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Alekseev, Aleksandr

The Power of Incentives

Alekseev, Aleksandr (2022) The Power of Incentives. Working Paper. (Unpublished)

Date of publication of this fulltext: 14 Nov 2022 13:50
Monograph
DOI to cite this document: 10.5283/epub.53030


Abstract

I study an optimal design of monetary incentives in experiments where incentives are a treatment variable. I introduce the Budget Minimization problem in which a researcher chooses the level of incentives that allows her to detect a predicted treatment effect while minimizing her expected budget. The Budget Minimization problem builds upon the power analysis and structural modeling. It extends ...

I study an optimal design of monetary incentives in experiments where incentives are a treatment variable. I introduce the Budget Minimization problem in which a researcher chooses the level of incentives that allows her to detect a predicted treatment effect while minimizing her expected budget. The Budget Minimization problem builds upon the power analysis and structural modeling. It extends the standard optimal design approach by explicitly making the budget a part of the objective function. I show theoretically that the problem has an interior solution under fairly mild conditions. I illustrate the applications of the Budget Minimization problem using existing experiments and offer a practical guide for implementing it. My approach adds to the experimental economists' toolkit for an optimal design, however, it also challenges some conventional design recommendations.


Involved Institutions


Details

Item typeMonograph (Working Paper)
Date14 July 2022
InstitutionsBusiness, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung - Prof. Lea Cassar
Keywordsincentives, economic experiments, experimental design, power analysis, sample size, effect size
Dewey Decimal Classification300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
StatusUnpublished
RefereedNo, this version has not been refereed yet (as with preprints)
Created at the University of RegensburgYes
URN of the UB Regensburgurn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-530303
Item ID53030

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