Direkt zum Inhalt

Alekseev, Aleksandr

The Power of Incentives

Alekseev, Aleksandr (2022) The Power of Incentives. Working Paper. (Unveröffentlicht)

Veröffentlichungsdatum dieses Volltextes: 14 Nov 2022 13:50
Monographie
DOI zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments: 10.5283/epub.53030


Zusammenfassung

I study an optimal design of monetary incentives in experiments where incentives are a treatment variable. I introduce the Budget Minimization problem in which a researcher chooses the level of incentives that allows her to detect a predicted treatment effect while minimizing her expected budget. The Budget Minimization problem builds upon the power analysis and structural modeling. It extends ...

I study an optimal design of monetary incentives in experiments where incentives are a treatment variable. I introduce the Budget Minimization problem in which a researcher chooses the level of incentives that allows her to detect a predicted treatment effect while minimizing her expected budget. The Budget Minimization problem builds upon the power analysis and structural modeling. It extends the standard optimal design approach by explicitly making the budget a part of the objective function. I show theoretically that the problem has an interior solution under fairly mild conditions. I illustrate the applications of the Budget Minimization problem using existing experiments and offer a practical guide for implementing it. My approach adds to the experimental economists' toolkit for an optimal design, however, it also challenges some conventional design recommendations.


Beteiligte Einrichtungen


Details

DokumentenartMonographie (Working Paper)
Datum14 Juli 2022
InstitutionenWirtschaftswissenschaften > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung - Prof. Lea Cassar
Stichwörter / Keywordsincentives, economic experiments, experimental design, power analysis, sample size, effect size
Dewey-Dezimal-Klassifikation300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
StatusUnveröffentlicht
BegutachtetNein, diese Version wurde noch nicht begutachtet (bei preprints)
An der Universität Regensburg entstandenJa
URN der UB Regensburgurn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-530303
Dokumenten-ID53030

Bibliographische Daten exportieren

Nur für Besitzer und Autoren: Kontrollseite des Eintrags

nach oben