When nudges promote neutral behavior: an experimental study of managerial decisions under risk and uncertainty

URN to cite this document:: urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-540189
DOI to cite this document:: 10.5283/epub.54018

Renz, Erich

; Müller, Marvin M. ; Böhm, Kim Leonardo

License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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Date of publication of this fulltext: 06 Apr 2023 06:35

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Abstract

Managers often make decisions in situations involving risk and uncertainty. To ensure the prosperity of the company, neutral behavior is desirable in such situations. However, when evaluating future-oriented managerial actions, cognitive biases can arise that are manifested as aversions towards risky and uncertain situations, leading to non-optimal decisions. In an online experiment with a ...