Go to content
UR Home

Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope

Roider, Andreas (2009) Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 165, pp. 193-209.

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (241kB)
Date of publication of this fulltext: 10 Aug 2011 06:16

at publisher (via DOI)


Abstract

This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project's scope before some later (operative) decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, only if the exogenous risk is sufficiently large may the risk-neutral principal prefer to delegate ...

plus


Export bibliographical data



Item type:Article
Date:2009
Institutions:Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider)
Identification Number:
ValueType
10.1628/093245609789273268DOI
Related URLs:
URLURL Type
http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/professuren/behfin/delegation_risk.pdfAuthor
Dewey Decimal Classification:300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes, this version has been refereed
Created at the University of Regensburg:Unknown
Item ID:21704
Owner only: item control page

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

  1. Homepage UR

University Library

Publication Server

Contact:

Publishing: oa@ur.de

Dissertations: dissertationen@ur.de

Research data: daten@ur.de

Contact persons