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Bodenstein, Christian ; Schryen, Guido ; Neumann, Dirk

From "Take-it-or-leave-it" offers to "Take-it-or-be-left-out" Ultimatum - A trade mechanism for Online Services

Bodenstein, Christian, Schryen, Guido und Neumann, Dirk (2010) From "Take-it-or-leave-it" offers to "Take-it-or-be-left-out" Ultimatum - A trade mechanism for Online Services. In: 18th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2010), 7-9 June 2010, Pretoria, South Africa. (Im Druck)

Veröffentlichungsdatum dieses Volltextes: 22 Jun 2011 06:21
Konferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag
DOI zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments: 10.5283/epub.21266


Zusammenfassung

In a world, where more and more businesses seem to trade in an online market, the supply of online services to supply the ever-growing demand could quickly reach its capacity limits. Online service providers may find themselves maxed out at peak operation levels during high-traffic timeslots but too little demand during low-traffic timeslots, although the latter is becoming less frequent. At this ...

In a world, where more and more businesses seem to trade in an online market, the supply of online services to supply the ever-growing demand could quickly reach its capacity limits. Online service providers may find themselves maxed out at peak operation levels during high-traffic timeslots but too little demand during low-traffic timeslots, although the latter is becoming less frequent. At this point not only deciding which user is allocated what level of service becomes essential, but also the magnitude of the service provided, can be controlled by pricing. Pricing is an important factor when efficient and acceptable allocation of resources between individuals must be reached. Without prices, transferring or sharing goods would be impossible. In sharing information, pricing a product however is not as simple as relatively pricing an apple or a pear. Often the costs, and hence the prices are simply unknown. Backed by this scenario, the online services market could be combined with the market design mechanism of diamonds. For this we propose an ultimatum pricing strategy which effectively allows for valuations to be accounted for, but no longer a necessity when pricing in grid, cloud or other online computing environments.


Beteiligte Einrichtungen


Details

DokumentenartKonferenz- oder Workshop-Beitrag (Nicht ausgewählt)
Datum2010
InstitutionenWirtschaftswissenschaften > Institut für Wirtschaftsinformatik > Entpflichtete oder im Ruhestand befindliche Professoren > Professur für Wirtschaftsinformatik (Prof. Dr. Guido Schryen)
Stichwörter / KeywordsPosted Price, Ultimatum Game, Energy Efficiency, Mechanism Design
Dewey-Dezimal-Klassifikation300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
000 Informatik, Informationswissenschaft, allgemeine Werke > 000 Allgemeines, Wissenschaft
StatusIm Druck
BegutachtetJa, diese Version wurde begutachtet
An der Universität Regensburg entstandenNein
URN der UB Regensburgurn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-212663
Dokumenten-ID21266

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