Optimal Incentive Contracts for Knowledge Workers

Roider, Andreas ; Englmaier, Florian ; Mühlheusser, Gerd

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Date of publication of this fulltext: 24 Mar 2014 12:31

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Item type:	Article
Journal or Publication Title:	European Economic Review
Publisher:	Elsevier
Volume:	67
Page Range:	pp. 82-106
Date:	2014
Institutions:	Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomik (Prof. Dr. Andreas Roider)
Keywords:	knowledge workers, moral hazard, limited commitment, ex-post outside option
Dewey Decimal Classification:	300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Status:	Published
Refereed:	Yes, this version has been refereed
Created at the University of Regensburg:	Partially
Item ID:	29705

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