Did Firms Profit from Concentration Camp Labour? A Critical Assessment of the Literature
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Did Firms Profit from Concentration Camp Labour?  
A Critical Assessment of the Literature*  

Mark Spoerer†

Abstract: This paper addresses the oft-raised question of whether German firms profited from concentration camp labour. Answering involves implicit or explicit normative assessments. In a first step, I conduct a typical neoclassical labour market analysis in that I compare the rental fees that firms paid for concentration camp inmates with their (understandably low) labour productivity. Contrasting an oft-repeated assertion, it turns out that concentration camp labour was not generally "cheap" when compared with other forms of labour. We may doubt that financial aspects were still mattering for firms in 1944/45, though.

Yet, in order to assess the firms’ behaviour from a normative-ethical perspective, it is much more meaningful to ask whether they expected to profit from concentration camp labour rather than whether they practically did. This switch from an ex-post- to an ex-ante-perspective down scales the more complex matter of measuring profitability to a simple matter of choice: if a firm deliberately deployed concentration camp inmates, then it must have expected to profit from it in some way (note that the literature does not report cases in which firms deployed concentration camp inmates to improve their living conditions).

Therefore, in the second step, I employ a simple decision-theoretic instrument to model the decision-making process involving the firm and the armaments authorities. I take into account the probabilities of the relevant documents being passed down to and being accessible in the present; and the probabilities of the relevant documents finding a researcher making them public. Based on this framework I analyse the case studies reported in the literature to test for whether firms deliberately used concentration camp labour. Evidence suggests that there is only one case of a firm having likely been coerced into deploying inmates. Yet, there are 18 well-documented cases of privately-run firms taking the initiative on deploying inmates. Given that several 100,000 inmates were working for construction and armaments firms by the end of 1944, this is strong evidence that many German firms deliberately used concentration camp labour. Thus, they cannot abdicate their responsibility.

Keywords: Concentration camps, forced labour, labour productivity

JEL classification: N34, N84

* This discussion paper is a translation of a journal article originally written in German. Possible revisions to the original version (inclusion of new literature and/or new evidence) are indicated as such. The original publication is: Mark Spoerer (1999): Profitierten Unternehmen von KZ-Arbeit? Eine kritische Analyse der Literatur, in: Historische Zeitschrift 268: 61-95. Please cite the original publication along with this discussion paper.

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Did Firms Profit from Concentration Camp Labour? A Critical Assessment of the Literature

The probably most media-effective and therefore best-known aspect of German companies' involvement in the National Socialist regime’s crimes is the use of forced labourers and especially of concentration camp prisoners. More than fifty years after the end of the Second World War, German courts are still dealing with claims by former prisoners. The defendant would either be the Federal Republic of Germany, the company that used the prisoners at the time (if still existent), or the company’s legal successor. The accusation would be that the company profited from the prisoners' work and that the prisoners – if they survived at all – were not compensated. But to what extent is it true that companies profited from prisoner labour? And what does this mean for the question of moral and historical guilt? I will pursue these questions in the following by a comprehensive evaluation of the literature; with a claim to completeness.

The use of concentration camp prisoners was the cruel culmination of a labour market policy that had already been characterised by direct coercion shortly after the seizure of power – coercion which would further deepen over time. With labour scarcity becoming ever more pressing a matter during the war, the ideological concerns that had initially prevented the forced deployment of "foreign" workers were gradually fading. Even Soviet prisoners of war and civilian deportees (”Ostarbeiter”), in Nazi propaganda "Slavic sub-humans", were deployed from 1941/42 onwards. In the end, married German women and concentration camp prisoners were the last remaining labour force of note. However, the regime did abstain from extending the obligation to work to all women due to concerns about the general mood in the population. The SS commanding over the use of prisoners recognised their economic value rather late and then attempted to build an economic empire of its own upon the prisoners’ backs. It took the SS years to understand that economic success was not achievable by way of command alone and that the whole undertaking had effectively failed. Because of the increasing pressure of competing organisations with a stake in managing labour, the SS was starting to make contingents of concentration camp prisoners available to armaments companies on a large scale, instead of only small units, in the fall of 1942. In the spring of 1944, in particular, the number of concentration camp prisoners was greatly increasing so that by the end of 1944, when the
number peaked, several hundred thousand prisoners were literally being slaved to death on construction sites and in German companies’ factories.¹

The question of how profitable concentration camp work was for companies has to be seen in this context. Attracting only little attention until a decade ago, the question of the companies’ employment of prisoners has since led to a number of studies being published on the subject. To provide comparative perspectives, many business and regional historical studies on the use of concentration camp prisoners in the economy have especially been published in three collective volumes of 1986, 1991, and 1996.² Thus there is now sufficient material available from individual studies to make at least a first attempt at answering this question on a broader basis than has been the case so far.³

1. Some methodological considerations

The epistemological interest in answering the question of whether companies benefited from prisoner labour basically is connected with the attempt to analyse the interaction between the Nazi regime and the companies in the framework of "extermination through labour"; may this be from a historic or sociological perspective, as regards the matter of compensation, or with the aim of criminalising the capitalist economic system. Implicitly or explicitly, the aim is to elaborate on the historical facts of the cases in such detail that the companies’ behaviour can be assessed with normative-ethical criteria. This article follows that road, too. Since guilt can only be individual, it would hardly make any sense to examine "the private sector" or "industry".⁴ Therefore, the bearer of the blame to be investigated here must be the individual company or, in the case of companies with spatially separated production units, possibly the plant management.⁵ As regards the company or plant management, we can probably not deny that the decision-makers normally pursue business management goals, i.e. goals oriented towards long-term profitability. However, each

³ Cf. e.g. Kaiser (1975), Pingel (1978), and Budraß/Grieger (1993).
⁵ Strictly speaking, even the actions of the company management cannot be measured by ethical standards, but only those actions of the individuals involved in the decision. Apart from the fact that the sources and the literature are seldom sufficient for this purpose, it should be methodologically unproblematic for the following analysis to define the company as a black box, i.e. an entity that cannot be broken down further. If the guilt of individual decision-makers (e.g. board members) is under discussion, this hypothetical construct can be abandoned provided the material basis allows for it.
individual case must be examined as to whether, and to what extent, the question of the use of concentration camp labour was also influenced by considerations other than purely economic; e.g. the desire to actively support the state in the extermination of actual or supposed opponents of the regime or, conversely, to protect the prisoners from the SS’ despotism by claiming the importance of their labour to the armaments industry.

Disregarding non-economic motives for the moment, a financial-economic analysis is in order to answer the question posed. A reasonable first step would be to subject the published balance sheets of the companies that used concentration camp prisoners to a thorough analysis; this has already been attempted in the literature. However, in Germany, disclosed balance sheets have little validity, and this is particularly true for the period of National Socialism. This is because industry’s very good profit situation since 1936 was systematically concealed. This was completely in line with the legal situation and, what is more, it was deliberately promoted by the National Socialist commercial and tax legislation. Besides, balance sheets affected the entire company, while prisoners were used in parts of the plant, so that imputability should not be taken for granted. A related step would be to analyse the more detailed and truthful internal accounting that has been carried out by each larger company. Although there are apparently isolated documents, not a single such analysis is available in published form, to the best of my knowledge. For this reason, authors usually content themselves with pointing out that concentration camp labour at four to six Reich marks (RM) per prisoner and day was very cheap. However, this judgement is misleading for three reasons.

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8 Personal messages from Lutz Budraß and Bernd Ertl-Wagner. It is also conceivable that the extensive company holdings of the state and regional archives of the new federal states (above all Berlin (city archives), Dresden, Leipzig, Magdeburg and Weimar) contain corresponding material. Although these holdings are well catalogued and have unrestricted access, they have rarely been used in social and economic history research.
9 Merely Feldenkirchen (1995: 210) reports that in 1947 Siemens presented corresponding profitability calculations when investigated by the Allies; hardly surprising, these calculations told that concentration camp labour involved loss, taking into account plant overhead costs. However, Feldenkirchen (1995: 555, note 153) indirectly denies the value of this source.
10 Until 30 September 1942, concentration camp prisoners had cost two to four RM per day; cf. Herbert (1991: 409, 424). Messerschmitt had even paid up ten RM per prisoners (skilled workers) per day; cf. Kucera (1996: 78-81).
1.1. Labour Productivity

From a company’s point of view, the truly decisive determinant of profitability was labour productivity; this holds in the context of slave labour – nothing else was the use of concentration camp prisoners – as well as in the context of free wage labour. A firm only hires an employee (or leases his or her labour) if it expects the additional associated costs, above all the wage, to be lower than the additional value added resulting from the worker's employment (i.e., the marginal product of labour).

Whether the ratio of the marginal product of labour per concentration camp prisoner to the rent (which did not remain with the SS but was transferred to the Reich)\(^{12}\) including incidental costs

- was cheaper than it would have been in case of free labour, or, in view of the inability to obtain people capable of work during the last years of the war,
- was favourable (greater than one) at all,

cannot be easily assessed. On the one hand, concentration camp prisoners were "cheaper" in purely monetary terms and also easier to discipline; on the other hand, those employed voluntarily were usually more motivated and, in view of the the concentration camp prisoners’ catastrophic state of health, in any case more efficient.\(^{13}\) Table 1 attempts to weigh these effects – lower productivity, lower wages – against each other.\(^{14}\) Column 2 is decisive for the argument. It states how large the productivity of concentration camp prisoners, measured by suitably trained German workers, would have had to be in order for their deployment to have been cost-neutral from the company's point of view. Not taken into account due to lack of data are voluntary company social services for German workers as well as corresponding advance payments for the deployment of concentration camp prisoners (building of barracks, surveillance of women, additional food)\(^{15}\).\(^{16}\)

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\(^{13}\) Broszat (1965: 143-144) has already pointed to this fact. Cf. the interesting study of Eichholtz (1991), too. As early as 1943, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Occupational Physiology and its industrial clients had results from preliminary experiments which showed that the performance of Soviet prisoners of war increased over-proportionately when their food rations were increased.

\(^{14}\) Cf. Dieckmann (1968: 102-110) for a similar calculation. Dieckmann assumed that the prisoners' daily hourly output was lower (9-10 hours) and therefore came to the conclusion that concentration camp work was by no means cheap. Similarly, Naumann (1972: 262) and Hachtmann (1996: 64-65).

\(^{15}\) These services were partly offset again against the rental fee. There was no uniform regulation; cf. Pingel (1978: 124), Kaenb (1990: 286), Wysocki (1992: 144-145), and Naasner (1994: 338-339). Piper (1995: 274) points out that it is precisely this fact that gave companies room for manoeuvre in prisoner treatment.
Table 1: Hypothetical cost-neutral and estimated actual level of productivity of concentration camp prisoners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rent to SS or gross hourly wage in RM (March 1944)</th>
<th>Hypothetical cost-neutral productivity</th>
<th>Estimated actual productivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concentration camp skilled worker (6 RM / 11 h =)</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi- or unskilled concentration camp prisoner (4 RM / 11 h =)</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female concentration camp prisoner in the Metal processing industry (4 RM / 11 h =)</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal processing industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>1.210</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled worker</td>
<td>1.011</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female worker</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrotechnical industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female worker</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter, formworker, cement skilled worker</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker in civil engineering</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Interpretation: For a company in the electrical engineering industry, the use of female concentration camp prisoners was more favourable than that of German women if the prisoners’ labour productivity was more than 58% of the labour productivity of German women. In other words, the hourly rent of a female concentration camp prisoner was 58% of the gross hourly wage of a German female worker. However, the estimated actual productivity was probably larger than 58%.


There are only estimates on the actual productivity of concentration camp prisoners available: for prisoners deployed in production these are more or less unanimous at 40-60 per cent, in individual cases they rather tend to be lower. A productivity of more than 50

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16 This should not be a methodological problem. In the *Siemens* group, for example, the statutory and voluntary social security expenses in the fiscal years 1939/40 to 1941/42 were almost constant at around RM 200 per employee per year, i.e. less than 15% of annual gross earnings; cf. Siegel/v. Freyberg (1991: 384). At Daimler-Benz, this ratio was 18% in 1943 and 14% in 1944; cf. Pohl/Habelth/Brüninghaus (1986: 172-173) and Roth (1987: 336). The working time of 11 hours per day assumed here is likely to be too high rather than too low; cf. Naumann (1972: 162-166, esp. 165) and Piper (1995: 318-320). Moreover, it is irrelevant here that the working time of German workers tended to be shorter than that of prisoners, since both wage and productivity in Table 1 refer to working hours. In March 1944, the average weekly working time in the capital goods industry was 50 hours (skilled and semi-skilled workers 52 hours, unskilled workers 51 hours, employees 39 hours); cf. Siegel (1989: 305).

per cent may have been realistic for one or the other contingent of skilled or semi-skilled workers\textsuperscript{18}, but not for unskilled workers or even prisoners deployed in construction, who are known to be often exposed to lethal working conditions.\textsuperscript{19} The specifications of German construction companies for the settlement of accounts with the Organisation Todt show that the productivity of prisoners was estimated at only one-third.\textsuperscript{20} There are no generalised estimates on the work performance of female concentration camp inmates available. The difference in productivity to German women will certainly be much smaller than that between male concentration camp prisoners and German workers, since female prisoners were generally not exposed to such cruel working and living conditions as men.\textsuperscript{21} It is also known that German female workers were increasingly difficult to discipline as war proceeded, and companies' corresponding complaints became more frequent.\textsuperscript{22} German male workers, on the other hand, were easier to discipline for fear of being categorised as dispensable and usable for war.

Comparing these estimates with the hypothetical cost-neutral productivity levels (columns 2 and 3 in Table 1), it can be concluded that the deployment of male semi-skilled concentration camp prisoners, female prisoners, and perhaps also skilled prisoners could indeed have been more cost-effective for the companies than the employment of German workers. For male unskilled and construction prisoners, however, and this was the overwhelming majority of the prisoners used\textsuperscript{23}, it can be said with some certainty that their work performance remained below 50 per cent and that the companies would have preferred German workers for this reason alone.

Overall, then, contrary to many assertions, concentration camp prisoners were on average not or only slightly "cheaper" than comparable German workers. Taking into account labour productivity, one can perhaps even conclude that the rent on prisoners was,

\textsuperscript{18} Cf. e.g. the impressive learning effects of female concentration camp prisoners at Henschel Flugzeug-Werke (Budraß/Grieger 1993: 129).


\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Raim (1992: 125-126), and also Dieckmann (1968: 107-108) for construction prisoners at IG Auschwitz (30%) and Naumann (1972: 259).


\textsuperscript{22} Cf. Winkler (1977: 190-191) and Hachtmann (1993: 344-348).

\textsuperscript{23} Speer (1984: 457) assumed a ratio of two unskilled workers to one skilled worker. In view of the many complaints from companies about the prisoners' level of training, however, the ratio appears to have been considerably higher.
to a certain extent, "in line with the market". The Reich obviously had no interest in letting industry have workers below cost.

Of course, the comparison made in Table 1 is hypothetical: There were no longer any German workers available, and if there had been any, the companies would very probably have been prepared to pay higher wages in view of the lucrative armaments orders, which, however, they were not allowed to pay because of the wage freeze. Table 1 must therefore not be interpreted as meaning that companies did not earn money from using concentration camp prisoners, but rather that on average they probably did not earn more or just a bit more from them than from German or Western European workers, who were paid roughly the same amount.

1.2. Price formation

Table 1 only includes data on the labour costs of production and on productivity, but not on net value added, i.e. the link between these figures and output prices. However, the extent to which the use of concentration camp prisoners (or other groups of forced labourers) was taken into account by the armaments authorities, which together with the companies fixed the prices in constant negotiations, is completely unexplored. On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine that the numerous state price control commissions, which by their very nature would have been interested in low prices, would have ignored a possible reduction in labour costs associated with the use of concentration camp prisoners. On the other hand, the companies would certainly have argued with lower productivity. Moreover, it can be assumed that the commissions that themselves had to struggle with increasing personnel shortages would have been increasingly unable to shed light on the actual cost situation of the surveyed companies and would therefore have investigated ever fewer companies at all.

24 Cf. Georg (1963:117-118) for a corresponding directive by Himmler and Dieckmann (1968: 109-110) for the detailed calculations by the administration of the concentration camp Neuengamme; cf. also Müller (1988: 57-60). Of course, there no longer was a labour market in the conventional sense.

25 An exception to the wage freeze was, of all things, the remuneration of concentration camp prisoners. Apparently the SS did not object to companies introducing material incentives for prisoners. IG Farbenindustrie was also a pioneer in this respect; cf. Kaienburg (1990: 330-331). Further early examples are documented for Heinkel and the Volkswagen plant where the prisoners received camp money for their performance; cf. Fiedermann/Heß/Jaeger (1996: 512).

26 Merely in Mönnich (1991: 376) do we find a statement as to an executive employee at BMW who, with the argument of ever-repeated price controls, rejects the accusation of cheap concentration camp labour across-the-board. Companies that were paid by public customers on the basis of proven cost price plus a percentage markup on costs and profits even had an interest in higher wages, also for forced labourers; cf. Hopmann et al. (1994: 334-335) and Feldenkirchen (1995: 206, 550-551), but also Mommensen/Grieger (1996: 564). In principle, this should also have applied to concentration camp labour, but there is no evidence of such examples.
The question of operational price and cost calculation and the corresponding state controls is undoubtedly an urgent matter for economic and corporate historical research on the war years. However, it is questionable whether the results of this research could provide a meaningful answer to the question of whether companies "benefited" from prisoner labour.

1.3. Non-financial corporate goals

For there is a further consideration letting us doubt that documents from the firm’s financial-economic sphere are useful along the lines of this investigation. Addressed here is the extent to which companies in the last year of the war still paid attention to monetary factors. The synonyms "gain" and "profit" originate from the financial accounting of the firm, which has the function of expressing the real economic sphere of the firm in one dimension, in money. The actual economic profit is, to put it somewhat simple, the surplus tied up in real capital (buildings, machinery, etc.) or immediately available as money capital, which can be distributed to the company's owners given long-term profitability is secured. The real growth is normally reflected in the (correctly calculated) financial profit. In the case of inflationary processes, however, the financial and real economic variables can move away from each other, the former thus losing their meaning (problem of fictitious profits).

Already at the end of the thirties, the increasing inflationary glut of money was discussed surprisingly openly in the business press of the Third Reich. If one had initially still been able to lull oneself into the false hope that this would be neutralized by the real economic booty taken from the occupied territories, this turned out to be an illusion after the defeat of Stalingrad and at the very latest after the invasion of the Allies in June 1944. Until then, many armaments companies had been able to avoid the problem of impending inflation by reinvesting their huge financial profits in real capital, either directly in the form of assets or indirectly in the form of shareholdings or takeovers. However, these strategies also appeared increasingly questionable in view of the threat of defeat. Thus, it can be assumed that the companies’ primary strategic goal was no longer conventional profit making in the narrow financial sense, but rather the rescuing of real and human capital beyond the end of the war.

Whether the use of concentration camp prisoners has thus benefited companies would therefore have to be measured by the extent to which it has served the goal of maintaining production potential.\textsuperscript{30} At first glance, a perspective of this kind seems to be beyond measuring. Here the analysis seems to end in a dead end.

2. A model of the decision-making process

But perhaps the question of the profitability of concentration camp labour, which is so often raised in the literature, is misplaced. It has already been explained above that this question is implicitly or explicitly based on the goal of a normative-ethical evaluation and that therefore the individual guilt of the decision-makers is at the centre of the epistemological interest. Much more important than the question of whether concentration camp labour actually, ex-post, contributed to the achievement of the firms' goals, is the extent to which the decision-makers expected this to be the case, i.e. the ex-ante perspective. For a meaningful normative evaluation of the conduct of business, it is ultimately the intention and, thus, the desired result that is decisive, not the actual result. The question should therefore be reformulated in this way: did firms expect to profit from concentration camp work?

This question can be operationalised: If it can be shown that a firm has voluntarily, i.e. within the framework of an autonomous decision offering realistic alternatives of action, used concentration camp prisoners, then it must have assumed at the time of the decision that it would come closer to realising its goals. In this respect, this approach is independent of the thesis advocated above that the preservation of production potential was the companies' primary goal from about 1944 onwards. In other words: whatever the goals of a company may have been towards the end of the Second World War, if it used concentration camp prisoners on its own initiative, then it expected to profit from it. Here, too, however, it must first be taken into account that non-economic goals may have played a role to a limited extent. More on this will follow.

Whether companies requested concentration camp prisoners of their own accord or whether prisoners were assigned to them by quasi omnipotent armaments authorities has

\textsuperscript{30} However, it should be noted that the first deployments of concentration camp prisoners in companies (1941 IG Farbenindustrie and Steyr-Daimler-Puch, 1942 BMW, Siemens & Halske and Volkswagenwerk) occurred at a time when this motive was not yet important. These qualitatively important, but altogether still few cases are therefore not covered by this interpretation. The mass deployment of concentration camp prisoners in industry, however, did not begin until spring 1944 and not coincidentally at the same time as the underground relocations; cf. Fröbe (1991), Herbert (1991: 412), and Piper (1995: 213-232).
been controversially debated. Even today, companies claim that concentration camp contingents were basically allocated from above within the framework of a state forced economic system. However, research has disproved this. Today the prevailing opinion is that the companies requested prisoners out of their own motivation, which is almost always underlined by the statements of the head of the Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt (WVHA), Oswald Pohl, of one of his co-workers in the office group responsible for the concentration camp deployment, Karl Sommer, and of one of the commanders of the concentration camp Auschwitz, Rudolf Höß. In contrast, there are allegations, for example, by leading employees of *IG Farben* that they acted under duress. So it is statement against statement. Herbert Obenaus has repeatedly pointed out that Pohl’s statements have to be interpreted, among other things, with regard to their self-exonerating function that they undoubtedly had in the Nuremberg Trials. In fact, it is hard to see why SS officials who sent hundreds of thousands to death from their desks and therefore had to reckon with the death penalty for good reason should be given credit without further evidence. If one takes Obenaus’ objection seriously, then the question of who initiated the initiative for the employment of prisoners is quite open.

Of course, many individual cases have been documented in the literature in which the question of the initiative for concentration camp deployment was raised and answered. But the judgments are contradictory, and there is no systematic evaluation. The following section therefore attempts to answer this question by synthesising the cases documented in the literature. The object of investigation is the process that led to a decision on the use of

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34 Cf. Obenaus (1985: 167) and Obenaus (1996: 212-213, 219). Incidentally, the most important and most frequently quoted statement by Karl Sommer contains clear errors: The deployment of concentration camp prisoners in private industry took place long before August/September 1942, as Sommer claimed (cf. Table 3 in the appendix), and it was by no means "at almost all German industrial firms for which a mass deployment of concentration camp prisoners was considered". Also the statement: "A deployment [of prisoners] did not take place if at least about 500 concentration camp inmates could not be employed in one operation" is obviously incorrect, as a large number of examples show among which is Sommer’s own testimony; cf. Eichholtz/Schumann (1969: 473) and also Naumann (1972: 75).
35 Cf., contrasting common opinion or at least qualifying it, Obenaus (1985: 179) and business historians like Plume (1992: 528-529), Feldenkirchen (1995: 204-214), and Hayes (1991: 137-138). Even an author completely unsuspicious of apologetic reservations like Piper (1995: 99) mentions cases, in which the use of concentration camp prisoners was forced upon companies; he, however, does not go deeper into this matter.
concentration camp prisoners. Naturally, this process was very different in each individual case, so that the question arises as to whether a meaningful scheme can be developed that would permit a problem-oriented evaluation of the literature. The following Figure 1 represents an attempt at modelling the process of decision-making involving the authorities36 and the companies with the help of a simple instrument of analysis borrowed from decision theory, the decision tree or game tree.

The course of the negotiation process between the two actors – authority or bureaucracy (B) and firm (F) – can be divided into three steps:

1. Initiative of an actor (proposal to use concentration camp prisoners: yes or no),
2. Evaluation of the proposal by the other actor (agreement: yes or no), and in case of disagreement
3. Opposition by the first actor (with success: yes or no).

In total, there are seven conceivable cases, six of which are practically relevant. For a better overview, the disagreements between the two actors are shown in Figure 1, as are the endpoints (E). The branches stand for yes or no decisions (y, n).37 In the so-called payoff vectors, it reads a plus if the authority was able to enforce its will or a minus if not. The lower element of the payoff vector, which indicates whether the company was able to maintain its interest, is of particular interest to our question. Decision points B3 and F3 are particularly interesting in our context, as they represent cases of conflict. If a case is of type E1 to E3, there is an initiative by the administration, and conversely, types E4 to E6 indicate an initiative by the company. Type E7 is irrelevant and is only listed here for logical completeness.

36 The large number of authorities actually involved in the deployment of concentration camp prisoners does not allow for a more precise specification. What is meant is the authority that is decisive in each individual case.

37 It is irrelevant whether the decision tree starts with B1 or with F1, as displayed here. The cases are symmetric, but the representation of the decision tree is by definition asymmetric and requires a formal starting point. A very illustrative representation is presented by Dixit/Nalebuff (1995: 34-57).
Figure 1: Model of the decision-making process between firm and administration regarding the deployment of concentration camp prisoners

B₁: initiative?
  y
  n
  F₁: initiative?
    y
    n
  F₂: consent?
    y
    n
  B₂: consent?
    y
    n
  B₃: opposition
    successful?
      y
      n
      E₁
      E₂
      E₃
      (+)
      (+)
      (-)
      (+)
      (-)
      (+)
      (+)
      (-)
      (-)
      0
      0

Notes: "Opposition successful" refers to the perspective of the first actor (from whom the initiative for the concentration camp deployment emanates), who tries to break through the lack of consent of the second.

For illustrative purposes, the decision tree is explained using a case of type E₃. The authority instructs the company to prepare the deployment of concentration camp prisoners (B₁ → F₂), but the company does not agree (F₂ → B₃). The authority is, for whatever reason, unwilling or unable to break the refusal of the company (B₃ → E₃). The corresponding payoff vector (⁻) expresses that the company was able to enforce its will (+), but the authority was not (⁻).

Using this scheme, the cases documented in the literature can be evaluated in respect to two questions:

Q₁ Were the companies autonomous in their decision-making, i.e. were they able to enforce their objectives in cases of conflict?
Q₂ Did the companies want to use concentration camp prisoners?

For reasons that will become clear later, the following question is not included in the model:

Q₃ Why did companies (not) want to use prisoners? Three groups of motives are conceivable here: on the one hand economic motives, on the other hand ideological motives, either in agreement with the regime or in opposition to the regime or at least to the use of prisoners under the given inhuman conditions.

The answer to Q₁ provides information on the actual room for manoeuvre of the companies regarding the deployment of concentration camp prisoners and that of Q₂ and Q₃ on the core question of this study.
If the totality of the cases documented in the literature were a truthful reflection of the reality at the time, it would only be necessary to classify the cases according to the above scheme and count the relative frequencies of cases $E_1$ to $E_6$ in order to answer the first two questions at least "by a majority", i.e. empirically. Unfortunately, however, this procedure is confronted by a number of problems which can be traced back to the source situation on the one hand and to the epistemological interest in the literature on the other.

The documents relevant to the questions raised here were produced by two groups of institutions, the armaments authorities on the one hand and the companies on the other. Probably only a company that had to use prisoners against its will would have been particularly willing to document the decision-making process of interest here in detail beyond the end of the war, i.e. to record it in writing at all and to keep the documents later. Since on the one hand the companies were aware, or very quickly became aware, of the inhuman circumstances coming with concentration camp labour and since on the other hand the outcome of the war could at least be guessed at, it was in their interest to be armed against later accusations. Case $E_2$ is therefore a priori likely to have a much higher probability of having been originally documented than the others, of not having been concealed by the destruction of documents in 1945, and of having been made accessible for research later on. For obvious reasons, this does not apply to the cases in which the company initiated the concentration camp deployment itself ($E_4$ to $E_6$) or agreed to it ($E_1$), nor does it apply to case $E_3$. In this case the deployment was not possible due to the successful refusal of the company, so that a legitimacy pressure did not arise in the first place. Since these considerations are admittedly somewhat speculative, they should be formulated here explicitly as an assumption, especially since we will have to come back to this later:

Assumption $A_1$: A priori, case $E_2$, in which a company was forced to use concentration camp prisoners, has a higher probability of being transmitted than all others, especially $E_1$ and $E_4$ to $E_6$.

A second problem that should not be underestimated and that is somewhat delicate is that of the historian's epistemological interest. Even if one may not go so far as to accuse historians of having a fundamentally negative attitude towards the capitalist economic system in general and enterprises in particular$^{38}$, it is nevertheless obvious that in the literature on forced labour, authors critical of capitalism predominate by far, i.e. there so to

$^{38}$ Cf. Perkins (1995: 6) with a reference to the United States: „With few exceptions, most historians’ attitudes toward our capitalist system and the majority of its business leaders are hostile and suspicious.”
speak is a clear self-selection bias. The implicit conclusion that the results in the literature are therefore pressed into a pattern of explanation that is fixed from the outset anyway assumes scientific dishonesty and requires proof. However, the imputation of dubious work is not the point of interest here. The problem rather is that it is difficult to remain "neutral" after reading through sources or even after personal contacts with former concentration camp prisoners. Moreover, the understandable desire to find responsible actors should have a considerable influence on the perception and interpretation of the sources. On the basis of these considerations, it can be assumed that there is a tendency in the literature, on the one hand, to give preference to documenting cases in which companies used concentration camp prisoners on their own initiative or at least with consent, and, on the other hand, to interpret other cases incorrectly as such:

Assumption A₂: Due to most authors’ epistemological interest, cases in which companies voluntarily used or wanted to use concentration camp prisoners (Cases E₄ to E₆) have a higher a priori probability of being published than E₁ and especially E₂ and E₃. Moreover, misinterpretations tend to favour these cases.

Therefore, in the following evaluation of the literature special consideration must be given to these assumptions. In detail, the following basic principles result for the analysis:

- Events that are documented unclearly or contradictorily are not taken into account.
- Cases that look like E₁ should be interpreted with caution: If it was clear to a company that it would not withstand anyway in case of conflict (i.e. E₃ was unrealistic), it is conceivable that it agreed at decision point F₂ in order to avoid conflicts.³⁹
- The existence of an authority’s directive is not sufficient to accept a type E₂ case. In many cases, it was only issued pro forma after the conclusion of negotiations.
- A request of concentration camp inmates to the WVHA is not in itself sufficient to assume that the company has given its consent.⁴⁰ It must be examined whether the company felt compelled to request concentration camp prisoners due to constraints for which it was not responsible. This would be the case, for example, in the case of a forced assignment of arms orders with the order to request workers from the WVHA. If, on the other hand, the company had actively applied for armaments contracts, knowing at the time of concluding the contract that only concentration camp prisoners would be available on the "labour market", it would have accepted the fact that it would be forced to request concentration camp prisoners; it therefore was responsible for its choice.

• If industry’s self-governing bodies took initiative for the deployment, it must be examined whether the company under investigation had a dominant position in the corresponding body.\footnote{In the case of the deployment of concentration camp prisoners in the \textit{Adlerwerke} (Frankfurt on Main), the initiative came from the Main Committee on Motor Vehicles, which was dominated by representatives of industry at the time. However, since it can be assumed that \textit{Adlerwerke} only had a minor role in the committee, it is not necessarily correct to conclude that the company was in agreement; cf. Kaiser/Knorn (1994: 111-114, 121), Leßmann (1990: 129), and Mommsen/Grieger (1996: 652). The situation was very similar at \textit{Blohm \& Voss} in Hamburg; cf. Wiborg (1993: 103-105). The same problem arises in the evaluation of the use in the \textit{Rax} plant in Vienna-Neustadt. Here, however, it can be assumed that their parent company \textit{Henschel} had considerable influence in Special Committee A4, which was dominated by locomotive companies; cf. Freund/Perz (1988: 66-68) and Freund (1991: 43-48, 448). The same might apply to Carl Krauch’s role in the allocation of concentration camp prisoners to the Buna plant of \textit{IG Farbenindustrie} in Auschwitz; cf. Hayes (1992: 411-412) and Sandkühler/Schmuhl (1993: 260-265).}

• The fact that a company sent employees to a concentration camp to select prisoners is also not sufficient to assume that the company gave its consent. After all, it is conceivable that the company was forced to take this step.

• Whether a concentration camp deployment actually took place after the end of the negotiations is usually irrelevant. However, it must be examined whether apparently "technical" facts which prevented a planned concentration camp deployment were deliberately brought about by the party which had lost in the negotiating conflict.

• The treatment of the concentration camp prisoners in the actual deployment does not necessarily allow a conclusion to be drawn on the fundamental attitude of the management at the time of the negotiations.\footnote{At \textit{Blohm \& Voss} in Hamburg, for example, working and living conditions were worse than average, although the company had repeatedly and successfully rejected the deployment of further prisoners; cf. Eiber (1995: 60-73).}

3. \textbf{Were concentration camp prisoners requested or assigned? An analysis of the literature}

The evaluation of the literature is quite sobering in two respects. Firstly, there are no studies that would examine the decision to use concentration camp prisoners in construction companies. This is very unfortunate in view of the fact that there were probably more "construction prisoners" than "production prisoners".\footnote{I thank Rainer Fröbe for this advice.} Secondly, only a fraction of the documented cases report the decision-making process concerning the deployment of concentration camp prisoners in such detail that it is acceptable to classify them according to the framework presented above. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that the source situation is usually poor. In many cases, the concentration camp contingent suddenly appears in the sources or in interviews with contemporary witnesses without the preceding decision-making process having been documented. On the other hand, earlier works in particular are less carefully exercised. Especially in the research of the former GDR, the existence of a concentration camp contingent without sufficient evidence often led to
assuming the company management had consented.\textsuperscript{44} In Western German research, a trend can be observed from, to put it somewhat casually, a kind of "literature of indignation" of the time up to the end of the 1980s towards more problem-oriented research, which in particular also addresses the question of the initiative of the deployment explicitly.\textsuperscript{45} The results of the evaluation are shown in Table 3 (Appendix).\textsuperscript{46} Since it is conceivable that the answers to the questions posed may vary over time, the cases are sorted chronologically there.

Table 2 summarizes how often the six empirically meaningful cases have been documented in literature. This is preceded by the consideration of how likely it is that a particular case will be documented under consideration of the assumptions $A_1$ and $A_2$. It should be noted that the first three lines contain estimates of relative probabilities, e.g. the probability of a type $E_1$ case being handed down and documented in relation to the other five cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases (cf. Fig. 1)</th>
<th>$E_1$</th>
<th>$E_2$</th>
<th>$E_3$</th>
<th>$E_4$</th>
<th>$E_5$</th>
<th>$E_6$</th>
<th>$\Sigma$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative probability of case documents having survived ($A_1$)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>med.</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative probability of case being documented ($A_2$)</td>
<td>med.</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional relative probability of documentation ($A_2</td>
<td>A_1$)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All evaluable cases</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thereof private sector firms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ($A_2 | A_1$) = "$A_2$ given $A_1$", med. = medium.
Sources: Table 3 (Appendix).

Due to the reservations following a critical analysis of the sources and the literature mentioned above, it would be presumptuous to aim at quantitative statements of the kind "in x per cent of cases...". But if the count shows a clear preponderance for a particular case, then this must be given a high empirical weight. Tables 2 and 3 (the latter in the Appendix) show that, at least as far as the documentation in the literature is concerned, case $E_4$ clearly predominates: the company requested inmates and the authorities agreed. This dominance


\textsuperscript{45} Cf. especially the contributions in Fröbe et al. (1985) and representative for many of the more recent works the summaries in Kaienburg (1996).

\textsuperscript{46} For the sake of clarity, only those cases are shown in Table 3 which could be allocated almost beyond doubt. A list of the entire literature examined can be requested from the author.
does not change much if one does not count public enterprises like the Reichswerke "Hermann Göring" including its subsidiaries (Steyr-Daimler-Puch, Flugmotorenwerke Ostmark), the Volkswagenwerk, and the state-dominated Brabag. The hypothesis that state-owned enterprises played a pioneering role in the deployment of concentration camps\(^{47}\) is not substantiated by the chronological course of cases E\(_4\) in Table 3. Private sector firms, especially in the chemical and aircraft industries, made use of the last remaining labour force potential at a quite early stage. Case E\(_1\) (initiative of authorities, approval by companies) has only been documented three times; the Volkswagen plant, Krupp, and Siemens-Schuckert followed this path. The most interesting cases are those of conflict: on two occasions the authorities disallowed (state or state-dominated!) firms the use of concentration camp prisoners (Case E\(_6\)).\(^{48}\) In 1941, racial reasons were still invoked against the planned deployment of Jewish concentration camp prisoners\(^{49}\), while, in 1944, the firm’s production was not given priority. A case in which a company enforced the deployment of concentration camp prisoners against the original will of the authorities (E\(_5\)) is not documented. It is instructive that companies have been able to successfully withstand the forced deployment of prisoners desired by the authorities (E\(_3\)). Only with respect to a single company, the Akkumulatorenfabrik in Hanover, one might argue with a high probability that the use of concentration camp prisoners was forced upon it (E\(_2\)).

The evaluation of the case studies also allows answering the question as to what motives the companies had when they rejected or agreed (Q\(_3\)). It is not easy to answer this question because the companies were always well advised towards the end of the war to use pure business arguments for and against in their correspondence and to leave unmentioned any ideological motives or concerns. But for the question of normative evaluation from today's perspective, it makes little difference whether a company requested concentration camp prisoners for economic reasons, or to help the SS annihilate them. For the third case, i.e. the request of prisoners out of compassion, no concrete reference can be found in the literature. Even after the war this has not been mentioned. In the Nuremberg Trials, the defendants only referred to the fact that the prisoners had had a better time in


\(^{48}\) Possibly, we have to count in the very early case of the Heinkel works in Oranienburg in early 1940 (!) as well, as mentioned in Greier (1995: 46).

\(^{49}\) Recall the attempts by the SS to establish their own economic empire through concentration camp labour; cf. Georg (1973), Pingel (1968: 123-124), and Naasner (1994).
the company than in the gas chambers, and that in all other respects they had acted under a Command Emergency.\textsuperscript{50} Since no evidence can be found for ideological motives for the use of prisoners – and this is not very plausible anyway, at least in the case of private companies – the answer to the question of motives ultimately appears quite clear, despite all caution in individual cases: the focus was on business management goals.

With regard to question Q\(_1\) (the firms’ autonomy of action), one has to examine the cases of conflict (E\(_2\), E\(_3\), E\(_5\) and E\(_6\)). Unfortunately, so few cases have been documented (eight or six for privately managed companies) that only a very vague statement is possible. For both cases there is evidence, i.e. that the use of concentration camp prisoners was successfully refused or that companies were ordered to carry it out. This should make clear that statements of Pohl and others, that prisoners were only assigned on request (read: initiative of firms) are wrong and thus not sufficient to imply the consent of a company to the deployment of concentration camp prisoners without hard evidence. As it has been explained above, the cases of an octroy have a high probability a priori of being recorded in written form and kept. If today merely a single such case can be satisfactorily documented, it can be assumed for the time being that it was an exception. In this respect it seems reasonable to assume – given the current state of research – that most companies have been able to maintain their autonomy in the question of the use of concentration camp prisoners.\textsuperscript{51} A "Command Emergency" may have existed in individual cases, but it was not the rule.

The core question Q\(_2\) is therefore easier to answer. The case in which a company requested concentration camp prisoners of its own free will is by far the most frequently documented, which is not particularly surprising when looking at the assumptions about the relative probability of documentation given the factually surviving cases. Since, however, the case of forced deployment, as explained in Q\(_1\), was an exception, despite the equally high probability of documentation, it can be concluded, in view of the several 100,000 prisoners who were deployed in the armaments industry at the end of 1944\textsuperscript{52}, that in industry there must indeed have been a strong original interest in the deployment of concentration camp prisoners.


\textsuperscript{51} Some of the newer studies have convincingly shown that even in a total war there was considerable entrepreneurial scope for action; cf. Peter (1995), Gehrig (1996), Heusler (1996), and Gregor (1997).

\textsuperscript{52} Figures vary between 230,000 and 500,000; cf. Hopmann et al. (1994: 353).
4. Summary assessment

The starting point of this study is the assertion regularly ventilated in the literature that companies profited enormously from concentration camp labour; this comes at least implicitly with a corresponding normative assessment. In this study, however, it is argued that, given the current state of research, it is hardly possible to assess the issue from an ex-post perspective. It rather has to be assessed from an ex-ante perspective which is interesting enough since it is accessible to a normative-ethical view. The question, reworded in this way: "Did companies expect to profit from the use of concentration camp prisoners?", can be condensed into whether companies voluntarily used concentration camp prisoners. If this was the case, it can be assumed that the companies expected prisoners’ deployment to positively contribute to their objectives, however defined, towards the end of the war.

In order to create an analytical framework for an analysis of the literature, the negotiation process between companies and authorities is modelled with the help of a simple decision-making instrument. An evaluation of the literature, in which the work of concentration camp detachment has been documented, leads to the somewhat disappointing results that research has so far left out the construction industry and that only a small percentage of the studies on industrial enterprises show a picture of the decision-making processes that allows for a relatively reliable interpretation. Nevertheless, the following results can be derived from the 33 evaluable cases:

- Within the framework of the analysis of the literature, it could only be determined with some degree of certainty for one single company that the use of concentration camp prisoners was forced upon it (Akkumulatorenfabrik 1943). This is all the more remarkable as such cases, because of their relieving function for the companies concerned, have a disproportionately higher a priori probability of being fixed in writing at the time of the decision and being discussed after the war. In isolated cases, therefore, companies may have been forced to use concentration camp prisoners. Thus the statements of Pohl and others in the Nuremberg Trials, according to which prisoners were only assigned on request, have been exposed as self-serving. It further follows that it is not permissible, as is almost universally the case in the literature, to infer the consent of the company concerned from the sheer existence of a detachment

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53 It should again be pointed out here that Franciszek Piper, who has been intensively involved with the work deployment of the Auschwitz concentration camp, mentions further cases of the forced deployment of concentration camp prisoners in industry; cf. Piper (1995: 99) and footnote 35.
of concentration camp prisoners without further evidence, by referring to these allegations.

- By contrast, there are several cases in which companies have successfully rejected the use of concentration camp prisoners as advised – for whatever reasons. As a rule, the companies were left with the entrepreneurial leeway to decide on the question of the use of concentration camp prisoners.

- In the overwhelming majority of the documented cases it has been proven that not only state but also private firms actively sought to allocate concentration camp prisoners. Incidentally, most of these efforts took place during a period in which the miserable living and working conditions of other disproportionately discriminated forced labour groups – Eastern workers, Soviet prisoners of war, and Italian military internees – were quite obvious (from mid/end 1942). Even if a firm may not have been informed in detail about the living conditions of the concentration camp prisoners, it could certainly assume that their physical constitution would not be any better.\(^{54}\)

- According to the current state of research, there is no evidence of any case in which a company requested concentration camp inmates in order to protect them from a worse fate through work deployment.\(^{55}\) Conversely, "annihilation through work" was certainly not an original corporate goal, at least in the case of private companies, but it was obviously accepted with alarming frequency.

In summary, the conclusion can be drawn that despite the increasing loss of room for manoeuvre in many areas of operation, companies were normally left with the possibility of making autonomous decisions on the use of concentration camp prisoners. In case armament authorities were suggesting the deployment of a concentration camp detachment, rejection required, besides civil courage, the willingness to risk the loss of the company's economic position, either through the loss of orders or even of skilled personnel and plant(s).\(^{56}\) Many companies were obviously not prepared to do this. But in the majority of documented cases, it was the company that took the initiative anyway.

\(^{54}\) The Akkumulatorenfabrik apparently knew exactly what the use of concentration camp inmates meant as early as early 1943: The company calculated a monthly "fluctuation" of eight or even 16%.; cf. Schröder (1985: 56). In addition, cf. Obenaus (1996: 222).

\(^{55}\) The Jews protected by Berthold Beitz and Oskar Schindler were "working Jews" who were not yet assigned to a concentration camp.

\(^{56}\) Cf. exemplarily Budraß/Grieger (1993).
The question whether companies expected to profit from the use of concentration camp labour can therefore be answered with "yes": since the companies obviously still had the freedom to say "no" to using concentration camp prisoners in the vast majority of cases, they must have believed – particularly clearly in the many cases in which they wanted the deployment of concentration camp prisoners of their own accord – that they would profit from it. This is especially because non-economic motives, such as compassion for the prisoners, were not even claimed later. And ex post, too, many companies certainly profited from the unscrupulous use of concentration camp labour if they had managed to relocate their stock of the relatively expensive production factor capital underground and later managed to bring it into the Western zones by drawing on the last reserve of the relatively cheap production factor labour, i.e. concentration camp inmates.\footnote{57}

Of course, these can only be preliminary results which, as far as private companies are concerned, are based on the analysis of only 24 cases. It would be desirable if the considerations presented here could contribute to the fact that in future research – not only on the use of concentration camp prisoners in the private sector – greater consideration would be given to the question of the room for manoeuvre towards the Nazi authorities. For only if actors have factual scope for action and thus realistic alternatives, does a normative-ethical evaluation of their behaviour make sense.

\footnote{57 This was examined particularly thoroughly for \textit{Daimler-Benz}; cf. Fröbe (1987), Hopmann et al. (1994), and Gregor (1997).}
## Appendix

### Table 3: Course and Result of Decision-Making Processes Between Industrial Firms and Nazi Authorities Concerning Deployment of Concentration Camp Inmates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm, Plant (Group)</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Consent</th>
<th>Deploym.</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akkumulatorenfabrik AG, Hanover</td>
<td>1-3 1941</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>E₃</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Schröder (1985: 52-54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichswerke AG für Erzbergbau und Eisenhütten „Hermann Göring“*, Salzgitter</td>
<td>3-4 1941</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>E₆</td>
<td>racial reasons</td>
<td>Wysocki (1992: 136-137, 492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG*, Steyr (Reichswerke)</td>
<td>1-3 1942</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>E₄</td>
<td>Steyr already deployed inmates</td>
<td>Perz (1991: 84); Freund/Perz (1991: 327-328); Perz (1996: 105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm, Plant (Group)</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Deploym.</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flugmotorenwerk Reichshof GmbH, Reichshof (Daimler-Benz)</td>
<td>6-7 1942</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>E₄</td>
<td>Jewish forced labour (no inmates)</td>
<td>Hopmann et al. (1994: 358-359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichswerke AG für Erzbergbau und Eisenhütten „Hermann Göring“*, Braunschweig</td>
<td>9-10 1942</td>
<td>B + F</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>E₄</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Wysocki (1986: 12); idem (1992: 141, 494)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkumulatorenfabrik AG, Hanover</td>
<td>2-3 1943</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>E₂</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Schröder (1985: 55-56); Obenaus (1985: 167-173, 179-180);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rax-Werk GmbH, Wiener Neustadt (Henschel)</td>
<td>4-6 1943</td>
<td>(F)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>E₄</td>
<td>initiative by committee</td>
<td>Freund/Perz (1988: 66-68); Freund (1991: 43-48, 448-449)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Württembergische Metallwarenfabrik, Geislingen</td>
<td>10 1943</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>E₄</td>
<td>firm not able to get guards</td>
<td>Haller (1998: 334-337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braunkohle-Benzin AG*</td>
<td>1 1944</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>E₆</td>
<td>low priority</td>
<td>Brenner (1982: 104-106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm, Plant (Group)</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Deploym.</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daimler-Benz Motoren-GmbH, Obrigheim (Daimler-Benz)</td>
<td>3-7 1944</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>E₄</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Fröbe (1987: 399-409); Hopmann et al. (1994: 399-400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henschel Flugzeug-Werke AG, Staßfurt</td>
<td>6 1944</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>E₃</td>
<td>after camp visit</td>
<td>Budraß/Grieger (1993: 119-121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henschel Flugzeug-Werke AG, Schönefeld</td>
<td>6-7 1944</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>E₄</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Budraß/Grieger (1993: 122-123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke AG, Gröditz</td>
<td>9 1944</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>E₄</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Drobisch (1964: 50-51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm, Plant (Group)</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Deploym.</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Benteler-Werke, Bielefeld</em></td>
<td>?</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>E₃</td>
<td>after camp visit</td>
<td>Paul/Pingel (1989: 323)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (i) * public enterprise, (ii) arab ciphers stand for months, latin for quarters, (iii) B - authority, F - firm, (F) - multi-firm institution, in which firm was dominant.
References


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DOI 10.5283/epub.43434  
RESH Papers – ISSN 2701-2050  

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