Employee shareholder associations (ESAs) have emerged as a novel, and widely underestimated actor in the European corporate arena, established to collect and pool the shares and voting power held by a company's employees. As such, they parallel existing institutions for employee representation, potentially empowering employees in their role as shareholders and possibly even providing a counterweight to traditional company owners. Unfortunately, we know little about the actual functioning, the inner workings, and, particularly, the ESAs' contributions to date. To address these shortcomings this paper explores the limitations but also the potential of ESAs in large, German listed companies to contribute to employee share ownership (ESO), to organizational democracy (OD), and to corporate sustainability (CS). Our findings show that, as far as ESOs and OD are concerned, in the specific German context, ESAs usually do not offer alternatives to (or even to compete with) existing employee representation but are instead rather dependent on cooperation with them. Regarding CS, any contribution here is closely linked to the ESAs' own principles and depends on the extent to which the ESA management takes them seriously and prioritizes them over other objectives.