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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

DOI to cite this document:
10.5283/epub.21720
Englmaier, Florian ; Mühlheusser, G. ; Roider, Andreas
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Date of publication of this fulltext: 11 Aug 2011 06:19

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