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Reputational Herding in Financial Markets: A Laboratory Experiment

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Roider, Andreas ; Voskort, Andrea

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Date of publication of this fulltext: 07 Sep 2016 07:35


We study reputational herding in Önancial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment behavior, but not investorsíability types. Thereby, reputational incentives may arise endogenously. We Önd that ...


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