Roider, Andreas (2009) Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 165, pp. 193-209.
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Abstract
This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project's scope before some later (operative) decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, only if the exogenous risk is sufficiently large may the risk-neutral principal prefer to delegate ...
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| Item type: | Article | ||||
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| Date: | 2009 | ||||
| Institutions: | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider) | ||||
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| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics | ||||
| Status: | Published | ||||
| Refereed: | Yes, this version has been refereed | ||||
| Created at the University of Regensburg: | Unknown | ||||
| Item ID: | 21704 |
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