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- URN zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments:
- urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-542810
- DOI zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments:
- 10.5283/epub.54281
Dies ist die aktuelle Version dieses Eintrags.
Zusammenfassung
Abstract In most OECD countries, financial advisors are primarily paid through commissions. This entails a principal agent problem in which the financial advisor has the incentive to sell financial products that maximize his income, not however the return of the investor seeking financial advice. To combat this conflict of interest, countries such as Denmark, Finland or Great Britain introduced ...
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