Simplifying Bayesian Inference: The General Case

URN zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments:: urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-344878

Krauss, Stefan

; Martignon, L. ; Hoffrage, U.

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Veröffentlichungsdatum dieses Volltextes: 02 Sep 2016 08:29

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Zusammenfassung

We present empirical evidence that human reasoning follows the rules of probability theory, if information is presented in “natural formats”. Human reasoning has often been evaluated in terms of humans’ ability to deal with probabilities. Yet, in nature we do not observe probabilities, we rather count samples and their subsets. Our concept of Markov frequencies generalizes Gigerenzer and ...