Epstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N. 
Alternative Links zum Volltext:DOIVerlag
| Dokumentenart: | Artikel |
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| Titel eines Journals oder einer Zeitschrift: | European Journal of Political Economy |
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| Verlag: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC |
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| Ort der Veröffentlichung: | NEW YORK |
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| Band: | 60 |
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| Seitenbereich: | S. 101743 |
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| Datum: | 2019 |
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| Institutionen: | Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS) |
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| Identifikationsnummer: | | Wert | Typ |
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| 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.08.007 | DOI |
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| Stichwörter / Keywords: | RENT-SEEKING; DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT; DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; FEDERAL SYSTEM; FOREIGN-AID; ACCOUNTABILITY; GOVERNMENT; CONTESTS; IMPACT; Govemance; Decentralisation; Economic-models-of-political-processes; Contests; Rent-seeking; Intergovernmental-relations |
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| Dewey-Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
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| Status: | Veröffentlicht |
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| Begutachtet: | Ja, diese Version wurde begutachtet |
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| An der Universität Regensburg entstanden: | Ja |
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| Dokumenten-ID: | 47989 |
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Zusammenfassung
Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the taxes they pay the government. We examine the political economy of a decentralised revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the ...
Zusammenfassung
Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the taxes they pay the government. We examine the political economy of a decentralised revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralised with decentralised governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by constituencies trying to affect government taxation decisions.
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