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Alex, Fabian

Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information

Alex, Fabian (2025) Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 77, S. 102383.

Veröffentlichungsdatum dieses Volltextes: 13 Feb 2025 05:20
Artikel
DOI zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments: 10.5283/epub.74977


Zusammenfassung

Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of ...

Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of success of firms’ projects (and, thus, repayment of their debt). Hence, making capital markets overall “less risky”, which may for example be the case when financial markets become greener, does not alleviate concerns of asymmetric information. The result holds both for cases of hidden information and for those of hidden actions.



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Details

DokumentenartArtikel
Titel eines Journals oder einer ZeitschriftThe North American Journal of Economics and Finance
Verlag:Elsevier
Band:77
Seitenbereich:S. 102383
Datum7 Februar 2025
InstitutionenWirtschaftswissenschaften > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Volkswirtschaft (Prof. Dr. Lutz Arnold)
Identifikationsnummer
WertTyp
10.1016/j.najef.2025.102383DOI
Klassifikation
NotationArt
D82 G14 G21Journal of Economics Literature Classification
Stichwörter / KeywordsAsymmetric information, Financial markets, Green loans, Hidden information, Hidden action, Project risk
Dewey-Dezimal-Klassifikation300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
StatusVeröffentlicht
BegutachtetJa, diese Version wurde begutachtet
An der Universität Regensburg entstandenJa
URN der UB Regensburgurn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-749777
Dokumenten-ID74977

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