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Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information
Alex, Fabian
(2025)
Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information.
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 77, S. 102383.
Veröffentlichungsdatum dieses Volltextes: 13 Feb 2025 05:20
Artikel
DOI zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments: 10.5283/epub.74977
Zusammenfassung
Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of ...
Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of success of firms’ projects (and, thus, repayment of their debt). Hence, making capital markets overall “less risky”, which may for example be the case when financial markets become greener, does not alleviate concerns of asymmetric information. The result holds both for cases of hidden information and for those of hidden actions.
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| Dokumentenart | Artikel | ||||
| Titel eines Journals oder einer Zeitschrift | The North American Journal of Economics and Finance | ||||
| Verlag: | Elsevier | ||||
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| Band: | 77 | ||||
| Seitenbereich: | S. 102383 | ||||
| Datum | 7 Februar 2025 | ||||
| Institutionen | Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Volkswirtschaft (Prof. Dr. Lutz Arnold) | ||||
| Identifikationsnummer |
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| Klassifikation |
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| Stichwörter / Keywords | Asymmetric information, Financial markets, Green loans, Hidden information, Hidden action, Project risk | ||||
| Dewey-Dezimal-Klassifikation | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft | ||||
| Status | Veröffentlicht | ||||
| Begutachtet | Ja, diese Version wurde begutachtet | ||||
| An der Universität Regensburg entstanden | Ja | ||||
| URN der UB Regensburg | urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-749777 | ||||
| Dokumenten-ID | 74977 |
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