Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian, Mühlheusser, G. and Roider, Andreas (2012) Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave. Working Paper.

Date of publication of this fulltext: 11 Aug 2011 06:19
Monograph
DOI to cite this document: 10.5283/epub.21720

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Involved Institutions

• Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider)

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Details

Item type	Monograph (Working Paper)
Number of Pages:	55
Date	September 2012
Institutions	Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider)
Related URLs	URL URL Type http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/professuren/behfin/dp7914.pdf Author
Dewey Decimal Classification	300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Status	Unknown
Refereed	Unknown
Created at the University of Regensburg	Partially
Item ID	21720

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