Zusammenfassung
Due to the advancing development of quantum computers, practical attacks on conventional public-key cryptography may become feasible in the next few decades. To address this risk, post-quantum schemes that are assumed to be secure against quantum attacks are being developed. Lattice-based algorithms are promising replacements for conventional schemes, with BLISS being one of the earliest ...
Zusammenfassung
Due to the advancing development of quantum computers, practical attacks on conventional public-key cryptography may become feasible in the next few decades. To address this risk, post-quantum schemes that are assumed to be secure against quantum attacks are being developed. Lattice-based algorithms are promising replacements for conventional schemes, with BLISS being one of the earliest post-quantum signature schemes in this family. However, required subroutines such as Gaussian sampling have been demonstrated to be a risk for the security of BLISS, since implementing Gaussian sampling both efficient and secure with respect to physical attacks is challenging.
This paper presents three related power side-channel attacks on GALACTICS, the latest constant-time implementation of BLISS. All attacks are based on power side-channel leakages we identified in the Gaussian sampling and signing algorithm of GALACTICS. To run the attacks, a profiling phase on a device identical to the device under attack is required to train machine learning classifiers. In the attack phase, the leakages of GALACTICS enable the trained classifiers to predict sensitive internal information with high accuracy. We demonstrate the practicality of the attacks by running GALACTICS on a Cortex-M4 and provide proof-of-concept data and implementation for all our attacks.
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