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Müller, Marvin M. ; Böhm, Kim Leonardo ; Renz, Erich

Pay or nudge employees into change? A theoretical and experimental investigation of the effect of nudging for organizational change

Müller, Marvin M., Böhm, Kim Leonardo and Renz, Erich (2023) Pay or nudge employees into change? A theoretical and experimental investigation of the effect of nudging for organizational change. Managerial and Decision Economics.

Date of publication of this fulltext: 30 May 2023 10:21
Article
DOI to cite this document: 10.5283/epub.54301


Abstract

Organizational change often fails due to employees' resistance to change resulting in unforeseen expenses, delays, or other disruptions in organizations. In our experiment, we compare behavioral interventions-a pro-change default rule and a pro-change recommendation-with a costly pay raise to foster supportive behavior. In regard to the pure nudge used (default), we support its effectiveness in ...

Organizational change often fails due to employees' resistance to change resulting in unforeseen expenses, delays, or other disruptions in organizations. In our experiment, we compare behavioral interventions-a pro-change default rule and a pro-change recommendation-with a costly pay raise to foster supportive behavior. In regard to the pure nudge used (default), we support its effectiveness in enhancing change-related success. In line with our model and based on the assumption of low decision confidence in change settings, we find that a preference nudge (recommendation) lacks a corresponding effect. In addition, we find that a pay raise has a positive effect that is likely to be triggered by positive reciprocity. If this pay raise fails to materialize, we report supporting evidence for negative reciprocity. We compare the effect sizes for these nudges and the pay raise and provide insights for the relative cost-effectiveness of such nudges compared to a pay raise for organizational change. We conclude with managerial implications.



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Details

Item typeArticle
Journal or Publication TitleManagerial and Decision Economics
Publisher:JOHN WILEY & SONS LTD
Open Access Type:DEAL (Wiley)
Place of Publication:CHICHESTER
Date27 May 2023
InstitutionsBusiness, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > Lehrstuhl für Innovations- und Technologiemanagement (Prof. Dr. Michael Dowling)
Identification Number
ValueType
10.1002/mde.3901DOI
KeywordsGIFT-EXCHANGE; PUBLIC-GOODS; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY; SELF-EFFICACY; RESISTANCE; DETERMINANTS; DISCLOSURE; PROVISION; ATTITUDES;
Dewey Decimal Classification300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
StatusPublished
RefereedYes, this version has been refereed
Created at the University of RegensburgPartially
URN of the UB Regensburgurn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-543018
Item ID54301

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