Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers
Article
Englmaier, Florian, Muehlheusser, Gerd and Roider, Andreas
(2014)
Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers.
European Economic Review 67, pp. 82-106.
Alternative links to fulltext
Involved Institutions
Details
| Item type | Article | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title | European Economic Review | ||||
| Publisher | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV | ||||
| Place of Publication | AMSTERDAM | ||||
| Volume | 67 | ||||
| Page Range | pp. 82-106 | ||||
| Date | 2014 | ||||
| Date of publication | 19 Dec 2024 08:11 | ||||
| Institutions | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider) | ||||
| Identification Number |
| ||||
| Keywords | CAREER CONCERNS; MORAL HAZARD; INFORMATION; EMPLOYMENT; PRINCIPAL; OPTIONS; AGENTS; FIRMS; Knowledge workers; Moral hazard; Limited commitment; Ex post outside option | ||||
| Dewey Decimal Classification | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics | ||||
| Status | Published | ||||
| Refereed | Yes, this version has been refereed | ||||
| Created at the University of Regensburg | Yes | ||||
| Item ID | 61591 |
Export bibliographical data
Owner only: item control page
Altmetric
Altmetric