Early View | Download ( PDF | 3MB) | License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 |
Pay or nudge employees into change? A theoretical and experimental investigation of the effect of nudging for organizational change
Müller, Marvin M., Böhm, Kim Leonardo and Renz, Erich
(2023)
Pay or nudge employees into change? A theoretical and experimental investigation of the effect of nudging for organizational change.
Managerial and Decision Economics.
Date of publication of this fulltext: 30 May 2023 10:21
Article
DOI to cite this document: 10.5283/epub.54301
Abstract
Organizational change often fails due to employees' resistance to change resulting in unforeseen expenses, delays, or other disruptions in organizations. In our experiment, we compare behavioral interventions-a pro-change default rule and a pro-change recommendation-with a costly pay raise to foster supportive behavior. In regard to the pure nudge used (default), we support its effectiveness in ...
Organizational change often fails due to employees' resistance to change resulting in unforeseen expenses, delays, or other disruptions in organizations. In our experiment, we compare behavioral interventions-a pro-change default rule and a pro-change recommendation-with a costly pay raise to foster supportive behavior. In regard to the pure nudge used (default), we support its effectiveness in enhancing change-related success. In line with our model and based on the assumption of low decision confidence in change settings, we find that a preference nudge (recommendation) lacks a corresponding effect. In addition, we find that a pay raise has a positive effect that is likely to be triggered by positive reciprocity. If this pay raise fails to materialize, we report supporting evidence for negative reciprocity. We compare the effect sizes for these nudges and the pay raise and provide insights for the relative cost-effectiveness of such nudges compared to a pay raise for organizational change. We conclude with managerial implications.
Alternative links to fulltext
Involved Institutions
Details
| Item type | Article | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title | Managerial and Decision Economics | ||||
| Publisher: | JOHN WILEY & SONS LTD | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Open Access Type: | DEAL (Wiley) | ||||
| Place of Publication: | CHICHESTER | ||||
| Date | 27 May 2023 | ||||
| Institutions | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > Lehrstuhl für Innovations- und Technologiemanagement (Prof. Dr. Michael Dowling) | ||||
| Identification Number |
| ||||
| Keywords | GIFT-EXCHANGE; PUBLIC-GOODS; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY; SELF-EFFICACY; RESISTANCE; DETERMINANTS; DISCLOSURE; PROVISION; ATTITUDES; | ||||
| Dewey Decimal Classification | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics | ||||
| Status | Published | ||||
| Refereed | Yes, this version has been refereed | ||||
| Created at the University of Regensburg | Partially | ||||
| URN of the UB Regensburg | urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-543018 | ||||
| Item ID | 54301 |
Download Statistics
Download Statistics