Lukas Denk

Morphosyntactic coding of proper names in Mapudungun

Regensburg Papers in Linguistics 10

Universität Regensburg

FAKULTÄT FÜR SPRACH-, LITERATUR- UND KULTURWISSENSCHAFTEN

Herausgeber: Universität Regensburg

Universität Regensburg
Universitätsstraße 31
93053 Regensburg

DOI: 10.5283/epub.40555

Formatierung: Lukas Denk

Coverdesign: Maximilian Weiß

Redaktion: Katarzyna I. Wojtylak

Der Text stellt eine überarbeitete Version der B.A.-Arbeit des Autors dar, die er 2013 an der Fakultät für Sprach-, Literatur- und Kulturwissenschaften der Universität Regensburg eingereicht hat.

Die *Regensburg Papers in Linguistics* werden in unregelmäßigen Abständen vom Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine und Vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft veröffentlicht.

https://www.uni-regensburg.de/sprache-literatur-kultur/allgemeine-vergleichende-sprachwissenschaft/regensburg-papers-in-linguistics/index.html

Universität Regensburg

Contents

Abbreviations

1	1st person
2	2nd person
3	3rd person
A	agentive participant, subject of a transitive clause
ABS	absolutive case
ACC	accusative case
ACCES	accessible
ADJ	adjective
CF	constant feature
CL	clitic
CN	common noun
COLL	collective
d	dual
DEF	definite
DIM	diminutive
DIR	direct
DOM	differential object marking
E	*-e* morpheme; marker for MLS.
ELS	extended local scenario
ERG	ergative case
GIV	given
HS	high semantic
HUM	human
IMPORT	important
IND	indicative
INSTR	instrumental case
INTS	intensive
INV	inverse
ITER	iterative
LS	low semantic
MLS	minimal local scenario
MU	*-mu* morpheme, inverse marker for ELS
NC	noun class marker (I, II...)
NEG	negation
NFIN	non-finite
NOM	nominative case
O	objective/ patientive participant, direct object of a transitive clause
obv	obviative
p	plural
PAST	past tense
PN	proper name
PPOS	postposition
PRO	pronoun
prox	proximate
PSR	possessor (of a possessive construction)
REP	reportative
RI	ruptured implicature (unexpected event, irreal mode, past time, cf. Zúñiga 2006b:133-135)
S	single participant/subject of an intransitive clause
s	singular
SAP	speech-act participant(s)
W	*-w* morpheme, direct marker for ELS
(x) --> (y)	(x) acts upon (y)
Ø	zero marker

1 Introduction

This study deals with the morphosyntactic coding of proper names[1] in Mapudungun. The language is spoken mainly in the central south of Chile and in the Argentinian Andean Region and counts a speaker population of 258,620 in total[2]. Mapudungun belongs to the Mapudungu (ethnologue) or Araucanian (Campbell 1997) family, together with the southern variety Huilliche,. Basic features are an agglutinating head-marking morphology and polysynthetic structure. The alignment of person marking on the verb follows a 'hierarchical pattern', that means, that the grammatical relation of the core participants S (single participant/ subject of an intransitive clause), A (agentive participant/ subject of a transitive clause) and O (patientive participant/ object of a transitive clause) depend on a hierarchical ranking of their semantic or pragmatic status.

1.1 Aim and issue

The central aim of this paper is to show how proper names (expressions referring to a single, mostly human entity like *John* or *Mary*) are coded in Mapudungun grammar as the core participants A, S and O. Thereby, the coding should be compared to that of other referential expressions (i.e. noun phrases), especially of pronouns, human or definite common nouns in order to see whether proper names constitute a nominal category of their own, and to find out which position they occupy in the hierarchal ranking of referents in Mapudungun.

The closeness between proper names, pronouns and common nouns has been frequently noticed and claimed in literature (Aissen 2003, Anderson 2007, Van Langendonck 2007) and even presented in typological hierarchies dealing with animacy and definiteness (Silverstein 1976, Dixon 1979, 1994, Comrie 1989, Aissen 2003). Here, proper names are supposed to occupy an intermediate position, being thus higher (namely 'more animate/definite') ranked than common human nouns and lower than personal pronouns. In this sense, I will further investigate if the position of proper names in the referential hierarchy in Mapudungun – as far as any position can be pointed out – coincide with the predicted position in the generalized hierarchies mentioned above.

1.2 Methodology and data

The topic is introduced by a brief resume of morphosyntactic properties of proper names and of hierarchical systems in general. As to proper names, (2.1.1 and 2.1.2) I will rely primarily on Anderson (2007) and Van Langendonck (2007), and explain their status within typological hierarchies

[1] I will here use the term 'proper name' and 'name' synonymously.
[2] Cf. *Mapudungun* in Ethnologue (Lewis 2009).

(2.1.3). In 1.2, the morphosyntactic alignment 'hierarchical' should be explained by means of its realization in a few languages. Here I will mainly rely on Klaiman (1992) and Zúñiga (2006a). The latter reference and a grammar of Mapudungun (Smeets 2008) should lead us to the description of the language-specific hierarchical pattern (3.1.1-3.1.4.). As to the coding of proper names (3.2), again a paper published by Zúñiga (2010) and excerpts of Mapudungun texts from Coña (1995) should help us to offer a preliminary answer. After comparing the coding with the prediction of typological hierarchies (4.), the results should be resumed in (5.).

2 Morphosyntax of proper names and hierarchical systems

The following chapter resumes on the one hand morphological and syntactic traits of proper names that have been described in theory and typology and on the other hand the traits of morphosyntactic hierarchical alignment. These two topics shall act as the background information in order to further analyze the behavior of names in Mapudungun.

2.1 Common morphosyntactic properties of proper names

"All languages have names, and in all languages names have a syntax distinctive from other syntactic categories." (Anderson (2007: 168 f.). Since it could be hard to envision a language without names, I would take Anderson's statement for granted to pique one's curiosity to what grammatical traces determine this "essential category" (p. 169).

2.1.1 Definition and particular properties

John Stuart Mill (1843*:* 1. ii. 5.), an English philosopher, states: "[A] proper name [is] a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing it is that we are talking about, but not of telling anything about it". If we may interpret the statement by using more concrete linguistic terms, the "answer(...)[of the] purpose of showing" seems to enlighten a *determinative* or *definite* property, the "thing (...) that we are talking about" points to the importance of *identification*, and "not (...) telling anything about it" indicates the *lack of a lexical meaning*.

Van Langendonck's definition (2007: 87; cf. p. 6) arranges the functions of proper names according to linguistic levels:

> "A proper name is a noun that denotes a unique entity at the level of established convention to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category [pragmatic]. The meaning of the name, if any, does not (or not any longer) determine its denotation [semantic]. An important formal reflex of this pragmatic-semantic characterization of proper names is their ability to appear in such close appositional constructions as *the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the River Thames,* or *the City of London* [syntactic]."

Such appositional constructions can be regarded as a particular syntactic property that proper names exhibit, for Van Langendonck (2007) the most peculiar one.

Further examples deal with morphosyntactic reflexes of the properties *determinacy, definiteness, identification, lack of lexical meaning*, based on the interpretation of Mill's (1843*:* 1. ii. 5.) and Van Langendonck's (2007: 87) definition.

As to the determinative nature, Anderson argues that names are already determinative phrases, because "proper names like *Sally* and *Ambrose* – that is, personal names – are not usually modified by determiners of any kind" (Anderson 2007: 171), like articles or adjectives. Common nouns, instead, share this ability: *the two frightful battered hats* (cf. p. 171). However, phrases like *A different John* (Van Langendonck 1990: 574) are indeed found in speech. In that case, Van Langendonck argues that "the P[roper] N[ame] (...) has been embedded in a C[common] N[ame] phrase" (loc. cit.). Some evidence for a proper name acting as a common noun phrase can be seen by the agreement variation in Kirundi:

(1) Agreement in Kirundi (cf. Van de Velde 2010: 13, from Meeussen 1959: 191)

a) *Taama a-raaje*
Taama NC.I-arrives
'Taama arrives'

b) *Taama ki-raaje*
Taama NC.VI-arrives
'(the big) Taama arrives.'

c) *Taama ka-raaje*
Taama NC.XII-arrives
'(the little) Taama arrives'.

d) *Taama ru-raaje*
Taama NC.XIII-arrives
'(the strong/awful) Taama arrives.'

Here, the agreement varies depending on the meaning of that which modifies the name. Van de Velde (cf. 2010: 13) speaks here also about an 'emotive meaning' (which proper names can bear instead of a lexical meaning).

Closely related to determinacy is definiteness, which is claimed to be inherent to proper names (cf. Van Langendonck 2007: 154). A syntactic evidence is the possibility for them to appear in 'right dislocation'. Also definite NPs, pronouns and proper names (all definite expressions) show the same

syntactic behavior:

(2) Right dislocation of proper names in Dutch (p. 155)

a) *Ik heb hem nog niet gezien, Jan/hem/ de buurmann.*
'I have not seen him yet, Jan/ him/ the neighbor.'

b) **Ik heb hem nog niet gezien, iemand/ een buurman.*
'I have not seen him yet, somebody/ a neighbor.'

Furthermore, proper names serve particularly to identify referents, and hence do not appear as a predicate nominal, in Polish marked by the instrumental case:

(3) Predication in Polish (cf. p. 148)

a) *Clinton jest prezydent-em.*
Clinton is President-INSTR
'Clinton is president.'

b) **Prezydent jest Clinton-em.*
President is Clinton-INSTR
'The president is Clinton.'

Example (3) even shows that proper names lack lexical or descriptive meaning, since the predicate may function as a description (cf. Van Langendonck 1990: 570). Unlike proper names, common nouns may qualify their meaning by restrictive relative clauses (cf. loc. cit. based on Pope 1976: 61, fn. 18):

(4) a) **John* ***who were to make any objection*** *would be fired.*
b) *The man* ***who were to make any objection*** *would be fired.*

Other morphosyntactic peculiarities of proper names may be noted randomly, like the lack of countability or plurality. In this sense, the construction *the Johnsons* would not express twice the same referent, but rather refer to two different persons named in a homophonous way (cf. Van Langendonck 1990: 570).

Proper names seem to lack of phoricity, i.e., they don't refer back or forward to a reference in the discourse (like pronouns), but function instead as those expressions to which pronouns or common nouns refer. If proper names refer to somewhat, this reference lies outside the discourse, so that proper names could be seen as exophoric deictics or as the "weakest anaphoric elements" (cf. Van Langendonck 2007: 153, 182).

Van Langendonck (2007: 172 f.) assumes, that prototypical proper names "are mostly zero coded". It should be said, however, that there exist particular markers, which overtly constitute a morphosyntactic class of proper names. In Hoočąk, a Sioux language of Wisconsin, the suffix -ga is used not only in order to mark proper names, but even to transform common nouns into them:

(5) Proper name marking in Hoočąk

a) *šųųkxete-ra 'eeja nųųp ha-ja-wi.*
horse-DEF there two COLL-be.standing-p
'(...) there were two horses.' (cf. Hartmann & Marschke 2010: 72)

b) *šųųkxete-įk-**ga** 'eeja nųųgiwąk-ji hegų t'ąt'ąp nįsge rahe*
horse-DIM-PN there run-INTS that.way jump VAGUE be.going.there
'There goes the horse ('Horsie') running and bucking over there'. (p. 75)

2.1.2 Shared properties

Some of the features proper names exhibit are even shared by other nominal expressions. Halliday (cf. 1994: §6.60) sees proper names as a subclass of nouns, together with common nouns and pronouns. Van Langendonck states that a proper name is "the prototypical noun"3 (cf. 2007: 53, 171 ff., 223) and that they are on the whole "to be situated between pronouns and common nouns" (1990: 567, cf. 571; cf. 2007: 169, 171). This is also noticed by Anderson (2007: 173): "Some grammarians do acknowledge that 'with proper names we have reached a stage part way between noun and pronoun.'" In fact, some morphosyntactic properties could confirm that closeness.

2.1.2.1 With common nouns

Van Langendonck (2007: 171) supposes that proper names "share more characteristics with common nouns than with personal pronouns." As to diachrony, Van Langendonck (1990: 568) says that proper names "derive from CNs in most cases". And even syncronically they are mostly derived from common nouns (loc. cit): Hockett (1958: §37.2, in Anderson 2007: 170) points out that "if the language has a noun-like part of speech, then names are almost invariably nouns."

Morphosyntactic properties confirm this similarity. In Dutch, proper names can appear, like common nouns and unlike pronouns, in left dislocation:

(6) a) *Karel/ De baas, die lacht altijd*

[3] This could be one explanation why Van Langendonck (2007: 87) uses the terms 'proper name' and 'proper noun' quite synonymously, other than Coates (2005: 27; see also 2006: 371, cited in Van Langendonck 2007: 67): "[T]he proper nouns which are the prototypical proper names."

lit. 'Karel /The boss, that laughs all the time.' (Van Langendonck 2007: 170)

b) **Hij, de lacht altijd.*
'He, that laughs all the time.' (loc. cit.)

Furthermore, proper names and common nouns can both take modifiers (cf. 2.1.1) like in *Our cute Sheila/ girl has made it* (Van Langendonck 2007: 170). Examples from Bantu languages like the Kirundi example above (1) show that they behave like other common nouns as they have to choose a nominal class prefix to trigger, even if the choice is a pragmatic (emotional) one.

2.1.2.2 With pronouns

While the differences between pronouns and proper names "reside in the referential and pragmatic areas", Van Langendonck (1990: 574) concludes that "the main similarities (...) are to be found in the areas of **categorial** and **lexical meaning**", this being reflected in morphosyntax.

We can refer to the properties noted in 2.1.1: Proper names and pronouns both lack lexical or descriptive meaning; neither can proper nouns, like in (4) precede a restrictive relative clause (loc. cit. 570):

(7) a) **John who were to make any objection would be fired.*
b) **You who were to make any objection would be fired.*

Pronouns share all categorial features with proper names (cf. Van Langendonck 1990: 571-573), like definiteness: both are inherently definite and specific, which can be tested in French via right dislocation (cf. also example 2):

(8) a) *Il est fort, Jean.*
(lit.) 'He is strong, Jean.'
b) *Il est fort, lui.*
(lit.) 'He is strong, him.'
c) **Il est fort, quelqu'un.*
(lit.) 'He is strong, somebody.'

Furthermore, they both have in common a distinction in animacy. While *he/she* refer to animate entities, *it* is for inanimates. The same distinction can be made in English by using the article with proper names:

(9) a) *Mr. Hudson* vs. *the Hudson Bay.*
b) *Queen Elizabeth* vs. *the Queen Elizabeth.*

Where common nouns in Polish have to be in the instrumental case when being in predicational sentences, proper names cannot, cf. (3). Pronouns and proper names can only stand in identificational sentences, here in the nominative case (cf. Van Langendonck 2007: 148).

(10) a) *Clinton jest prezydent-em.*
Clinton is President-INSTR
'Clinton is president'
b) *Ten pan to (jest)* ***Clinton***.
That gentleman this (is) Clinton.
'That gentleman is Clinton.'
c) *To (jest)* ***on***.
This (is) he.
'That is him.'

2.1.3 The role of proper names in referential hierarchies

Hierarchies are core generalizations to explain functions in typology. Regarding markedness of nominal expressions, proper names have been claimed to form part of several chains.

2.1.3.1 Animacy hierarchy

The 'animacy hierarchy' is one of the most important generalizations in linguistic typology. It predicts, for instance, that asymmetries in the marking of grammatical relations (S, A, O), are sensitive to the following cline:

(11) 1/2 pronoun > 3pronoun
> proper names/ kin terms > human
> non-human > inanimate common nouns
(cf. Dixon 1979: 85)

Participants like pronouns, which are higher on the cline (i.e. on the left) could be marked otherwise than those which are lower-ranked (i.e. on the right), like inanimates.

Other designations for the 'animacy hierarchy' (Comrie 1989) are 'lexical hierarchy' (Silverstein 1976) 'nominal hierarchy' (Dixon 1979, 1994); 'empathy hierarchy' (Kuno & Kaburaki 1977; DeLancey 1981); 'hierarchy of reference' (Zwicky 1977), 'prominence hierarchy' (Aissen 1999) and others. The variety of denominations could be due to the heterogeneity in its composition. In fact, a distinction in terms of 'animacy' could be only made between animate referents (human pronouns, human names, human common nouns, animals) and inanimates (tools, abstract referents). Rather, this hierarchy appears to be a cluster of three separate hierarchies (cf. Comrie 1989: 190f; Croft

2003: 130):

(12) a. Person: 1/2 > 3

b. Definiteness: pronoun > proper name > common noun

c. Animacy (proper): human > animate > inanimate (common noun)

Comrie (1989: 197 f.), however, admits that 'animacy' is to be understood in a broad-manner:

> "Many of the relevant distinctions, such as between pronoun and non-pronoun, proper name and common noun, are clearly not indirect reflections of animacy in its literal sense. (...) Clearly, in many instances, animacy in the literal sense does give us a close approximation to the ranking of noun phrases that we find justified on structural grounds, so that it may well be the case that animacy in the literal sense will remain part of our over-all conceptual schema, rather than being subsumed into some other parameter of which it would be a special case."

Based on Comrie, I will refer as well to the 'animacy hierarchy' when speaking about the cline given in (11).

This generalization appeared first in Silverstein (1976), where he suggested that different case or cross-reference marking of the syntactic-semantic roles A, S and O (morphosyntactic alignment) is semantically motivated by this hierarchy (cf. loc. cit. p. 125).

Languages, which encode a group of referents following a nominative-accusative pattern and other groups as ergative-absolutive, are called 'split-ergative' languages. This distinction is made by a 'split' between the cline in (11), which divide classes of referents on the right – commonly with a nominative-accusative alignment – and on the left – with an ergative-absolutive alignment. Australian languages are known for exhibiting this phenomenon. In Dyirbal, for instance, 1st and 2nd person pronouns trigger the cases nominative for A and accusative for O, 'lower ranked' referents, that means, 3rd person pronouns, proper names, human common nouns, animates and inanimates obtain the cases ergative and absolutive, respectively:

(13) Dyirbal (Pama-Nyungan, Australia; Dixon 1972: 60-64)

a) *ŋadʸa-Ø ŋinu-na balgan.*
1s-NOM 2s-ACC hit.
'I hit you.'

b) *ŋadʸa-Ø bayi yaṛa- Ø balgan.*
1s-NOM NC.I.ABS man-ABS hit
'I hit the man.'

c) *ŋaygu-na baŋgul yaṛa-ŋgu balgan.*
1s-ACC NC.I.ERG man-ERG hit
'The man hit me.'

d) *Balan* *dʸugumbil-Ø* *baŋgul* *yaṛa-ŋgu* *balgan.*
NC.II.ABS woman-ABS NC.I.ERG man-ERG hit
'The man hit the woman.'

That means, that 'mixed scenarios', where participants with different animacy status requiring different alignment patterns act upon each other, happen to be overtly over-marked (13c) or to show no case marking at all (13b).

The animacy hierarchy is a typological hierarchy because it resumes in a single row the different classes caused by different splits found in various languages. For instance, where Dyirbal makes a distinction between speech-act-participants (SAPs; 1st and 2nd person) and non-speech act participants (3rd person), there are a lot of languages, like Cashinawa (Panoan, Peru/Brasil), where non-pronouns (proper names and common nouns) behave ergatively in opposition to pronouns (cf. Dixon 1994; Aikhenvald 2012: 211ff.). Marking can overlap, like in Waga-Waga (Pama-Nyugan, Australia) where all referents receive ergative marking in A position, but not all absolutive marking in O position (named also as 'tripartite marking', where A, S and O are marked differently.) The split (dark marked) is made between human and not-human with the former group obtaining accusative marking, the latter absolutive:

Table 1: Case marking pattern of intransitive (S) and transitive (A, O) clause participants in Waga Waga (Pama-Nyugan, Australia; cf. Wurm 1976: 106f)

A	ERG (*-bu*)						
S	ABS (-Ø)						
O	ACC (*-na*)						ABS (-Ø)
animacy hierarchy	personal pronouns	>	proper names	>	human common nouns	>	non-human common nouns

As to proper names, their position in the animacy hierarchy has been claimed to be between '3rd person pronouns' and 'human common nouns' (cf. example 11). Silverstein (1976), however, does not give a single example to demonstrate the position of proper names in the animacy hierarchy. Helmbrecht et al. (cf. 2013) noticed that this issue had been quite neglected by authors who addressed the animacy hierarchy. As far as it has been researched (cf. loc. cit.), languages with a split or hierarchical alignment (see. 2.2) seem to lack proper evidence for the claimed position of proper names in that hierarchy.

Nevertheless, I will even go further and present the proper name position in a nearly related hierarchy.

2.1.3.2 Definiteness hierarchy

The animacy hierarchy has been described as combining the prediction of three separate hierarchies (cf. (12)). When we are searching for the proper name position in terms of the "rewritten" scale in (12), we have to consider the dimension of definiteness (12c.). Thereby we should recall that for Van Langendonck (cf. 1990: 571-573) proper names are inherently definite and specific, like personal pronouns.

A definite hierarchy can be presented in Aissen (2003: 437) with more detail than in (12b.):

(14) Personal pronoun > Proper name > Definite NP > Indefinite specific NP > Non-specific NP

While the animacy hierarchy predicts a possible marking behavior among grammatical relations in split-alignment, the definiteness hierarchy has been established especially for the phenomenon of a differential object marking (DOM) in some languages. That means, that "if in some language a direct object at some rank can be case-marked, then higher-ranked direct objects in that language can be case-marked, but not necessarily lower ranked ones" (p. 437). Because this hierarchy deals with the distinctions of O's, it can be regarded as a sub-analysis of the animacy hierarchy in (11), which deals with the behavior of all participants. Languages show different cut-off points distinguishing two markings for objects (cf. p. 449 ff.):

Table 2: Differential marking of objects in a few languages[4]

	Personal Pronoun	Proper Name	Definite NP	Indefinite NP	Non-specific NP
Catalan	Preposition *a*	Ø			
Pitjantjatjara	Accusative *-nya*		-Ø		
Hebrew	Preposition *'et*			Ø	
Turkish	Accusative *-(y)i/ı*				-Ø

The languages Catalan and Pitjantjatjara should be of concern to us, because they give together a hint for the confirmation that proper names are on the scale between pronouns and definite NPs:

[4] This table is a simplified sketch based on the schema and examples in Aissen (2003: 250-454)

(15) Catalan (Romance; examples from Vallduví 1992 noted in Aissen 2003: 451 f.)

a) ***A*** ***ell*** *no el vull.*
ACC 3s.M NEG CL 1s.want
'Him, I don't want.' (Vallduví 1992: 76)

b) *... docs el Joan el veiem ben poc.*
since the John CL we.see very little
'...since John we see very little of.' (p. 90)

(16) Pitjantjatjara (Pama Nyungan, Australia; cf. Aissen 2003: 452, from Bowe 1990)

a) *Tjitji-ngku* ***Billy-nya****/ngayu-nya nya-ngu.*
child-ERG Billy-ACC/1s-ACC see-PAST
'The child saw Billy/me.'

b) *Billy-lu* ***tjitji*** *nya-ngu.*
Billy-ERG child see-PAST
'Billy saw the child.'

Although DOM is closely related to the definiteness hierarchy, Aissen notes that it can also be dependent from the parameters listed in (12), namely person and animacy (proper) (cf. Aissen 2003: 436 f.). This means that DOM is dependent to the whole animacy hierarchy, which Aissen names 'prominence hierarchy' (cf. loc. cit. and Aissen 1999)[5]. As an instance, Romanian object case marking is obligatory for animate-referring personal pronouns and proper nouns (cf. loc. cit. based on Farkas 1978).

This section could only present the position of proper names as a hypothesis in the animacy hierarchy or as an indication by two language examples (15, 16) referring to the definiteness hierarchy. Actually these examples do not show a special treating of proper names within one language, but must be compared to each other to demonstrate the position. As split languages normally have one split, every cut-off point of the hierarchy is to be established through comparison.

A much concreter way to analyze hierarchies of NP groups could give us languages, which exhibit an own hierarchical pattern in order to code participants. This kind of morphosyntactic alignment should be described in the following section.

2.2 Hierarchical marking pattern

'Hierarchical' or 'direct-inverse alignment' is a feature not found very frequently in the languages of the world. Siewierska (2011) lists only 11 out of 380 languages which exhibit a hierarchical verbal

[5] Consider that the animacy hierarchy takes not only with DOM into account, but other arguments, too. In split-ergative languages, also the A position is therefore analyzed as well (DSM 'differential subject marking', according to Aissen, cf. 2003: 472 ff.)

person alignment, so that this pattern appears as the least frequent type in her sample. In contrast to the more established alignment patterns like accusative or ergative, where the marking of A and O is fixed, the hierarchical alignment codes A and O depending on the ranking of their relative referents on the language specific hierarchy (cf. loc. cit.).

2.2.1 Direction and obviation

The 'grammatical category of *direction*' (Klaiman 1992: 230; quoted from Wolfart and Carroll 1981: 68) is an indicator to understand which argument is higher ranked in the language specific hierarchy. The direction can be 'direct' or 'inverse'. The former entails a 'default scenario', where higher-ranked participants act upon lower ranked, the latter expresses the opposite, where lower-ranked participants act upon higher-ranked. Consider an example from Plains Cree (Algonquian, North America):

(17) Plains Cree (Algonquian, North America) (Klaiman 1992: 230. From Wolfart and Carroll 1981: 69)

a) *Ni-pēh-**ā**-nān-ak*
1-wait-**DIR**-1p-3p
'We await them.'

b) *Ni-pēh-**iko**-nān-ak*
1-wait-**INV**-1p-3p
'They await us.'

In the nominal hierarchy of Plains Cree, 1st person outranks 3rd person. If the higher ranked participant (1st person plural) acts upon the lower-ranked (3rd plural), the action is direct-marked (17a), otherwise the action is inverse-marked (17b).

In the direct-inverse system, core arguments which are merely 3rd person referents are usually distinguished hierarchically as well. This can be done by means of their different animacy status:

(18) Navajo (Athabaskan, North America) (cf. Hale, 2003: 11 f.)

a) *ahkii łįį' **yi**-ztał.*
boy horse DIR-kicked
'The boy kicked the horse.'

b) *ashkii łįį' **bi**-ztał.*
boy horse INV-kicked
'The horse kicked the boy.'

Here, the animacy hierarchy reflects even the word order: higher animated (human) NPs precede the lower animated (animals), triggering direct *yi-* when the action direction occurs 'along the hierarchy', and inverse *bi-* when it occurs 'against the hierarchy'.

A further technique to distinguish non-speech act participants (3rd persons) known in Algonquian languages is the pragmatic dependent use of 'obviation' - namely distinguishing between a 'proximate' 3rd person and an 'obviative' 3rd (or '4th') person, the former referring to the more salient participant(s) – that means, more central to the concerns of the speaker/ hearer (cf. Klaiman 1992: 235) – and the latter to the less salient(s):

(19) Algonkin (Algonquian) (cf. Klaiman 1992: 243, from Henderson 1971: 39)
a) *O-wāpam-ā-n*
3.prox-see-DIR-3obv
'He sees the other.'

b) *O-wāpam-iko-n*
3prox-see-INV-4obv
'The other sees him.'

Proximate participants are higher-ranked than obviatives. So if a proximate participant acts on a obviative, the marking is direct (*-ā*), otherwise it is inverse (*-iko*).

2.2.2 Occurrence and diversity

Languages with a hierarchic pattern exist primarily in the Americas, among them the families Algonquian, Kutenai, Sahaptian, Kiowa-Tanoan, Salishan and Athbaskan (North America), Mixe (Central America), Aymara, Mapudungun (South America) (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 4, Siewierska 2011). Another areas are the Tibeto-Burman languages in the Himalaya, like Jyarong (Klaiman 1992: 229) and Chukotko-Kamchatkan in Siberia (Comrie 1980).

Not only the hierarchical marking pattern is relatively seldom among the languages of the world, but its implementation is also very heterogeneous. Languages which have a clear overt opposition between direct and inverse morphemes are primarily found in the Algonquian languages like Plains Cree (17) and Algonkin (19), which therefore are said to exhibit a prototypical direct-inverse behavior (Zúñiga 2006a: 3). Many other languages mark the inverse construction but not the direct one, and combine it with a cross-referenced A/O:

(20) Tlahuitoltepec Mixe (Mixe, Central America) (Lyon 1967: 27)
a) *tə paat ha həyuhk t-wopy*
PAST Peter the animal 3A-hit
'Peter hits the animal.'

b) *tə paat ha həyuhk w<y>opy-**ə***
PAST Peter the animal <3O>hit-**INV**
'The animal hits Peter.'

The Mapudungun examples in 3. will show further evidence for non-prototypical hierarchical alignment.

The most important fact is that hierarchical systems differ in their particular hierarchies. While in all languages there is a strong coincidence with the distinction of speech-act-participants (SAPs: 1st and 2nd person) from non-speech-act participants (participant hierarchy, cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 21), other traits cannot be exposed coherently. Effects of animacy may be common like in Navajo (18), but languages like the Algonquian ones (17&19) imply (even) a pragmatic dimension (obviation) in their hierarchies.

What most of these languages have in common is their conformity to head-marking (cf. Klaiman 1992: 227, based on Nichols 1986.), that means – at a clause level – a scarce nominal morphology but a complex verbal morphology, whereby the grammatical relations are coded.

3 Mapudungun: morphosyntactic coding of participants

Based on the overview of the morphosyntactic patterns of proper names in 2.1 and the patterns of a hierarchical alignment presented in 2.2, this section should combine both insights to understand the coding of proper names along the hierarchical pattern in Mapudungun. Firstly, the general marking patterns of participants should be described.

3.1 Coding scenarios

Mapudungun has a simple nominal morphology: there is no marking on nominals apart from a plural morpheme *pu* and an oblique postposition *mew* (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 211). As there are no cases or a fixed word order, the role of the participants has to be distinguished by the verbal complex. Smeets (2008: 177- 309) has analyzed up to 36 grammatical slots as suffixes to the verb stem which operate at each level of the sentence (like mood, evidentials, negation, illocutionary force, directionals, transitivizers, person, etc.).

The participants are cross-referenced to the verb among the last suffixes (Slot 2: Number; Slot 3: Person)6 Therefore, free pronouns can be dropped out. The intransitive finite indicative pattern for coding the S-argument is the following:

Table 3: Monopersonal finite inflection (indicative) (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 212 and Zúñiga 2007: 21)

amu- 'go'	1st	*underlying*	2nd	*underlying*	3rd	*underlying*
singular	amu-n	*(unknown)*	amu-ymi	*-i-**m**-i*	amu-y	*-i-**Ø**-Ø*
dual	amu-iyu	*-i-**i**-u*	amu-ymu	*-i-**m**-u*	amu-yngu	*-i-**Ø**-Ø=eng-u*

[6] Smeets (2008) counts from 'right to left', so that slots with a higher ordinate are closer to the stem and slots with a lower ordinate are farther from it (V-36, 35....3,2,1). The slots' naming here are changed from the denominations of Smeets (2008) to fit better into the typological pattern of direction (cf. Zúñiga 2006a). Smeets' version is: Slot 1: Dative Subject, Slot 2: Number; Slot 3: Subject, Slot 6: Direct object.

plural	amu-iñ	*-i-**i**-n*	amu-mün	*-i-**m**-n*	amu-yngün	*-i-**Ø**-Ø=engu-n*

The S argument shows agreement in person (1st *-i*[7], 2nd *-m* and 3rd *-Ø*; accentuated in **bold**), and number (singular *-i*, dual *-u*, and plural *-n*) preceded by the mood slot (indicative *-i*/ *-y*).

Transitive Verbs, wherein arguments in A and O function are involved, obtain following endings (underlying forms in *cursive*)

Table 4: Bipersonal finite endings (indicative) (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 218; 2007: 22)

A / O	1s	1d	1p	2s	2d	2p	3
1s	*Reflexive forms not listed*			-en *-e-n*	-mun *-mu-n*		-enew *-e-n-mew*
1d				-muyu *mu-i-u*			-eyumew *-e-i-i-u-mew*
1p				-muiñ *-mu-i-n*			-eiñmew *-e-i-i-n-mew*
2s	-eyu *-e-i-u*	-wiyiñ *-w-i-i-n*		*Reflexive forms not listed*			-eymew *e-i-m-i-mew*
2d							-eymumew *-e-i-m-u-mew*
2p							-eymünmew *-e-i-m-n-mew*
3HS	-fiñ *-fi-n*	-fiyu *fi-i-i-u*	-fiyiñ *-fi-i-i-n*	-fimi *fi-i-m-i*	-fimu *-fi-i-m-u*	-fimün *-fi-i-m-n*	-fi/ -eyew *-fi-i/ -e-i-mew*
3LS	-n *-n*	-iyu *-i-i-u*	-iñ *-i-i-n*	-imi *-i-m-i*	-imu *-i-m-u*	-imün *-i-m-n*	-i/ -eyew *-i/ -e-i-mew*

The use of those endings and their classification in 'participant scenarios' should be resumed in the following subsections.

3.1.1 Local scenarios

The 'local scenarios' are interactions of speech-act-participants, namely 1st and 2nd person. The local scenarios can be divided into 'minimal local scenario' (MLS; dark grey in Table 4) including only singular participants (i.e. 1s<>2s) and 'extended local scenarios' (ELS; middle grey), where 1st person or 2nd person (regardless of number) acts upon non-singular 2nd person or 1st person, respectively (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 214).

(21) Mapudungun MLS forms (Zúñiga 2006a: 217)

[7] The ending *-n* is a non-segmentable portmanteau-morpheme with expresses the grammatical functions "indicative, 1st person, singular".

a) (2s-->1s)
pe-e-n
see-E-1s.IND
'you(sing.) saw me.'
b) (1s-->2s)
pe-e-yu
see-E-1d.IND
'I saw you(sing.).'

Note that the morphological difference between the monopersonal form *amu-n* 'I go' and *pe-e-n* 'you saw me' is made by the marker *-e*. In 21a, the A participant (1s) is marked explicitly and the O participant (2s) is understood by default (cf. loc. cit.). In 21b, the same marker *-e* and 1st dual serve to indicate the inverse scenario 2s-->1s. This conforms by no means to the Algonquian counterpart, where direction marking is clearly defined as direct or inverse:

(22) Plains Cree (Algonquian) (Klaiman 1992: 239, from Wolfart and Carroll 1981: 73)

a) *Ki-wāpam-**i**-n*
2-see-**DIR**-1s
'You(sing.) see me.'

b) *Ki-wāpam-**iti**-n*
2-see-**INV**-1s
'I see you(sing.).'

The extended local scenario shows a clearer distinction between direct and inverse marking:

(23) Mapudungun ELS forms (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 217)

a) (1s-->2d/p; 1p/d-->2s/d/p)
pe-w-iyiñ
see-W-1p.IND
'I saw you(d/p) / we(d/p) saw you(s/d/p).'

b) (2d/p-->1s; 2s/d/p-->1d/p)

pe-mu-n/	*pe-mu-yu /*	*pe-mu-iñ*
see-MU-1s.IND	see-MU-1d.IND	see-MU-1p.IND
'you(d/p) saw me.'/	'you(s/d/p) saw us(d).'/	'you(s/d/p) saw us(p).'

Although we can assume that *-w* could act as a direct marking and *-mu* as an inverse, there are still asymmetries in their implementation: Not only because the inversion of (23a) is expressed in three different ways, but because even here, like in (23), the 2nd person is overtly omitted (i.e. the O argument in 23a and the A argument in 23b). Furthermore, the former example is derived from the homophonous 1st plural reflexive 'we(d/p) saw ourselves'. This is the reason why *-iyiñ* is glossed as 1p.IND; and *-w* is actually a reflexive marker. Nevertheless, Zúñiga's (2006a) analysis based on a direct-inverse system should be followed here. The markers *-w* (W) and *-mu* (MU) should be thus understood in the extended local scenario as direct and inverse, respectively.

3.1.2 Mixed scenarios Sap<>3

Mixed scenarios (light grey in Table 4) consist of SAPs interacting with non-SAPs. Here, the direction marking is even more explicit. If 1st or 2nd person is the A and 3rd person is the O, the action is 'direct', zero-marked. If, on the other hand, 3rd person acts upon 1st or 2nd person, the action is inverse, marked with *-e...-ew*.

(24) Mapudungun mixed scenario (cf. Zúniga 2007: 24 f.)

a) SAP-->3rd

Iñche	*nie-**Ø**-n*	*kiñe*	*fütra*	*lasu*
1sPRO	have-**DIR**-1s.IND	one	big	lasso.

'I have a big lasso.'

b) 3rd--> SAP

Kallfüpan	*engu*	*Antüpan*	*kellu-**e**-n-**ew***
K.	3dPRO	A.	help-**INV**-1s-**3A**

'Calfupán and Antipán helped me.'

Since 3rd person in (24a) is not marked in O function, we find the same marking as in the monopersonal paradigm (Table 3), showing overtly only 1st person. In (24b), a marker referring to the 3rd person as A appears together with the inverse-marking. But there is a peculiar distinction regarding to the 3rd person:

If 3rd person is O, Mapudungun differentiates between a higher ranked ('high semantic') and a lower-ranked ('low semantic') object (see Table 4). The features of the former can vary between 'animate~definite~important' (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 220; 2010: 154), the features of the 'lower semantic' object between 'indefinite~inanimate~less important' (further discussion in 3.2.2). While the object with a 'lower semantic' is unmarked, the other triggers *-fi* on the verb:

(25) Differential object marking (cf. Zúñiga 2010: 143)

a) SAP-->3rd(LS)

*Pe-**Ø**-n*	*kura.*
see-DIR-1s.IND	stone

'I saw a stone/ stones.'

b) SAP-->3rd(HS) (cf. Smeets 2008: 271)

Feymew fey	*entu-**fi**-y-iñ*	*tüfa-chi kiñe*	*küđaw.*
therefore that	take.out-**DIR.DOM**-IND-1p	this-ADJ one	work.

'Therefore we have undertaken this particular project.'

Note that the differential object marker (DOM) *-fi* functions even as the direct marking, which is zero-coded in 25a. The inverse marker, however, does not alternate depending on the semantics of the 3rd person A (see further examples in 3.1.3).

3.1.3 Non-local 3prox<>3obv

In the non-local scenario (no color filling in Table 4) the hearer must identify which 3rd person referent acts upon which other 3rd person referent. In 2.2.1, I mentioned the function of 'obviation' in hierarchical systems to distinguish more and less salient participants in the clause. Although Mapudungun does not show overtly proximate and obviative marking like in Cree, the inverse marker (*-e*) appears when an obviative – not morphologically defined but by the discourse or context – acts upon a proximate referent.

It must be clear that the features 'proximate' and 'obviative' have to be distinguished from the above mentioned 'high semantic' and 'low semantic' participants. Where A and O can be both proximate or obviative, only O is distinguished as either HS or LS. Thus, we can point out the following repertoire of interactions in the non-local scenario:

direct:	3prox --> 3obv.LS	*-Ø*
	3prox --> 3obv.HS	*-fi*
inverse:	3obv --> 3prox.LS	*-e... -ew*
	3obv --> 3prox.HS	*-e... -ew*

But as there is no object differentiation in the inverse pattern, the non-local scenario has three alternations (two for direct and one for inverse):

(26) Proximates and obviatives (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 214 ff.)

a) direct (3rd.prox-->3rd.obvLS) (cf. Smeets 2008: 231)
*pichin plata nie-fu-**Ø**-y welu fill antü ngilla-ki-**Ø**-y kofke*
little money have-RI-**DIR**-IND but every day buy-CF-**DIR**-IND bread
'He(prox) had little money(obv) but still he(prox) would buy bread(obv) every day.'

b) direct (3rd.prox-->3rd.obv.HS) (cf. Zúñiga 2006a: 214 ff.)
*Chi wenüy feypi-**fi**-y:...*
ART friend say-**DIR.DOM**-IND
'The friend(prox) said to them.(obv.HS):...'

c) inverse (3rd.obv-->3rd.prox.LS/HS) (loc. cit.)
*Ñi chaw duam-urke-la-**e**-y-**ew**.*
3POSS father care-REP-NEG-**INV**-IND-**3A**
'His father(obv.) did not care for him(prox.HS/LS).'

d) inverse (3rd.obv-->3rd.prox.LS/HS) (loc. cit.)
*Ngürü mütrüm-**e**-y-**ew** williñ*
fox call-**INV**-IND-**3A** otter
'The otter(obv.) called the fox(prox.HS/LS).'

3.1.4 The underlying hierarchy in Mapudungun

To what extent is Mapudungun a 'hierarchical language'? How is here a nominal hierarchy rea-

soned? The existence of 'direct' and 'inverse' forms has been mentioned in the last subsections. Let us summarize the results:

Table 5: Mapudungun direct and inverse scenarios and their direction markers (cf. Zúniga 2006: 214, 224)

	Local scenario				Mixed scenario		Non-local scenario	
	MLS		ELS					
DIR	1s<-->2s	*-e*	1s-->2d/p; 1p/d-->2s/d/p	*-w*	SAP-->3LS	*-Ø*	3prox--> 3obv.LS	*-Ø*
					SAP-->3HS	*-fi*	3prox--> 3obv.HS	*-fi*
INV			2d/p-->1s; 2s/d/p-->1d/p	*-mu*	3-->SAP	*-e*	3obv-->3prox	*-e*

We note that direction is expressed in various ways: direct marking is *-w* for ELS, *-Ø* and *-fi* for the mixed and non-local scenarios, depending on the definiteness/animacy/importance of the object (HS/LS). Inversion is expressed by *-mu* in the extended local scenario and by *-e* in the mixed and non-local scenarios. The marking *-e* in the MLS does not allow a prediction of a distinction between direct and inverse, both interactions (1s-->2s; 2s-->1) trigger the same morpheme. With this representation we may conclude a referential hierarchy for Mapudungun (based on the finite paradigm).

Considering that 'direct' constellations are the constructions where the referents act 'along' the hierarchy, SAPs are higher ranked than non-SAPs and proximates 3rd persons are higher ranked than obviatives. However, to define which referent of the SAP is higher-ranked on the hierarchy seems to be a difficult issue. The finite MLS has no formal distinction between direct and inverse and the cases where -w and -mu occur, are complex to reveal. Nevertheless, *-w* appears always when 1st person acts upon a 2nd, and *mu* when a 2nd person acts upon a 1st. Considering that it is always the 1st person that triggers a person marker on the local scenarios (see example 20 and 22), we could say that 1st person is higher ranked than 2nd.[8]

Zúniga concludes (regarding also the non-finite forms that have not yet been considered here):

> Albeit incomplete, Arnold's [1994, 1997] hypothesis seems to me to be the best explanation

[8] Zúñiga (2006a: 237) explains the higher ranking of the 1st person by means of topicality (the topic is higher ranked than the non-topic): "whatever actant is marked by Set I [i.e. the monopersonal forms] is the topic." and further (p. 238): "(...) since every finite verb form takes the 1st person marker [...], by definition the 1st person is topical (...)."

> of the present-day situation: An original hierarchy SAP > 3' > 3"[9] governed the access to primary argumenthood. [... L]ocal interactions counted as inverse and were marked by *-e* or zero (this last option cooccurring with the A markers *-w* and *-mu* in a different slot).[...] Then, due to unknown reasons, an underlying drive toward an additional ranking 1>2 disturbed the morphosyntax of the corresponding verb forms and additional, hitherto also unknown, factors were responsible for different outcomes in the finite and nonfinite paradigms.

The Mapudungun referential hierarchy could be therefore regarded as the following:

(27) 1(>)2>3prox>3obv

The question of whether there is an additional cline of referents which trigger a different object marking will be discussed in the section 3.2.3.

3.2 Coding of proper names

With the knowledge about the behavior of the coding of participants in Mapudungun we can finally come to the central question of this paper: how are proper names coded in Mapudungun as A, S and O arguments? Which position do they take in the referential hierarchy of Mapudungun? I will limit myself to personal proper names – "the most prototypical subclass" of proper names, according to Van Langendonck (2007: 186).

3.2.1 Grammatical relations: proper names as S, A and O

I will analyze proper names in the role of S, A and O. Within transitive clauses, it is important to oppose different participants to them to see which direction marker is applied.

(28) Proper name as S (cf. Coña 1995: 52)
*Afeluw-ke-la-fu-y-**Ø*** *P. Constancio*
get.tired-CF-NEG-RI-IND-3 P. Constancio
'P. Constancio didn't get tired.'

We can notice that a proper name as the single argument in the clause triggers the monopersonal form of 3rd person, namely a zero-marker. That means, proper names agree like common nouns and 3rd person pronouns (mostly dropped):

(29) 3rd person expressions as S (Smeets 2008: 214)
a) Pronouns as S
*(Fey) rupa-y-**Ø***
(3sPRO) pass-IND-3
'he passed.'

b) Common nouns as S (cf. Zúñiga 2006b: 240)
*La-y-**Ø** ñi chaw.*
die-IND-Ø 1sPSR father

[9] 3': here 3prox; 3": here 3obv.

'my father died.'

In transitive clauses, proper names show following properties when interacting with SAPs (Mixed Scenario):

(30) PN<--> SAP

a) PN as A, SAP as O (PN--> SAP) (cf. Coña 1995: 44)
Kiñe antü mütrüm-e-n-ew P. Constancio
One day call-INV-1s-3A P. Constancio
'One day P. Constancio called me.'

b) PN as O, SAP as A (SAP--> PN) (p. 54)
(...) pi-fi-ñ P. Constancio:
say-DIR.DOM-1s.IND P. Constancio
'I said to P. Constancio:'

Proper names show here the same behavior like 3rd person referents in mixed scenarios (see 3.1.2). As O's, the verb takes the direct marker (30b), as A's, the marking is inverse (30a). That means, that proper names are lower-ranked than SAP's.

However, the difference between proper names and common nouns is that they don't alternate between 'high semantic' and 'low semantic' as O's. In fact, one could count them to the HS-objects, since they **always trigger *-fi*** (Zúniga 2010: 146; cf. Augusta 1903: 73). This does not change within the non-local scenario.

In the following examples we can see that the pragmatic features 'proximate' and 'obviative' can be attributed to proper names as well. We obtain thus four possible constellations[10]:

(31) PN(prox/obv)<-->3rd(prox/obv)

a) PN(prox) as A, 3rd(obv) as O (PN.prox--> 3rd.obv) (Coña 1995: 21)
*Nie-fu-**Ø**-y* *kiñe* *fotüm* *Domingo* *Coña*
have-RI-**DIR**-IND one son Domingo Coña
'**Domingo Coña(prox.)** had a son(obv.).'

b) PN(obv) as A, 3rd(prox) as O (PN.obv--> 3rd.prox) (cf. loc. cit.)
Wüdetulu *Carmelita,* *fei* *nief-**e**-y-ew* *Ignacio Melillang*
having.separed Carmelita, 3sPRO have.RI-**INV**-IND-3A Ignacio Melillang
'Having separed Carmelita (from her first husband), **Ignacio Melillang(obv)** had her(prox.) (as his wife).'

c) PN(prox) as O, 3rd(obv) as A (3rd.obv--> PN.prox) (Smeets 2008: 228)
Xasinta *püna-e-**y**-ew* *ti chiklet*

[10] I will omit the examples of the differentiation of PN acting on LS and HS objects, since this does not affect the agency of PNs.

Jacinta paste-**INV**-IND-3-3A the chewing.gum.
'**Jacinta(prox)** got stuck onto the chewing gum(obv)'[11]

d) PN(obv) as O, 3rd(prox) as A (3rd.prox-->PN.obv) (Zúñiga 2010: 152)
*Feymew amu-y-Ø, ina-**fi**-y Pedro*
then go-IND-3s, follow-**DIR.DOM**-INV **Pedro(obv)**
'Then he went, he followed Pedro.'

As proper names can act both as proximates and as obviatives, direct and inverse-marking is the same than with other 3rd person referents. In this sense, they are part of the category '3rd person referent'.

However, proper names show, as mentioned, a specific property: they always trigger *-fi*. In the next section, we will see if this marking predicts something about the status of proper names in Mapudungun.

3.2.2 Differential object marking: The marker *-fi*

In this paper, the marker *-fi* is glossed as DIR.DOM, that means, it is an allomorph for direct marking which appears when a 3rd person object has a 'high semantic'. The latter feature should be defined here more properly, in order to clarify the status which proper names receive through *-fi*. I will start with finite transitive clauses, where the marker indicates alternations in the semantic or pragmatic features of 3rd person referents. In 3.2.2.2, there will be shown that *-fi* is governed also by 1st and 2nd person pronouns in non-finite verb forms. In order to focus the comparison on transitive clauses, ditransitive constructions, where *-fi* plays again a significant role, should be omitted (for further reading: 2006a: 221 ff.; Smeets 2008: 153 ff.).

3.2.2.1 In finite verb forms

Smeets (cf. 2008: 153) defines the function of *-fi* as a "deictic element[12]" which refers to a "third person (...) identified by the situation". This person is thus definite, regardless of being animate or inanimate.

Zúñiga (2010), however, analyzes the function more precisely. According to his examples, not all definite persons trigger this marker. He notes that in literature, the differential object marking of *-fi* is mostly associated with humanicity, definiteness and anaphoricity, but that the exact conditions which explain its use hadn't been clarified up to then (translation, cf. Zúñiga 2010: 143). For him, this marker is governed by 'soft constraints', apart from a few exceptions:

-Fi ALWAYS occurs when i) referring to objects which are proper names (as illustrated in 3.2.1) and ii) referring back to previous extraclausal referents (anaphoric function):

[11] Note that 30c is a fully transitive clause, i.e. chewing gum(A) --> Jacinta(O).
[12] In diachronic dependence on the pronoun *fey.* (Smeets 2008: 153)

(32) Anaphoric function of *-fi* (cf. Zúñiga 2010: 152).

*Pichikelewe-fu-y kütral. Neyen mew chongüm-pa-**fi**-y.*
little.be.left-RI-IND fire. Breath PPOS extinguish-CIS-**DIR.DOM**-IND
'There was little fire left. With his breath he extinguished **it**.'

Zúñiga (2010: 150) compares the prediction for DOM by Aissen's (2003) hierarchies with the marker *-fi* in Mapudungun. For instance, the marking is sometimes governed, sometimes not governed by the object's properties [±human] or [±animate]:

(33) Alternation of *-fi* reffering to [±human] (Zúñiga cf. 2010: 151)

a) *Ina-**fi**-y ñi epu peñi.*
follow-**DIR.DOM**-IND 3PSR two brother.
'He followed his two brothers.'

b) *Feymew ka in-ka-tu-**Ø**-y ñi epu peñi.*
then again follow-CONT-again-**DIR**-IND 3PSR two brother.
'Then he kept following his two brothers.'

Neither does definiteness influence the use of *-fi* at all:

(34) Alternation of *-fi* referring to [±definite] (cf. loc. cit.)

*pe-**fi** kiñe kawellu, kiñe flang-ürke pe-**Ø**-y.*
see-**DIR.DOM** one horse, one white-MIR see-**DIR**-IND.
'(He stood up at midnight and) saw one horse, one white horse.'

Observing these alternations, Zúñiga (2010: 152 ff.) made a corpus study where he analyzed the used of the verbal marker in some stories taken from Augusta (1910) and Coña (1930) and from audio recordings. He categorizes his findings under the objects' semantic-pragmatic features [±human] [±definite] [±given] [±accesible] [±important]. 'Givenness' refers here, in terms of Zúniga (cf. 2010: 152), to whether the referent is new in the discourse [-given] or not [+given]. The latter two features refer to the textual topicality and denote the anaphoric accessibility (continuity)[13] and the cataphoric persistence (recurrence)[14], respectively. Zúñiga summed up his results in a table (2010: 152):

Table 6: semantic and pragmatic factors for the opposition -fi/Ø in finite clauses.

	[+/-HUM]	[+/-DEF]	[+/-GIV]	[+/-ACCES]	[+/-IMPORT]
-fi (39)	25/14	35/4	26/13	20/19	25/14
-Ø (50)	7/43	29/21	22/28	16/34	14/36

[13] In Zúñiga's terms (cf. 2010: 153), whether the referent of the complement has been mentioned in the 1st, 2nd or 3rd clause before [+accesible] or not [-accesible] (further before mentioned or newly introduced).

[14] In Zúñiga's terms (cf. 2010: 153), whether the referent of the complement has been mentioned at least 3 times in the 10 following clauses [+important] or not [-important] (2 at the utmost).

For instance, *-fi* appears when referring to human 25 times and 14 times referring to non-human, and zero marking (i.e. no *-fi*) appears 7 times when referring to humans and 43 times when referring to non-humans.

In order to show the behavior between *-fi* and the semantic-pragmatic features of the objects it is referred to, I took the liberty to transfer the results into a cline. Therefore I counted from 89 analyzed referents those that exhibit each feature (e.g. the tokens with feature [+human] are 25+7 = 32 and the tokens with feature [-human] are 14+43= 57) and calculated thereof the percentage[15] of those who trigger *-fi* (25/32×100=78% of the [+human] tokens and 14/57×100=25% of the [-human] tokens trigger *-fi*).

The features are ordered then from 'more likely to trigger *-fi*' to 'less likely to trigger *-fi*'.

(35) Probability cline of features of referents which trigger *-fi.*

[+HUM](78%) > [+IMPORT](64%) > [ACCES](56%) >
> [+DEF](55%) > [+GIV](54%) > [-ACCES](36%) > [-GIV](32%) >
> [-IMPORT](28%) > [-HUM](25%) > [-DEF](16%).

The probabilities listed in (35) would quite probably not hold for the whole Mapudungun language, since it is merely a calculation based on a particular corpus. Nevertheless, we acquire a view in the ranking of soft constraints governing the appearance of *-fi*. This cline should help as a device to confer the proper name's position with the other referential expressions in Mapudungun.

3.2.2.2 In non-finite verb forms

Not least, *-fi* can also refer to 1st and 2nd person referents, but only in non-finite clauses.

(36) Non-finite clause (Zúñiga cf. 2010: 152)

Iñche newe	*kim-la-fi-ñ*	*ñi*	*chem düngu ñi*
1s.PRO not.much	know-NEG-DIR.DOM-1s.IND	3PSR	what matter 3PSR

*pi~pi-nge-**fi**-el*.
ITER~*say*-ITER-**DIR.DOM**-NFIN
'I didn't know what exactly he said.' lit. 'I didn't know his what matter saying-to-me.'

For example, in the nonfinite EL-2 forms (p. 221), the marker *-fi* has a different function. While it can act in the mixed and non-local scenarios as a direction marker as well (depending on the same soft and hard constraints of the object like in the finite paradigm, cf. Zuniga 2006a: 220), it even appears in the local scenario, where the function of direction is overridden, as the table shows:

Table 7: Non-finite verb form -el and in different constellations (extract from Zúñiga, cf. 2006a:

[15] rounded to an integer.

221, EL-2-forms and cf. Smeets 2008: 211 f.)

X-->3 'DIR'	POSS(A) *(fi-)el*	*ñi/ ñi/ yu/ yiñ/ mi/ mu/ mün pe-e-**fi**-el* (1s/ 3/ 1d/ 1p/ 2s/ 2d/ 2p)PSR see-INV-**DIR.DOM**-NFIN 3PRO 'my/his/her/their/our(d)/our(p)/your(s)/your(d)/your(p) seeing him/her/it/them.'
3-->X 'INV'	POSS(O) *-etew*	*ñi/ ñi/ yu/ yiñ/ mi/ mu/ mün pe-e-t-ew* (1s/ 3/ 1d/ 1p/ 2s/ 2d/ 2p)PSR see-INV-INV.NFIN-3A 'my/his/her/their/our(d)/our(p)/your(s)/your(d)/your(p) being seen by him/her/it/them.'
1-->2 'DIR'	POSS(O) *-fi-el*	*(eymi) mi/ (eymu) mu/ (eymün) mün pe-**fi**-el* (2sPRO) 2sPSR/ (2dPRO) 2dPSR/ (2pPRO) 2pPSR see-**DOM**-NFIN 'your seeing me/us(d)/us(p).'
2--->1 'INV'	POSS(A) *-fi-el*	*(iñche/ iñchiu/ iñchiñ) mi/mu/mün pe-**fi**-el* (1sPRO/ 1dPRO/1pPRO) 2sPSR/2dPSR/2pPSR see-**DOM**-NFIN 'my/our(d)/our(p) seeing you(s).'

Regarding this fact, Zúñiga (250a: 220 f.) says that the triggering of *-fi* by SAPs is obligatory with non-finite verb forms like *-el.*

3.2.2.3 Conclusion: another hierarchy?

Summing up the restrictions for *-fi*, we can point out four referential classes: i) proper names, which always trigger *-fi*, ii) common nouns, which depending on their semantic and pragmatic features trigger *-fi* more or less frequently, and iii) SAPs, which trigger *-fi* only in non-finite clauses:

Table 8: Direct markers/ DOM in Mapudungun

	SAP	Proper Names	Common Nouns
finite	*-e, -w*	*-fi*	(*-fi*/*-Ø*) gradual cline (see 34)
non-finite	*-fi*	*-fi*	(*-fi*/*-Ø)* gradual cline (maybe similar to 35, not investigated yet)

The question whether there is a cline from 'referents who more likely trigger *-fi'* to 'less likely trigger *-fi*' is not easy to answer. The conditions where *-fi* appears seem difficult to generalize. Nevertheless, we could attempt to combine the results in Table 8 and the probabilities in (35) to build up an eclectic cline governing the restrictions for *-fi.*:

(37) Combined hierarchy for the appearance of DOM *-fi*

PN(always trigger) >

> SAPs(only in non-finite clauses) >

> common nouns ([+HUM]>[IMPORT]>ACCES]>[+DEF]>[+GIV]>[-GIV]>[-IMP]>[-HUM]>[-DEF])

3.2.3 Proper names within the referential hierarchies of Mapudungun

The coding of proper names in the roles of S, A and O in interaction with other nominal referents has been illustrated in 3.2.1. We can conclude:

Proper names trigger direct and inverse marking in the same way than other 3rd person referents do. That means that in the scale 1(>)2>3prox>3obv (see example 27) the distinction between the pragmatic categories 'proximate' and 'obviative' are preferred to the lexical distinction between a proper name and other noun subclasses (see 2.1.2; cf. Halliday cf. 1994: §6.60). Therefore, the Mapudungun referential hierarchy for coding the participants arranges no position for proper names.

On the other side, proper names show a particular restriction with regards to differential object marking. Proper names, unlike other common nouns, always trigger *-fi*. If we look at the combined hierarchy in (37), we find that proper names are those referential expressions that are more likely to trigger *-fi*, namely in all cases.

This conclusion should be integrated in comparison to the position of proper names in typological hierarchies.

4 Contribution of the Mapudungun case to the prediction of the animacy and definiteness hierarchy

Which conclusions can we draw for the implication of the coding of proper names in Mapudungun for the animacy and the definiteness hierarchy? We can compare the behavior of proper names in relation to their coding as arguments with the predictions of the animacy hierarchy, which deals generally with the differential marking of S, A and O, and, in relation to *-fi*, with the prediction of the definiteness/prominence hierarchy which deals especially with the differential marking of the object.

4.1 Animacy hierarchy

We contrast the nominal hierarchy for coding grammatical relations of Mapudungun with the animacy hierarchy:

(38) a) the Mapudungun nominal hierarchy

1(>)2>3prox>3obv

b) the animacy hierarchy (cf. Dixon 1979: 85)

1/2 pronoun > 3pronoun > proper names/ kin terms > human > non-human > inanimate common nouns

The cline in 38a coincides with the prediction of the hierarchy in 38b, since SAP participants are ranked higher than 3rd person referents. However, the hierarchy ends with a pragmatic distinction

in Mapudungun, whereas the animacy hierarchy deals merely with semantic features. Semantic features are not the essential criterion for determining the ranking of participants in Mapudungun, and a grammatical category '3rd person pronoun' does not exist in this sense. Instead, only 1st and 2nd person pronouns are treated differently from the rest.

Regarding the position of proper names within the animacy hierarchy, the Mapudungun data does not allow to draw conclusions whether this position (namely between 3rd person pronouns and human common nouns) is justified: In Mapudungun, 3rd person pronouns, proper names, human nouns, non-human nouns and inanimate common nouns all fall into the same category coding the participants S, A and O with either direct or inverse marking. Even if this pattern agrees in this manner with the prediction of the animacy hierarchy (SAPs are indeed higher ranked than non-SAPs), we cannot confirm the prediction for the ranking from '3rd pronoun' to 'inanimate common noun' by means of Mapudungun, and not even the claimed position for proper names.

4.2 Definiteness and prominence hierarchy

As *-fi* is supposed to be a DOM, Aissen's proposed hierarchy for DOM shall be compared with the cline of likelihood for nominal expressions to trigger -fi:

(39) a) Definiteness hierarchy:

Personal pronoun > Proper name > Definite NP > Indefinite specific NP > Non-specific NP

b) Combined hierarchy for the appearance of DOM *-fi*

PN(always trigger) >

> SAPs(only in non-finite clauses) >

> common nouns ([+HUM]>[IMPORT]>ACCES]>[+DEF]>[+GIV]>[-GIV]>[-IMP]>[-HUM]>[-DEF])

At a first glance, the second cline appears to be rather unclear in contrast to the first. This has to do with the fact that the latter is a composition of two different conditions (finite and nonfinite, see table 8). What Aissen's definite hierarchy refers to, are languages, in which the direct object marking is either fully attributed to a referential class or not at all (see Table 2). Secondly, Aissen (2003: 437) claims that "if in some language a direct object at some rank can be case-marked, then higher-ranked direct objects in that language can be case-marked, but not necessarily lower ranked ones". If we compare the restrictions for *-fi* with those of other languages, we wouldn't obtain a single clear cut-off point for the use of DOM in Mapudungun:

Table 9: Mapudungun DOM distribution conferred to other languages (cf. Table 2)

	SAPs	3rd Pro	Proper Name	Definite NP	Indefinite NP	Non-specific NP
Catalan	Preposition *a*		Ø			

Pitjantjatjara	Accusative *-nya*		*-Ø*		
Hebrew	Preposition *'et*			Ø	
Turkish	Accusative -(y)i/ı				*-Ø*
Mapudungun	NFIN: *-fi*	*-fi*	*-fi* (55%)	*-fi* (16%)	*-Ø*
	FIN: *-e, -w, - mu*				

That means, that Aissen's hierarchy (2003) refers mainly to a marking behavior with 'hard constraints', whereas *-fi* is governed by 'soft constraints' (cf. Zúniga 2010: 154, based on De Hoop & Narashiman 2005). That is the reason why we have a language internal cline for the use of *-fi*.

But at a second glance, the hierarchy in 39b does not even show the same ranking like in the other. Proper names are situated previous to SAPs, since the latter do not show *-fi* in finite clauses. However, an argument against this ranking order is that SAPs show other 'direction markings' in finite clauses, being an allomorph of *-fi*. And, if we only look to non-finite clauses, both SAPs and proper names could be subsumed under the group which always trigger the marking. But even then, the 3rd person pronouns would still be absent to this group, since 3rd person pronouns can be dropped out in Mapudungun, and the demonstrative pronoun *fey*, which could be best compared with a 3rd person pronoun, acts as a substitute of all common nouns and shows therefore variation in triggering *-fi* (cf. Zuniga 2010: 157; Smeets 2008:97 ff.). However, in 3.2.2.1 (32) it has been shown that *-fi* always occurs when referring back, as an anaphor does.16 This anaphoric function could be compared with the function of a 3rd person pronoun:

(40) a) *-fi* as a substitution of 3rd person pronouns: (cf. Zúñiga 2010: 148)

Ngilla-fi-mu
buy-DIR.DOM-2d
'We(d) bought it/them.'

Seeing *-fi* as a 'pronoun' (compare also its supposed origin from *fey,* Smeets 2008: 153) would imply that it be a referential expression, not more a grammatical morpheme. Therefore, this deviance makes it impossible to subsume '3rd person pronoun' to those expressions which always 'trigger' *-fi*.

In this sense, a border between personal pronouns and proper names is difficult to point out in Mapudungun. We can thus better exclude the personal pronouns from the comparison with the definiteness hierarchy. On the other side, we have the gradual ranking of common nouns. If we know that proper names always trigger *-fi*, then we could deduce that 100% of the those nouns which have the feature **[+proper]** and 0% which have the feature **[-proper]** trigger *-fi*. This would allow us to include proper names as 'common nouns with the feature [+proper]' to the gradual cline:

16 Smeets (2008: 153) states that "the suffix *-fi*" *is* actually a deictic element".

(41) Including proper nouns into the gradual cline of common nouns (semantic features **bold**):

[+PROP](100%)>**[+HUM](78%)** > [+IMPORT](64%) > [ACCES](56%) >
> **[+DEF](55%)** > [+GIV](54%) > [-ACCES](36%) > [-GIV](32%) >
> [-IMPORT](28%) > **[-HUM](25%)** >**[-DEF](16%)**>**[-PROP](0%)**

In comparison, the ranking of nominals, which appears after the proper names, is the following in the definiteness hierarchy:

(42) Definiteness hierarchy (without personal pronouns):

Proper name > Definite NP > Indefinite specific NP > Non-specific NP

Among the features triggering *-fi* presented in Zúñiga (2010) and those which are cross-linguistic sensitive to trigger a DOM in Aissen (2003), we only find 'definiteness' as a common denominator. Therefore, the closeness between proper names and definite NPs in the definite hierarchy can be compared to the closeness between the negative features 'not definite' [-DEF] and 'not proper' [-PROP] at the end of the cline. This implication could be an argument for Aissen, even if it is deduced by a very indirect way.

At the left end of the cline in (41), the feature [+PROP] is near to the feature [+HUM]. This could be compared to the statement, that DOM can be governed by animacy, too (cf. 2.1.3.2 penultimate section; animacy scale according to Aissen 2003: 437: Human> Animate> Inanimate).

In this sense, we even can apply Aissen's (1998) 'prominence hierarchy', which is the combination of person, definiteness and animacy features and represents the same cline as the 'animacy hierarchy' presented in (11): 1/2 pronoun > 3pronoun > proper names/ kin terms > human > non-human > inanimate common nouns (cf. Dixon 1979: 85). Here, proper nouns are close to human common nouns, and this coincides with the proximity of the features [+PROP] and [+HUM] within the cline in (41).

With this intricate analysis relating to DOM, the observations in Zúñiga (2010) could confirm both the position of proper names as closed to definites on the one side (definiteness hierarchy) and to humans on the other side (animacy hierarchy). However, the main problem remains in comparing the typological hierarchies with gradual language specific hierarchies.

5 Conclusion

The coding of proper names in Mapudungun has been analyzed in terms of their morphosyntactic behavior as S, A and O arguments and as referents triggering DOM. This survey has been introduced with a general view on morphosyntactic patterns proper names exhibit, especially in typological hierarchies. In Mapudungun, proper names can be categorized as those nominal expressions that trigger *-fi* throughout. Beside this peculiarity, they are treated like all 3rd person referents

in that in transitive clauses they can appear as proximates and obviatives.

The coding of proper names in Mapudungun has been compared to the predictions of the 'animacy hierarchy' (cf. Silverstein 1976, cf. Dixon 1979, Comrie 1989, cf. Aissen 1999) and the 'definiteness hierarchy' (Aissen 2003). The fact that proper names are encoded in the roles of S, A and O like other nominal expressions but not like pronouns can be regarded as an instance of the prediction of the animacy hierarchy: namely as the distinction between SAPs and Non-SAPs. However, we cannot confirm or falsify the claim, that proper names are situated cross-linguistically between 3rd pronouns and human common nouns by means of the Mapudungun inverse pattern.

As *-fi* is a DOM marker that discerns proper names clearly from other expressions, we tried to compare the proper name status with predictions of hierarchies dealing with DOM. While leaning on Zúñiga (2010) who analyzes the conditions for the marker *-fi*, we realized that its appearance is difficult to grasp. Forming a cline of nominal features from 'more likely trigger *-fi*' to 'less likely to trigger *-fi*' has allowed the comparison with the marking hierarchies of definiteness and animacy. This comparison gave an argument in favor of Aissen's (2003) prediction, whereas it had to be deducted by an indirect way. However, the asymmetries between the means of comparison were that, on the one side, the *-fi* is governed mainly by soft constraints among semantic and pragmatic features of common nouns and, on the other side, Aissen's (2003) hierarchy is induced by languages which have hard constraints on DOM.

In conclusion, it can be said that proper names form a morphosyntactic category in Mapudungun. This proper name category, however, cannot be easily differed from other categories like pronouns or common nouns, since their status cannot be pointed out due to morphosyntactic deviances: pronouns behave non-uniformly in terms of direct and inverse marking, and the behavior of *-fi* with common nouns is not governed by 'hard constraints'. Therefore, the general claim that the category of proper names is even morphosyntactically situated between pronouns and common nouns has to be proven or falsified with another language(s).

References

Aikhenvald, Sasha. 2012. *The Languages of the Amazon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aissen, Judith. 1999. Agent Focus and Inverse in Tzotzil. *Language* 75. 451-485.

Aissen, Judith 2003. Differential Object marking: Iconicity vs. Economy. In *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory* 21. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 435-483.

Anderson, John M. 2007. *The grammar of names*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Arnold, Jennifer. 1994. Inverse voice marking in Mapudungun. In S. Gahl, A. Dolbey, and C. Johnson (Eds.), *The twentieth annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Linguistics Society. 28-41.

Arnold, Jennifer. 1997. The inverse system in Mapudungun and other languages. *Revista de Lingüística Teórica y Aplicada.* 34. 9-48.

Augusta, Félix José de. [1903] 1990. *Gramática Araucana bilingüe*. Santiago: Séneca.

Augusta, Félix José de. 1910. *Lecturas araucanas.*Valdivia: Imprenta de la Prefectura Apostólica.

Bowe, Heather. 1990. *Categories, Constituents and Constituent Order in Pitjantjatjara.* London: Routledge.

Campbell, Lyle. 1997. *American Indian Language. The historical linguistics of native America.* New York, etc.: Oxford University Press.

Coates. 2005. *Properhood*. Manuscript, Department of Linguistics and English Language, University of Sussex, Brighton (UK).

Coates. 2006. Properhood. *Language* 82. 356-382.

Comrie, Bernard. 1980. Inverse verb forms in Siberia: Evidence from Chukchee, Koryak, and Kamchadal. *Folia Linguistica Historica* 1. 61-74.

Comrie, Bernard. 1989. *Language Universals and Linguistic Typology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Coña, Pascual. 1995. *Lonco Pascual Coña ñi tuculpazugun. Testimonio de un cacique mapuche. Texto dictado al padre Ernesto Wilhelm de Moesbach*. 5th edition. Santiago: Pehuén. [Original edition: Moesbach 1930.]

Croft, William. 2003. *Typology and Universals*. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

DeLancey, Scott. 1981. An Interpretation of Split Ergativity and Related Patterns. *Language* 57. 626-657.

Dixon, R.M.W. 1972. *The Dyirbal language of North Queensland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dixon, R.M.W. 1979. Ergativity. In: *Language* 55. 59-138.

Dixon, R.M.W. 1994. *Ergativity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

De Hoop, Helen & Bhuvana Narasimhan. 2005. Differential case-marking in Hindi, in M. Amberber & H. De Hoop (eds.). *Competition and Variation in Natural Languages. The case for case,* Amsterdam: Elsevier. 321-245.

Farkas**,** Donka F. 1978. Direct and Indirect Object Reduplication in Romanian. In: *Papers from the Fourteenth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society.* Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. 88-97.

Hale, Kenneth. 2003. Topic and focus scope positions in Navajo. In: Karimi, Simin: *Word order and scrambling*. Oxford: Blackwell. 1- 21.

Halliday, M. A. K. 1994. *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, 2nd edition. London: Arnold.

Hartmann, Iren & Christian Marschke. 2010. *Hocąk teaching materials,* Volume 2. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Helmbrecht, Johannes, Lukas Denk, Sarah Thanner & Ilenia Tonetti. 2013. Morphosyntactic coding of proper names and its implications for the Animacy Hierarchy (manuscript). Presented at *Linguistisches Forum* in the University of Regensburg.

Henderson, T.S.T. 1971. Participant-reference in Algonkin. *Cahiers linguistiques d'Ottawa* 1. 27-49.

Hockett, C. F. 1958**.** *A Course in Modern Linguistics.* New York: Macmillan.

Klaiman, M. H. 1992. Inverse languages. *Lingua* 88. 227–261.

Kuno, Susumo & E. Kaburaki. 1977. *Empathy and Syntax. In: Linguistic Inquiry* 8. 627-72.

Lyon, Shirley. 1967. Tlahuitoltepec Mixe clause structure. In: International Journal of American Linguistics 33. pp. 25-33.

Lewis, M. Paul (ed.), 2009. Ethnologue: *Languages of the World*. Sixteenth edition. Dallas, Texas: SIL International. Online version: http://www.ethnologue.com/16. [Retrieved August 10, 2013]

Meeussen, Achille. 1959**.** *Essai de grammaire rundi.* Termvuren: Koninklijk Museum van Belgisch-Congo.

Mill, John Stuart. 1843. *A system of logic*. London: Longmans. New ed. 1872.

Pope, Emily N. 1976. *Questions and Answers in English*. The Hague: Mouton.

Siewierska, Anna. 2011. Alignment of Verbal Person Marking. In: Dryer, Matthew S. & Haspelmath, Martin (eds.) *The World Atlas of Language Structures Online.* Munich: Max Planck Digital Library, chapter 100. Online version: http: //wals.info/chapter/100. Accessed on 2013-07-27. [Retrieved August 10, 2013].

Silverstein, Michael. 1976. Hierarchy of Features and Ergativity. In: R.M.W. Dixon (ed.) *Grammatical Categories in Australian Languages*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies. 112-71.

Smeets, Ineke. 2008. *A grammar of Mapuche.* Berlin [u.a.]: Mouton de Gruyter.

Van de Velde, Mark. 2010. Grammatical criteria for delimiting the category of proper names (manuscript). Presented at the conference *the grammar of proper names – a typological perspective* in the University of Regensburg.

Vallduví, Enric. 1992. *The Informational Component.* Garland: New York.

Van Langendonck, Willy. 1990. Proper nouns and pronouns. In: *Proceedings of the XVIth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences* 567-576. Québec: Presses Universitaires Laval.

Van Langendonck, Willy 2007. Theory and typology of proper names. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Wolfart, H.C. and J.F. Carroll. 1981. *Meet Cree: A guide to the Cree language*. 2nd revised ed. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.

Zúñiga, Fernando. 2006a. *Deixis and alignment. Inverse systems in indigenous languages of the Americas*. Amsterdam [u.a.]: Benjamins.

Zúñiga, Fernando. 2006b. *Mapudungun: el habla mapuche. Introducción a la lengua mapuche, con notas comparativas y un CD*. Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudios Públicos.

Zúñiga, Fernando. 2007. *Mapudungun*. München: LINCOM.

Zúñiga, Fernando. 2010. La marca diferencial del objeto en Mapudungun. Lingüística 24. 141-164.

Zwicky, Arnold. 1977). Hierarchies of Person. In: *Papers from the Thirteenth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society.* Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. 712-33.