Abstract
The reply concentrates on advancing again my third thesis, which has not directly been taken up by Breyer and Kliemt. The thesis says that both criticisms against the Rule of Rescue - the irrationality objection, which Breyer and Kliemt try to defend, and the objection that the Rule is discriminatory, which they do not defend - are the results of insufficient action-theoretical reflection. I ...
Abstract
The reply concentrates on advancing again my third thesis, which has not directly been taken up by Breyer and Kliemt. The thesis says that both criticisms against the Rule of Rescue - the irrationality objection, which Breyer and Kliemt try to defend, and the objection that the Rule is discriminatory, which they do not defend - are the results of insufficient action-theoretical reflection. I argue that Breyer's and Kliemt's objection to the Rule, unstable as it is in their comment, is not even clearly identifiable if they do not take a stance towards the central question: Do they want to -and, if so, can they consistently -incorporate people's interest in taking account of the attributability of an outcome to a decision maker into their utility concept?
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