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Arnold, Lutz G. ; Reeder, Johannes ; Steger, Susanne

On the Viability of Group Lending when Microfinance Meets the Market: A Reconsideration of the Besley--Coate Model

Article

Arnold, Lutz G., Reeder, Johannes and Steger, Susanne (2013) On the Viability of Group Lending when Microfinance Meets the Market: A Reconsideration of the Besley--Coate Model. Journal of Emerging Market Finance 12, pp. 59-106.

DOI to cite this document: 10.5283/epub.34495


Abstract

Besley and Coate (1995) analyse the impact of joint liability and social sanctions on repayment rates when repayment enforcement is imperfect. Motivated by the microfinance industry’s move towards markets, we conduct an equilibrium analysis of the Besley–Coate model. We find that individual loan contracts may be used in market equilibrium, even though group lending entails the higher repayment ...

Besley and Coate (1995) analyse the impact of joint liability and social sanctions on repayment rates when repayment enforcement is imperfect. Motivated by the microfinance industry’s move towards markets, we conduct an equilibrium analysis of the Besley–Coate model. We find that individual loan contracts may be used in market equilibrium, even though group lending entails the higher repayment rate and the lower break-even interest rate. This is because group lending causes potentially large deadweight losses. The market equilibrium is possibly characterised by financial fragility, redlining or rationing. Cooperation between borrowers and social sanctions imposed on each other in the case of strategic default turn group lending into the equilibrium mode of finance and ameliorate the market failures.



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Details

Item typeArticle
Journal or Publication TitleJournal of Emerging Market Finance
PublisherSage Publications
Open Access TypeAlliance-/National licence
Volume12
Page Rangepp. 59-106
Date2013
Date of publication26 Aug 2016 12:53
InstitutionsBusiness, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Volkswirtschaft (Prof. Dr. Lutz Arnold)
Identification Number
ValueType
10.1177/0972652712473403DOI
Classification
NotationType
G21Journal of Economics Literature Classification
KeywordsMicrofinance, group lending, enforcement, social capital, social sanctions
Dewey Decimal Classification300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
StatusPublished
RefereedYes, this version has been refereed
Created at the University of RegensburgYes
URN of the UB Regensburgurn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-344956
Item ID34495

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