Bibliography of the Universität Regensburg

Rott, Hans and Zhu, Wei (2025) The Dynamics of Non-Belief (with Modesty). Journal of Philosophical Logic.

Pfeifer, Niki and Sanfilippo, Giuseppe (2024) Connexive Logic, Probabilistic Default Reasoning, and Compound Conditionals. Studia Logica 112 (1-2), pp. 167-206. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2023) Difference-Making Conditionals and Connexivity. Studia Logica 112, pp. 405-458.

Raidl, Eric and Rott, Hans (2023) Towards a logic for ‘because’. Philosophical Studies.

Pfeifer, Niki (2023) Towards a Conceptual Framework for Conspiracy Theory Theories. Social Epistemology 37 (4), pp. 510-521. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2022) Evidential Support and Contraposition. Erkenntnis.

Lindström, Sten (2022) A semantic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning: Inference operations and choice. Theoria 88 (3), pp. 494-528.

Günther, Mario and Sisti, Caterina (2022) Ramsey’s conditionals. Synthese 200 (2).

Rott, Hans (2022) 3. Was ist Zufall? Kontingenz - Unvorhersagbarkeit - Koinzidenz. In: Papathanasiou, Konstantina, (ed.) Zufall: Rechtliche, philosophische und theologische Aspekte. Philosophische Schriften, 109 (3). Duncker & Humblodt, Berlin, pp. 34-51. ISBN 978-3-428-18621-1 (print), 9783428586219 (online).

ROTT, HANS (2022) DIFFERENCE-MAKING CONDITIONALS AND THE RELEVANT RAMSEY TEST. The Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1), pp. 133-164. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2022) ‘A Formula Which I Derived Many Years Ago’ Boole, Reichenbach and Popper on Probability and Conditionals. History and Philosophy of Logic 43 (4), pp. 383-390. Fulltext not available.

Andreas, Holger and Günther, Mario (2021) A Ramsey Test Analysis of Causation for Causal Models. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2), pp. 587-615. Fulltext not available.

Sanfilippo, Giuseppe , Gilio, Angelo, Over, David E. and Pfeifer, Niki (2020) Probabilities of conditionals and previsions of iterated conditionals. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 121, pp. 150-173. Fulltext not available.

Kraft, Tim (2020) Rezension: Nikil Mukerji, Adriano Mannino: Covid-19: Was in der Krise zählt. Über Philosophie in Echtzeit. Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie.

Douven, Igor and Rott, Hans (2018) From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models. Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6), pp. 1099-1124. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2017) Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief. Synthese 194 (8), pp. 2695-2720. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2017) Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs. Minds and Machines 27 (1), pp. 167-197. Fulltext not available.

Kraft, Tim (2014) Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious. Synthese 191 (12), pp. 2617-2632. Fulltext not available.

Brun, Georg and Rott, Hans (2013) Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision. Synthese 190 (18), pp. 4041-4063. Fulltext not available.

Wagner, Christoph (2012) Themenverbund Sehen und Verstehen (des gesamten Heftes). Blick in die Wissenschaft : Forschungsmagazin der Universität Regensburg 21 (25), pp. 1-48. Fulltext not available.

Kronfeldner, Maria E. (2007) Darwinism, memes, and creativity: a critique of Darwinian analogical reasoning from nature to culture. PhD, Universität Regensburg.

Rott, Hans (2006) Revision by Comparison as a Unifying Framework: Severe
Withdrawal, Irrevocable Revision and Irrefutable Revision. Theoretical Computer Science 355 (2), pp. 228-242. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2006) "Alle andere Dinge müssen; der Mensch ist das Wesen, welches will'' - Anmerkungen zu Schillers Philosophie des Geistes. In: Riedl, Peter Philipp, (ed.) Schiller neu denken: Beiträge zur Literatur-, Kultur- und Kunstgeschichte. Regensburger Kulturleben, 3. Schnell und Steiner, Regensburg, pp. 69-90. ISBN 3-7954-1834-8; 978-3-7954-1834-2. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2006) Belief Revision. In: Adler, Jonathan and Rips, Lance, (eds.) Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (In Press) Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2006) Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-beliefs
and Disbeliefs. In: Huber, Franz and Schmidt-Petri, Christoph, (eds.) Degrees of Belief. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford. (Submitted) Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2006) Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for
Twenty-seven Iterated Theory Change Operators. In: Lagerlund, Henrik and Lindström, Sten and Sliwinski, Rysiek, (eds.) Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg. Uppsala Philosophical Studies, 53. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala, pp. 359-384. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (2006) The Value of Truth and the Value of Information: On
Isaac Levi's Epistemology. In: Olsson, Erik J., (ed.) Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 179-200. ISBN 0-521-84556-4. Fulltext not available.

Horák, Vítezslav (2005) Bildspiele. Untersuchungen zur Gebrauchstheorie der Bedeutung von Bildern. PhD, Universität Regensburg.

Rott, Hans (2004) A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation. Synthese 139 (2), pp. 225-240. Fulltext not available.

Fermé, Eduardo and Rott, Hans (2004) Revision by comparison. Artificial Intelligence 157 (1-2), pp. 5-47. Fulltext not available.

Heimgärtner, Rüdiger (2002) Antirepräsentationalismus - Kognition ohne Repräsentation? Magisterarbeit, Universität Regensburg.

Rott, Hans (1994) Chaos: The Reason for Structural Causation. In: Faye, Jan and Scheffler, U. and Urchs, M., (eds.) Logic and causal reasoning. Akad.-Verl., Berlin, pp. 191-215. ISBN 3-05-002599-9.

Rott, Hans (1994) Coherent Choice and Epistemic Entrenchment (Preliminary Report). Lecture notes in computer science : Lecture notes in artificial intelligence 861, pp. 284-295.

Rott, Hans (1994) Zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie von Imre Lakatos. Philosophia naturalis 31, pp. 25-62.

Rott, Hans (1993) Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice. The journal of symbolic logic 58 (4), pp. 1426-1450.

Rott, Hans (1992) Modellings for Belief Change: Base Contraction, Multiple Contraction, and Epistemic Entrenchment (Preliminary Report). Lecture notes in computer science : Lecture notes in artificial intelligence 633, pp. 139-153.

Rott, Hans (1992) Modellings for Belief Change: Prioritization and Entrenchment. Theoria 58 (1), pp. 21-57.

Rott, Hans (1992) On the Logic of Theory Change: More Maps Between Different Kinds of Contraction Function. In: Gärdenfors, Peter, (ed.) Belief revision. Cambridge tracts in theoretical computer science, 29. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 122-141. ISBN 0-521-41260-9 (print), 978-0-511-52666-4 (e-book).

Rott, Hans (1992) Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1), pp. 45-78.

Rott, Hans (1991) A Nonmonotonic Conditional Logic for Belief Revision I. Semantics and Logic of Simple Conditionals. Lecture notes in computer science : Lecture notes in artificial intelligence 465, pp. 135-183.

Morreau, Michael and Rott, Hans (1991) Is it impossible to keep up to date? Lecture notes in computer science : Lecture notes in artificial intelligence 543, pp. 233-343.

Rott, Hans (1991) Reduktion und Revision : Aspekte des nichtmonotonen Theorienwandels. Europäische Hochschulschriften : Reihe 20, Philosophie, 290. Lang, Frankfurt a. M.. ISBN 3-631-42080-3.

Rott, Hans (1991) Two Methods of Constructing Contractions and Revisions of Knowledge Systems. Journal of philosophical logic 20 (2), pp. 149-173.

Rott, Hans (1990) Approximation versus Idealization: The Kepler-Newton-Case. In: Brzeziński, J., (ed.) Idealization, vol. 2 : Forms and applications. Poznań studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities, 17. Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp. 101-124. ISBN 90-5183-154-4.

Rott, Hans (1990) Updates, Conditionals and Non-monotonicity: Introductory Comments on Veltman and Morreau. In: Kamp, Hans, (ed.) Conditionals, defaults and belief revision. ESPRIT Basic Research Action BR 3175; DYANA report, R2.5.A. Univ. of Edinburgh, Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, pp. 65-78. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (1989) Approximation versus Idealisierung: Das Verhältnis zwischen idealem und van der Waalsschem Gasgesetz. In: Weingartner, Paul and Schurz, G., (eds.) Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften : Akten des 13. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 14. bis 21. August 1988, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Österreich) ; ausgewählte Beiträge. Schriftenreihe der Wittgenstein-Gesellschaft, 17. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien, pp. 224-228. ISBN 3-209-00861-2.

Rott, Hans (1989) Conditionals and Theory Change: Revisions, Expansions and Additions. Synthese 81 (1), pp. 91-113.

Rott, Hans (1989) Rezension von: Gärdenfors, Peter, Knowledge in Flux (Cambridge, Mass., London: Bradford Books, MIT Press 1988). Künstliche Intelligenz (2/89), pp. 69-70.

Rott, Hans (1988) 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes' (Lakatos). In: Volpi, Franco and Nida-Rümelin, Julian, (eds.) Lexikon der philosophischen Werke. Kröner, Stuttgart, pp. 276-277. ISBN 3-520-48601-6.

Rott, Hans (1988) 'Foundations' (Ramsey). In: Volpi, Franco and Nida-Rümelin, Julian, (eds.) Lexikon der philosophischen Werke. Kröner, Stuttgart, p. 286. ISBN 3-520-48601-6.

Rott, Hans (1988) 'The Rise of Scientific Philosophy' (Reichenbach). In: Volpi, Franco and Nida-Rümelin, Julian, (eds.) Lexikon der philosophischen Werke. Kröner, Stuttgart, pp. 622-623. ISBN 3-520-48601-6.

Rott, Hans (1987) On Relations Between Successive Theories. In: 8 International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, LMPS'87: Moscow USSR, 17-22 August 1987. vol. 4,2: abstracts. Nauka, Moskau, pp. 123-126. Fulltext not available.

Rott, Hans (1987) Reduction: Some criteria and criticisms of the structuralist concept. Erkenntnis 27 (2), pp. 231-256.

Rott, Hans (1987) Rezension von: Rheinwald, Rosemarie, Der Formalismus und seine Grenzen - Untersuchungen zur neueren Philosophie der Mathematik (Königstein/Ts.: Hain 1984). Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung : ZphF 41 (1), pp. 156-159.

Rott, Hans (1986) Ifs, though, and because. Erkenntnis 125 (3), pp. 345-370.