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Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract

URN to cite this document:
urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-217055
Roider, Andreas
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Date of publication of this fulltext: 10 Aug 2011 06:15


Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts. In a holdup framework, we provide two sets of conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem. In cases where overinvestment can be ruled out, delegation is optimal if the payoffs of the parties satisfy certain separability conditions. If overinvestment ...

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