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How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note

Jerger, Jürgen (2002) How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note. European Journal of Political Economy 46 (3), pp. 623-632.

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that a conservative central banker reduces equilibrium inflation with no cost in terms of real activity. More recently, this proposition has been turned around in models with inflation averse wage setters who are Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the central bank: In this case a populist central banker with no interest in inflation was shown to lead to the first-best ...

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Item type:Article
Date:2002
Institutions:Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Internationale und Monetäre Ökonomik (Prof. Dr. Jürgen Jerger)
Identification Number:
ValueType
10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00096-9DOI
Classification:
NotationType
E50Journal of Economics Literature Classification
J51Journal of Economics Literature Classification
Keywords:Central bank; Wage setting; Inflation; Unemployment
Dewey Decimal Classification:300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Status:Published
Refereed:Unknown
Created at the University of Regensburg:Unknown
Item ID:16224
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