Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment

URN to cite this document:: urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-253859
DOI to cite this document:: 10.5283/epub.25385

Rott, Hans

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Date of publication of this fulltext: 18 Jul 2012 11:05

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Abstract

A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic ...