Helm, Roland and Kloyer, M. (2004) Controlling contractual exchange risks in R&D interfirm cooperation: an empirical study. Research Policy 33 (8), pp. 1103-1122.
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Suppliers and buyers of R&D results perceive two exchange risks: first, the risk to achieve a lower profitability on the innovation return than the exchange partner, second, the risk of the partner becoming a competitor by unplanned, one-sided knowledge flows. Both risks motivate opportunistic behaviour. The paper deals with the reduction of the perceived supplier risks. We analyse how an option on later negotiation of an additional continuous innovation return sharing which is based on contractual hostages can lower the perceived exchange risks. An empirical study examines how effectively these hostages lower the perceived risks.
|Institutions:||Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaft, insbesondere Strategisches Industriegütermarketing (Prof. Dr. Roland Helm)|
|Keywords:||R&D interfirm cooperation; Transaction Cost Theory; Agency Theory; Contractual arrangements; Exchange risks|
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Refereed:||Yes, this version has been refereed|
|Created at the University of Regensburg:||Unknown|
|Deposited On:||17 Nov 2010 09:35|
|Last Modified:||15 Jul 2011 10:27|