.1967, pp. 1–6.
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78. In practice, it was the bureaucratic political elite that regained dominance in the enterprise and society as a whole in the 1970s. In Kosovo, a new generation of Albanian leaders of the League of Communists gained the upper hand in the party and benefited from the reaffirmation of stricter party control. During the 1970s, directors of Trepča were political functionaries. Ironically, as Oruqi proclaimed the victory of self-management in 1970, the first Albanian general director of Trepča, Veli Deva, was a political functionary. Oruqi himself was one of the political managers of Trepča during the 1970s.

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