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Chaos, cheating and cooperation: potential solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma

URN to cite this document:
urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-285144
Brembs, Björn
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Date of publication of this fulltext: 24 Jul 2013 10:32


Abstract

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is widely regarded as a standard model for the evolution of cooperation. This review tries to give an outline of the development in the field since Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) spawned an avalanche of papers with the announcement of Tit-for-tat as the winner of their computer tournament. The most important advancements in the game-theoretical work on different ...

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