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Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract

Roider, Andreas (2006) Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162, pp. 391-411.

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Date of publication of this fulltext: 10 Aug 2011 06:15

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Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts. In a holdup framework, we provide two sets of conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem. In cases where overinvestment can be ruled out, delegation is optimal if the payoffs of the parties satisfy certain separability conditions. If overinvestment ...

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Item type:Article
Date:2006
Institutions:Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider)
Identification Number:
ValueType
10.1628/093245606778387366DOI
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/professuren/behfin/delegation.pdfAuthor
Dewey Decimal Classification:300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes, this version has been refereed
Created at the University of Regensburg:Unknown
Item ID:21705
Owner only: item control page

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