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Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information
Alex, Fabian
(2025)
Project risk neutrality in the context of asymmetric information.
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 77, p. 102383.
Date of publication of this fulltext: 13 Feb 2025 05:20
Article
DOI to cite this document: 10.5283/epub.74977
Abstract
Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of ...
Using the modeling framework of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we show that – perhaps surprisingly – there is no influence of average project risk on the capital market equilibrium. The savings interest rate fully determines the amount of credit rationing and the nature of an equilibrium (adverse selection, two-prices etc.). This rate is, in turn, fully determined by the relative probabilities of success of firms’ projects (and, thus, repayment of their debt). Hence, making capital markets overall “less risky”, which may for example be the case when financial markets become greener, does not alleviate concerns of asymmetric information. The result holds both for cases of hidden information and for those of hidden actions.
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Details
| Item type | Article | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title | The North American Journal of Economics and Finance | ||||
| Publisher: | Elsevier | ||||
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| Open Access Type: | DEAL (Elsevier) | ||||
| Volume: | 77 | ||||
| Page Range: | p. 102383 | ||||
| Date | 7 February 2025 | ||||
| Institutions | Business, Economics and Information Systems > Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Ökonometrie > Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Volkswirtschaft (Prof. Dr. Lutz Arnold) | ||||
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| Classification |
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| Keywords | Asymmetric information, Financial markets, Green loans, Hidden information, Hidden action, Project risk | ||||
| Dewey Decimal Classification | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics | ||||
| Status | Published | ||||
| Refereed | Yes, this version has been refereed | ||||
| Created at the University of Regensburg | Yes | ||||
| URN of the UB Regensburg | urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-749777 | ||||
| Item ID | 74977 |
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