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Cryptographic Protocol Analysis of AN.ON

Westermann, Benedikt ; Wendolsky, R. ; Pimenidis, L. ; Kesdogan, Dogan


This work presents a cryptographic analysis of AN.ON’s anonymization protocols. We have discovered three flaws of differing severity. The first is caused by the fact that the freshness of the session key was not checked by the mix. This flaw leads to a situation where an external attacker is able to perform a replay attack against AN.ON. A second, more severe, error was found in the encryption ...


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