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- URN zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments:
- urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-597300
- DOI zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments:
- 10.5283/epub.59730
Zusammenfassung
This paper investigates the determinants of the probability that a central bank chooses to make its financial sector green. We derive a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium from a strategic setting of two monetary authorities choosing simultaneously between the alternatives of greening and conducting business as usual. Using a very general setup, we obtain a model that nests most of the usual 2 × ...
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