Socialist Urban Development in Kosovska Mitrovica
– Compressed Socio-Spatial Duality in a Medium-Sized Industrial City in Yugoslavia’s Underdeveloped South

Abstract: This article examines spatial patterns of socialist urban transformation in Mitrovica (Kosovo) from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s. During the initial phase of intensive urban development until the mid-1960s, the monopolistic position of the high-priority enterprise Trepča in financing and allocating housing in combination with the material and physical contingencies of the pre-socialist city led to compressed socio-spatial duality between the new socialist neighbourhood to the north of the Ibar River and the pre-socialist city on the south bank of the river. The reforms of 1965 strengthened the position of the municipality as the coordinator of market-regulated individual engagements in house construction.

Keywords: Socialist Kosovo, Kosovska Mitrovica, socialist urban development, socio-spatial differentiation, smaller industrial city.

Introduction: A view from off the map

In July 1963, the city of Kosovska Mitrovica adopted its first general urbanistic plan, which forecasted the city’s “exceptional perspectives” for development. From a socialist point of view, indeed, Mitrovica had strong assets for urban growth. Industrial production provided the material basis for qualitative urban expansion. In the interwar period, mining activities had been resumed at the nearby site of Trepča under British ownership and management. Socialist Yugoslavia expanded the mining enterprise into a typical big-system heavy

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1 Architectural Studio Iskra, Generalni urbanistički plan Kosovske Mitrovice, Belgrade, 1962, i. (hereafter: Iskra, Generalni urbanistički plan...
industry complex for mining, metallurgy, and chemical industry. The urban plan foresaw a large zone for industrial processing, which would further develop the integrated vertical production process of the Trepča combine and guarantee the material basis for urban development. Rational and clearly differentiated road and railway connections in all directions would establish Mitrovica as a regional socio-economic hub and integrate the local economy at a national and international scale.

The city’s relative smallness was a second asset, as it enabled controlled and compact growth that would not overstretch the city’s capacities. It allowed for the concentration of economic, social, cultural, administrative, and recreational functions in singular designated areas. The expansion of residential areas for an anticipated population of 60,000 by 1990 was foreseen in radial zones to the north and southwest of the existing city. Stand-alone low-rise buildings were located in the periphery and would house a quarter of the urban population. The rest of the urban residents would live in high-rise residential buildings of three to six storeys in central residential zones. Stand-alone high-rise buildings – the so-called *soliteri* – formed the landmarks of the urban landscape in the city centre. Finally, the natural position of the city at the confluence of the Sitnica and Ibar Rivers and the foot of the hills of Zvečan provided strong potentials for sports and recreation and gave the city a unique aesthetic identity.

With its focus on rationality, functionality, compactness, and verticality, Mitrovica’s urbanistic plan neatly subscribes to modernist and socialist urban planning. In this paper, I argue, however, that socialist Mitrovica developed along particular socio-spatial patterns reflecting its position as a smaller industrial city in the Yugoslav periphery. In line with Jennifer Robinson’s call for urban studies to bring in ordinary cities, I provide a view on socialist urban development from off the map. The literature is particularly focussed on a restricted number of big central cities or new socialist cities, which implicitly set the standard for research and theorising on socialist urban-

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For Socialist Yugoslavia, international urban history deals almost exclusively with Belgrade. This seems justified considering the political weight ascribed to New Belgrade as the model for ideal types of Socialist Yugoslav urbanity. However, the urbanity of Yugoslavia’s capital seems far away from the particular experiences of urban take-off in the country’s underdeveloped areas. The urban population of Kosovo amounted to 14.5 percent in 1953, making it the country’s least urbanised region. Only Prizren had a population of slightly more than 20,000. A characteristic feature of socialist development in these underdeveloped regions was the emergence of small to medium-sized cities. The province’s capital Priština reached 100,000 inhabitants in the 1980s and concentrated 6.8 percent of the province’s population, but almost 60 percent of the urban population lived in cities of 20,000 to 65,000 inhabitants, which had been towns at best in the pre-socialist period.

Mitrovica was a typical fast-growing medium-sized city, with an annual growth rate of 4.1 in the post-Second World War decades and a population growing from under 15,000 to 52,866 in 1981. It was relatively privileged because of the presence of the high-priority enterprise Trepča, which generated exceptional means for urban development and transformed Mitrovica into the model socialist industrial city of Kosovo. Its privileged status can be measured from the relatively large share of social-sector housing, which comprised mostly high-rise residential buildings constructed from enterprise or municipal funds. In 1971, Mitrovica had 2,473 dwellings in social ownership on a total of 8,463 (29.22 percent). In Kosovo, only Priština had a higher absolute number and share of social-sector housing (5,408 on a total of 13,765, or

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39.29 percent). Other cities of comparable size, such as Peć (13.27 percent) and Prizren (14.60 percent) had much lower shares of social-sector dwellings.\(^9\)

This article analyses the particularity of socialist urban development in the Yugoslav periphery, covering the period from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s. This period comprises the take-off of intensive urban development in the second half of the 1950s, the policy shift toward market principles in the framework of the general economic reforms of the 1960s, and the renewed intensification of urban development in the second half of the 1970s. I argue that particular patterns of socialist urban development in Yugoslavia’s underdeveloped South in combination with the material and physical contingencies and ideological degradation of the pre-socialist town gave rise to compressed socio-spatial duality in the urban landscape. This compressed duality continues to give meaning to the city.\(^10\)

**Between enterprise, professionals, and municipality:**

**Urban development until the mid-1960s**

The urbanistic plan of 1963 did not operate on a blank slate. Mitrovica had been a typical Ottoman military and trade centre of around 10,000 inhabitants, which had come to development in the last quarter of the nineteenth century with the construction of the railroad to Thessaloniki and the southward retreat of the Ottoman Empire. Its administrative and commercial centre and military barracks were located on the southern, right bank of the Ibar. Unlike in typical Balkan cities, the čaršija was not exclusively intended for trade and crafts, but also comprised residential housing. The main residential expansion of the city took place in the area of Bair, south of the centre. A much smaller residential quarter of around 150 houses and an extension of the čaršija developed on the northern, left bank of the Ibar. It was primarily inhabited by Muslim immigrants from Bosnia and was hence called Bošnjačka mahala. According to Atanasije Urošević, writing in the early 1950s, this was the most beautiful part of the city, with modern houses and straight roads.\(^11\)

In the interwar period, some attempts at Western-style urban modernisation were carried out, but the town retained its Ottoman character. Street pavement, sewerage, and water supply systems were limited. The housing stock was considered of low

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quality. Annual urban growth was minimal at an index of 1.2. The city also suffered badly from wartime bombings, which destroyed almost 1,500 residential buildings. The general urbanistic plan denounced the pre-socialist city as an outcome of “palliative measures” and “passive adaptations to the elements of nature”. It envisaged intensive reconstruction to transform the Ottoman city into a socialist industrial city, including the regulation of the course of the Ljušta River, which flowed right through the city centre. Contemporary traffic needs required energetic interventions in the “crooked and narrow streets and building stock of poor material and aesthetic value”. The reconstruction of the city could only commence after the dislocation of “worn-out” houses, army barracks, market, graveyard, and small shops.

The general urbanistic plan was also adopted after a period of intensive socialist urban development. During the first post-war decade, parallel with the post-war reconstruction of the city, the main focus went out to the reestablishment and expansion of heavy industry, accompanied with some investment in the construction of new housing. In 1946–1955, 1,165 new residential dwellings were built in the municipality. The 267 new dwellings that were built in social ownership were primarily financed by Trepča and were located in the factory settlements surrounding the city. Development was particularly pronounced in Zvečan, which had been developed as a residential area for factory management in the interwar period and was expanded with residential buildings and a series of prestigious communal buildings, including a modern elementary school, a first-class hotel, and a workers’ cultural centre, with movie theatre, concert venue, library, tavern, and summer garden. Development in the city of Mitrovica itself was non-existent, until Trepča started building low-rise apartment buildings on the sparsely-built slopes on the left bank of the Ibar in the mid-1950s.

In the second half of the 1950s, a paradigm change took place to more comprehensive urban development and intensive house construction. Yugoslavia’s second five-year plan of 1957–1961 planned and realised the construction of 200,000 new dwellings. The third five-year plan stepped up construction to over 100,000 new dwellings per year. Reflecting the prioritisation of house construction, the number of new residential dwellings in Mitrovica between 1956 and 1960 doubled to

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13 Breznik, D., Stanovništvo Jugoslavije…, p. 137.
15 Iskra, Generalni urbanistički plan…, p. 2.
1,380, including 614 new flats in the social sector. House construction was spatially concentrated in four-storey apartment blocks on the left bank of the Ibar. By the time of the adoption of the general urbanistic plan, the municipality counted 429 buildings with almost 2,000 flats in social ownership. These were duly incorporated in the urban plan.

The shift to intensive urban development went hand in hand with a critique of bureaucratic “deformations” in the emerging self-management system. In early 1958, in response to the first public signs of mass social unrest and dissatisfaction, the Central Committee of the League of Communists launched a country-wide attack against bureaucratic power abuse and privileges in self-managing enterprises and local governments. One of the most visible exponents of these deformations were the luxurious apartments built by enterprises for specialists and management. This applied to Mitrovica as well, where Trepča invested in low-rise apartment buildings.

Figure 1. New residential buildings in Mitrovica, 1945–1980

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19 Savezni zavod za statistiku, Popis stanovništva i stanova, pp. 101–102.
22 Iskra, Generalni urbanistički plan..., p. 6.
hotels, and recreation and sports facilities, while production workers lived in barracks in the factory settlements or in pre-socialist dwellings in the city. The central Communist leadership denounced the false promise that socialism would allow everybody to live in wealth and comfort and stated that it was more urgent to improve the living standards of the working people through rational and cost-efficient mass construction of modest apartments in industrial and large-scale building projects.25

This criticism of power concentration in closed circles was accompanied by a series of legal instruments, which transferred competences in urban development to the municipality as part of a broader ideological programme to increase popular participation in self-management. The law on expropriation of 1957 determined that residential buildings and land could be expropriated and transferred into social ownership for economic, residential, and communal development in the general interest. Crucially, it was up to local authorities to determine what the general interest exactly implied, primarily through urban planning.26 The law on nationalisation of 1958 determined that all building land in urban areas and all private housing above the allowed maximum of two dwelling units were nationalised for the purpose of speedy urbanisation.27 In a clear reaction against the focus on “luxurious” houses for management and specialist cadres in enterprise-dominated urban development, the reforms obliged the municipality to invest and regulate house construction and communal development in a coordinated manner, in accordance with the means and demands of all parts of the population. The population should be regularly informed about planned house construction and house allocations.28

In the particular case of Mitrovica, however, urban development remained the outcome of a difficult balancing act between the municipality, Trepča, and professional urban planners. In 1959, the municipality delineated the urban area that would be subject to nationalisation and urban planning and established a municipal council for urbanisation.29 Reflecting the city’s reliance for its development on specialists


from the more developed northern parts of the country, Mitrovica’s urban plan was designed by the Belgrade architectural studio Iskra. The adoption of the general urbanistic plan was postponed repeatedly, to the dismay of the local newspaper and municipal authorities, who insinuated that the architects were not familiar with the local situation and abused their bureaucratic power. Allegedly, drafts for urban planning were a duplicate of the urban plan for Priština, which was developed by the same studio. The newly constructed houses were completely identical, apart from some meaningless variations in the facades, and urban development was too expensive due to unnecessary and even counterproductive demolition.30

Apart from professional expertise, the municipality also lacked the financial means to invest in house construction and urban development. Legal reforms of the second half of the 1950s concentrated financial means for house construction in municipal funds, with the purpose to stimulate rational urban development in line with long-term urban planning. Municipalities were authorised to set rental tariffs that covered maintenance and amortisation costs in an attempt to undo the heavy subsidisation of rent. The part of the rent for maintenance was transferred to individual house funds and was managed by house councils. The part covering amortisation went to the investor for further house construction. For houses constructed before 1960, the amortisation costs would be revalued through a points system, which took into consideration the quality of the dwelling and its location.31 Although other sources for house construction continued to exist, most notably the common consumption funds of enterprises, social investment funds, and private means, the municipal housing funds was strengthened through housing taxes on enterprises and private house owners.32

By thus strengthening and concentrating municipal means for house construction, the municipality should become the basic source for rational and planned urban development. The municipality could directly invest in house construction or provide loans to investors and prescribed regulations and guidelines for house construction on its territory.33 Yugoslav-wide, the reforms of the late 1950s concentrated 2/3 of the financial means for house constructions in municipal funds. The rest went to the

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30 “Kada će biti gotov urbanistički plan?”, Zvečan, April 20, 1958, p. 2.
enterprise funds for house construction.\textsuperscript{34} This was far from the case in Mitrovica, however. In the late 1950s, the municipal housing funds disposed of 100 million dinars, which was sufficient for the construction of around 110 flats. These amounts were meagre compared to the investments by Trepča, which amounted to the fivefold.\textsuperscript{35} The municipal budget for house construction would match that of Trepča only by the mid-1960s.\textsuperscript{36} It is clear that Trepča had disproportional decision-making power in determining the location and social target for house construction.

Reflecting these particular small-city power relations in the Yugoslav periphery, urban development in practice was the outcome of ad-hoc decisions aligning the diverging interests of the municipality, the architectural studio Iskra, and the main investor Trepča.\textsuperscript{37} Whereas the general urban plan spoke of the gradual transformation of the city as a whole, ad-hoc decisions on urban planning confirmed a more compromised approach to build houses as efficient as possible in freestanding areas and avoid the demolition of the existing housing stock.\textsuperscript{38} In this line of reasoning, construction was predominantly concentrated in the sparsely-built area on the left bank of the Ibar, while the building activities in the pre-socialist centre remained fragmentary and restricted to isolated free parcels.\textsuperscript{39} The comprehensive reconstruction of the city centre into the administrative and political centre of local government was postponed to a later stage of urban development.\textsuperscript{40}

The divergences in urban development between the new settlement in the north of the city and the existing pre-socialist city produced spatiotemporal duality in the urban fabric. Contemporary local accounts describe the north of the city as “a modern settlement” with functional and comfortable apartments in high-rise residential blocks and soliters as hallmarks of urban modernity. The apartment blocks were equipped with central heating and water supply, which was a novelty for the city and considered another sign of urban progress. Of the 860 flats with access to electricity, water, and central heating in 1971, 814 were socially owned, which implies that these were primarily located in the northern part of the city.

\textsuperscript{34} Münnich, N., \textit{Belgrad zwischen...}, pp. 180–182.
\textsuperscript{39} Simović, Ž., “Koncepcije dalje izgradnje...”
\textsuperscript{40} Janićevijević, M., “Kosovska Mitrovica...”
The northern part was called “Mitrovica city” (in English in the original) because of the consumption opportunities in modern shops and stores located at the ground floor of the new apartment buildings. There were also facilities for technical education and health care. Finally, the area was crucial for the symbolic integration of the city in the ideology of Yugoslav Partisan resistance. The low hill behind the residential buildings was labelled Partisan Hill and became the site for the city’s partisan monument, for which the municipality engaged the prestigious sculptor Bogdan Bogdanović.

As in other socialist cities, the ideologically-charged promotion of the new socialist neighbourhood relied on the “downward filtering” of pre-socialist urban areas. Reconstruction and building in the southern part of the city were limited. The municipality did build cheaper houses in Bair and on the other side of the Sitnica River but these dwellings were of a lower quality and served as provisional solutions awaiting more comprehensive urban development. The houses across the Sitnica were demolished for the development of the chemical industry enterprise.

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42 Simović, Ž., “Koncepcije dalje izgradnje...”
The residential neighbourhoods on Bair had limited access to public utilities or the anticipated green spaces, which were particularly important in this part of the city near the industrial zone. Residents also repeatedly complained about the dirt, which was the result of the absence of sewerage and water supply, but was also associated with persistent rural ways of living. The spatial division of the city carried strong normative divisions with it. An article of 1966 compared the left bank of the Ibar to New Belgrade and the old part of the city to Mostar. The former symbolised socialist modernity, the latter Ottoman backwardness.

The spatiotemporal division in the city concurred with socio-occupational differentiation in access to housing. As in other Yugoslav cities, flat distribution in Trepča was based on a points system, which prioritised high-qualified workers. The 1971 census showed that experts and managers had higher chances of living in social-sector dwellings than industrial workers or pensioners. Of the 206 manager households, 128 leased a social-sector house (62 percent), for experts the number was 387 on 805 (48 percent), and for white-collar workers 248 on 756 (33 percent). Among pensioners and blue-collar workers the shares were 20 (358 on 1828 households) and 21 percent (610 on 2855 households), respectively. Voters’ councils, a body for social oversight where citizens gathered on a regular basis to discuss communal issues, criticised that flats were only given to doctors, engineers, and other experts while residents of Mitrovica were left in the cold. Local communist leaders countered this criticism by arguing that in the initial stage of economic development, specialists had to be attracted from outside the region to lead the development of the city, which would ultimately be in the collective interest.

Of course, intra-urban socio-spatial boundaries were not absolute. One decision on the distribution of flats in the northern part of the city of 1962 shows that on a total of 31 beneficiaries, four were engineers, ten high-skilled technicians, nine administra-

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52 Savezni zavod za statistiku, Popis stanovništva i stanova, p. 379.
tive workers, and three supervisors, but also, three skilled workers, and two drivers.55 One of the first high-rise buildings constructed in Mitrovica was the so-called trade union building, which targeted socially-vulnerable strata of the population and was located in the northern part of the city.56 The municipality also constructed social-sector provisional housing in Bair and Sitnica for “socially vulnerable people, relatives of victims of fascist terror, [and] families of fallen soldiers” but also for “cadres for the management organs of the people’s committee, education, and health care services”.57 Still, the spatial organisation of social-sector housing for specialists in the northern part of the city, while production workers had to resort to dormitories and barracks in the factory settlements or the private sector, indicates that segregationist features were inherent to enterprise-led socialist urban planning.

The spatial organisation of socio-occupational differentiation in socialist cities is not a new finding. Ivan Szelenyi and David M. Smith have argued that socialist urban planning and zoning and the prominent role of enterprises in house construction and distribution led to spatial patterns of housing segregation. They have also pointed at the spatiotemporal and politically meaningful juxtaposition of new socialist neighbourhoods with old urban centres.58 Michael Gentile and Örjan Sjöberg elaborated on these findings and introduced the notion of intra-urban landscapes of priority. Put briefly, high-priority factories with access to central funding constructed high-quality housing for their employees in zones of priority with better access to public services and less exposure to pollution.59

Although Mitrovica subscribes to these general patterns, three features related to its peripheral position produced compressed socio-spatial duality.60 First, unlike the more diversified patterns of socio-spatial differentiation in socialist cities with a varied urban economy, the monopolistic role of Trepča in urban development led to the spatial concentration and social homogeneity of social-sector urban development

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60 For similar power relations between a big enterprise (FAP) and a small city and the resulting spatial duality in urban development see the case of Priboj. Hodžić, Husein, “Kako udruživati sredstva u komuni – odnosi velikog preduzeća i male opštine”, Komuna 13/4, 1966, pp. 12–16. The dual city phenomenon has received great attention in scholarship on global cities. In line with my argument about the compressed duality of smaller and peripheral cities, Richard M. Silverman has recently argued that socio-spatial duality is distinct and most pronounced in peripheral cities on a global level. Silverman, Richard M., “Rethinking shrinking cities: Peripheral dual cities have arrived”, Journal of urban affairs 2018, doi: 10.1080/07352166.2018.1448226.
in one zone of priority in the northern part of the city. Second, the degradation of the pre-socialist town was particularly marked in the Yugoslav South. Typically, during the first phase of socialist urban transformation, prestigious pre-socialist housing in historical neighbourhoods in the inner city was redistributed to the new urban elite and high-quality housing for the higher strata of the population was built in war-ravaged city centres. This in fact led to multi-nucleic residential patterns of the urban elite in the inner city and a relatively heterogeneous social profile of inner city inhabitants. In the case of Mitrovica, the material contingencies and ideologically-driven degradation of the Ottoman city paired with limited investments in reconstruction implied that prestigious pre-war housing remained restricted to the interwar villas for management in peri-urban factory settlements. In 1971, only 30 houses from the pre-war period had access to all utilities and presumably most of these were located in Zvečan. To give a counterexample, in Subotica, a medium-sized town with a long urban history in Vojvodina, half of the dwellings with access to all utilities were in private ownership. If we presume that a large part of these dwellings dated from the pre-socialist period, it becomes clear that the duality between the socialist and the pre-socialist city was less pronounced. Third and final, the smallness of pre-socialist Mitrovica and the limited concentric expansion implied that the duality between the new socialist city and the old Ottoman city was compressed. As opposed to bigger cities where new socialist residential estates were constructed on greenfield sites in the urban periphery, in Mitrovica, the new socialist city was immediately adjacent to the old Ottoman town.

Coordinated individual engagement: Communal development after the market reforms of 1965

In the ideological model of Yugoslav self-management, the insufficient pace and socio-spatial divisions characterising urban development were the outcome of the bureaucratic concentration of power with local economic and political powerholders. The particularly uneven development of Mitrovica seems to be a case in point of the distortive impact of power monopolies in urban development. Enterprise-led urban development was considered a relatively progressive way of house construction, because the direct accountability of workers for house construction provided incen-

65 “Kada će biti gotov urbanistički plan?”, Zvečan, April 20, 1958, p. 2.
tives for improving the rationality and quality of construction as well as stepping up productivity in the enterprise. However, it confused the role of the work collective in production with house construction and distribution as consumption. This was reflected in the socio-occupational divisions that were reproduced in housing, the squandering of means into luxurious flats, and the shortage of affordable housing. It was considered that house construction should be the competence of associations of citizens in their capacity as consumers, not producers. The municipality itself was another potential site for dislocated bureaucratic power. The practice whereby municipalities acted as representatives of a uniform community and determined social and economic decision-making through budgetary redistribution in fact preserved an element of the despised bureaucratic state at the local level.

In a broader context of market-oriented economic reforms, urban policy-makers argued for a more realistic and flexible manner of urban development, which channelled individual investments and took into consideration different individual needs and means. Until the productive capacities of society would be sufficient to provide the entire population with equally comfortable housing conditions, urban planning was to coordinate diverging social interests. The policy shift did not amount to capitulation to individual laissez-faire or speculative urban development, however, but strengthened the role of the municipality in coordinating self-management interests in urban development.

In what follows, I explore three aspects of the reforms in Mitrovica: marketisation of social-sector house construction, modernisation of the urban infrastructure, and regulation of private-sector house construction. I argue that the outcomes for each confirmed the compressed socio-spatial duality of the urban landscape.

Social-sector house management on market principles

The reforms of the mid-1960s professionalised social-sector house management along market principles, that is, by differentiating the means and needs of the population. A newly established municipal housing enterprise took over the management of the social-sector housing stock, the financial means of the abolished municipal funds for house construction, and a starting capital of 15 million dinars. Reflecting the distorted local power balances, Trepča owned 70 percent of the enterprise’s housing stock and contributed 2/3 of its starting capital. The housing enterprise

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was responsible for preserving the quality of the social-sector housing stock. It was also authorised to increase rents and costs for utilities in accordance with the market. The enterprise could buy and sell real estate and use the income to rationally invest in house construction targeting various parts of the population.\(^\text{70}\)

One of the key elements of the reforms was the revalorisation and differentiation of rent in line with contemporary construction costs.\(^\text{71}\) In Mitrovica, the point value almost doubled compared to 1959, when the first revalorisation had taken place.\(^\text{72}\) The actual rent would be gradually increased to reach the market value, through subsidisation from a 4 percent aggregate wage tax for housing on enterprises and social institutions.\(^\text{73}\) The increase of rent was presented as a socially just measure. Those tenants who had gained access to social-sector housing in the earliest phases of urban development had disproportionally benefited from collective efforts in urban development. By increasing rents for social-sector housing, the housing enterprise extracted the financial means from the current tenants to invest in affordable social-sector house construction.\(^\text{74}\) In the case of Mitrovica, this concerned the engineers and doctors who obtained flats in the zones of priority in the northern part of the city and Zvečan and benefitted from subsidised rents. When the Municipal Assembly discussed this measure, some local functionaries expressed concern that direct production workers, who lived in Bair, Prvi Tunel, and Stari Trg, would be affected as well by the rent increase. It was concluded, however, that the municipality should “set the economic value of housing, without considering the social aspect”, but that there was no risk of burdening production workers because rent was anyway extremely low in these neighbourhoods and Trepča would put in extra money.\(^\text{75}\)

Rent differentiation measures reflected the more individualising understanding of housing with social undertones. Flats of “humble comfort” were intended for citizens

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\(^\text{70}\) “Odluka o investicionom i tekućem održavanju stambenih zgrada i stanova”, Službeni list AKMO 21/41, 1966, pp. 1286–1289.

\(^\text{71}\) “Osnovni zakon o utvrđivanju vrijednosti stambenih zgrada, stanova i poslovnih prostorija”, Službeni list SFRJ 21/34 1965, pp. 1389–1390.


\(^\text{75}\) RAM 6 / 1965–2: Meeting of the Municipal Assembly of 14 September 1965. The quote is from Dejan Rundić.
with relatively low incomes. The rents for these types of dwellings covered only the direct costs for building and maintenance. In more comfortable flats, residents would pay higher rents that would cover not only the building and maintenance costs but also contribute to expanded production of new affordable housing. Flats with “the most contemporary comfort”, finally, would be subject to free market rules.\(^{76}\) The municipality of Mitrovica fixed rental costs for social-sector housing in relation to the quality of the dwelling, except for flats of “rich comfort” and “isolated ground floor buildings”.\(^{77}\) The quality of the dwelling was calculated through a points system that took into consideration the material and construction quality of the house, its functionality, infrastructure and equipment (kitchen, bathroom), age, location, and exposure to sun, moist, and pollution.\(^{78}\) The differentiation in rent again confirms the socio-spatial division of the city, with the more qualitative and costly flats located in the northern part of the city and the cheaper flats in the pre-socialist city centre, Bair, and Sitnica.\(^{79}\)

The professionalisation of social-sector housing management, however, did not bring the expected results. There was general dissatisfaction with the work of the municipal housing enterprise. The quality of maintenance was claimed to be worse than before, when individual house councils had been responsible.\(^{80}\) The collection of increased rents was highly irregular. The housing enterprise started a public campaign against non-payers, naming 745 tenants (on a total of slightly over 2,500) who did not pay their rent regularly.\(^{81}\) Figure 1 shows that the number of newly-constructed flats in social ownership stagnated and then dropped after the economic reforms of 1965. In the first half of the 1970s, the number of new social-sector dwellings amounted to a mere 125.\(^{82}\) Against that background, not even Trepča had flats at its disposal to attract badly needed specialists.\(^{83}\) In order to secure funds, the municipality authorised the housing enterprise to sell the provisional and low-quality social-sector housing in Bair and Sitnica, indicative of their limited economic and social value.\(^{84}\)

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\(^{76}\) Knežević, M., “Diferencirane – slobodne stanarine”.

\(^{77}\) “Odluka o najvišim iznosima stanarina”, _Službeni list APKiM_ 20/38, 1965, pp. 1218–1219.

\(^{78}\) “Odluka o utvrđivanju vrednosti stambenih zgrada”.


\(^{84}\) “Odluka o prenošenju obaveza po kreditima korišćenim za stambenu izgradnju”, _Službeni list APKiM_ 23/15, 1968, pp. 480–481; “Odluka o davanju ovlašćenja preduzeću za gazdovanje stambenih zgrada u Kos. Mitrovici o prodaji jednog dela stambenih zgrada i poslovnih prostorija”, _Službeni...
The market reforms thus had an abortive impact on social-sector house construction and in fact consolidated the spatial concentration of social-sector housing in the north of the city.

By the early 1970s, the failure of the reforms provoked growing criticism from urban policy-makers. The market had not done away with unequal access to housing, to the contrary. The sharp increase of communal and rental prices and the decline of social-sector house construction made it increasingly unlikely and costly for those people outside the social housing sector to realise their right to housing. Particularly problematic for the socialist state was that industrial production workers were disproportionally represented among the part of the population living in substandard private housing. The League of Communists increasingly stressed the need for solidarity. Not only should tenants of social-sector housing contribute to expanded construction by paying higher communal and rental costs, socially-vulnerable groups should gain access to housing at favourable conditions. In the early 1970s, municipal solidarity funds were established for this purpose. One of the first results of the solidarity funds in Mitrovica was the construction of the so-called three soliters right across the Ibar in the northern part of the city.

In the second half of the 1970s, social-sector construction was stepped up with the formation of a self-management interest community (samoupravna interesna zajednica, SIZ) for housing, communal development, and protection of the human environment. Essentially, the SIZ took over the assets and competences of the solidarity funds, the municipal funds for communal development, and the municipal housing enterprise. For the construction of new housing in the social sector, the SIZ disposed of a 5 percent aggregate wage tax, private contributions of citizens, and considerable start-up loans. This led to a notable increase of social-sector housing construction to around 1,000 flats between 1976 and 1980 (figure 1). The SIZ faced much of the same problems as the housing enterprise: irregular payment of rent and huge back

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pays,\textsuperscript{90} low rent, limited care of residents (although house councils were again made responsible for maintenance), and lack of professional maintenance services.\textsuperscript{91}

The largest part of the new high-rise residential buildings were again constructed in the northern part of the city.\textsuperscript{92} The capacities of the heating plant serving the social-sector residential buildings in the northern part of the city were expanded.\textsuperscript{93} In Bair, a new social-sector residential area with around 250 dwellings was built for solidarity purposes. Many of its residents were workers with low income who had been on waiting lists for over ten years. Residents complained about numerous shortcomings. There was no street lighting, only water at night, and central heating was not functioning because the boiler was still under construction. Moreover, the site for the production and transport of cement and concrete for the construction works in the city was located in the middle of the settlement, which caused dust and noise pollution.\textsuperscript{94} Social-sector high-rise residential buildings for solidarity purposes were also constructed in Prvi Tunel to replace the old miners’ barracks. The communal infrastructure and connection of the settlement with Mitrovica were improved.\textsuperscript{95} Thus, although social-sector housing was dispersed in this phase, the concentration of “solidarity” social-sector housing in Bair and Prvi Tunel and “normal” social-sector housing in the northern part of the city actually consolidated the socio-spatial duality in the urban landscape.

\textit{Municipal self-contribution and the reconstruction of the pre-socialist city centre}

The housing reforms of 1965 strengthened the role of the municipality vis-à-vis enterprises in urban development. This should lead to more coordinated and long-term urban planning. The municipal council for urbanism in 1971 for example evaluated that the urbanisation of Mitrovica had “played a significant role in the transformation of the way of life. … From a provincial town (\textit{kasaba}), Kosovska Mitrovica was gradually growing into a modern city”. However, there were major shortcomings

\textsuperscript{90} “Ne plaća: Ko može i kome se može”, \textit{Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja} 1/5, 1978, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{91} “Umesto prave akcije, tužakanje: održavanje stambeni zgrada”, \textit{Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja} 1/3, 1978, p. 5; “Premalo društvene brige”, \textit{Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja} 3/14, 1980, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{92} “Više stanova nego ikada ranije”, \textit{Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja} 3/14, 1980, pp. 2–3.
\textsuperscript{93} “Zimske teme: Kako se Mitrovčani greju”, \textit{Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja} 2/10, 1979, p.9.
\textsuperscript{95} “Prvi Tunel: Gradi se vodovod”, \textit{Komuna, list za komunalna i stambena pitanja} 3/11, 1980, p. 12.
due to the isolated and fragmentary urban solutions, which were the result of the conception of urban development as “a technical specialised affair and not as a social activity in the interest of all citizens, work organisations, and socio-political organisations”. The changing power relations at the local level had important socio-spatial implications. Most obviously, the reconstruction of the pre-socialist city centre got finally under way. In 1968, the architectural studio Iskra developed a detailed plan for the reconstruction of the city centre as the administrative, commercial, and cultural gravitation centre for the city. In 1971, the old and narrow steel bridge over the Ibar was replaced by a wider bridge. Representative public buildings and some high-rise residential buildings were constructed along the central korzo: the headquarters of the League of Communists, the municipal assembly, a hotel, and health care centre.

By this time, however, the “de-etatisation” of the municipality cut short the traditional “budgetary method” for financing investments and instead imposed local governments to “self-finance” their services and investments. Various forms of self-financing were available, from the increase and individualisation of communal costs, to self-taxation (samooporezivanje) or self-contribution (samodoprinos) for collective investments in communal development. Some continued federal redistribution to underdeveloped municipalities was maintained, but it was expected that communal services and investments would be primarily realised through increased civil commitment. In the 1970s, two municipal referendums endorsed “self-taxation” for the ambitious modernisation of the water supply, sewerage, and roads system and the construction of public buildings in Mitrovica. The renewed intensity in urban development was part of the self-management agreement reached by the SIZ for housing, communal development, and protection of the human environment.

Unlike the urban plan of the early 1960s, the SIZ prioritised the reconstruction of the “remains of the old town (kasaba), with its narrow cobbled streets, packed and ramshackle little houses, wild building, unregulated sewerage and water supply burden, … [and] private houses of low comfort.” The reconstruction works finally demolished the pre-socialist street pattern, introduced a modern road network with

sewerage and electricity, and regulated the Ljušta River through an underground canal. A new modern warehouse, football stadium, cultural centre, elementary schools, and bus station added to the modern look of the pre-socialist city centre. The material contingency of the existing pre-socialist city, however, imposed a more pragmatic and layered approach to urban development than envisaged by the urban plan of 1963. Moreover, the perception and reputation of high-rise buildings and the old city had changed by this time. Contrary to the harsh criticism of the old čaršija in the plan of 1963, it was decided that a part of the pre-socialist city centre would be preserved and renovated in the Ottoman style. This would become the “calm part of the city”, which would “break the greyness the city due to the construction of new residential buildings”. As such, the communal development of the pre-socialist city centre confirmed the socio-spatial duality of the city by juxtaposing the uniformity of the socialist neighbourhood in the northern part of the city with a more fragmentary and layered urban environment.

**Individual housebuilding in the periphery**

The economic reforms took place against the background of massive rural-to-urban migration, which was the result of agricultural overpopulation, the strong social benefits coupled to wage labour and urban life, and the underdevelopment of neighbouring rural municipalities. In the 1960s and 1970s, over 600 migrants annually settled in the city. Over 80 percent of them came from other municipalities in Kosovo, mostly from neighbouring Srbica and Vučitrn. The urban population in the municipality increased from 28.5 percent in 1948 to 52.4 percent in 1981. Urban development could not keep pace with migration. In 1965, it was estimated that there was a demand for over 3000 dwellings, while the municipality and Trepča constructed around 300 flats per year. Under such conditions of under-urbanisation, rural-to-urban migrants resorted to illegal house construction.

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became massive from the early 1960s. Urban planners of course abhorred illegal house construction, because it jeopardised rational urban planning, was of a low standard, and brought the “smallholders” habits of villagers into the city.\textsuperscript{109} However, facing the enormous pressure on the urban fabric, the authorities in practice established a toleration policy.\textsuperscript{110}

It is important to stress at this point that socialist urban planning was not hostile to individual house construction. Mitrovica’s urban plan foresaw less dense residential areas for individual house construction in Tavnik, an open terrain to the west and southwest of the historical city centre. Trepča also provided loans for the private construction of stand-alone houses, of which the absolute majority went to qualified and high-qualified workers. During the initial phase of urban development, however, the municipality focussed on land development for high-rise residential buildings.\textsuperscript{111} Facing a dramatic rise of requests from citizens for individual house construction and increased illegal house construction, the final version of the general urbanistic plan expanded the residential zone for individual family houses and the municipality took measures to regulate and concentrate the construction of stand-alone houses.\textsuperscript{112}

The municipality opened various competitions for individual house construction in Tavnik, particularly targeting families with a critical housing situation.\textsuperscript{113} Crucially, thereby, building permits obliged house constructors to stick to certain urban standards of quality and uniformity. The municipality also markedly increased funds for individual house construction, developed 500 parcels for detached houses in Tavnik, and invested in water supply and sewerage and road construction in the settlement.\textsuperscript{114} Administrative procedures for obtaining building permits for individual family houses were made faster and easier, particularly for the most vulnerable layers of the population.\textsuperscript{115} The result was that in 1964 for the first time, the number of new flats in private ownership (350) was higher than that in social ownership (267).\textsuperscript{116}

The economic reforms of 1965 consolidated these trends. The reforms obliged municipalities to develop land prior to construction, which included the legal set-

\textsuperscript{109} Radauš, Vjenčeslav. “Bespravna izgradnja u gradovima”, \textit{Komuna} 9/6, 1962, pp. 9–12.
\textsuperscript{111} “Pomoću kredita igrađeno 109 stanova”, \textit{Trepča}, March 25, 1962, p. 4; “Odobreno 40 miliona za kreditiranje stambene izgradnje”, \textit{Trepča}, September 25, 1962, p. 2; Simović, Ž., “Koncepcije dalje izgradnje”.
\textsuperscript{112} RAM 6 / 1963–1: Municipal People’s Committee of 4 February 1963; “Odluka o izmenama i dopunama odluke o određivanju užeg građevinskog reona grada Kosovska Mitrovica i naselja gradskog karaktera Zvečana i Vučitrna”, \textit{Službeni list AKMO} 17/17, 1962, pp. 625–626.
\textsuperscript{115} RAM 6 / 1964–2: Session of the Municipal People’s Committee of 9 March 1964.
tlement of property issues, sanitation and land levelling, and connection to public utilities networks.\textsuperscript{117} This allowed to set mid-term plans for house construction, which ideally aligned the collective interests of long-term urban planning with short-term interests of individual investors.\textsuperscript{118} Prior to the reforms, communal development had been funded from donations from the municipality and economic organisations, one-time land development contributions by investors,\textsuperscript{119} and an aggregate wage tax of 1.5 percent.\textsuperscript{120} The reforms of 1965 turned the funds into a local body with the task to stimulate rational communal development on market principles, either through direct investments or through competitive credits and loans.\textsuperscript{121} The main source of financing for the new funds was a tax on urban land.\textsuperscript{122} As with increased rental costs, the underlying reasoning was that users of urban land would thus pay for the benefits they received in terms of economic activities and living standard from multi-generational collective urban development (which were called the urban interest, \textit{gradska renta}).\textsuperscript{123}

In that line of thinking, urban land taxation was differentiated according to the quality of the land, which indirectly confirmed the sharp spatial differentiation in the city. For commercial buildings, the first and most expensive zone (10 dinars/m\textsuperscript{2}) comprised the pre-socialist centre of the city. The second zone (7 dinars/m\textsuperscript{2}) covered the new residential buildings north of the Ibar and Zvečan, the third zone (2 dinars/m\textsuperscript{2}) the rest. In other words, for commercial purposes, the \textit{čaršija} was considered the most profitable part of the city. For residential housing, the first and most expensive zone comprised the new residential area north of the Ibar and Zvečan. The second zone was the historical city centre and Bair and included the peripheral areas for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} "Zakon o određivanju građevinskog zemljišta u gradovima i naseljima gradskog karaktera", \textit{Službeni list SFRJ} 24/5, 1968, pp. 77–78.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Krštić, Branislav, "Uređenje građevinskog zemljišta – instrument urbanističke politike grada", \textit{Komuna} 13/5, 1966, pp. 14–17; “Opcí zakon o uređivanju i korištenju gradskog zemljišta”, \textit{Službeni list FNRJ} 18/12, 1962, pp. 194–195.
\item \textsuperscript{119} “Odluka o obaveznom učešću investitora u izgradnji komunalnih uređaja i investicija”, \textit{Službeni list AKMO} 16/44, 1961, pp. 1267–1268.
\item \textsuperscript{120} “Odluka o osnivanju opštinskog fonda za komunalnu izgradnju”, \textit{Službeni list AKMO} 15/17, 1960, p. 364.
\item \textsuperscript{122} RAM 6 / 1965–1: “Odluka o doprinosu za korišćenje gradskog zemljišta” (27 February 1965); “Osnovni zakon o doprinosu za korištenje gradskog zemljišta”, \textit{Službeni list SFRJ} 21/10, 1965, pp. 254–255.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Nikolić, Miodrag, “Neka pitanja gradske rente u teoriji i praksi”, \textit{Komuna} 17/9, 1970, pp. 24–27.
\end{itemize}
individual house construction in the northern part of the city. The third zone, finally, covered Tavnik.\textsuperscript{124}

A new system of auctions allowed the municipality to distribute land to the best offer and cover the costs for communal development. Land development for individual house construction was heavily promoted. Whereas social investors were obliged to pay the full development costs, the municipality set a maximum tariff per square meter for private buyers. The communal costs that were not covered by private owners (up to 75 percent of the total costs) were subsidised from the municipal funds for communal development.\textsuperscript{125} Later measures further promoted individual house construction in Tavnik by reducing the development costs for that area compared to the rest of the city.\textsuperscript{126} The shift to individual house construction clearly addressed the social inequalities in social-sector housing. Voters’ councils and meetings of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People regularly discussed house distribution schemes and suggested that “true inhabitants” of Mitrovica should have priority access to land for individual house construction. In the competition for urban land, urbanites felt disadvantaged compared to migrants, who could sell their land in the village and use the money to construct a house in the city.\textsuperscript{127} These criticisms apparently had effect. Land auctions gave priority to partisan war veterans, war and work invalids, persons whose house had been demolished for urban development, people without adequate housing, and people registered in Mitrovica for at least five years.\textsuperscript{128} Partly as a result of these measures to regulate individual house construction, the problem of illegal house construction remained acute, as the procedures for legal individual house construction remained restrictive for most rural-to-urban migrants. Between 1966 and June 1971, 1,060 illegal objects were built.\textsuperscript{129} The municipality again provided opportunities to legalise and concentrate informal housebuilding in zones for detached housing.\textsuperscript{130}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} “Odluka o doprinosu za korišćenje gradskog zemljišta”, \textit{Službeni list APKiM} 20/15, 1965, pp. 538–540; “Odluka o doprinosu za korišćenje gradskog zemljišta”, \textit{Službeni list SAPK} 26/12, 1971, pp. 183–185.
\item \textsuperscript{125} RAM 6 / 1965–1: “Odluka o uredjivanju i korišćenju gradskog zemljišta” (27 February 1965).
\item \textsuperscript{126} “Odluka o izmjeni i dopunii odluke o uredjivanju i korišćenju gradskog zemljišta”, \textit{Službeni list APKiM} 21/38, 1966, p. 1219.
\item \textsuperscript{127} “Kome i kako dati plac”, \textit{Zvečan}, May 28, 1966, p. 3; “Perkrahja reformes dhe kritika e hapert”, \textit{Zvečan}, August 27, 1966, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{129} RAM 6 / 197–1: “Informacija o bespravnoj izgradnji gradjevinskih objekata za period 1966. do 1971. godine” (1 October 1971).
\item \textsuperscript{130} “Odluka o posebnim uslovima, načinu i merama za regulisanje bespravno podignutih objekata”, \textit{Službeni list SAPK} 26/31, 1971, pp. 663–665.
\end{itemize}
The result of the economic reforms was a clear shift to private house construction. In the second half of the 1960s, over 1,500 stand-alone houses were built in the private sector, while the number of new social-sector houses stagnated at around 700 (figure 1). In 1969, for example, only 140 flats were constructed in social ownership, against 729 in the private sector. After a stagnation in both private and social-sector house construction, the intensification of urban development in the late 1970s also implied a sharp increase in private house construction. In the 1960s, individual house construction was primarily concentrated to the south and southwest of the city, on the right bank of the Ibar. During the 1970s and 80s, the area of Suvi Do, on the left bank of the Ibar to the west of the city, was developed for individual house construction.

The increase of individual house construction had clear socio-spatial implications. First, the city expanded strongly as a result of repeated decisions to incorporate informal house settlements in the urban space. The shift to individual house construction thus added a sprawling peripheral belt of detached housing around the existing core of the compressed and dual city centre. Second, it aborted high-rise neighbourhood extension, a characteristic feature of socialist cities. It was considered more cost-efficient to use urbanised land with limited prospects for high-rise building construction within the foreseeable future for individual house construction. Individual house construction occupied areas that were originally planned for high-rise residential buildings, such as the lower eastern slopes in the northern part of the city that had already developed as a residential area from the late 19th century (Bošnjačka mahala), Bair, and parts of Zvečan, as well as areas that were initially foreseen as green areas, such as the area on the back slope of Partisan Hill (Mikronaselje).

The expansion of the city in individual house settlements added a new dimension of urban-rural hybridity to the socio-spatial differentiation in the city. The quality of living in the urban periphery was low as communal development remained dead letter, although individual house construction primarily targeted socially vulnerable groups who had been discriminated in urban development thus far. The municipality recognised that areas for individual house construction “were completely undeveloped

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… wastelands”, but had to postpone communal development because of the limited means in the funds for communal development. In Tavnik, for example, there were no real roads, no order for house placement, and no sewerage or garbage collection. In 1972, only 30 percent of the 4,000 residents of Tavnik had access to the city’s water supply system. Of the total of 5,990 private houses in Mitrovica, 3,739 had no pipe water or central heating. Initial plans to construct a green protective belt in Tavnik were abandoned because of the rapid individual house building and the new “Adriatic Magistrale”, which connected Mitrovica with north-eastern Montenegro. The municipality even dropped its earlier principle of strict delineation between rural and urban areas and allowed residents of the individual house settlements in the urban periphery to hold cattle. The urbanisation of Tavnik was only started in the late 1970s, in the framework of the reconstruction of the pre-socialist city centre.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have argued that the socialist urbanisation of Mitrovica gave rise to compressed socio-spatial duality. Three features of urban development were relevant in this process. First, patterns of spatial segregation depend on the material contingencies imposed by the pre-socialist city. Pre-socialist Mitrovica was predominantly located on the right bank of the Ibar and was ideologically degraded as the counterimage of socialist urban modernity. This imposed spatial concentration of intensive socialist house construction on the less densely built terrain on the left bank of the river and limited growth of the pre-socialist city centre. Due to the particular physical geography and the limited development of the city before the Second World War, the historical city centre was not fully encircled by transitional zones or industry, which compressed the socio-spatial duality between the new socialist residential area and the existing pre-socialist city, immediately adjacent on both sides of the Ibar.

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140 “Odluka o izmeni i dopuni odluke o držanju domaćih životinja i pernate živine na području grada Kosovska Mitrovica i prigradskih naselja Zvečan, Stari Trg i Prvi Tunel”, *Službeni list APKiM* 20/47, 1965, pp. 1561–1562.
A second factor underlying spatial segregation in socialist cities is the role of workplaces and state administration in allocating housing.\(^{143}\) Due to the dependence on one high-priority enterprise, socialist urban development in Mitrovica remained confined to one single zone of priority. The abortive effects of the market reforms on enterprise-led social housing expansion, moreover, stalled socialist neighbourhood extension. The municipality took the lead over urban development in the mid-1960s and shifted the spatial focus to the pre-socialist city. The more thorough reconstruction of the city centre came under way in the 1970s and 80s, but remained fragmentary and layered due to limited financial means, the material contingencies of the pre-socialist built environment, and shifting reputations of the Ottoman-era city centre and the socialist high-rise residential buildings. Moreover, the concentration of social-sector housing for solidarity purposes in Bair confirmed the socio-spatial duality of the city.

A final factor underlying spatial segregation in socialist cities is the degree of informal residential mobility challenging formal house allocation.\(^{144}\) Individual and mostly informal house construction was an inherent feature of socialist urban development in Mitrovica. It was spatially concentrated in peripheral concentric belts around the dual city centre and occupied areas that were initially foreseen for high-rise neighbourhood extension. As such, individual house construction encircled and consolidated the compressed duality in the urban landscape.

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Др Питер Трох

Урбанистички развој у Косовској Митровици у периоду социјализма: сажета друштвено-просторна двојност у индустријском граду средње величине на неразвијеном југу Југославије

У раду је изложено да је социјалистичка урбанизација Митровице довела до компризирание друштвено-просторне двојности. Обрасци просторне сегрегације зависили су од материјалних околности предсоцијалистичке Митровице. Овде су од посебне важности не само локација и ограничен раст отоманског града на јужној обали Ибра, него и идеолошка деградација старог града после Другог светског рата. Затим у основи просторне сегрегације била је и улога предузећа високог приоритета Трепча и општинске управе приликом расподеле стамбених јединица. Услед монопола Трепче до средине 1960-их, социјалистички урбани развој у Митровици био је ограничен на једну зону на северној обали Ибра. Општина је преузела вођство над урбаним развојем средином 1960-их и преусмерила просторни фокус на предсоцијалистички део града. Међутим, ограничени финансијска средства, индивидуалистички приступ урбаном развоју и увођење принципа „солидарности“ у стамбеном сектору су потврдили друштвено-просторну двојност града. Трећи фактор који је утицао на урбанизацију К. Митровице био је индивидуална и углавном неформална изградња кућа. Просторно је концентрисана у периферне концентричне појасове око центра града. Као таква, индивидуална изградња кућа окруживала је и учвршћивала сажету двојност у урбаном пејзажу.

Кључне речи: социјалистично Косово, Косовска Митровица, социјалистички урбанистички развој, друштвено-просторна диференцијација, мањи индустријски град