Go to content
UR Home

Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope

URN to cite this document:
urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-217048
Roider, Andreas
[img]
Preview
PDF
(241kB)
Date of publication of this fulltext: 10 Aug 2011 06:16


Abstract

This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project's scope before some later (operative) decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, only if the exogenous risk is sufficiently large may the risk-neutral principal prefer to delegate ...

plus


Owner only: item control page
  1. Homepage UR

University Library

Publication Server

Contact:

Publishing: oa@ur.de

Dissertations: dissertationen@ur.de

Research data: daten@ur.de

Contact persons