Abstract
According to the Lockean thesis (LT), a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable ...
Abstract
According to the Lockean thesis (LT), a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be non-skeptical. We compare these proposals with each other and with the LT, in particular with regard to the question of how much we gain by adopting any one of them instead of the probability 1 requirement, that is of how likely it is that one believes more than the things one is fully certain of.
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