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Advantageous leadership in public good provision: the case of an endogenous contribution technology

Buchholz, Wolfgang ; Eichenseer, Michael


From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this needs no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by ...


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