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Asset Ownership and Contractibility of Interaction

URN to cite this document:
urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-217147
Roider, Andreas
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Date of publication of this fulltext: 11 Aug 2011 06:30


Abstract

In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. The model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. I admit general message-dependent contracts but provide conditions under which noncontingent contracts are optimal. First, the article contributes to the foundation of the property-rights ...

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