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Alex, Fabian

Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information

Alex, Fabian (2025) Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 77, p. 102383.

Date of publication of this fulltext: 13 Feb 2025 05:20
Article
DOI to cite this document: 10.5283/epub.74977


Abstract

Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of ...

Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of success of firms’ projects (and, thus, repayment of their debt). Hence, making capital markets overall “less risky”, which may for example be the case when financial markets become greener, does not alleviate concerns of asymmetric information. The result holds both for cases of hidden information and for those of hidden actions.



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Details

Item typeArticle
Journal or Publication TitleThe North American Journal of Economics and Finance
Publisher:Elsevier
Open Access Type:DEAL (Elsevier)
Volume:77
Page Range:p. 102383
Date7 February 2025
InstitutionsBusiness, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Volkswirtschaft (Prof. Dr. Lutz Arnold)
Identification Number
ValueType
10.1016/j.najef.2025.102383DOI
Classification
NotationType
D82 G14 G21Journal of Economics Literature Classification
KeywordsAsymmetric information, Financial markets, Green loans, Hidden information, Hidden action, Project risk
Dewey Decimal Classification300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
StatusPublished
RefereedYes, this version has been refereed
Created at the University of RegensburgYes
URN of the UB Regensburgurn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-749777
Item ID74977

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