Abstract
Both the economic theory of federalism and international environmental economics are interested in finding conditions under which countries or groups of countries would like to start cooperation with other countries. In the framework of the standard public-good model this paper presents a criterion for individually rational and thus voluntary international cooperation aiming at the provision of ...
Abstract
Both the economic theory of federalism and international environmental economics are interested in finding conditions under which countries or groups of countries would like to start cooperation with other countries. In the framework of the standard public-good model this paper presents a criterion for individually rational and thus voluntary international cooperation aiming at the provision of an international public good. This basic criterion can be traced back to Wicksell and Rawls and reflects the idea of reciprocity. In a further step, it is used to specify determinants that affect the decision of a group of countries to enter a coalition. It turns out that in this context the adjustment behavior of the original coalition members as well as that of the remaining outsiders is of particular importance. Finally the theoretical considerations are confronted with actual behavior of countries and groups of countries (as the EU, US and the developing countries) in the Kyoto process leading to a discussion of further prospects for global climate-change policy.